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ABSTRACT 
This thesis will examine the development of the Cyprus problem from September 
1964, when Galo Plaza assumed the UN Mediatory role, until July 1974, when the 
coup d’état and the Turkish invasion took place. Its main focus is on the internal 
aspects of the emerging deadlock. The efforts at peace-making will be examined in 
three phases: Plaza’s mediation of 1964-1965, the negotiating impasse on the island 
during the period 1965-1967, and finally the inter-communal talks of 1968-1974. 
Each of these successive phases, particularly the latter two, were inextricably 
interwoven with developments within the two main communities. Hence, identifying 
these developments will be the primary concern of the thesis. Inevitably, the role of 
Archbishop Makarios III, as the dominant political personality, must be taken into full 
account during the three phases. 
Starting with the most critical and hitherto under-explored period of 1964-1968, the 
thesis will shed light on how the de facto separation of the two communities was 
established and how the separate administrative and economic structures were 
consolidated. This divergent development of the two communities produced new 
realities that had to be confronted by the respective negotiators and peace-makers at 
all levels. Subsequently, a detailed analysis of the first round of the inter-communal 
talks, from 1968 until 1971, will explore how and why the two communities missed 
the crucial opportunity for a settlement which appeared in 1968. Although the 
negotiations continued until 1974, it will become evident that after 1972, the 
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implications of the internal division within the Greek-Cypriot community meant that 
any chance for a viable compromise settlement ‘evaporated’. 
Without ignoring the external aspects of the Cyprus problem, the study will argue 
that the burden of responsibility for the constant failures to settle the problem until 
1972 lies mainly on factors produced within the island itself. Specifically, the Greek-
Cypriot political leadership, as the predominant force on the island, crucially failed to 
grasp the nature of the changes within the island’s post-independence arena, and 
hence to adapt their goals accordingly. Recurrent attempts within both communities 
to create faits accomplis favourable to their own bargaining positions before being 
prepared to embark on a definitive settlement, only served to heighten the barriers to 
a stable and peaceful outcome. This thesis will, therefore, enlarge our understanding 
of an underlying failure which the events of 1974 were to throw into stark relief. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In December 1963, only three years after the birth of the Republic of Cyprus, a 
violent, inter-communal clash abruptly terminated the already shaky co-existence of 
the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots in the state apparatus of the island that had 
been envisaged in the 1960 Constitution. Thereupon, both communities’ leaderships 
set in motion their plans for consolidating separate administrations, making Cyprus ‘a 
simmering cauldron’ which exploded ten years later, in July 1974. The essential 
purpose of this thesis therefore, is to explore the development of the Cyprus problem 
through the decade 1964-1974 with a main focus on the goals, the decision-making 
and actions of the leaderships of the two communities. 
It should be borne in mind that the Cyprus question, even before independence, had 
evolved through several phases closely entwined with the international context. The 
interests of the great powers at stake in the region interacted with the inter-
communal relations and distorted the internal rivalries within the communities 
themselves. There is still a widespread perception, especially among the Greek-
Cypriots, that the island’s fate was pre-determined, according to the interests of the 
big powers and the secret ‘arrangements’ between the junta in Greece and Turkey. 
There are several theories and studies that tend to confirm this belief. This thesis 
however, through extensive archival research, focuses instead on the primary and 
decisive contribution by specifically Cypriot players to the events that led up to July 
1974. Through this examination several elements are distinguished, which explain 
the compelling motives that drove the two communal leaderships, and how these 
moulded the political context of Cyprus. It becomes transparent that wishful thinking, 
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lack of rational political evaluation of internal problems and the international context, 
and consequently the misperception of threats, led to self-fulfilling prophecies, 
catastrophic for the peaceful co-existence of the two communities in Cyprus. 
The main underlying cause of the island’s fragile situation during the period under 
examination can be detected in the background that led to Independence and the 
nature of the Constitution of the new state. As a former colony, the Republic of 
Cyprus had inherited several colonial legacies which made its existence even more 
challenging. The rivalry and mistrust between the two ethnic communities 
exacerbated by the former colonial power, the failings of political institutions and the 
dearth of good governance skills were some of the default characteristics of the new 
state. Nevertheless, in this case another erratic factor has been the role of the 
Church and its involvement in the island’s politics. More specifically, the role of the 
enigmatic figure of the President, Archbishop Makarios III, and his great influence on 
Greek-Cypriots, remains an issue of much debate. No other leader in the history of 
Cyprus had an analogous impact on the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Greek-Cypriots, 
and that had given him, until recently at least, ‘immunity’ for the political mistakes he 
had made. Interestingly Paul Sant Cassia explains that Makarios’ policies were 
highly affected by his dual capacity as the spiritual and secular leader of the Greek-
Cypriots and that gave him “immense popularity which never declined in spite of the 
ultimately disastrous effects his tight-rope walking policies led to”.1 Therefore, both 
his personality and his policies are closely examined in this thesis. 
Conversely, for the Turkish-Cypriot community things were very different. The lack of 
an experienced political leadership along with the self-imposed isolation after 1964, 
                                                          
1
 Paul Sant Cassia, “The Archbishop in the Beleaguered City: An Analysis of the Conflicting Roles 
and Political Oratory of Makarios”, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 8:1, (1982), 191-212 (p.192) 
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led to a constantly growing economic and military dependence on Ankara. It was 
only after April 1968, with the return of the previously exiled Turkish-Cypriot leader 
Rauf Denktash from Turkey, when it seemed that in the event of a settlement on the 
island, Makarios would have to face a worthy opponent. It should be stressed that 
although the Turkish-Cypriot community deeply relied on Turkey’s diplomatic and 
economic aid, it was also true that it remained very much a distinctive entity, 
capable, to a limited extent, of expressing its own views and positions.  
The immediate background of the thesis coincides with the adoption on 4 March 
1964 of the UN Security Council Resolution 186 with which the UN peace-keeping 
force and the UN Mediator were assigned to the island following the inter-communal 
crisis of December 1963, in order firstly, to maintain a peaceful status quo and 
secondly, to seek for a solution to the Cyprus problem.2 This Resolution is 
considered as the most important diplomatic victory for the Greek-Cypriots since it 
gave international legitimacy to the entirely Greek-Cypriot led state. This success 
was further enhanced with a second important diplomatic victory, the Report of the 
UN Mediator, Galo Plaza in March 1965. As explained in subsequent chapters, 
Plaza’s report largely affected the negotiating positions of both two communities in 
the following decade.  
The starting point therefore, of this study lies in the arrival of Galo Plaza, the second 
UN Mediator, in Nicosia in September 1964. From that point onwards Plaza 
employed a new, more Cypriot-centric, approach to settle the inter-communal 
                                                          
2
 More on the UN involvement in Cyprus in: Oliver P. Richmond, Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot 
Communities and the United Nations, (London: Frank Cass, 1998); James Ker-Lindsay, ‘The Origins 
of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), International Politics on the Road to Security-
Council Resolution 186 (1964)’ (Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Kent at Canterbury 1997),  
Oliver P. Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, (eds.) The Work of the UN in Cyprus: Promoting Peace 
and Development (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2001) 
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problem, while all previous attempts to find a solution on the basis of a Greco-
Turkish understanding were, at least temporarily, shelved. Thereafter, it seemed that 
focus was concentrated solely on the UN Mediator and the two communities’ 
leaderships. By March 1965 however, mediation was effectively terminated. Plaza’s 
conclusions were used as an excuse by both communities to justify their preference 
for a negotiating stalemate on the island, so as to give time to each side to upgrade 
its own bargaining position. Nonetheless, each year a series of new faits accomplis 
on the ground induced the ‘benign stalemate’, as the British had characterized it,3 
and steadily reduced the chances for finding an acceptable settlement.  
When in June 1968 the active peace-making efforts resumed, it was evident that the 
situation on the island was very different from 1965. In 1969 the British High 
Commissioner in Nicosia stated: “Cyprus is partitioned in the most haphazard and 
intricate way between intermingled areas controlled by the Greek Government of 
Cyprus and the Turkish-Cypriot administration respectively, making the communal 
map of Cyprus look like the latter days of the Holy Roman Empire”.4 This however, 
was a reality that the Greek-Cypriot leadership failed to realize in its full implications, 
but the Turkish-Cypriot leadership exploited. Therefore, the most crucial opportunity 
to settle the Cyprus problem, through the inter-communal talks of 1968, was to be 
missed. Although the negotiations continued until were violently terminated on 15 
July 1974, by 1972 it was evident that the developments on the island and especially 
the increasingly violent opposition against President Makarios led the inter-
communal discussions up a blind alley. Thereafter, the window of opportunity for a 
negotiated settlement progressively closed.  
                                                          
3
 Peter Ramsbotham (Nicosia) to Foreign Commonwealth Office (hereinafter FCO), 23 May 1969: 
FCO 9/781, The National Archives of the UK (hereinafter TNA) 
4
 Sir Norman Costar (Nicosia): Valedictory Dispatch, 26 March 1969: FCO 9/785, TNA 
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Undoubtedly, the decade under examination was one of the most critical periods for 
Cyprus. Nevertheless, it should be equally interesting to keep in mind that during this 
decade, throughout the globe, world-changing developments were taking place. The 
western powers, especially Britain and America, had to tackle a lot of challenges in 
their foreign policy commitments. Firstly, the great decolonization wave of the 1960s, 
Britain’s economic problems and its decision to reduce its forces in the 
Mediterranean had inevitably reduced its previous hegemonic role, especially in the 
Middle East. On the other hand, American foreign policy was greatly pre-occupied 
with the war in Vietnam. Simultaneously, anti-war student demonstrations were 
organized all over Europe and America. While 1968 proved to be a critical time for 
Cyprus, the Prague Spring, Soviet Union’s invasion to Czechoslovakia and, the 
catastrophic for the US interests, Tet offensive in Vietnam had marked some of the 
most crucial developments in global politics. Equally severe were the two Arab-
Israeli wars, the Six-Day war of 1967 – when, as Claude Nicolet states, US realized 
“that even NATO allies were no longer as responsive to American pressure as they 
had been during the 1950s”5 - and the Yom Kippur War of 1973, which had almost 
led to a US-Soviet confrontation.  
Finally, this decade was also pivotal for the development of European and 
international laws prohibiting discrimination, advancing equality, protecting minorities 
and strengthening human rights. Indeed, this was an era in which the anti-Apartheid 
and Civil Rights movements were particularly active. In the US for instance, 
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act 1964, while the British parliament enacted the 
Race Relations Act 1965. Additionally, various international treaties were negotiated. 
                                                          
5
 Claude Nicolet, United States Police Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974, Removing the Greek-Turkish 
Bone of Contention (Möhnesee: Bibliopolis, 2001), p.304 
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These included the International Convent on Civil and Political Rights 1966 and the 
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973.  
What is of great interest in the case of Cyprus, however, is that although there were 
indeed shockwave developments inside and outside of Europe and important 
progress on the question of protection of human rights, most of the times people in 
Cyprus showed limited interest on these. Hence, these world-wide developments 
had minimal impact on the evolution of the island’s politics or on the Cyprus problem 
itself. Indicative is the fact that seismic events throughout the globe had a very 
marginal presence in the Cypriot press of that period.  
Chapter overview 
The thesis starts with a brief historical background of how the Cyprus question 
evolved from the 1950s until the summer of 1964. Thereafter, the main body of this 
study is divided in two parts. Part I, comprising chapters one, two, three and four, 
deals with the period from 1964, when Galo Plaza assumed the mediatory role in 
Cyprus until the eve of the November 1967 inter-communal clash. Part II, comprising 
chapters five, six and seven, focuses on the immediate aftermath of the latter crisis 
and the initiation of the inter-communal talks in 1968 until their violent termination in 
July 1974. 
Chapter One presents the first attempt of the UN mediation in Cyprus of 1964-1965.  
The chapter provides an analysis of Galo Plaza’s strategies and achievements, the 
reasons that led to the termination of his mediation and the impact of his conclusions 
in the later evolution both of the peace-making efforts and the negotiating policies of 
the contested parties. 
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Chapter Two analyses the internal restructuring of the Cyprus state after the 
separation of the two communities in 1964. It highlights the goals set by each 
community’s leadership according to the new state of affairs and how these were 
pursued from 1964 until 1967. Throughout this period, the Greek-Cypriot community, 
effectively holding the political reins of the island, succeeded in overcoming the 
previous administrative obstacles of the Constitution. Conversely, the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership, isolated in the enclaves, managed to establish its own, separate 
administrative structures on the island, whilst arguing that this was a necessity 
deriving from the Greek-Cypriot faits accomplis. As it is indicated in Chapter Six, the 
new realities of this period came to haunt the negotiating process of 1968-1974. 
Subsequently, Chapter Three goes on to explore the economic situation of the two 
communities during the same period of 1964-1967 and the impact of this particular 
context on the evolution of the inter-communal problem. The quick economic 
recovery of the Greek-Cypriot community from the 1964 set-back, along with its 
material and social growth, cultivated the independence mentality among the 
majority of Greek-Cypriots. Meanwhile, we shall show how the economic sanctions 
imposed on the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves became the Greek-Cypriot ‘tool’ which 
sought to force the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to surrender to the former’s demands.  
Chapter Four deals with the prolonged diplomatic efforts inside and outside the 
island to break the stalemate created after the submission of Plaza’s report. This 
chapter briefly explains the dynamics of the sterile dialogue between Greece and 
Turkey, initiated in May 1965 and lasted until September 1967. Nonetheless, the 
most important part of the chapter analyses what had been discussed in Cyprus 
simultaneously with the Greco-Turkish negotiations, and explains why despite their 
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constant efforts, the UN Secretary-General’s representatives failed to recapture the 
initiative or find even the minimum common ground between the two communities. In 
this chapter, the role of President Makarios in “defusing the power” of the enosis 
dream is also highlighted.6 
Chapter Five coincides with the beginning of the second Part of the thesis. Initially, 
there is a brief analysis of the November 1967 crisis which is considered a turning 
point both for the peace-making process and the political development of the two 
communities. By April 1968 the UN Secretary-General convinced the parties to 
accept a constructive inter-communal dialogue, which began two months later. 
Parallel with this development were very significant changes within the island. This 
chapter therefore, explains the aims of the parties in the eve of the talks and their 
negotiating tactics as these were transformed after this ‘reshuffling of the deck’. 
Chapter Six explores extensively the first round of the inter-communal talks, from 
June 1968 until December 1971. The chapter evolves simultaneously with the 
analysis of the developments on the negotiating table and the political developments 
in Cyprus, which crucially affected the pace and progress of the talks. By mid-1971, 
however, the first round of the talks collapsed and the UN Secretary-General tried to 
find a suitable way to break the impasse. We shall argue that the first round of the 
inter-communal talks was one of the most important opportunities missed for settling 
the Cyprus problem.  
Chapter Seven provides an overall perspective on the inter-communal talks from 
January 1972 until July 1974, held under a new procedure. Nonetheless, the 
                                                          
6
 Michael A. Attalides, Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics, (Möhnesse: Bibliopolis 2005), 
p.183 
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problems created within the Greek-Cypriot community and the seeds of division that 
had been pervasively cultivated during the previous phase of the talks, reduced the 
second round of the negotiations to what became a mere safety-valve for avoiding 
the threat of violence should talks collapse altogether. The internal developments led 
to three detrimental ‘pauses’ during negotiations. Paradoxically however, progress at 
the negotiating table was unprecedented. By July 1974 there was a compromise 
legal formula for all constitutional aspects. However, even if the coup d’etat or the 
Turkish invasion were ultimately averted, a mere legal formula and a constitutional 
compromise would have not been sufficient for providing an authentic and lasting 
political solution to the Cyprus question.  
Finally, the conclusion to the thesis reviews the various threads of the argument, 
locating the real cause for failure within the post-independence political culture of the 
island. 
Literature review 
The post-independence history of Cyprus has only recently become the focus of 
proper academic study. Nevertheless, the history of the inter-communal conflict of 
Cyprus, interacting as it did with Cold War rivalries and regional diplomacy, are 
subjects that invariably dominate the existing secondary literature of that period. 
What is presently not extensively studied in the historiography is an analysis based 
on primary documentation, where available, and relevant secondary literature, on the 
issue of the divergent evolution of the two communities and subsequently of the 
Cyprus problem from 1964 until the landmark year of 1974. More specifically, the 
interactive effect of the development of the Cyprus question on the separate 
development of the two communities and vice versa needs to be much more clearly 
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distinguished. Furthermore, the period between the two severe inter-communal 
clashes of 1964 and 1967 is not examined in an essential way from a Cypriot-centric 
angle. This is a period therefore, that forms a central part of this thesis. Likewise, this 
study aims to fill in the gap of the most crucial effort to settle the constitutional 
problem on the island of the period 1968 and 1971. 
Undoubtedly, the existing literature provides a vital and general background of the 
period under examination. It should be kept in mind however, that most of the current 
literature was produced before the lifting of classification restrictions of official 
documentation.  
First and foremost, Glafkos Clerides’s memoirs represent the most detailed personal 
account by a leading protagonist concerning the evolution of the Cyprus problem and 
Cypriot politics in general. My Deposition - Η Κατάθεσή μου (1988-1989), constituted 
undoubtedly one of the key books for this study. Supplementary to this was Niyazi 
Kizilyurek’s, Glafkos Clerides: The path of a country (2008), containing an extensive 
interview in which Clerides reflected broadly on the situation and the decision-
making of that era. Relevant analyses covering Makarios’ policies and the rising of 
his ‘disloyal opposition’ were presented in The rise and the fall of the Cyprus republic 
by Kyriakos Markides (1977) and two suggestive articles by Paul Sant Cassia.7 The 
latter provided an interdisciplinary dimension to the project, explaining the 
connection between the actions of the paramilitary organizations and the evolution of 
the Greek-Cypriot politics of that period. 
                                                          
7
 Paul Sant Cassia, “The Archbishop in the Beleaguered City: An Analysis of the Conflicting Roles 
and Political Oratory of Makarios”, Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, 8.1, (1982), 191-212; and 
“Patterns of covert politics in post-independence Cyprus”, European Journal of Sociology, XXIV 
(1983), pp.115-135; 
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One of the most important field-studies on the internal and separate evolution of the 
two communities is the Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict, 1963-1971 
(1976), conducted by the Canadian officer of UNFICYP, Richard A. Patrick. As a 
comprehensive analysis of the Cyprus conflict, it constitutes one of the very few 
analyses providing detailed information on the Turkish-Cypriot reorganization after 
1963.  
One of the most authoritative accounts of US policy towards the Cyprus problem, 
and helpful for this thesis, is Claude Nicolet’s United States Policy towards Cyprus, 
1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention (2001). The dense 
primary documentation used for this study, especially from the US State Department 
affords a clear account of the American foreign policy towards the Cyprus question 
of the period, as well as supplementary information about the Greek and Turkish 
foreign policies on the Cyprus issue. 
An insightful account for the progress and evolution of the inter-communal talks of 
1968-1974 is Polyvios G. Polyviou Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation 1960-1980 
(1980) which deals with the evolution of the inter-communal talks. Last but not least, 
Κυπριακό: Η Τελευταία Ευκαιρία 1972-1974 (The Cyprus issue: The last chance 
1972-1974, 2003), written by Michael Dekleris, the Greek constitutional expert who 
was assigned to facilitate the progress of the inter-communal talks in 1972, was 
essential for the concluding part of this thesis. 
 
Methodology and sources 
In order to make the best possible use of all the available sources and information, 
the presentation of this thesis evolves on a broadly chronological basis. Meanwhile 
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however, and in order to avoid possible repetition or confusion of the reader, where 
necessary, there is particular focus and analysis on certain developments and 
events that constituted key junctures both for each community and the Cyprus 
question in general. As already stated, the main body of the thesis is divided into two 
parts in which there is a clear distinction between the phases of the Cyprus problem. 
The substantive treatment firstly focuses on 1964-1967 and the latter one from late-
1967 until July 1974.  
Although the use of the available secondary literature was unquestionably of vital 
importance for shaping the necessary background, there has also been an extensive 
use and analysis of primary resources. The archival material cited at The National 
Archives of the United Kingdom at Kew, London (hereinafter called TNA) has been 
undoubtedly the most crucial source of information. The official correspondence held 
at the TNA, contains the most insightful narratives and analyses of events and 
personalities from all the interested parties.  
Besides possessing an interest in the smooth functioning of the Sovereign Bases, 
and also being a Guarantor Power of the independence of Cyprus, the British still 
had vital concerns at stake on the island. Therefore, the archival material kept in the 
Dominions Office (DO), in the Foreign Office (FO) and - after the merger of the 
Commonwealth and Foreign Office in 1968 - the Foreign Commonwealth Office 
(FCO), as well as the documents from the Prime Minister’s Office (PREM), provided 
detailed reports and evaluations of administrative and economic aspects of the 
Republic of Cyprus, and for each community in particular. Meanwhile, there is, where 
relevant, a precise focus on various diplomatic and military crises and the crisis-
management of various players. The weekly, quarterly and annual dispatches of the 
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five successive British High Commissioners in Nicosia were also essential for this 
project, along with the detailed minutes held following the discussions of various 
British diplomats with key political figures from Cyprus, as well as from Greece, 
Turkey and the US.  
Through the British archives it was possible to offset one of the greatest difficulties in 
the conduct of the thesis. Due to the difficulties in consulting material in the Turkish 
language, the official documentation held by the TNA brings to light vital information 
concerning Turkish-Cypriots as well as their Greek counterparts. It should be kept in 
mind however, that since the Greek-Cypriots were the majority and the main driving 
force of the state’s machinery, material in the TNA is concerned to a larger extent 
with the Greek-Cypriot affairs. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis, the 
information available on Turkish-Cypriot dimensions has been plentiful and entirely 
adequate.  
In addition, the TNA files contain translations from both leading Greek and Turkish-
Cypriot newspapers and extracts from the press of international actors (the UK, the 
US, Greece and Turkey). These allowed a more complete perspective of an often 
explosive atmosphere. Intelligence reports kept by the War Office (WO) in London, 
also provided some key information on specific security incidents and the prevailing 
conditions on the island, elements that give a more lucid image of the internal affairs 
of Cyprus. 
Supplementary to the study of the British archives, the publication of certain archives 
from the US Department of State especially for the period 1964-1968 proved to be 
also crucial. The online publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States, 
23 
 
1964-1968,Volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey;8 was a source of additional 
information on discussions and meetings of American diplomats with key political 
figures of the three interested countries, as well as of official correspondence of the 
British and American diplomats concerning the Cyprus issue.  
Although extensively consulted, the State Archives in Nicosia, Cyprus, gave mostly a 
general background of most important events with limited information about daily 
problems within the Greek-Cypriot community and inter-communal relations in 
general. It remains the case that it is the British and American archives which yield 
the most accessible information both on the internal policies of both main 
communities and the diplomatic goals of the Republic itself. Still the comprehensive 
study of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot newspapers held in the Makarios III 
Foundation and the Press and Information Office (PIO) in Nicosia,9 vividly illustrated 
the intense day-by-day situation, the propaganda games and the constant 
polarization of public opinion on both sides. 
Critical for the period 1968-1969 was also the personal archive of Glafkos Clerides,10 
the Greek-Cypriot negotiator in the inter-communal talks after 1968. The official 
minutes of the negotiators’ meetings, notes from discussions of the Greek-Cypriot 
interlocutor with other important political figures and correspondence between the 
various ministries enabled a better understanding of the prevailing political 
atmosphere inside and outside the negotiating ‘chamber’. 
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Lastly, certain oral interviews with Greek-Cypriot politicians of that period were 
conducted as a purely supplementary source. There were of course certain practical 
limitations, since recollection of historical events or even facts almost fifty years later 
are prone to distortion.  
Historical Background 
February 1959 constituted a critical landmark in the history of Cyprus. This small 
British colony in the eastern edge of the Mediterranean became independent, during 
a period when ‘self-determination’ movements were gaining ground, new 
independent states were emerging and Cold War rivalries helped to shape the 
political development of the newly founded states. It was in this context that the 
Republic of Cyprus emerged after a four-year struggle against the British colonial 
rulers. However, independence and the creation of a new autonomous state was not 
what the majority of the inhabitants of the island wanted or believed in. This majority 
was of Greek origin and believed for many years that the final destiny of their island 
would be enosis; unification with their motherland of Greece. Nonetheless, there 
were critical factors and interests at stake which barred the fulfilment of their ideal 
aim and will be central to our analysis. 
An important part of the background of this study is that during the almost 300 years 
of Ottoman rule on the island (1571-1878) a small but important Ottoman minority 
was formed, which at independence in 1960 was recognized as an entity almost 
equal in political rights and privileges to those of the majority of the nascent republic. 
Despite their substantial cultural differences and the fact that they were never truly 
integrated, the Greek Orthodox and Muslim population of Cyprus had co-existed 
peacefully for years. Since 1830, when Greece gained its independence and then in 
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1843 when the campaign for the ‘Megali Idea’ was launched, Cyprus’ Greek 
population pursued an often subdued but nonetheless consistently expressed desire 
to be joined to a Hellenic motherland. The struggle for enosis intensified during the 
1940s and continued, if often covertly, after independence but was terminated in 
1974 after the Turkish invasion.  
Before presenting briefly the recent history of the conflict of these two communities 
on the island, it is should be borne in mind that the Greek community of Cyprus over 
a long period underestimated not only the existence of the Turkish minority but 
developed a strong tendency to overlook the fact that Cyprus geographically is 
located under the ‘soft underbelly’ of Turkey, only 40 miles away from its southern 
cost. Thus Turkey’s strategic interests inevitably came to play a significant role in the 
determination of the island’s destiny. 
The pursuit of Enosis 
Since Cyprus was occupied by the British in 1878 and became a Crown Colony in 
1925, the Greeks of Cyprus actively sought the fulfilment of their national obligation. 
The Orthodox Church and the right-wing circles had the leading role in this 
campaign. Determined to take the matter to the United Nations, Archbishop 
Makarios III, after his enthronement in October 1950, pursued an intensified 
unification campaign and decided to initiate a mission of internationalization of the 
Cyprus issue. The left wing circles and the communist party of AKEL also came to 
support this campaign.11 The Greeks of Cyprus believed that their numerical 
superiority (80%) of the island’s population legitimated their struggle for enosis. That 
however, was nullified by Britain’s determination not to accept any radical change in 
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the status quo on the island, the opposition of the Turkish minority of Cyprus and the 
increasing influence of Turkey at a regional level.  
During the political fermentation of the Greek-Cypriots during the 1950s, the role of 
Archbishop Makarios proved to be crucial and indeed he managed to hold the 
political reins of the Greek-Cypriot community until his death in 1977. It should be 
stressed that since Ottoman rule in Cyprus, the Church and in particular the 
Archbishop had been the Ethnarch or recognized political leader of the Greek-
Cypriots. However, Archbishop Makarios breathed a new life into an often moribund 
Ethnarchy. His intelligence, charismatic personality and great oratorical skills allowed 
him to build up an immense popular appeal.12  
By 1955 the efforts of the Greek-Cypriots for unification with Greece had borne very 
limited fruit due to Britain’s refusal to discuss ‘self-determination’ of the island within 
the UN. The Greek-Cypriots then decided to take a more radical initiative. On 1 April 
1955, the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, known as EOKA, initiated a 
guerrilla campaign against the colonial rule aiming at enosis.13 EOKA was organised 
under the military leadership of General Georgios Grivas, a Greek-Cypriot officer of 
the Greek army, and under the political leadership of Archbishop Makarios. Although 
the British tried initially to negotiate a political compromise with Makarios, they failed 
and in March 1956 the latter was deported to Seychelles. His exile, according to 
Sant Cassia, increased immeasurably his popularity among his community, while “it 
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was seen as a point of passage marking the transition from an 'otherworldly' priest to 
a 'this-worldly' politician”.14 
Conversely with the Greek-Cypriot community, it was the threat of enosis which 
sparked the acceleration of political activity among the Turkish-Cypriots during the 
1940s. Alongside a growing Turkish-Cypriot apprehension of union with Greece went 
a distinct Turkish consciousness, the enhancement of secularism and thus – as in 
Turkey - the gradual prevalence of kemalists over the old Turkish-Cypriot political 
elite.15 Leading figures of this movement were Dr. Fazil Kuchuk and the young 
lawyer, Rauf Denktash, who later became the leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. The culmination of this activity came in November 1948, when the first 
Turkish-Cypriot demonstration was organized against enosis.16  
Ultimately this Turkish-Cypriot opposition became an integral feature in British tactics 
to address the Greek-Cypriot upheaval. In September 1955 Turkey was officially 
established as an equal political partner on the Cypriot issue alongside Greece, 
when Britain organized a tripartite conference to discuss the island’s future in the 
wider context of the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, in December 1956, the 
British Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd, stated that in case the 
right of self-determination is exercised by Greek-Cypriots, then Turkish-Cypriots 
would equally have the right to decide their future status on the island.17 
Notwithstanding, as the EOKA campaign evolved and intensified, several Turkish-
Cypriot extremists with the encouragement and practical support of Ankara, formed 
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in 1958 the most effective hitherto resistance movement, the paramilitary 
organization, called  TMT – Turkish Resistance Organization aiming at the fulfilment 
of the so-called KIP project (Kıbrıs İstirdat Planı- Plan for the Reclamation of 
Cyprus). According to this project, TMT would “reclaim the land which had previously 
belonged to Turkey”.18 Since its formation, the TMT remained clandestine, actively 
pursuing its aim through underground activities. It was not until the breakdown in the 
stability of Cyprus after December 1963, that it was to come into the open.19  
At the beginning of 1959 it was decided that Cyprus would become independent. 
Although a new state was about to be established, the most important ingredient for 
the nascent Republic, that of a common Cypriot ethnic identity had still been missing. 
Additionally, due to the lack of political institutions in Cyprus, EOKA and TMT were 
about to become the organizational prototypes and ideologies for the secret armed 
groups formed within the island between 1960 and 1974. Inevitably, even after 
independence, violence and clandestine activities constituted the natural default 
position for many ex-EOKA and TMT fighters for achieving their ‘national’ goals. 
Inevitably, Cyprus democracy was built upon fragile foundations, while the rule of law 
was not properly entrenched in the Cyprus’ political culture. This reality was 
profoundly evident throughout this decade. Additionally, the cultivation of mistrust 
and fear during the last years of the British rule, were also critical factors that 
hindered the smooth functioning of the new independent state.  
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The transitional period 
Ultimately, the compromise agreements - the Zurich-London Accords - that traced 
the outline of an independent state in Cyprus excluded both enosis and partition.20 
Its basic constitutional framework along with several elements about its international 
status and its relations with the two motherlands and Britain were incorporated in the 
new Constitution and three founding Treaties; the Treaty of Alliance which gave the 
right to Greece and Turkey to station military contingents in Cyprus for defence 
purposes; the Treaty of Guarantee with which Greece, Turkey and Britain 
guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, either jointly or solely; 
and the Treaty of Establishment which it envisaged the establishment of two British 
Sovereign Base Areas on the island. These treaties were signed by all interested 
parties, including the two Cypriot communities, at the Lancaster House in London on 
19 February 1959. 
After three years in exile, on 1 March 1959, Makarios arrived back home from 
Athens, and was met by a massive welcoming demonstration. As the historian Diana 
Markides notes, however, the two hundred thousand Greek-Cypriots that lined up 
from the airport to the Archbishopric Palace “were not paying homage to the 
signatory of the Lancaster House Agreements, but acknowledging the ethnarch who 
had led them out of colonial servitude”.21 Although independence was not what the 
Greek-Cypriots were aiming for in 1955, Makarios in his speech tried to inspire his 
people that a new, better era now lay ahead.22 That did not alter the fact that these 
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agreements were considered by many Greek-Cypriots and certainly by Georgios 
Grivas,23 a painful and an unfair compromise that had to be accepted in order to 
avoid further bloodshed. Not only enosis was not achieved, but the Turkish-Cypriot 
minority, which represented only the 18% of the Cypriot population, gained 
significant political privileges and a disproportionate representation in all pillars of the 
new state.24 
The eighteen months of the transition from the colonial rule to Independence was 
indeed, a very crucial period.25 All pending constitutional and other relevant issues 
had to be finalized, elections had to be conducted while inter-communal hostilities 
and antagonism had to be contained. The strong bi-communal character and the 
inherent divisiveness of the Constitution were making these tasks even more 
complex. Addressing these was very difficult since nationalist factions from the two 
communities were constantly sabotaging the efforts of the working committees 
established in order to lead the island smoothly towards the official Independence 
Day.26  
The brittle inter-communal relationship and the disagreements over the 
implementation of various ambivalent provisions of the 1959 Agreements were not 
the only challenges. Political rivalries within the Greek-Cypriot community 
overshadowed the transition. In order to entice several young ex-EOKA fighters, 
Makarios assigned them to key-posts both within the transitional government and his 
later Cabinet. That proved crucial for two reasons. Firstly, by actively engaging those 
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who had previously fought for enosis with the new state’s apparatus, had weakened 
Grivas’ later efforts to sabotage the birth of the Republic. On the other hand 
however, it meant that the old political elites, who were also disappointed by the 
1959 Agreements, were excluded from the new administration and so fuelled further 
resentment among various Greek-Cypriots factions. In this context and with the 
prospect of the first Presidential elections of December 1959, two different political 
campaigns were initiated among the Greek-Cypriots which led to several unstable 
coalitions and the first post-EOKA political formations.27 
Soon after the signing of the Agreements, Makarios had encouraged the formation of 
a political organization by ex-EOKA fighters and other right-wing members, 
designated as the Unified Democratic Front of Recreation, EDMA (Ενωτικό 
Δημοκρατικό Μέτωπο Αναδημιουργίας). Nonetheless, due to various internal 
quarrels in a few months EDMA was transformed into a new organization called 
Patriotic Front (Πατριωτικό Μέτωπο).28 The Patriotic Front, although not a fully-
fledged political party, constituted a loose coalition of Makarios supporters, 
representing the broader right-wing of Greek-Cypriots. With their support for 
Makarios’ candidacy during the December elections, the Patriotic Front supported 
the implementation of the Zurich-London Agreements.  
Conversely, two ex-opponents and members of the old political bourgeois, Ioannis 
Clerides and the hard-line mayor of Nicosia, Themistoclis Dervis, formed in 
November 1959 the Democratic Union. This new party was not only seeking to 
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overthrow the Zurich-London Agreements but also to eliminate Makarios’ political 
dominance among the Greek-Cypriots. Paradoxically, when Ioannis Clerides 
announced that he would oppose Makarios in the forthcoming elections, he was 
supported from politicians both of the extreme right-wing and of the communist party, 
AKEL. Like Dervis and Clerides, AKEL joined the anti-Zurich forces due to its 
resentment concerning Makarios’ political actions during the transition.29 On 13 
December 1959 the first elections for the President and Vice-President of the 
Republic of Cyprus were held. As expected Archbishop Makarios III won by gaining 
66.85% of the Greek-Cypriot votes. In the separate elections held within the Turkish-
Cypriot community, Fazil Kuchuk, was elected unopposed as the Vice-President.  
A few months later, on 31 July 1960, the elections for the fifty members of the House 
of Representatives (35 Greek-Cypriots and 15 Turkish-Cypriots) were held. For the 
Greek-Cypriot seats there was a loose pre-electoral agreement between Makarios, 
the Patriotic Front and AKEL, in which it was decided that thirty seats would be 
allocated to the former and the five remaining seats to the latter. After the 
Presidential elections, AKEL and Makarios proceeded to establish a mutually 
beneficial alliance, which lasted until the latter’s death.30 Although AKEL enjoyed the 
support of a significant percentage of the Cypriot population, its representation within 
the Parliament had to be contained. It should be kept in mind that it was a period that 
Cold War rivalries were reaching a peak and a strong communist party in the Cyprus 
Parliament would have been an ‘anathema’ for the West. Besides, for AKEL 
Makarios was the only guarantee that Cyprus would not fall under NATO’s influence 
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- mainly by declaring imminent enosis with Greece.31 Nonetheless, this agreement 
was equally important to Makarios, because it enabled him to establish his complete 
dominance over Greek-Cypriot politics. The AKEL-Makarios alliance had another 
important effect. Being essentially Makarios’ greatest supporter throughout his 
presidency, AKEL did not manage to evolve a distinctive role of its own in the 
island’s politics. That perhaps was one of the underlying reasons for the absence of 
a properly structured right-wing party. Therefore, it could be argued that AKEL’s 
containment was also one of the factors that affected the normal development of 
political institutions on the island. 
The fifteen Turkish-Cypriots seats were taken by the Cyprus Turkish National 
People’s Party of Fazil Kuchuk.32 Neither the selection of the Turkish-Cypriot 
members however, was purely democratic since those who were not previously 
approved by Ankara were forced to withdraw their candidacy.33 It is noteworthy that 
one of the most influential Turkish-Cypriot political leaders, Rauf Denktash, remained 
outside the central governmental machinery of the new state. The truth was that 
Denktash never believed in this new bi-communal state and therefore, refused to 
assume a post, either in the executive or in the parliament, that would have 
promoted institutional inter-communal co-operation.34 Instead, he became the 
President of the Turkish Communal Chamber, an institution that dealt exclusively 
with Turkish-Cypriot affairs. 
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By early August 1960 everything was set for the official inauguration of the Republic 
of Cyprus. It should be noted that the initial date for the transfer of sovereignty was 
set for exactly a year after the signing of the Zurich-London Agreements, that is on 
19 February 1960.35 The negotiations however, over the implementation of several 
constitutional arrangements, and mainly the negotiations over the size of the British 
Sovereign Base Areas, had not been concluded when expected and thus the date 
for the inauguration was repeatedly deferred. After several postponements, 16 
August 1960 was set as the effective date for the Independence Day of Cyprus.36 
Nevertheless there was certainly nothing exceptional or enthusiastic about the 
Independence celebrations on that day. The inauguration of the new Republic was 
overseen by the Governor of the island, Sir Hugh Foot, with a short procedure. 
It is rather doubtful if the occasion was indeed a celebration for any of the parties 
concerned.37 It seemed a “business handover” to Makarios.38 The Greek-Cypriots 
failed to achieve enosis, while the Turkish-Cypriots did not secure partition or the 
transferring of the island to its previous owner. The British for their part, had worried 
that independence might prove even worse than enosis.39 This fear was valid to a 
degree since independence implied the dominance of Makarios in the internal affairs 
of the island and thus of policies characterized by ambivalent intentions not only 
towards the future of their Bases, but also for the extent of Soviet involvement on the 
island. The transitional period that led up to the official transfer of sovereignty and 
the ‘celebration’ planned for that day, were a clear indication of the lukewarm 
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feelings of both communities and of the ex-colonial power. Such ambivalence was 
also illustrated in 1963 when it was decided by the Council of Ministers to move the 
Independence Day commemoration to 1 October due to the fact that the 16 August 
was during the main summer holiday period. It was not until 1979 that 1 October 
became a public holiday in the official Cypriot calendar.40 
Furthermore, it was still an unspoken but shared assumption for both communities 
that independence was not a permanent settlement. It was just an interim path 
towards their unfulfilled but continuing and contradictory goals. While the Greek-
Cypriots believed that as a majority they would eventually have the right for enosis, 
the Turkish-Cypriot leadership argued that the Zurich Agreements recognized them 
as the co-founders of the new state and not just a minority with certain rights, as the 
Greek-Cypriots wanted them to be.41 That was their strongest negotiating card until 
1974. Nonetheless, the separatist elements which permeated the fundamental 
structure of the constitution enhanced the communal mistrust not only among the 
elected political leaders of the two communities but also among the people 
themselves. In this way the cultivation of a common Cypriot identity was hobbled at 
the start. 
‘Constitutional breakdown’  
The already limited signs of goodwill of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot leaderships 
for the smooth functioning of the state and the constitution were, therefore, subject to 
erosion from the outset. Lack of co-operation between the leaders of the two 
communities, mostly at the executive level, increased the difficulties created by the 
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enhanced bi-communal nature of the Constitution. Glafkos Clerides, the President of 
the Parliament, stated: 
Although there was a considerable degree of cooperation in the House 
[of Representatives] on a number of issues ... the main problem was 
that no feeling of trust was created between the two leaders, the 
President and Vice-President, which could have started at the top and 
worked its way down.42 
The assumption that goodwill could have solved the main political difficulties of the 
first three years of the Republic might be questionable but the possibility is still 
relevant for our analysis. Clerides explains that during 1960-1961 there were clear 
signs that through the necessary compromises in all three pillars of the state the 
constitution could have worked.43 Nevertheless, the main problems that eventually 
led to the breakdown were firstly the constitutional need for separate majorities for 
the adoption of the tax legislation and secondly, the establishment of separate 
municipalities in the five main towns of the island. These were the main issues to 
which the two communities’ leaderships were unable to find a compromise solution.44  
Besides these political differences, the fundamental need to build bridges of 
cooperation and trust was also hampered by another factor. Both communities were 
secretly importing arms, making ammunition and enhancing the numerical strength 
of their secret armies by bringing in mainland Greeks or Turks.45 The paramilitary 
organizations formed under the command of Greek-Cypriot officials, like the 
underground army of the Minister of Interior, Polikarpos Yorkadjis, and the other two 
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under the command of Nikos Sampson and Vassos Lyssarides, both Members of the 
Parliament, were a clear indication that the Cyprus problem had not been solved in 
1960. In the Turkish-Cypriot community similar tendencies were at work.46 The TMT 
focused on the aims set in 1958, and continued to recruit fighters, until time was 
‘right’ for action.47 The time was ‘right’ by the end of 1963, when the explosive 
situation needed a small spark to lead to the inter-communal violence that followed.  
Due to the lack of the necessary compromise to address the constitutional impasse, 
Makarios in November 1963 decided to take a radical step and made a proposal to 
the Vice-President for certain amendments – the famous ‘Thirteen Points’ - on the 
basic constitutional framework, which according to the former were necessary for the 
smooth functioning of the state.48 The immediate and strongly negative response of 
Turkey gave little room for manoeuvre to the Turkish-Cypriot leadership which 
seemed willing to, at least, study Makarios’ proposals.49 Therefore, the Turkish-
Cypriots rejected them and the tense atmosphere created on the island led swiftly to 
an inter-communal clash, on 21 December 1963, and to the subsequent 
constitutional breakdown. 
It is essential here to say more about the ‘Thirteen Points’ of Makarios. These were 
indeed aiming at reducing the disproportionate constitutional privileges of the 
Turkish-Cypriots and enhancing the unitary character of the state. Through the 
account of the development of the inter-communal negotiations of 1968-1974 in the 
later chapters, it will be evident that most of the points that were strongly rejected in 
1963, in fact came to constitute the first Turkish-Cypriot concessions in 1968. When 
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the time was ripe for negotiations and concessions, the 1963 proposals for 
proportional representation of the two communities in the state’s apparatus along 
with the abolition of the veto rights of the Vice-President were to be accepted by the 
Turkish-Cypriot side. Moreover, by 1974 through the inter-communal talks there 
were legal compromise formulas which settled on paper many problematic issues of 
the Constitution. That however, seemed impossible in 1963. This element illustrates 
that in policy-making and especially in a context of hostility and mistrust, rationality in 
evaluating all the possible consequences, the value trade-offs, the empathy for the 
opponent and the ‘ripe moment’ for any kind of radical changes are of crucial 
importance. Unfortunately in the negotiating history of the period examined in this 
study, these qualities were often absent from the decision-making processes of the 
leaders of both communities.  
By the end of 1963 the power-sharing model of the constitution collapsed. All the 
Turkish-Cypriots employees of the state promptly withdrew from the government and 
from their public posts and a large percentage of the Turkish-Cypriot population 
retreated into enclaves created in several strategic parts of the island. For the Greek-
Cypriots, these withdrawals were perceived as acts of rebellion. For the Turkish-
Cypriot standpoint, this was an act of necessity for their physical protection.50 
However, the truth, as always, lays somewhere in the middle; but whatever the exact 
truth might have been, these deeply contested versions have determined the 
competing discourses at the international level and within the separate political 
universes of the communities themselves. 
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Establishment of UN peace-building operation  
The escalation of violence between the two communities in December of 1963 posed 
severe problems for the Guarantor powers and the wider stability of the region. The 
danger for the eruption of a Greco-Turkish war was looming, since Turkey was 
threating to intervene in Cyprus in order to protect the Turkish-Cypriot minority. A 
while later, Makarios declared that both the Treaty of Alliance and Guarantee were 
the main source of the anomalous situation and thus his Government decided to 
abrogate them.51 Conversely, Vice-President Kuchuk stated that the December crisis 
bore out primarily that the two communities could not live peacefully together, the 
Constitution was dead and thus partition was the only viable solution.52 It was urgent, 
therefore, especially for the British and the Americans, to find a way to reconcile the 
wide gap in both communities’ perceptions before the crisis further deteriorated and 
negatively affected their own security interests in the area. Initially, Britain took the 
lead and invited the interested parties to a conference in London, which ended in 
failure. The best possible option for the Greek-Cypriot leadership was recourse to 
the UN but this was still discounted by the western powers due to the fear that it 
might provide a cover for Soviet involvement.53 It should be borne in mind that most 
UN member-states, as Cyprus, belonged to the Non-Aligned movement. Therefore, 
through the UN, Makarios’ Government could have gathered valuable diplomatic 
support. Almost two months after the outbreak of the inter-communal violence, it was 
impossible to reach a satisfactory agreement over the peace-keeping of the island. 
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After several attempts to break the deadlock over the latter, Britain decided to take 
the matter to the UN Security Council.54 
From 18 February until 4 March 1964, there was an intense debate in the Security 
Council in New York about the most appropriate way to address the Cyprus crisis. 
The bipolarity of Cold-War rivalries was evident throughout.55 Nonetheless, by 4 
March the Security Council adopted the Resolution 186 unanimously, which made 
provision for establishing a peacekeeping force, to be called United Nations Force in 
Cyprus (UNFICYP), and envisaged the appointment of a UN Mediator.56  
It is true that the Resolution 186 is perceived to be a landmark for the Cyprus 
problem.57 First and foremost, it constituted one of the most important diplomatic 
victories for the Greek-Cypriots because it initially prevented NATO’s active 
involvement in the Cyprus question, as favoured by the Western powers and Turkey, 
and secondly, it recognized the Cyprus Government, even without the Turkish-
Cypriot representation in it, as the only legitimate party responsible for the 
maintenance and restoration of the law and order on the island. Conversely, the 
Turkish-Cypriots, disregarding American and Turkish suggestions, decided even 
after this Resolution to remain isolated, thereby missing an important face-saving 
opportunity to return to their abandoned posts.58 
Soon, however, it was evident that both the UNFICYP and the UN mediator were 
unable to lead the parties towards a stable solution. During the first months of 
UNFICYP’s assignment in Cyprus, both communities’ militias hampered its smooth 
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functioning. Cyprus became essentially a ‘powder keg’, whilst bombing and shooting 
incidents remained a constant theme on the daily news.59 Turkey threatened to 
militarily intervene on several occasions, while the island was brought twice to the 
brink of a war. Firstly, in June 1964, Ankara was ready to intervene, when the 
Americans, with the notorious letter of President Johnson, stopped them at the 
eleventh hour.60 This for Turkey was diplomatic humiliation. Nonetheless, the crisis 
had not been completely averted. Each side’s forces tried to intercept the military 
plans of the opponent for expanding de facto control over certain areas on the island. 
By August this led to a recurrence of inter-communal fighting and subsequently to 
new Turkish air raids over Cyprus, which seriously threatened again the peace of the 
region.  
Meanwhile, the first UN Mediator, Sakari Tuomiojia, almost a month after assuming 
his post in Cyprus, admitted that he was at a complete impasse, unable to make any 
breakthrough to restore normality. Both he and the UN Secretary-General therefore, 
discreetly allowed the US to take the lead in the mediation.61 The Americans still 
considered that the Cyprus problem should had been dealt principally between 
Greece and Turkey, overestimating Athens’ ability to manipulate Makarios. Given the 
constitutional breakdown, both the Americans and the British then concluded that 
some form of enosis with territorial concessions for Turkey was the most appropriate, 
and, from their point of view, pragmatic solution that would probably be acceptable to 
the two NATO allies and more importantly secure Western interests in the area.62 
Consequently, after the June crisis, the Americans under Dean Acheson’s mediation 
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engaged in a series of negotiations with Athens and Ankara. The outcome of these, 
were two plans in the name of the American policy-maker Dean Acheson, which 
proposed two successive versions of enosis with certain territorial exchanges for 
Turkey. Nonetheless, Acheson’s mediation ended in failure after both of his plans 
were rejected, the first version by Athens and the latter by Ankara. Moreover, 
Makarios’ rejection of both versions highlighted once again that the primary 
responsibility for the island’s future lays solely with the Cyprus Government and the 
UN, while he turned towards the Soviets for further military and diplomatic support. 
After Acheson’s failure and the sudden death of Tuomiojia, the UN Secretary-
General decided to take back the lead in the mediation on the island. A new UN 
mediator was appointed and the Americans decided to gradually disengage from 
actively seeking for a long-term solution to the Cyprus question.63 
 
Constitutional breakdown, serious inter-communal clashes and a buffer zone dividing 
the Greek and Turkish sector of the capital of the island, known as the Green Line,64 
were the price Cyprus paid for this inter-communal crisis. Turkey for the first time in 
January 1964 used as a pretext the Treaty of Guarantee to intervene in Cyprus. The 
US and Soviet Union were actively engaged with the Cyprus problem, while the two 
communities’ leaderships in Cyprus were completely estranged, having almost all 
official channels of communication closed. The violent events of 1963/1964 was an 
early indication of what was about to follow ten years later. The power-sharing 
model, as had been articulated, in such a fragile manner at independence had 
collapsed in violence creating refugees, missing persons, and physical destruction. 
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Very ominously for the future, the different paramilitary organizations saw in this the 
opportunity to enhance their own authority and goals. In this situation the two political 
leaderships were already becoming preoccupied with their own extreme factions, 
underpinning inflexible positions and creating conditions for the failure of UN 
Mediation in March 1965. After that, the impasse, – above all an impasse within the 
island’s political culture itself – was to shape the political landscape of Cyprus for the 
ten dramatic years ahead. The ensuing experience, with its principally internalized 
focus will be the focus of our treatment.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Galo Plaza Report, 1964-1965: Origins and Consequences 
 
The events of December 1963 indicated that the Zurich-London Arrangements, not 
only failed to produce a lasting and peaceful solution to the Cyprus question, but on 
the contrary triggered a new unstable era. The internal turmoil led to a complex 
situation that widened the perceptions’ gap about the optimal settlement between the 
two communities. Since the initiation of the peace-making effort in March 1964, the 
UN officials had been well aware that the variables surrounding the Cyprus question 
included elements such as the interests at stake of various important players, a 
fragile balance which threatened the region’s peace and an already precarious co-
existence of the two communities. In addition, the latters’ lack of trust and genuine 
will to compromise progressively shaped a very difficult and challenging task for any 
prospective Mediator. Although himself not optimistic on arrival, the second UN 
Mediator in Cyprus, Senor Galo Plaza Lasso, still felt able to say that he saw some 
“rays of hope”.65 
A few months later, on 26 March 1965 Plaza, submitted his report, containing what 
he characterized as “directions which the parties should explore in the search for a 
peaceful solution and an agreed settlement”.66 By clarifying that these directions 
were to be considered neither as recommendations nor as concrete suggestions, he 
highlighted the need for the immediate initiation of direct talks between the two 
communities.67 However the parties’ perceptions, regarding not only the nature of 
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these directions but their content as well, were diametrically different to Plaza’s view. 
Although this report sought to bring the parties towards a constructive basis for direct 
negotiations, it drove them further apart. A ‘comfortable’ impasse for both 
leaderships – that is, one which both could see as not hindering their respective 
long-term aims – was then created, which unavoidably led to the acceleration of the 
separate political and social evolution of the two communities on the island.  
In order to have a clear insight into the situation and the determining nature of the 
Mediator’s report for the later evolution of the Cyprus problem, it is important to 
identify the reasons that led to Plaza’s failure in 1965. This chapter therefore, will 
initially examine the prevailing atmosphere upon his assuming of the Mediator’s post 
in Cyprus, along with the negotiating objectives and agendas of the conflicting 
parties. Subsequently, Plaza’s assessments will be identified along with the 
reactions raised by the conflicting parties and the aftermath of his short-lived 
mediation. Before these, however, it is important to sketch out a brief background to 
the appointment of Galo Plaza in September 1964. 
The new Mediator in Cyprus 
In terms of reaching a functional settlement, the Cyprus problem is inevitably 
perceived as one of the conspicuously unsuccessful missions of the UN. It is for that 
reason that this problem has usually been characterized as the ‘diplomat’s 
graveyard’. Perhaps it was indeed a bad omen the sudden death of the first such 
Mediator, the Finnish Diplomat Sakari Tuomioja, on 9 September 1964, only a few 
months after his assignment to Cyprus. Finding a suitable Mediator back in March 
1964, acceptable to all of parties concerned was not an easy task for the UN 
47 
 
Secretary-General. U Thant in particular, admitted that he was “completely stuck”.68 
After the new wave of inter-communal clashes in August 1964, the failure of 
Acheson’s initiative and Washington’s gradual disengagement from the active efforts 
to broker an agreement, there was again a pressing need for the UN Secretary-
General to recapture the initiative over the mediation efforts, not least by finding a 
suitable successor of Tuomioja.  
Having previously been the Political Advisor of UNFICYP, apparently familiar with all 
the peculiarities and complexities of the Cyprus problem, and without any other 
viable options, U Thant believed that Plaza was the natural alternative after 
Tuomioja’s death. As the Political Advisor of the peacekeeping operation, Plaza’s 
main task had been to effectively manage the daily tensions that occurred between 
the two communities, to negotiate short-term solutions with Greek and Turkish-
Cypriot officials separately, and above all to head off any fresh recourse to 
violence.69 Besides his previous post in Cyprus, Galo Plaza was an ex-President of 
Ecuador and an “old hand at UN troubleshooting”.70 He was assigned in 1958 as a 
chairman of a UN observation group in Lebanon and two years later as a chairman 
of a study group on the Congo problems.71 He therefore, had a good deal of 
experience of deeply divided and even collapsed societies.  
Nevertheless, the name of the new Mediator drew mixed reactions within the 
Turkish-Cypriot community and Turkey. Although generally considered as a skilled 
UN official, the Turkish side perceived that Plaza, through his UNFICYP post, thus 
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far tended to favour the Greek-Cypriots. Besides, his Latin-American background 
made him instinctively anti-colonial and strongly supportive of the principle of self-
determination. For that reason, before U Thant made public his final decision, 
Ankara discreetly but unsuccessfully lobbied in order to ward off Plaza’s 
appointment.72 The British had convinced them, however, that U Thant’s choice was 
perhaps the only viable alternative at that critical juncture. Turkey, therefore, 
grudgingly agreed to the latter’s assignment and on 16 September 1964 Galo Plaza 
officially succeeded the late Sakari Tuomiojia. Nevertheless, the impartiality or 
otherwise of the new Mediator continued to constitute a great source of concern for 
Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots, and from their perspective the final outcome of the 
report seemed to prove them right. 
Lessons from Dean Acheson’s mediation of summer 1964 
 
I am not going into this blindfolded. I am very much aware of the 
difficulties involved in this complex task. However, if it is believed that I 
am in a position to make a positive contribution to the cause of peace, I 
find it a moral obligation to accept the assignment. If I fail, I will move 
on and let a better man to take over. Mediators must be understood to 
be expendable.73 
With these words Galo Plaza opened on 17 September a new chapter in the peace-
making of the Cyprus problem. He knew that if he wanted to produce any concrete 
results he had to follow a totally new approach to that of his predecessor. The 
developments that took place throughout the summer of 1964 and particularly the 
failure of the US mediation with Dean Acheson in Geneva gave important lessons 
that all parties had to take now under serious consideration. Primarily, the Cyprus 
problem was not an exclusively Greco-Turkish affair and thus a solution on the basis 
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of enosis with territorial exchanges for Turkey was not as feasible as Britain and US - 
believed. Although after summer of 1964 enosis was still regarded by the West as 
the only solution that would guarantee stability in the area, the UN continued to seek 
out possible middle ground between the two communities and their motherlands. It 
should be stated that although Plaza sought American and British diplomatic support 
and their help to exert moderate influence on the parties, he also requested that they 
accept that mediation would be an exclusively UN initiative which only he would take 
responsibility for it if it failed.74 The Anglo-Americans consented and decided to 
shelve the enosis option for the moment, let the UN take the lead in seeking a 
solution that would focus firstly on preserving independence on the island and, 
above all, put a stop to any further destabilisation.75  
The most important lesson for Plaza was that Makarios and the Cyprus Government 
had to be maintained at the centre of the negotiating attempts since anything else 
was a recipe for failure.76 Makarios had made plain that he was not going to accept 
any solution that would seem to be imposed from the outside, regardless of its 
benefits.77 The Republic of Cyprus was a sovereign state and in principle a solution 
had to be sought within the island according to Security Council Resolution 186 and 
with the UN in the driving seat. Besides, Makarios’ political manoeuvres during the 
Geneva negotiations of Acheson provided evidence, not for the first time, of the 
falsity of the British, American and Turkish belief that Greece had the necessary 
leverage to force Makarios to accept a solution in the making of which he had not 
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been involved.78 It should be stressed, however, that throughout the following 
decade Turkey never really accepted this counter-thesis, whilst Greece tried 
unsuccessfully to reverse it by constantly trying to strengthen its military presence 
and political influence on the island.79 Nonetheless, after Geneva the Greek 
Government, ostensibly at least, decided to follow a common line with the Cyprus 
Government, refused to have bilateral discussions with Turkey and argued that a 
solution should first be sought on the basis of independence.80 
Despite all the above however, the most important ‘side-effect’ for the West during 
the Geneva negotiations was that it reinforced Makarios’ turn to the Soviet Union. In 
August 1964 Makarios secured not only military support but also a diplomatic 
‘shield’, with a statement confirming that “if a foreign armed intervention takes place 
in Cyprus the Soviet Union will help Cyprus to defend its freedom and 
independence”.81  
Acheson’s mediation, meanwhile, had a negative effect on Turco-American relations. 
Following the diplomatic humiliation in June 1964, when President Johnson 
prevented Ankara from intervening in Cyprus, the Turkish Government believed that 
Washington was letting them down again. Ankara was coming under fire at home for 
being too subservient to the Western alliance, including over Cyprus. In these 
circumstances, enosis in any form became impossible for Turkey.82 Whilst never 
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abandoning the belief that Cyprus was a matter to be dealt primarily between Greece 
and Turkey, the Turkish Government now seemed willing to go along with UN 
Mediation, whilst harbouring misgivings about Plaza.83 It also hedged its bets, 
however, on making fresh declarations about the inviolability of the Zurich-London 
settlement, and at the same time on arguing that any new constitutional arrangement 
in Cyprus had to be a federal one. 
Having all these realities in mind, in taking up the reins, Plaza’s basic idea was to 
concentrate principally on the leaders of the two communities with the concept of 
thrashing out a solution “without an absolute winner or absolute loser”.84 
Absoluteness, however, remained the nub of the matter. Plaza soon began to 
discover that each of the Cypriot parties was not preoccupied with an urgent 
agreement to sooth existing discontents, but rather with gaining time to strengthen 
their own negotiating positions through outside alliances and, most essentially, a 
series of faits accomplis on the island. Meanwhile, polarization of their public opinion 
was essential for this ‘game’.85 The American Ambassador in Ankara caught the 
essence in November 1964 when he reported:  
Despite Galo Plaza's inveterate optimism and political virtuosity, 
including close rapport with Makarios, his multiple conversations 
with all parties concerned have not resulted in any narrowing of 
gap,.…, but instead have served [to] reveal that gap greater than 
was thought.86  
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The parties’ agendas 
It could be argued that the developments of the first half of 1964 had nonetheless 
secured the diplomatic preponderance of the Greek-Cypriot community vis-à-vis the 
Turkish-Cypriots. The Security Council debate in March 1964 saw the Cyprus 
Government and the Greek-Cypriot position broadly victorious. The Greek-Cypriots 
controlled the state’s machinery enjoying the international recognition given to them 
by the Resolution 186, whilst the Turkish-Cypriots were isolated, without any official 
voice in the Government and fully dependent on Ankara’s diplomatic, and even 
potentially physical, support.  
Nevertheless, a second diplomatic battle within the UN was anticipated by both 
sides. Particularly, after September 1964 both sides were getting prepared for a 
General Assembly debate. Their preparation activities, however, to some extent, 
overshadowed Plaza’s negotiations.87 At this point, we shall briefly define the 
objectives of each party and the mechanisms employed in order to achieve them 
during Plaza’s mediation.  
Firstly, the Greek-Cypriot leaders agitated in favour of an independent, unitary, 
integral, demilitarised and sovereign State with adequate safeguards for minority 
rights and respect for the legitimate right of the people of Cyprus to determine their 
future without outside interventions.88 There should be however, a particular 
emphasis on the latter part of this assertion. The respect of the right of self-
determination for the Greek-Cypriot leadership naturally meant that as soon as 
unfettered independence was consolidated, the Cypriots should have the right to 
pursue freely unification of the island with Greece. Nevertheless, this enosis was 
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very different from the one that the Greek Government and the West had sought.89 
For the Cyprus Government it meant primarily, unconditional enosis, without any 
territorial exchanges to Turkey, and secondly, that Cyprus would enjoy a special 
status within Greece’s administration, since it would not be bound by any of the 
latter’s international commitments.90 Makarios already knew, however, that this was 
impractical. Nevertheless, he could not openly admit that enosis, which was still 
perceived by Greek-Cypriots as the only road for national salvation, was an illusory 
dream.91 Although he continued to pay constant lip-service to enosis, Makarios 
decided to put the dream into cold storage for the moment, and work towards the 
consolidation of the first goal; an independent, unitary state with minority rights for 
the Turkish-Cypriots. As will be explained, the first step towards that goal was to 
institutionally re-organize and economically develop the state along the lines he 
favoured, by removing all the contentious provisions of the Constitution. The 
absence of the Turkish-Cypriot factor was going to make this task easier. Secondly, 
he had to find ways to get rid of the 1959 Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee, which 
for him not only undermined but also posed a real threat to the sovereignty of the 
Republic. Finally, he had to force the Turkish-Cypriot community into accepting the 
minority status on offer, but without provoking military intervention by Turkey. 
In order to achieve the latter, the Cyprus Government decided to impose a series of 
measures aiming to tighten the pressure on the Turkish-Cypriots residing in the 
enclaves created after the inter-communal clashes of December 1963. More 
specifically, the embargo of the so-called ‘strategic materials’ that could have been 
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used for building arms and fortifications - such as iron, tiles, cement, several types of 
clothing and raw materials, building materials, fuel, batteries and so on - and 
restrictions of movement were an indispensable part of the Government’s attrition 
policy towards the isolated Turkish-Cypriots.92 In February 1965, however, a few 
months after the strict embargo, the Cyprus Government argued that it was ready to 
discuss with the Turkish-Cypriots but solely on the basis of minority rights.93 All other 
procedures, seemingly, were rejected.94 We shall see that this proved to be a highly 
ineffective policy. 
On the other hand, nullifying the two 1960 Treaties was practically very difficult due 
to its wider legal and international implications. Immediately after the December 
1963 clash, Makarios unilaterally declared that the Treaties were no longer valid for 
the Cyprus Government, but this statement was not accepted by the other 
signatories, especially Britain and Turkey.95 The treaties had been signed by the two 
communities themselves and the three guarantors, whilst their abrogation or 
amendment needed the consent of all the signatories. Nonetheless, the Cyprus 
Government was determined to eliminate all the obstacles to its sovereignty and 
believed that the forthcoming UN General Assembly debate and resolution would 
provide a stepping stone in that direction.96 It tried therefore, to secure diplomatic 
support by initiating a ‘good-will mission’ towards the Non-Aligned countries - where 
the quest for self-determination was highlighted - and towards the Soviet Union - 
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stressing the West’s allegedly sinister and divisive plans in the region.97 In the 
meantime, the Cyprus Government tried to incapacitate the Treaty of Alliance by 
creating obstacles and setting pre-conditions for the rotation of Turkey’s troops.98 In 
October 1964, when the troop rotation issue came up, Ankara appeared flexible and 
accepted some of the Cyprus Government’s pre-conditions. However, in February 
1965, when that issue re-surfaced, the Turkish Government was determined to show 
a firm hand, even in indicating a preparedness to intervene if the rotation was 
hampered.99  
On the other side of the buffer line, as already stated, there was an isolated and 
internally weak Turkish-Cypriot leadership. By rejecting their characterization as a 
rebellious minority, the Turkish-Cypriots tried to convince the international 
community that they were in fact the victims of what they depicted as a repressive 
and illegal Greek-Cypriot Government, which was planning their complete 
domination.100 The imposition of what was characterized by Ankara as a criminal 
blockade on the Turkish-Cypriots who lived in the enclaves, was seen as a proof of 
the Greek-Cypriots’ determination to condemn them to live under concentration 
camp conditions until they were brought to their knees.101 Moreover, the constant 
rhetoric of enosis by the Greek-Cypriots leaders (increasingly formulaic though it 
may have been for some of them) was a firm indication for Ankara and the Turkish-
Cypriots that the sole adequate mechanism for ensuring their safe existence on the 
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island was the physical and geographical separation of the two communities through 
a federal state or even partition.102 
In fact, the conditions for the establishment of a federation, such as defined and 
geographically coherent areas where Greek and Turkish-Cypriots might carry on a 
separate existence, did not exist. On the contrary, Turkish-Cypriot and mixed villages 
were spread throughout the island and the creation of a federated state would have 
implied a compulsory movement of population. As in 1956 when Lord Radcliffe, the 
constitutional expert assigned to prepare proposals for a Cyprus Constitution, now 
Plaza was constantly emphasizing to the Turkish side that the above reality confirms 
that a federal system in Cyprus would not be functional.103 The Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership, including the TMT under Ankara’s guidance, sought to effect the 
necessary conditions. The creation of strategic enclaves in several parts of the island 
and Turkish-Cypriot self-isolation in them was a prerequisite for such consolidation. 
The main ones were in Nicosia and the villages of Limnitis, Lefka and Kokkina. In 
addition, securing the control of the main road which connected Nicosia and Kyrenia 
was perceived as a key development for the Turkish-Cypriot aims. This road enabled 
them to concentrate the necessary military equipment and to forbid the Greek-
Cypriot movement throughout their own sectors.104 Such a heightening of the 
minority’s sense of security was essential to maintaining its morale.   
For ensuring the separation of the two communities on the ground, the TMT leaders 
and Turkish military officials imposed severe restrictions of movement outside these 
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enclaves, trying thus to cut off inter-communal contacts and prevent any 
fraternization with Greek-Cypriots. Pamphlets were occasionally circulated 
throughout the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves regarding fines and punishments for 
association with Greek-Cypriots.105 Simultaneously, Turkish-Cypriot military and 
political leaders initiated an aggressive propaganda proposing their distinctive 
version of the present situation and the events which had shaped them.106 For that 
reason, it was essential to promote the strengthening of a common Turkish 
consciousness, especially during the first months of the separation, by engaging as 
many Turkish-Cypriots as possible with the separate administration and the fighters’ 
corps.107 Additionally, the cultivation of mistrust for the ‘common enemy’ and the 
physical elimination of voices in favour of peaceful co-existence, were also crucial 
parts of their plans. Simultaneously, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership was able to point 
to the economic restrictions imposed on them to give evidence of their victimization 
by Makarios’ Government. This was also illustrated in several UNFICYP 
commanders’ reports, recalling visits to the Kokkina caves inhabited by refugees, so 
allowing the TMT leaders to claim that the situation was worse than it really was.108  
With their own leverage faltering, both within the island and in the UN debates, the 
Turkish-Cypriot leaders felt threatened, and to counterbalance this weakness Ankara 
initiated an internationalisation strategy designed to maximize its limited political 
assets. Through this strategy the Turkish Government sought to portray the 
illegitimacy of the Cyprus Government and the inability of the two communities to live 
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together under a unified state.109 It was essential for Ankara to gain outside support 
in order to prevent a General Assembly resolution which could diplomatically 
strengthen Makarios’ position, especially on the aspect the 1960 Treaties. Ankara’s 
first stop was Moscow, where the Turkish diplomacy ‘played’ the enosis card. 
Although the Soviets in August 1964 had given assurances to the Cyprus 
Government for support in case of an external aggression, at the same time USSR 
wanted to prevent any type of enosis, since that would have brought Cyprus under 
NATO’s protection. Ankara and Moscow therefore, were ready to form a common 
front against enosis were it to become at all imminent. The Turco-Soviet 
rapprochement of autumn 1964 secured two important gains for Turkey; firstly, in 
November 1964 a joint communiqué which made reference to both communities’ 
legal rights and the inviolability of the 1960 Treaties110; and, secondly, in January 
1965, a statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, favourable to the 
concept of a federal solution for Cyprus.111  
Moscow’s support for Turkey’s position in this sense had affected to some extent the 
dynamics of the Cyprus problem. As the American Ambassador in Turkey explained, 
the Turco-Soviet rapprochement alleviated the previous American concern for the 
growing Soviet influence over Makarios’ Government.112 As a result, it reduced 
America’s previous sense of urgency to find a solution on the basis of enosis.  
After a series of negotiations and a shuttle diplomacy between the interested parties, 
the UN mediator had a clear image both of their overt and hidden agendas. It should 
be re-emphasized, however, that at that juncture it was the Greek-Cypriots who held 
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a tight rein of the island.113 Moreover, it was true that in terms of history, legality and 
democracy, the Greek-Cypriot objectives had clear elements of legitimacy, indeed. 
Nevertheless, the Greek-Cypriot leaders crucially failed to make accurate and 
pragmatic evaluation about their ‘opponents’ objectives and position.114 One of these 
mistakes was the erroneous beliefs of the Cyprus Foreign Ministry about the primary 
concern of Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots. . The Greek-Cypriots underestimated the 
importance of safeguarding Ankara’s own prestige and the security concerns of the 
Turkish-Cypriots in any prospective settlement; they also overestimated the UN’s 
capabilities for providing adequate guarantees and anything other than moral 
support to the parties. Spyros Kyprianou, the Cypriot Foreign Minister, reiterated his 
belief that Turkey’s “sine qua non in the Cyprus problem” was the rights of the 
Turkish-Cypriots themselves. After securing the latter, however, Ankara would have 
probably sought a solution that would have satisfied its security concerns and finally 
a compromise that would have constituted an honourable exit from the Cyprus 
impasse.115 Kyprianou concluded: 
The Turkish-Cypriots for the most part, do not have a preference as 
to independence or enosis but are most interested in where they 
can get reliable guarantees of human rights. He thought that they 
would be happy to accept these if they involve some degree in 
autonomy and religion, culture, education, and personal status, 
combined with some Government financial assistance.116  
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These assessments were proved to be mistaken but they would continue to highly 
affect the Greek-Cypriot decision-making process until 1974.117  
The truth was really an inversion of this ranking. The Cyprus problem had become a 
huge liability for Turkey and therefore, the first and most important concern for 
Ankara was to find a face-saving way out both for its public opinion and the armed 
forces.118 A second concern was Turkey’s broader geopolitical and security interests, 
insofar as Cyprus had any relevance from them, and very much last was the well-
being of the Turkish-Cypriots “with the latter being much the weakest point”, as the 
Turkish Prime-Minister, Ismet Inonu confessed to Plaza.119  
It should also be borne in mind that Turkish general elections were scheduled for 
October 1965 and that inevitably increased domestic pressure. This was not the first 
time that the Cyprus issue had a great impact on Turkish politics. Since the 1950s, 
the Cyprus issue had continuously affected Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy. 
Admittedly, Cyprus was only one of several territorial issues in which Turkish 
interests were involved in the wider region, stretching into Asia and the Caucasus, 
and which also raised the possibilities of tension with the Soviet Union. Of these 
various engagements, however, Cyprus was the one where the risks could be more 
easily calibrated and whenever necessary kept within bounds. Furthermore, the 
‘threat of extinction’ of the Turkish-Cypriot minority bound up with the Greek-Cypriot 
claim for enosis became a convenient tool for mobilizing new followers and popular 
support for new political movements and parties in Turkey itself. Those movements 
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were actively seeking to energize public opinion not only amongst the Turks but also 
to encourage the Turkish-Cypriots to fight against enosis. The Turkish press 
campaign towards that goal was an element that clearly had a purely domestic 
political dimension. The press created internal pressures on the Turkish 
Governments to evolve a more effective and radical strategy towards the 
‘unredeemed’ Turkish-Cypriot population.120 This factor had become increasingly 
significant over the second half of the 1950s, and continued throughout the following 
decade.  
Having in mind the totally inflexible positions of Nicosia and Ankara, Plaza could 
have only succeeded if he could manage to simultaneously lead the parties towards 
moderation with the same face-saving formula. Was that possible? 
Galo Plaza measures his options  
Pursuing their respective strategies, and positioning themselves for the looming 
General Assembly debate, by the end of 1964 both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-
Cypriots remained inflexible during their consultations with the Mediator.121 Although 
Plaza had reached several tentative conclusions, about the most functional and 
lasting solution for the Cyprus problem and for the most appropriate procedure 
towards it he decided to let the ‘storm’ of the expected UN debate fade and then to 
make known his conclusions. However, by early February 1965 it became known 
that the General Assembly on Cyprus would not take place and thus Plaza set about 
drafting his report. The latter also calculated that the previous Turco-Soviet 
rapprochement would constrain mainly the Greek-Cypriot reactions to his report, and 
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in particular that Makarios would line up behind it.122 Since at that point the 
international balance was seemingly changing, Plaza believed the time was ripe to 
introduce the element he considered vital for success all round. He explained that he 
would give both parties a “face-saving device to explain to their people why they 
abandoned their entrenched positions”.123 This device for Plaza was his report.  In 
particular, he was aiming to: 
Dislodge the present impasse without risking any serious deterioration 
of the situation in particular in creating the necessary conditions for a 
new phase in the mediation process, including the possibility of 
multilateral talks.124  
What, then, were the main options for settlement and the relevant factors that Plaza 
had to consider? First of all, there was enosis, entailing two important implications. 
Although it was the best possible solution for the West, essentially what Athens 
wanted and what the Greek-Cypriots favoured for the distant future, it was not 
possible for a UN representative to effectively recommend the dissolution of a 
member state of the UN organization.125 Its own membership would not permit any 
such dangerous precedent. Enosis was perhaps only possible if it was the outcome 
of a referendum but not from a unilateral UN proposal.126 Even in that case however, 
there was one crucial element missing; a clear understanding between the Greek 
Government and Makarios as to what enosis actually meant.127  
Alternatively, there was the option of independence under a federal state with 
physical separation of the two communities as Turks and Turkish-Cypriots favoured. 
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Plaza ruled out this option since it was “utterly repugnant” to the majority of the 
Cypriots.128 Also, it would have required forced movement of population along with 
the creation of more refugees. This would have damaging financial consequences, 
especially for Turkish-Cypriots, who would be forced to look even more towards 
Turkey for economic and material aid. That reality could easily lead to full partition 
and that was contrary to the philosophy of the UN Charter of Human Rights.129 
Lastly, there was the option of a solution on the basis of independence with 
adequate UN guarantees for the Turkish-Cypriots and demilitarization of the 
island.130 Plaza saw this as potentially acceptable to all parties since it would have 
satisfied the Turks on the grounds that the Zurich-London Treaties were still valid, 
and was essentially what Makarios was in favour of, even if he could not yet say so 
openly. Simultaneously, the Turkish-Cypriot rights would have been effectively 
guaranteed. Lastly, demilitarizing the island and preventing enosis helped to satisfy 
Turkey’s security interests.131  
Nonetheless, this type of settlement required some form of negotiations. But this was 
where the problems really began. Since it was imperative that Makarios remained in 
the centre of any negotiations, these had to be conducted between the two 
communities. This option however, was constantly rejected by Turkey. Meanwhile, 
Makarios agreed to negotiate as the President of the Republic of Cyprus and not as 
a community leader opposite some Turkish-Cypriot counterpart. Arguably, the most 
efficient negotiating method was through direct exchanges between Makarios and 
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Turkey who held effective control within their respective communities. This however, 
was an option that primarily clashed with the principles set by the contested parties 
and was, impossible for the UN Mediator to suggest.132 Both the UN Mediation and 
Western diplomacy increasingly sought in vain to ‘square the circle’ of any type of 
negotiations over Cyprus.133 Plaza’s report appeared to be the ‘last hurrah’ in such 
an exercise. 
On the eve of the submission of the Mediator’s report, there was no sign that the 
latter was succeeding in bringing the parties towards a common ground. The Greek-
Cypriot side was at least content that the looming report had overtaken a UN 
General Assembly debate in which Turkey, after the Turco-Soviet rapprochement of 
November 1964, might have mobilised support. The Greek-Cypriots were confident 
that Plaza’s conclusions would veer in their direction, and even though likely to be 
rejected by the Turkish-Cypriots, could reinforce their own future bargaining 
positions. 134  
Conversely, the Turkish Government had a very different perception not only about 
the timing of the publication of the report but also about its content. Ankara 
expressed strong reactions to the possibility of Plaza submitting a possibly 
unfavourable report before the forthcoming elections in Turkey of October 1965.135 
Ankara was anxious to ensure that even if the report was published, the Mediator 
should merely reiterate basic historical and current facts, without making any 
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substantive proposals.136 Otherwise, the Turkish Foreign Minister had threatened 
Plaza to reject it in advance.137 The Turkish Ambassador in Britain explained: 
The Mediator’s report should not contain a clear-cut solution, or even 
a basis on which the solution could be achieved... the Turks were 
asking that the mediator should be encouraged to say that the 
problem was insoluble and that he had nothing to suggest.138  
The Turkish-Cypriots for their part, according to the British High Commissioner in 
Nicosia, Sir David Hunt, did not expect much from Plaza since they believed that he 
was “a willing dupe of Makarios”.139 Hunt explained the general attitude of the 
Turkish-Cypriot side as follows:  
Let us wait and see what he [i.e Plaza] has to say but whatever it is we 
stand on our constitutional rights as a community and [we] are ready to 
negotiate only if the three Guarantor Powers are involved.140 
It seemed, therefore, that the Turkish authorities, even more than the Turkish-
Cypriots, were almost bound to react strongly to Plaza’s report. Finally, aware that 
the Mediator’s report would probably be inclined towards the Greek-Cypriot position 
and afraid of the Turkish reaction, Britain and US were sceptical even about its 
necessity.141 However, by March 1965, tension had again increased on the island 
and there seemed no other alternative than to sit and wait in the hope that some 
good might come out of it.  
The UN Mediator’s report  
A few days before the publication of his conclusions, Plaza explained that his report:  
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Would be a detailed analysis of each element in the situation and I 
hope that it would stimulate a flow of ideas which might help to move 
the various parties away from their present entrenched position. It 
would be the end of one chapter and the beginning of a new one. The 
report would not contain any positive suggestions. I am a mediator 
rather than an arbitrator. But I would lay down certain guide-lines. I 
was not able to accept the Turkish view that the report should be 
merely a historical account. I had tried to persuade the Turkish 
Government that if they wanted the mediation to continue it was 
essential to open up certain avenues along which future progress 
might be made in negotiations.142   
On 26 March 1965, the report was unveiled at a UN Security Council meeting.143 
After making a brief historical background, an analysis of the previous mediation 
effort and the objectives of the parties, the Mediator proceeded with his conclusions 
and “indications of the possible future course”.144 Trying to deflect Turkish reactions, 
he emphasized again that he was not an arbitrator and that nothing should be 
imposed upon the parties. He stressed that the views contained in the report were 
purely personal.145  
Guided primarily by the UN Charter, most of his observations indeed favoured 
Makarios’ position. Unsurprisingly, this infuriated the Turkish Government. Plaza 
particularly recommended that a solution should be sought primarily within Cyprus 
with negotiations between the two communities, on the basis of an independent, 
demilitarized state with special guarantees for minority rights, that would be 
supervised by a UN commissioner for as long as necessary, and autonomy for the 
Turkish-Cypriots in religious, cultural, educational and personal status affairs.146 
Nevertheless, he proposed that there should also be a second stage of negotiations 
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with all the other signatories of the Zurich-London Agreements.147 The Mediator 
stressed that although the Treaties and the Constitution were still legally binding, the 
recent events bore out that they could not be fully implemented, and thus should be 
either abrogated or at least modified. Moreover, it was stated that enosis should be 
voluntarily renounced due to its wider implications.148 Contrary to Ankara’s 
arguments, he concluded that federation and geographical separation of the two 
communities were neither realistic nor feasible.149  
Against Plaza’s previous hopes for fresh momentum, the intensity of the Turkish 
reactions deeply disillusioned the UN Secretary-General and the Mediator.  
Rejecting immediately all of Plaza’s conclusions out of hand, Ankara explained that 
the publication of his report brought the immediate termination of his services.150 The 
issue that primarily provoked this strong reaction was the recommendation for talks 
between the two communities.151 Both the Turkish Government and opposition in 
Ankara followed a common line that Cyprus was a Greco-Turkish affair and only 
negotiations between the two motherlands were acceptable.152 
The UN, US and Britain quickly set about trying to tone down Turkey’s hostility to the 
Report. The Americans were particularly disappointed by Ankara’s reaction.153 They 
believed it was an irrational and impulsive decision and placed the Turkish side in a 
disadvantageous position, especially in a future Security Council or General 
Assembly debate. They even saw some positive elements within the report for 
Turkey. For example the validity of the Zurich-London Agreements was highlighted, 
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and, although not as explicitly as Turkey wished, enosis was rejected. In addition, 
although there was a clear preference for inter-communal talks, Plaza did not 
exclude negotiations between the two motherlands.154 It was utopian for Turkey to 
expect that Makarios be excluded from active negotiations about the future of the 
island. By vehemently rejecting this report and by not accepting any form of 
negotiations in Cyprus itself, Ankara had given further credibility to Nicosia’s and 
Makarios’ arguments that there needed to be much greater recognition of Cyprus’ 
unfettered independence. 
The Turkish Government, however, was in no mood to show any such moderation. A 
few days later, therefore, it informed the UN Secretary-General that Plaza had 
exceeded his mandate without having obtained the consent of all parties concerned 
and that his services were perceived to be terminated.155 Although the UN Secretary-
General tried to defend his Mediator by explaining that Plaza had acted in complete 
accordance with his mandate under Resolution 186, he wholly failed to pacify 
Ankara’s reactions.156 
The immediate and negative of the Turkish Government gave little room for 
manoeuvre to the Turkish-Cypriot leaders. As in 1963, when President Makarios had 
proposed his ‘Thirteen Points’, the Turkish-Cypriot response was shaped by 
Ankara’s inflexibility.157 The Turkish-Cypriot leaders criticized the inadequate 
guarantees proposed by the Mediator for the protection of the Turkish-Cypriots, 
which they still argued that they could only be guaranteed under physical 
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separation.158 The report, they additionally claimed, sought to curtail the partnership 
status conferred on Turkish-Cypriots by the 1960 Constitution. However, according 
to British Intelligence Reports, “the Turkish-Cypriots would ideally have wished to 
take a less hostile attitude to the report but were compelled to do so by Ankara’s 
statement”.159 It was also suggestive that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership did not 
immediately endorse the Turkish position for the termination of Plaza’s mediation 
and privately certain moderate Turkish-Cypriot leaders did not fully reject the 
possibility of having direct talks with some Greek-Cypriot leaders.160  
Although initial indications coming from the Greek-Cypriot leaderships were 
favourable to the report, internal reactions were more mixed. Plaza’s call for a 
voluntary abandonment of enosis held within it the seed of considerable controversy. 
It was exploited by the right-wing press in order to attack the Greek-Cypriot 
leadership.161 The government’s ambivalence towards enosis was clearly exposed in 
the public domain since the Mediator had reported that “neither the President nor the 
Government of Cyprus, in their discussions with me as the Mediator, actually 
advocated for enosis as the final solution to the Cyprus Problem”.162 Instead, they 
had in private pursued the aim of an unfettered independence. The internal unrest 
between the right-wing and the Makarios government was intensified after Clerides’ 
statement of 31 March 1965 that: “time had come to stop telling people that enosis is 
round the corner ... we must be adult enough to give up wishful thinking, and realize 
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we have an adult population and treat them as such”.163 Extreme right-wingers called 
for Makarios’ resignation because he failed to renounce Clerides’ statement,164 whilst 
General Grivas was said to have commented “that damned priest is letting us all 
down”.165 Aware of the intense atmosphere in the aftermath of Plaza’s report, and in 
order to prevent any further causes of friction, The Economist reported that “western 
correspondents accepted an unusual degree of pressure not to write anything about 
this split out of which Grivas supporters could make capital”.166   
The official response of the Cyprus Government, which came a few days later, was 
nonetheless positive. Trying to appease concerns internally, however, the Cyprus 
Permanent Representative to the UN, Zenon Rossides, sent a letter to the 
Secretary-General in which he emphasised his country’s only reservation; it was 
inconceivable for the Cyprus Government to accept the self-restriction of their right 
for self-determination, and thus enosis, merely because of Turkey’s threats to use 
force in such a case.167 That element for the Greek-Cypriots was a clear violation of 
the UN Charter of Human Rights. 
Finally, as was the case with the Turkish-Cypriots, Greece’s reaction was also 
determined by the hostile reaction of Turkey. Although for the Greek leaders the 
Mediator’s findings were to some extent satisfactory, any acceptance of his proposal 
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for voluntary renunciation of enosis was domestically still perceived as political 
suicide.168 Hunt vividly recalls:  
While both Greek parties were hesitating and consulting each other 
they were saved from embarrassment by Ankara which, without giving 
the Turkish-Cypriots time to utter a word, denounced the whole plan 
and declared Galo Plaza was no longer acceptable as a mediator. This 
was not a clever move. The advice of the Turkish Foreign Service, a 
well-trained and shrewd body of men, had plainly been overruled by 
the government, which was weak in Parliamentary terms and 
accordingly thought it vital to take a strong line. They would have put 
Athens, though perhaps not Nicosia, in a much more difficult position if 
they had accepted the report at least as a basis for discussion. As it 
was the Greeks, much relieved, were able to put themselves on the 
right side with the United Nations.169  
Both Nicosia and Athens, therefore, expressed reservations about the enosis self-
renunciation but nevertheless, indicated their willingness for the continuation of 
Plaza’s mediation and of his constructive efforts to settle the Cyprus problem. 
Turkey’s rejection, however, forced the UN on the side-lines of the peace-making 
efforts once again and led to the awkward necessity of a new Mediator. The latter 
option, however, was rejected outright by Makarios.170 The impasse was, therefore, 
unavoidable and, as later proved, very difficult to be bridged. Up until 1968 it was 
impossible for the UN Secretary-General to achieve a compromise even on the 
question of a new Mediator. 
Conclusion 
The publication of this report marked the beginning of the end of the first UN 
mediating attempt in Cyprus. After several discussions to find a suitable exit from the 
new impasse, Plaza’s services effectively ended although he only officially resigned 
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in December 1965.171 However, he left an even more suspicious atmosphere. 
Interestingly, Oliver Richmond, a political scientist who dealt extensively with the UN 
peace-making in Cyprus, believes that Plaza’s failure had “set a dangerous 
precedent”.172  
There were two particular elements that should be kept in mind when examining the 
failure of Plaza’s mediation; the conclusions themselves, which infuriated the Turkish 
side, and the unfortunate timing of their publication. More specifically, the latter factor 
proved to be a double-edged sword. Although Plaza calculated that the Greek-
Cypriots at that time would be more amenable to accept inter-communal talks 
without pre-conditions and abandonment of enosis, it seems that he had 
underestimated the importance of prestige and honour concerns of the Turkish 
Government at that particular juncture. While the latter was in a weak position 
internally, the successful overtures of Ankara towards the Soviet Union in November 
1964 and January 1965 gave a great boost to the Turkish morale and confidence in 
its quest for federation. All these helped to consolidate on the part of Turkey an 
uncompromising attitude towards the Mediator and especially on the aspect of inter-
communal talks.  
Simultaneously, internal developments and the prevailing context on the island in 
February-March 1965 were further diminishing any chances for convincing the 
parties to show moderation. As will be explained in detail in the following chapter, 
after some months of relative calm, during the first months of 1965 inter-communal 
tension increased again due to several provocative statements and actions of the 
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Cyprus Government as well as due to the military confrontation of the National 
Guard and the Turkish-Cypriot fighters in various areas of the island. Adding to all 
these, Ankara’s strong views over the content of the Mediator’s report were gaining 
an extra edge in the run-up to the elections of October 1965. It should also be 
stressed that during this period both Britain and the US believed that they were 
unable to substantially press the Turkish Government not to reject Plaza’s 
suggestions in toto because their own leverage towards Turkey had diminished since 
the summer of 1964.173  
Accordingly, publishing a report in this shape under the circumstances, without any 
“coercive resources of major incentives” to convince Turkey to accept it, was to run a 
big risk.174 The UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs José Rölz Bennet, 
who tried to sound out the parties’ in order to take their approval for a new Mediator 
in 1966, explained that the Turkish side was particularly sensitive on the issue of 
making public the conclusions of any prospective Mediator.175 Perhaps, according to 
Rölz -Bennett, “if Plaza’s report had not been published and the Turks had been 
given time to consider it, they might have been less hostile towards it, especially as it 
came down against enosis”.176 Inevitably, the Plaza episode generated a deep 
mistrust of the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot side which was constantly reflected in 
Turkey’s foreign policy regarding Cyprus’ future.177 Until 1972, Turkey sought to 
prevent the direct involvement of the UN in the political aspects of Cyprus problem.  
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Along with the bad timing of the publication, the substance of the Mediator’s 
conclusions eventually brought mediation to naught. This element was decisive for 
the later development of the Cyprus problem. A key reason for this was that Plaza’s 
conclusions made Makarios even less keen to abandon what he saw as a position of 
strength, without first securing the de facto capitulation of the Turkish-Cypriots. 
Newly confident, in subsequent years Makarios never relaxed his pre-conditions over 
talks, whilst even after 1968, when he eventually accepted the inter-communal talks, 
his negotiating position was shaped on the basis of Plaza’s conclusions.178  
Although Turkey’s prompt and negative response was characterized as irrational by 
the Americans, Ankara had achieved its main goal from the UN mediation’s ultimate 
deadlock. It succeeded in downgrading the UN involvement on the political aspects 
of the Cyprus problem, while the focus again shifted to the bilateral Greco-Turkish 
dialogue initiated in May 1965. Despite their previous adamant position for the 
contrary, both Athens and Nicosia agreed to the motherlands’ dialogue and justified 
this volte-face on grounds that it was one of the Mediator’s suggestions. In that 
respect, therefore, it could be argued that indeed Plaza’s report constituted a face-
saving device for the initiation of negotiations. However, these negotiations were not 
conducted between the two communities but between the two motherlands, and 
were not on the basis of independence but on the basis of enosis.  
Meanwhile, due to the disagreement over the successor to Plaza between the Greek 
and Turkish-Cypriots, the UN Secretary-General was forced to downgrade his 
mediation to simply those of ‘good offices’ and to accept the primacy of the Greco-
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Turkish dialogue.179 This was a setback for the UN itself. Nonetheless, Makarios’ 
reluctance to accept any direct contacts with the Turkish-Cypriot leaders throughout 
the following years made even the good offices of the Secretary-General totally 
ineffective. The only active UN operation was UNFICYP, which tried to maintain at 
least a peaceful atmosphere on the island.   
What are the perceptions of this report almost fifty years after its publication? The 
Greek-Cypriots still perceive it as probably the most acceptable and balanced report 
that has emerged from the UN since the initiation of its efforts to the Cyprus problem. 
On the contrary, the critical perceptions of the Turkish-Cypriots remain rooted in the 
belief that Plaza was prejudiced in favour of the Greek-Cypriots. It is certainly hard to 
validate the assertion in one source that Plaza’s contribution was “successful in the 
face of extremely difficult circumstances”.180 Such a view probably reflects a desire 
on the UN’s own part to lay claims to a positive track record in the sphere of conflict 
resolution. Inevitably, the recollections of the protagonists themselves are prone to 
distortion and inaccuracy as to the real sequence of events. This is clearly illustrated 
by an interview that the Mediator himself gave in 1984 about his report. He recalled:  
[sic] Before I left I wrote a report on what I thought was a way to solve 
the problem between the two communities and hence between the two 
countries. That report is valid up to this day and has been used at the 
different meetings at the UN anytime the Cyprus problem has come 
up. I resigned at the time because the Greek Government, for internal 
political reasons, did not agree with the report. But they agreed since. 
Both communities have agreed with the report but at the time they did 
not .... The idea [of this report] was to give the Turks a greater hand in 
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the government of the country and also a greater presence in the area 
that they occupied themselves. So it would give them greater 
participation in [the] government and they did not think of themselves 
as being totally controlled and absorbed by the Greeks to a position 
where they might eventually become the owners of the country and the 
country added to Greece in what they called enosis; that is something 
the Greeks never accepted.181 
 
It seems that by 1984, intervening events had affected Plaza’s recollections. Despite 
the contested versions of all the players and the serious problems and limitations of 
the UN, goodwill and trust were the most important elements that were  absent from 
all the contested parties. Goodwill was absent before 1960; it was absent during this 
first mediation attempt; and it was to continue afterwards. Progress towards a 
settlement in the 1960s – as later – hinged on goodwill expressed openly in a power-
sharing state. Richard Haass, a Senior American policy-maker and political scientist 
closely involved in the peace-process in Northern Ireland, explains that distrust 
between communities is translated into an often unspoken preference for the status 
quo:182 indeed the fact that this preference for tactical reasons must remain 
unspoken on all sides helps to make a continuing situation even more muddled. 
Although events in the period 1964-1965 in some respect prevented an opportunity 
to row back from the alarming prospect opened up by the crisis of 1963-64, the 
prevailing context – or zeitgeist – of the time, both on the island and abroad, did not 
allow the parties to grasp the hazards of letting the status quo worsen. The 
stalemate that followed the Plaza episode led to the consolidation of communal 
separation and the perpetuation or establishment of divergent institutions as political 
formations. By the time a new UN initiative was to be launched in 1968, fresh 
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realities were to hamper the effort. This only validated the British prediction made in 
February 1965 that “inaction after report is presented would allow Makarios to 
consolidate present de facto position, continue erosion of constitution and weaken 
the Turkish community on the island by economic and other pressures”.183 This 
further deterioration in the likelihood of an agreed basis for a settlement in Cyprus 
will be explored in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
1964-1967: ‘Reshuffling the Deck’: The Restructuring of the 
State  
 
The dawn of 1964 had marked a new phase for the Cyprus question. The withdrawal of 
the Turkish-Cypriots from the state apparatus led to a reshuffling of cards in relation to 
the political problem. The Greek-Cypriots were left to govern the Republic of Cyprus, 
while the Turkish-Cypriots withdrew to enclaves where they administered their own 
areas. The former now had the opportunity to create the type of state they sought by 
amending all parts of the 1960 Constitution they considered problematic. Having as a 
legal shield the Security Council Resolution 186, this state would be internationally 
recognized and, whilst operating smoothly without the obstructing Turkish-Cypriot 
vetoes, further emphasis could be given to its economic development. These factors 
placed the Greek-Cypriot leadership in a position of strength vis-à-vis the Turkish-
Cypriots, who remained completely isolated during the first three years of separation.  
Therefore, the only element missing for the Cyprus Government to ensure its desired 
solution to the Cyprus question was to encourage, and even coerce, more and more 
Turkish-Cypriots to retreat into this ‘limbo-land’ without provoking a Turkish military 
response. In fact, in February 1965, the British High Commissioner commented: 
Makarios seems to be labouring under the delusion that if he avoids 
physical attacks on Turkish-Cypriots and does not declare enosis 
he can get away with any sort of political or economic pressures, 
and progressively erode Constitutional and Treaty provisions until 
he achieves an independent unitary state on lines which he and the 
Greek-Cypriots alone will determine.184   
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Wholly convinced that ‘the right is on our side’, both Makarios and the Greek-Cypriot 
leadership had overestimated their own ability to achieve their goals – either this was 
enosis or a purely Greek-Cypriot-led unitary state - along with the ultimate pliability of 
Turkish-Cypriots. By the same token, however, they critically miscalculated the 
determination of Turkish-Cypriots to cope with the isolation and the implications of the 
establishment of the de facto Turkish-Cypriot separate administration.  
This chapter will review the efforts made by the Cyprus Government from 1964 to 1967 
to restructure the state machinery by transforming it into what amounted to a purely 
Greek-Cypriot unitary state along the lines of Makarios’ previous ‘Thirteen Points’. That 
inevitably drove the Turkish-Cypriot leadership into setting up and gradually 
consolidating a separate de facto administration on the island. This presentation will 
make clear that the nature of the institutional evolution of the two communities during 
the three years in question - along with their socio-economic development and the lack 
of a strictly political settlement, presented in the following chapters - must be a vital 
aspect of the narrative. By 1968, when new efforts for settlement began, the conflicting 
issues were far more difficult and complicated than in 1964-5 during Plaza’s mediation.  
This chapter will analyse the most important changes in the three state pillars, i.e. 
executive, legislative and judicial. Meanwhile, there will be an analysis of the 
organization of the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves. Afterwards, particular emphasis will be 
given to two key junctures in the evolution of the Cyprus problem: the issue surrounding 
the holding of elections in 1965 and the termination of inter-communal cooperation in 
the judiciary in the summer of 1966. Finally, the critical effects of the reorganization of 
the Security Forces of the Cyprus Government will also be presented. Through this will 
be demonstrated that the military strengthening of the Republic became a double-edged 
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sword for the Government of Cyprus. This was the element which sowed the deep 
mistrust between Athens and Nicosia, whilst constantly leading to provocations and 
violent inter-communal incidents throughout the island. 
1960 Constitution revised: The implementation of the ‘Thirteen 
Points’ 
Immediately after the clash of Christmas 1963, and due to the withdrawal of all the 
Turkish-Cypriot officials and public servants to incipient enclaves, an administrative and 
constitutional gap had been created that had to be filled, or in some cases to be 
completely improvised. The Cyprus Government and the House of Representatives 
benefited from an important ‘tool’ to address the difficulties of the proper functioning of 
the state and the continuation of the legitimate existence of the Republic of Cyprus. The 
Supreme Court decision Attorney-General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim and 
others, in November 1964, recognized that developments in Cyprus generated “a 
necessity as a source of authority for acting in a manner not regulated by law but 
required, in prevailing circumstances, by supreme public interest, for the salvation of the 
State and its people”.185 Through this decision a legal precedent had been established 
which justified deviation from normal constitutional mandatory provisions. The otherwise 
compulsory separate majorities in the Parliament and the consent of the Vice-President 
for many decisions were no longer applicable. This made the work of the Parliament and 
the Government much easier. New institutions were established, new personnel 
appointed and new legislation adopted. In other words, a new process had begun which 
flowed naturally from Makarios’ famous ‘Thirteen Points’. For the Turkish-Cypriots, 
however, all these moves were a flagrant breach of the Constitution. Every new 
legislation and alteration triggered more or less the same reactions by the Turkish-
                                                          
185
 (1964) Cyprus Law Reports 195. http://www.uniset.ca/other/cs2/1964CLR195.html [Accessed on2 
December 2014] 
81 
 
Cypriot leadership: formal protests, sometimes stronger or milder, towards the UN and 
the Guarantor Powers about the alleged illegality of Greek-Cypriot actions. Our analysis 
will begin with the amendments to the executive and in particular, in the make-up of the 
Council of Ministers. We shall then note the modifications of the highly contested issue 
of local governance and the changes in the civil service of the Republic.  
The first significant modification in the executive authority was the formation of a new 
ministry (the eleventh) responsible for educational, cultural and religious affairs. Until 
then, those matters had been under the jurisdiction of two quasi-independent organs of 
the state, the two Communal Chambers. By late 1964, however, it was decided by the 
Cyprus Government that the Greek Communal Chamber should be dissolved, its 
responsibilities given to an executive portfolio within the new Ministry of Education and 
Culture, with Dr. Constantinos Spyridakis, the former head of the Communal Chamber, 
as Minister.  
The centralization process of these matters effectively met the previous criticism that a 
Communal Chamber which represented 80% of the population in Cyprus had no reason 
d'être mainly for two reasons. First and foremost, it hindered the unity of the state.186  
More importantly, however, it was proved that having such a separate organ responsible 
for the majority of the population in Cyprus, operating outside the Government’s main 
fiscal and social programming, created serious educational, economic, administrative 
and social setbacks to the state and an additional heavy burden to the Cypriot tax 
payer.187 
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Henceforth, it was obvious that the Government’s educational, cultural and fiscal 
policies had to be co-ordinated with its wider political programme. The work of the new 
Ministry was especially significant for the promotion of Hellenism within Greek-Cypriot 
schools. We should note that Spyridakis was a long-time ‘champion’ of Hellenic 
education. Well before the coming of Independence he had worked for the 
transformation of the colonial educational system towards a more ‘hellenocentric’ form 
of education by implementing the same annual syllabuses, books and types of schools 
as in Greece.188 By 1966 there were also rumours within the Greek-Cypriot press that 
Spyridakis, along with his counterpart in Athens, were discussing educational enosis. 
That option however, was soon proved to be practically and politically not feasible.189  
Spyridakis was a strong supporter of enosis and during his ten year tenure at the 
Ministry consistently opposed adopting policies or creating institutions that would 
undermine the purely Hellenic character of the state and thus could have led to the 
cultivation of a separate Cypriot consciousness.190 The Minister of Education expressed 
rigid and extreme enosists views in his speeches, often against the official line of his 
Government.191 Nonetheless, his appointment was highly significant according to an ex-
member of the Parliament and of the Patriotic Front, Mr. Lellos Demetriades.192 Setting 
up smoothly a newly born independent state, lacking solid foundations and with an 
embittered Greek-Cypriot community, had proved a very delicate task for Makarios. 
Unity within his community had to be preserved at all costs and the educational 
orientation of the government was essential to that goal. An educational policy 
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promoting Hellenic ideals was one way to avoid further divisions of the Greek-Cypriot 
community and thus the disruption of the Cyprus state. Nor was the Greek-Cypriot 
community in any mood to openly accept a common Cypriot consciousness.193 Yet the 
Spyridakis approach was to carry costs. 
Meanwhile, the new Ministry was not only about the strengthening and consolidation of 
the Hellenic character of the island. It also sought to have an important role in the efforts 
of the Cyprus Government towards economic growth. An important problem was the 
lack of skilled workers for several sectors of the economy and endemic under-
employment. Hence, Spyridakis introduced several innovative elements to Cyprus’ 
educational system in order to adapt to the developing nature of the island. Firstly, 
Career Centres for students were established in High Schools, in order to help and 
guide them towards productive sectors of the economy that needed skilful employees.194 
Additionally, in close collaboration with the Ministries of Labour and of Commerce, 
Industry and Tourism, a significant amount of government spending was allocated 
towards the creation of vocational training secondary schools and other relevant 
institutions of higher level education, such as the Higher Technical Institute or the Hotel 
and Catering Institute.195 In this way Spyridakis aimed to marry a very conservative 
Hellenic educational philosophy to more modern requirements.  
The creation of the eleventh Ministry was not the only modification in the composition of 
the Government’s Cabinet. Three months after the Turkish-Cypriot withdrawal from the 
administrative structures, Makarios announced the appointment of acting Ministers in 
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the three hitherto Turkish-Cypriot posts, of the Ministries of Defence, Health and 
Agriculture and Natural Resources, that remained vacant. These Ministries could not 
have remained ‘headless’ for long, while the Ministers who boycotted the Government 
could hardly have continued to be paid by the state’s funds.196 Additionally, Makarios 
was at pains to underscore Greek-Cypriot control on all the sectors of the Government 
so the refusal of the Turkish-Cypriots to return to their posts merely served his 
purposes. The US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, remarked that had Kuchuk and his 
ministers returned to their posts by March 1964, they could have been a serious 
embarrassment for Makarios.197 However, Rusk acknowledged that “Makarios' tactics 
will probably succeed if [the] Turk[ish]-Cypriots continue to sit on [their] hands and feel 
sorry for themselves”.198 It should be stressed, that both the British and Americans, 
along with several Turkish officials, had tried to convince the Turkish-Cypriot leadership 
to return to their posts precisely in order to forestall Makarios’ plans, especially after the 
establishment of the UNFICYP on the island, but to no avail.199 Arguably also, the 
persistent refusal of Turkish-Cypriots to return to their previous state responsibilities only 
served to give credence to Makarios’ Government’s allegations of a rebellious minority.  
 Although the above ministerial replacements were considered temporary, it was not 
until April 1966 that they became a legal reality. The Doctrine of Necessity was then 
applied for the official replacement of the Turkish-Cypriot Ministers. In 1966 therefore, 
Makarios appointed George Tombazos as the new Minister of Agriculture and Natural 
Resources, and assigned Tassos Papadopoulos (a future President) to the Health 
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portfolio along with his existing duties as Minister of Labour. This move was considered 
as a double provocation by Kuchuk, who appealed to the UN Secretary-General, and by 
Turkey which ineffectively threatened to use its treaty rights to restore the constitutional 
order on the island.200 Kuchuk claimed that these appointments were a fait accompli, an 
effort to obliterate the partner status enshrined in the 1960 Constitution and reduce 
Turkish-Cypriots to a ‘mere’ minority. In addition, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership believed 
that Tombazos was especially hostile to the Turkish-Cypriot community and had been 
selected partly because of this.201 The British officials shared the view that this 
appointment was a reward for Tombazos for his former services during the EOKA 
struggle in the 1950s and the inter-communal struggle of 1963.202 Nonetheless, it should 
be stressed that Makarios avoided appointing a new Greek-Cypriot Minister of Defence 
(or even a Greek-Cypriot Director-General for that Ministry) since this was a particularly 
sensitive portfolio for both communities. The formal replacement of that Turkish-Cypriot 
Minister would have provided a more obvious move away from the status quo.203 
Besides these changes within the Executive, additional amendments were pursued in 
the local government structures and public service. Undoubtedly, one of the major 
constitutional problems created in the aftermath of independence was that of the 
separate municipalities in the main towns of Cyprus. The local governance and the 
municipalities had been paralyzed since 1962 when the relevant temporary law expired 
and an agreement between the two leaderships on this issue proved impossible. The 
Greek-Cypriots argued that the separation in the local government should be abolished, 
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while for the Turkish-Cypriots, and mainly Ankara, this was a ‘red line’. However, the 
Constitutional provision for double municipalities in the five main towns of Cyprus 
constituted a major administrative and financial burden for both communities and the 
state’s funds. Inevitably, that complex issue, proved to be the Trojan Horse of 
separatism, as Diana Markides has fully evoked.204 The changes that the Greek-Cypriot 
side wanted to pursue on this matter were eventually set in place in November 1964, 
when the House of Representatives voted the Municipal Corporation Law of 1964. This 
abolished the separate municipal councils in the main towns and made provision for 
common rolls for Greek and Turkish-Cypriots in future elections for the local government 
officials.205 This was in contradiction with Article 173 of the Constitution, leading to the 
usual Turkish-Cypriot protest to the UN.206   
Although the new legislation for local governance did not have any immediate effects 
and there were no forthcoming municipal elections, the amendments within the Public 
Service were of practical significance. Throughout 1964, the Government planned 
important changes within the internal structure of the public sector, aiming at a full re-
organization. New legislation and a new Code of Conduct were adopted, in order to 
ensure the better safeguarding of labour rights/benefits and more efficiency overall.207 
Moreover, the structure of the Public Service Commission, the organ which according to 
the Constitution was responsible for the appointment, status and promotions of the civil 
servants, was restructured. According to Article 124, this Commission had ten members, 
seven Greek and three Turkish-Cypriots, all appointed jointly by the President and Vice-
President. However, on 9 December 1965 the Parliament enacted an amendment 
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envisaging that this should be constituted by five members appointed solely by the 
President.208 This law was initially stated to be provisional but the later modifications of 
October 1966 and June 1967 made it permanent. The enactment of the December 1965 
law marked the chronological implementation of the ‘Thirteen Points’.209 Having 
concluded all the important changes in the state apparatus, Makarios set in motion what 
was in effect a purely Greek-Cypriot state, with its main remaining concern the 
economic enhancement of the Republic and – since this was an inherent goal of the 
wider strategy - the eventual capitulation of the Turkish-Cypriots. Consistent with his 
usual tactics, Kuchuk on all these amendments appealed to the UN Secretary-General, 
protesting about the violations of the 1960 Constitution by the Greek-Cypriots.210 
At the lower levels of the public service, by 1963 the constitutional staff ratio of 70:30% 
was impossible to implement fully because of the lack of fully qualified Turkish-Cypriots 
employees. Although after December 1963, the Cyprus Government appeared 
determined to abolish this problematic ratio,211 in practice it was unnecessary since all 
Turkish-Cypriot public servants had already abandoned their posts and, according to the 
Minister of Finance, their replacement was not immediately necessary.212 Their 
withdrawal naturally led to the termination of their salaries.213 Zafer Ali Zihni, the 
President of the Cyprus Turkish Civil Servants, made a series of protests to Britain. By 
early 1964 he persistently declared that termination of their salaries was unjustifiable 
since the Turkish-Cypriot civil servants continued to “serve the public in offices which 
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have had to be set up in the Turkish sector with the object of rendering essential public 
services to the besieged Turks to whom such essential public services have been 
denied by the Greek elements of the Government”.214 Despite the negative financial 
consequences, he highlighted his community’s determination: 
not to fall into the trap of [the] Greeks and not resume attending 
their offices in the Greek sectors even if the Greeks give 
assurances as to their safety. Previous experience has shown that 
assurances given by the Greeks cannot be relied upon. In any 
event it is quite out of the question to work in the midst of EOKA 
infested hives which is virtually what Government offices have 
become since Independence.215  
The Society of the Turkish Civil Servants tried repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, to be 
compensated by the Cyprus Government for their services. A few months after de facto 
separation, however, Ankara gave them the very much needed financial support. In 
particular, it provided £30 per month for each civil servant, while by the end of 1965 this 
amount was increased to £40.216 The fact that in some ways, very reluctantly, ordinary 
Turkish-Cypriots felt driven to put reliance on Turkey as a ‘motherland’ was one of the 
several causes that Makarios’ strategy to economically grind down the Turkish-Cypriot 
community, finally produced the opposite effect from his desired outcomes. After 1963 
Turkish-Cypriots were totally dependent, both politically and economically, on Ankara, 
which provided them with at least the minimum resources needed to prevent their 
capitulation to the Greek-Cypriots. By the same token, the official Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership came progressively to ‘dance to the tune’ of Ankara. 
Conversely, there were two important exceptions from the general Turkish-Cypriot 
voluntary withdrawal from the Public Service in 1963; firstly, the judicial officers and 
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servants of the courts remained in place until June 1966 (to be discussed later) and 
secondly, a very sensitive sector, the Diplomatic Service of Cyprus. Τhe Turkish-Cypriot 
diplomats did not voluntarily withdraw but some of them were gradually dismissed by the 
Cyprus Government on the grounds that they would undermine the interests of their 
country both internally and abroad.217 In particular, by 1963 there were thirteen Turkish-
Cypriot senior diplomats and some more junior Turkish-Cypriot diplomats employed in 
the Diplomatic Corps. A year later, eight of the senior diplomats were dismissed, 
although the other five remained in place. The remaining Turkish-Cypriot diplomats were 
in posts mainly in London and in Ankara. Although these were perceived as very 
important positions, those who occupied them, of whatever ethnicity, were unable to 
make any practical difference to the conduct of Cyprus’ interests.218 Quite apart from the 
significance of diplomacy, it may be said that the Cyprus Government’s actions in this 
sphere revealed the ‘jobs for the boys’ – or rather jobs for the professional Greek-
Cypriot elite – that was also part of the push to new state formation in Cyprus after 
1963-1964.  
The organization of the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves 
The inter-communal separation of 1963 had marked a new era for the Turkish-Cypriots. 
Immediately after the December 1963 clash, the Turkish-Cypriots were confined in the 
enclaves formed in several strategic locations of the island. The creation of the enclaves 
was not a static process; from 1964 until 1967 there was a constant attempt of the 
Turkish-Cypriot fighters to effectively extend their control in wider geographical areas, 
causing severe clashes with the Cyprus Government’s militias.219 U Thant in December 
1964 reported that the enclaves covered 1.5% of the island’s territory with 59,000 
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population. Nevertheless, in 1970-1971, when Richard Patrick conducted his field 
research these figures were significantly different. The enclaves were geographically 
expanded and the percentage of Turkish-Cypriots living outside the Cyprus 
Government’s control was probably around 90%.220 This was to be a remarkable turn-
around from the still very ‘mixed’ demography that had prevailed before 1963. 
As soon as separation was imposed, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership decided to set up its 
own administrative structures for the areas under its control. Using as a pretext that it 
was not safe for them to attend their posts in the Greek-controlled sectors, the political 
and military Turkish-Cypriot leadership had either convinced or forced several Turkish-
Cypriots – civil servants or not – to abandon their previous jobs and join the 
administrative bodies in the enclaves.221 By May 1964 those structures had already 
been established and manned. In Nicosia, the biggest enclave, an executive body of 
thirteen officials, the General Committee, had been formulated. Head of the Committee 
was the Vice-President of the Republic, Fazil Kuchuk, and the other participants were 
former members of the Government such as the Turkish-Cypriot Ministers, the members 
of the Parliament, the Judiciary and the Executive Committee of the Turkish Communal 
Chamber.222 As a second tier of the Turkish-Cypriot administration, the District 
Committees were established in the five main towns, Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, 
Larnaca and Paphos. Municipal and village councils were placed under the District 
Committees. Executive decrees issued by Kuchuk and the District officers, along with 
regulations issued by the Communal Chamber and the Turkish-Cypriot members of the 
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Parliament were used for the administration of these areas.223 Nonetheless, after 
summer 1965 the latter two (members of the Communal Chamber and of the 
Parliament) formed a quasi-parliament issuing ‘official legislation’ for the enclaves.224 
The basic ‘legal framework’ for the operation of the General Committee was the 1960 
Constitution and all the decrees and ‘laws’ issued by the Turkish-Cypriot administration 
after 1963.225  
Kuchuk insisted that his community was forced to form a separate administration 
because there was no other way for maintaining all the essential public services.226 The 
main task of the General Committee and the Communal Chamber was the issue of 
decrees regulating daily affairs. Nonetheless, by the end of 1964 the Communal 
Chamber was effectively responsible for the collection of the income tax from Turkish-
Cypriots, the issuing of motor licenses and the collection of all relevant fees.227 That was 
another step to strengthen both the economic viability and the consolidation of their 
separate administrative structures.  
One of the biggest problems of the General Committee, however, was its practical 
inability to exert effective control over the majority of the enclaves. In fact, the enclaves 
were scattered throughout the island and due to their policy of isolation, there was no 
proper telephone communication or postal services between the Central Authorities and 
all the other enclaves and villages. Thus, in most enclaves the Turkish military 
commanders and Turkish-Cypriot fighters assumed a de facto administrative 
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leadership.228 According to Patrick, the administration of the enclaves was of “a civil-
military synthesis”.229 This inevitably had profound effects not only on the nature of 
Turkish-Cypriot decision-making, but also in the cultivation of a specific culture of 
Turkish-Cypriot politics. Yael Navaro-Yashin characterizes this culture as “the spirit of 
the TMT” and the culture of terror which to some extent exists until nowadays.230 
The organization of the Turkish-Cypriot fighters was assigned to a Turkish army general 
with the nom de guerre ‘Bozkurt’ (the Grey Wolf).231 The first ‘Bozkurt’ was Kemal 
Coskun, who came to Cyprus in 1962 as an attaché of the Turkish Embassy and had a 
determining effect on the Turkish-Cypriot re-organization within the enclaves. 
Denktash’s mouthpiece, the newspaper Zafer, declared that Coskun was the real leader 
of the Turkish-Cypriots and not the “self-seeking” Vice-President, Kuchuk.232 Certainly 
most of the key political and military decisions were taken by him, making Kuchuk 
something of a figurehead within his community.233 In March 1966, the Cyprus 
Government accused Coskun of being the master-mind behind bomb explosions in the 
recently built oil refinery in Larnaca and he was declared as persona non grata.234 A 
year later, the Turkish Government recalled him from Cyprus allegedly because of the 
Kuchuk-Coskun rivalry, although there were rumours that this was not the sole or main 
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reason.235 Nonetheless, Coskun’s successors did not manage to establish the same 
political authority within the enclaves and the main reason for that was Denktash’ return 
on the island in April 1968. It was reported that since Denktash’s return, the latter had 
managed to confine Bozkurt’s powers mainly on the military and security aspects of the 
enclaves, reducing thus his political powers.236 
Another practical problem of the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves during the first months of 
isolation was the large number of displaced persons. Inevitably,   Turkish-Cypriots who 
believed that it was no longer safe for them to stay in their villages decided to abandon 
them and move into the enclaves. For the Cyprus Government, this movement was 
organized and encouraged by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership as a measure to facilitate 
their plans for partition/federation. The Turkish-Cypriot leadership rejected these claims. 
According to Patrick’s conclusions, however, although there was probably not official 
administrative organization to direct the ‘refugee’ movements “there is ample proof that 
Turk-Cypriot political and military leaders controlled the return of refugees to their 
former homes”.237 The ‘refugees’ issue was one of the main obstacles to the ‘return of 
normality’ in the island. As will be explained in subsequent chapters, both the Greek and 
the Turkish-Cypriot leaderships exploited this phenomenon to make political profit out of 
it. Firstly, the Cyprus Government from 1965 until 1967 promulgated plans and actions 
to facilitate the rehabilitation of the displaced people under its own terms, as a measure 
to weaken and demoralize the Turkish-Cypriot resistance. Conversely, from 1968 until 
1972, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership used the Greek-Cypriot dilatory tactics on the 
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facilitation of the refugees’ return as an indication of Greek-Cypriot dishonesty and 
sinister motives. 
Lastly, it should be stressed that besides those living inside the enclaves there was also 
a considerable remnant of the Turkish-Cypriot population that continued to live in their 
villages in areas under the Government’s control – at least until the late-1960s. There 
were two perceptions about the reasons as to why these Turkish-Cypriots did not move 
into the enclaves. Firstly, many Turkish-Cypriots remained in their villages because they 
still had very good relations with their Greek-Cypriot neighbours and wanted to resist 
their leadership’s partition plans. On the other hand, Patrick argues that many Turkish-
Cypriots remained outside the enclaves because they lived in areas which the Greek-
Cypriots were simply unable or unwilling to penetrate.238 He continues that most 
Turkish-Cypriot villages that were under government control did not really recognize the 
legitimacy of the Cyprus Government and remained outside the government’s de facto 
administrative structure.239 Those villages were more or less administered on their own. 
In such cases, the Government’s main concern was for the villages to remain quiet and 
to pay all of their taxes and fees to the government bodies.240 
In spite of their own internal cleavages, and indeed to overcome them, the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership and the mainland military commanders constantly sought to make 
use of Greek-Cypriot policies to justify actions that in effect further consolidated the 
administrative separation of the two communities. Two of the most important events, the 
issue of the electoral law of 1965 and the termination of the judicial inter-communal 
cooperation in June 1966, will now be discussed.  
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The electoral law of 1965  
As already stated, up to the summer of 1965 the Cyprus Government had introduced 
several important modifications to the state apparatus. An important matter that sparked 
further political problems between the two communities and diplomatic unrest between 
the Guarantor Powers was the issue of the forthcoming end of the five-year tenure of 
the executive and legislative authority in August 1965. The crucial question for the 
Cyprus Government was whether then to hold the Presidential and Parliamentary 
elections. The debate about the feasibility of elections sprang from an interview that 
President Makarios gave in early February 1965 stating:  
I think …. that the term of office of the Government should not be 
prolonged beyond the period which people gave it a mandate 
through elections. People should be called upon to vote. But 
elections will not be held under the separatist provisions of the 
defunct Zurich-London Agreements. Electoral law should be 
passed providing for unified elections on the basis of a Common 
Roll. People will be called upon to vote as a whole, and not 
separately as Greeks and Turks.241  
Makarios’ statement triggered several reactions primarily because of his aim to press on 
with elections, but most importantly because of his intention to use common electoral 
rolls for the two communities, instead of separate, as envisaged in Article 63 of the 
Constitution. It was even reported that high ranking members of the Greek-Cypriot 
leadership, such as the President of the Parliament and the Attorney-General were not 
aware of Makarios’ intentions.242 Then again, Grivas, the Commander in Chief of the 
Cyprus Army, was opposed to any elections because the effect was bound to be the 
further consolidation of independence rather than enosis.243  
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According to the British, the timing of this announcement was crucial. Makarios decided 
to announce his intensions when criticism against his handling of the Cyprus issue, 
especially from the right-wing, was gaining ground. Constant accusations about his 
policies and his prevarication, even evasion, towards enosis from the right-wing press 
were strengthened after the notorious Soviet statement of January 1965, which leaned 
towards the Turkish argument for federation. Therefore, in order to avert the danger of 
factionalism that was increasing against him and in order to “re-create unanimity within 
his community”, Makarios wanted to direct public attention towards the amendment the 
electoral law and thus, towards his policy designed to nibble away at the Turkish-Cypriot 
position.244 
The Greek Government was also taken by surprise by Makarios’ statement because 
there had been no prior consultation. At this point, it should be noted that the relations 
between the Greek Premier, George Papanderou, and the Cypriot President were 
already strained both due to differences over the previous Acheson episode and 
generally their divergent opinions on the Cyprus issue.245 In order to avoid political 
embarrassment for its inability to control Makarios, the Greek Government felt it had no 
choice but to ostensibly go along with the Cyprus’ Government plan for elections.246 This 
was a classic example of Makarios’ habit of seeking to force the Greek Government’s 
hand to publicly agree with his own strategies, and thus, by a seemingly endless series 
of faits accomplis, make Athens a mere follower of his decisions.  This clashed directly 
with Papandreou’s thesis of Athens as the ‘National Centre’ from where all decisions 
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should derive.247 After the February statement, however, the latter privately tried to 
persuade Makarios to avoid holding them at least at that point. Following bilateral 
consultations, they came to an agreement of deferring the final decision until May 
1965.248 It was not only Athens, however, that tried to dissuade Nicosia from acting 
provocatively. U Thant also had advised the Cypriot Foreign Minister to avoid holding 
elections under a common roll.249 
Both the Turkish Government and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership reacted strongly on 
Makarios’ statement. Elections on a common roll in their eyes meant the official 
abandonment of the 1960 Constitution and the Zurich-London Agreements. This issue, 
therefore, was perceived by Turkey – and also by Britain – as the most fundamental 
challenge to the 1960 Constitutional structure.250 A common roll would provide a new 
ace up Makarios’ sleeve. Specifically, it was believed that Makarios could have then 
legally based his Government’s legitimacy on the new electoral mandate and not on the 
1960 Constitution, in effect asserting beyond contradiction its defunct character.251 The 
possible participation of some moderate Turkish-Cypriots residing in the Government-
controlled areas could strengthen this contention. Feridun Erkin, Turkey’s Foreign 
Minister, stated that Makarios again revealed his true intentions of destroying the basic 
principles of the constitution and sow the seeds of partition. Meanwhile, he attempted 
again to actively implicate Greece and Britain in this dispute, threatening that “the 
responsibility for the dangerous development which this situation will produce will fall 
entirely on Makarios and on the other Guarantor Powers who should prevent him from 
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pursuing this course”.252 Osman Orek, the Turkish-Cypriot Minister of Defence, initially 
commented that if elections were held by the Greek-Cypriots, then the Turkish-Cypriots 
would proceed to have their own elections and declare a new state with the Turkish 
Communal Chamber as their Parliament.253 Nonetheless, he also explained to the 
British High Commissioner, Major-General Alec Bishop and the Political Advisor of 
UNFICYP, Carlos Bernardes, that several Turkish-Cypriot leaders had receptively 
thought of the possibility that AKEL might invite them to participate in elections on the 
basis of unified rolls. As he explained, AKEL claimed to have the support of the two 
fifths of the electorate of the Greek-Cypriots and probably one fifth of the Turkish-
Cypriots. In such a case, AKEL might conceivably win the elections. Therefore, if the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership could reach an agreement beforehand with AKEL about the 
status of Turkish-Cypriot community after elections - a guaranteed separate identity and 
a large measure of autonomy within a federal state, as supported by the Soviets - then 
their leadership could accept AKEL running the rest of the island as it wished.254 Such a 
scenario was to revive ideals of an AKEL/Turkish-Cypriot orientation that had broken up 
in the later 1940s and 1950s, if not before, but which had certain folkloric status. There 
is no evidence that AKEL at this time had any such intention or plan to part company 
from President Makarios’ supporters.255 Nor is it likely that the Western powers or 
Greece would allow a communist party, to rule the island, even if that meant a lasting 
agreement on the Cyprus problem between the Greeks and Turkish-Cypriots. 
Nevertheless, Makarios now had to thoroughly calculate all the pros and cons of 
proceeding to elections. In addition to all the modifications he pursued within the state’s 
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structure so far, elections under a common roll would have emphatically confirmed that 
Makarios was perfectly able to fully transform the Republic of Cyprus into an 
independent unitary state without separatist provisions and with the Greek-Cypriot 
community as the sole master of its house. Furthermore, without the renewal of its 
mandate, the Cyprus Government would probably lack solid legal foundation. This could 
have become a valuable argument for Makarios’ opponents both within Cyprus and 
abroad. 
Conversely, he also had to assess that proclamation of elections would considerably 
sharpen his differences with two internal fronts; the Turkish-Cypriot leaders, who had 
already began protesting, and the Greek-Cypriot extreme right under General Grivas. 
An electoral campaign at that stage would have been another validation or expression of 
Cyprus as a self-standing independent state. Bearing also in mind the public debate that 
followed the publication of Plaza’s report and the internal upheaval cultivated by the 
rivalry between the political and military leadership of the Greek-Cypriot community, as 
we shall see later, a catastrophic disruption between the supporters of instant enosis 
and Makarios’ followers would have been certain.   
It was not until 20 July 1965 that the Government clarified its final decisions about this 
issue; on 23 July during an extraordinary plenary session, the House of Representatives 
would have extended with a legislative act the term of office both of the President and 
the members of the Parliament.256 Besides this extension, a new electoral law would 
have also been put for vote, with interim provisions for elections under unified electoral 
rolls for the two communities.257 On the hearing of these decisions, the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership requested from Carlos Bernardes to notify the President of the House that 
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the Turkish-Cypriot MPs wished to attend Parliament on that occasion. However, 
Clerides responded that their request would only be accepted if they agreed on three 
conditions: a) acceptance that the laws enacted by the House hitherto will be applicable 
to the whole island, including the de facto Turkish areas, b) regular future participation in 
the normal business of the House and c) recognition that the House no longer worked 
on the basis of separate majorities.258 Not surprisingly, on 23 July, three Turkish-Cypriot 
MPs, Umit Suleiman, Djemil Ramadan and Ahmet Berberoglu, who met with Clerides, 
rejected these conditions and said that they were ready to return only if the 1960 
constitution was fully applied.259 
Hence, on 23 July 1965, during the afternoon plenary session of Parliament, the two 
Bills were duly voted by Greek-Cypriot MPs, without any serious opposition.260 AKEL 
was the only political party that expressed concern about one element of the new 
electoral law: the majority voting system. More specifically AKEL members argued that 
this system was a remaining legacy of the colonial governance and now had to be 
amended into a proportional voting system.261 This could benefit smaller parties, 
principally AKEL itself, which presently had only five representatives. In fact, since any 
future Turkish-Cypriot parties would have benefited from such provision under unified 
rolls, the Greek-Cypriots might have thrown a substantive concession to the other side. 
In the event AKEL voted the law without pressing the amendment.262 The law that 
extended the term of the President and of the House, but not of the Vice-President or 
Turkish-Cypriot MPs who lacked any legal status for the Greek-Cypriots, made explicit 
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reference that this would last for a maximum of twelve months. Hence, elections had to 
be arranged at some point until August 1966.263  
Once again the positions taken by the parties concerned on these laws were polarizing. 
All of them talked about a fait accompli. As regards the Turkish-Cypriots, Kuchuk’s first 
reaction was to send a formal protest about the illegality of the Greek-Cypriot laws to the 
British High Commissioner.264 Representing the voices of the extreme Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership, Denktash asked for partition and the declaration of a separate state. The 
official Turkish-Cypriot policy, and Ankara’s instructions, nevertheless, remained 
opposed to de jure separation. Instead, they continuously stressed that they did not wish 
to act outside the existing constitution except when absolutely necessary.265 In this case 
they claimed to have no other option than to convene on 23 July an extraordinary 
meeting of the Turkish Communal Chamber and of the Turkish-Cypriot MPs, in which 
they voted a ‘law’ extending their own and the Vice-President’s terms of office. 
Simultaneously however, they decided that this first formal ‘legislation’ should be 
promulgated with a Turkish-Cypriot Gazette.266 According to the Turkish-Cypriot MP, 
Suleiman: 
The decision to publish the Gazette now, rather than say, a year 
ago, was due to the refusal of the President of the House [of 
Representatives] to allow the Turkish-Cypriot members to 
participate in the debates on the electoral bill and the extensions of 
terms of office laws. This is regarded by the Turkish-Cypriots as the 
breaking point after which they must protect their position by 
separate action even if this involves some departure from the 
Constitution.267 
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This move therefore, had a deeper meaning regarding the administrative organization of 
the Turkish-Cypriots. For the first time the Communal Chamber and the Turkish-Cypriot 
MPs acted as a separate ‘parliament’. Meanwhile, the Turkish-Cypriot General 
Committee from now on would use the Gazette as a new tool in order to make public 
and enforce all of its future ‘legislative’ acts. That inevitably meant a further step towards 
the consolidation of de facto partition. 
Athens, which was amidst of a serious political crisis then, was also disturbed by the 
new legislation of the Cyprus Government. The former was piqued, since according to 
Greek officials, Makarios acted contrary to his promise. Particularly, the Greek 
Ambassador in Cyprus, Menelaos Alexandrakis, stated that on 5 July, during their 
meeting, Makarios promised that he would not take such an action before consulting 
Athens. Greek leaders then had agreed that “this kind of brinkmanship is dangerous … 
and Makarios should not confront us with a fait accompli”.268 Henceforth the most 
important thing for Athens was to restrain the Cyprus Government from giving effect to 
the new electoral law.269 Except from its own domestic crisis, Greece was at the 
moment engaged in bilateral negotiations with Turkey regarding the Cyprus issue and 
feared that this development would negatively affect its position towards the 
negotiations.  
These developments also created a lot of suspicion both in Britain and the UN. They 
both believed that Nicosia’s action appeared to have been taken in bad faith, while 
Bernardes was constantly expressing the UN’s anxiety over the Greek-Cypriot 
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moves.270 Britain perceived that the Greek-Cypriots deliberately misled them about their 
true intentions on the matter, while sending a formal protest to the Cyprus Government 
under the pretext of the Treaty of Guarantee. Makarios, however, consistent to his 1963 
declaration that the Treaties were no longer applicable, replied that Britain’s protest had 
constituted an unacceptable interference in the domestic affairs of the Republic of 
Cyprus.271 Yet, as already stated, this gambit gained no credence in Britain, Turkey or 
the international community in general. The High Commissioner had a revealing 
conversation with Makarios regarding this development. David Hunt complained that the 
Government’s actions were provocative and contrary to the Security Council Resolution 
of 4 March 1964 and particularly its provision to avoid any actions that could worsen the 
situation. Makarios’ perceptions, as indicated in the following abstract of Hunt’s report, 
were totally different: 
[Makarios] reacted strongly to [the] reference to the UN resolutions. 
These, he said, referred only to fighting and he had scrupulously 
kept the peace. I said that I could not agree with this interpretation; 
and [the] enactment of the electoral law was as provocative to the 
Turkish-Cypriots and to Ankara as any shooting incident. He said 
the Turks could not keep Cyprus forever in a state of suspended 
animation. “What are we to do? The Constitution is unworkable and 
you say we cannot alter it and get onto a proper legal basis 
because Turks will stop us”. I said what was [the] need for electoral 
law since they had passed a law on [the] same day extending the 
tenure of Deputies and officers of State. It was the fact that it was 
so unnecessary that made it so provocative. He said that the law 
providing for extension was just as unconstitutional as the electoral 
law so why was I not protesting against that? I said all departures 
from Constitution were no doubt deplorable but some were more 
provocative than others. He said Cyprus is a sovereign state, a 
member of the UN, and did not believe that the UN would agree to 
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restrictions being put upon it which strangled its political life. Nor did 
he admit the right of Britain, Greece and Turkey to intervene.272 
The Government’s action was indeed provocative and unnecessary at that moment. 
Nevertheless, removing one more contentious and divisive provision of the 1960 
constitution as the separate electoral rolls was a matter of principle for the Cyprus 
Government and one of its public commitments. It was impossible, therefore, to 
retreat without losing face. In any case Makarios was confident that he still enjoyed 
considerable diplomatic support from abroad, and if a Security Council was convened 
for that issue, he could have definitely mobilized this support to his Government’s 
favour. 
Finally, Ankara perceived this new electoral law as the most serious provocation from 
Makarios’ Government and asked both Greece and Britain to meet under Article 4 of the 
Treaty of Guarantee to discuss this issue. Greece however, refused to meet under this 
pretext.273 Ankara decided then to formally protest and warn about the consequences of 
Makarios’ actions to the ‘Greek-Cypriot administration’ with a Note Verbale and 
simultaneously asked for a Security Council meeting to discuss the new 
developments.274 Ankara believed that Makarios’ previous diplomatic advantage, gained 
by Plaza’s conclusions, was to some extent faltering because his recent actions had 
alarmed many people outside the island.275 Nonetheless, both the British and Americans 
tried unsuccessfully to warn Ankara that a Security Council debate would probably 
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benefit the Greek-Cypriots, since the Security Council was traditionally reluctant to get 
involved with the interpretation issues of the constitution.276 
It was not only Ankara, however, that called for a Security Council meeting. Nicosia had 
also requested for a Security Council debate on the grounds that Turkey was once 
again interfering within the internal affairs of the Cyprus Government.277 A Security 
Council meeting about the electoral law was eventually convened on 3 August. It was 
notable that before the debate, Greek-Cypriot diplomacy adopted a new tactic. The 
Cypriot Foreign Minister had contacts with British and American officials during which he 
made direct threats that unless diplomatic support was not given to the Republic of 
Cyprus, there would be consequences both for the British bases and for the US radio 
installations in Cyprus.278  
The intense debate that followed between the interested parties led to an anodyne 
Resolution which reaffirmed UN Security Council Resolution 186 and called on the 
parties to refrain from any actions that could worsen the situation in Cyprus.279 The 
Cyprus Government claimed victory and a personal success for the Foreign Minister, 
Spyros Kyprianou – who according to Hunt, was presented at home “as the hero of a 
valiant fight against heavy odds”.280Nevertheless, the Turkish-Cypriots also drew 
comfort.281 Indeed, even some of Makarios’ Greek-Cypriot critics on the right-wing 
shared the view that the only effect of the UN debate was to further circumscribe the 
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Cyprus Government’s freedom of action for the conduct of elections in the future.282 To 
some extent this was probably true since elections were not held until early 1968, and 
even then the 1965 legislation was skilfully not used.283 It should also be noted that 
Kyprianou’s ‘warnings’ towards the British and American officials had irritated rather 
than affected the latters’ position during the debate.284 
What was really the outcome of the new electoral law on the island and on the Cyprus 
issue in particular? Although formal complaints to the UN was the ‘default’ response of 
the Turkish-Cypriots each time the Greek-Cypriots amended the constitutional 
provisions, this new legislation triggered stronger reactions and had deeper implications. 
This is why we have traced it in such detail. Most importantly, however, once more the 
Greek-Cypriot actions had given to the Turkish-Cypriot leadership a pretext to further 
consolidate administrative partition by officially transforming their own Communal 
Chamber to a legislative assembly and creating new mechanisms to underpin a 
separate administration. The Turkish-Cypriot newspapers, themselves absolutely critical 
in shaping a distinctive ‘voice’ for a minority perceiving itself as now increasingly 
‘besieged’, were handed a propaganda advantage.285 From the start of 1966 they 
stepped up their campaign towards the declaration of a separate state within Cyprus 
underpinned by the military contribution of Turkey.286 
Nevertheless, in some other respects the outcome reinforced Makarios’ position both 
internally and abroad. Once more he had in effect acted entirely unilaterally, and had 
taken both Greece and the other Guarantor Powers by surprise. In spite of the right-
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wing criticism, being able to dictate developments on the ground was his great 
advantage. By ‘holding tight’ to Resolution 186 and to the previous Mediator’s report, 
Makarios had further consolidated the existence of the Republic of Cyprus as defined by 
his own vision enshrined in the historic amendments. This was definitely a victory. In 
addition, he could use the developments of that summer in his search for allies in the 
forthcoming UN General Assembly, in which the Cyprus problem and Galo Plaza report 
were going to be discussed. Targeting the Afro-Asian states, with their sensitivity to 
issues of sovereignty and self-determination, Makarios could argue that events had 
demonstrated that Cyprus provided a classic instance of a new state struggling to assert 
its own legitimate rights.  
Fragile agreement on the Judiciary  
The Turkish-Cypriot judges had also withdrawn from their posts in December 1963. Yet, 
crucially a few months later the Minister of Justice and the Attorney-General along with 
the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot judges and leadership resumed inter-communal 
cooperation in the still-unified Courts with certain modifications to 1960 practice. It was 
vital that the judiciary was an independent and impartial authority and the majority of the 
professional judges of both ethnicities operated above political considerations. 
Apparently judicial officers from both communities still enjoyed cordial relations.287 This 
agreement was very important since it offered a constructive basis for the resumption of 
inter-communal contacts in other sectors of state. Unfortunately, the eruption of petty 
violence on the ground between rival militias and the resulting combustible atmosphere 
meant that such judicial co-operation did not survive beyond the summer of 1966. In 
retrospect, the fact that legal institutions ultimately failed to provide a counter-model to 
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the disintegrative dynamic in other spheres of Cypriot public life was to be highly 
significant. 
To begin with, the constitution envisaged that judicial practice was based on communal 
criteria. That is, the judges tried cases with litigants from their own community, while in 
mixed cases the trial was conducted by judges from both communities. In addition, there 
were two supreme Courts - the Supreme Constitutional Court with one judge from each 
community and the High Court with two Greek-Cypriots and one Turkish-Cypriot judge - 
both presided over by foreign judges.  
After the constitutional crisis of December 1963, the Turkish-Cypriot judges were 
compelled to follow their leadership’s policies and withdrew from their posts in the 
Government-controlled areas of the island. Nevertheless, they continued to try purely 
Turkish-Cypriot cases only in the District Courts of Nicosia since these were situated 
within the enclave’s boundaries. Their withdrawal, therefore, along with the restriction of 
movement in and outside the Nicosia enclave meant that great delays were caused in 
the trials of mixed cases.288 Further delays were also created at the appellate-supreme 
courts due to the fact that the posts of both the president of the Constitutional Court and 
of the High Court, the first in May 1963 and the second in May 1964, remained vacant.  
In order to bridge the gap and deal with the resulting practical problems, the Parliament 
voted in July 1964 the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Law no. 33, 
which introduced several important changes. This law provided the merger of the two 
Superior Courts into one - the Supreme Court - and abolished the communal criteria for 
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the composition of lower courts and of the hearing of cases.289 The post of the President 
of the Supreme Court was assigned to the most senior Judge and one of the moderate 
political voices within his community, the Turkish-Cypriot Mehmmed Zekia. The first 
reactions of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership were predictably hostile to the new law, 
which was voted without its consent and in its views, contrary to the constitution. With 
his characteristic bellicosity Denktash stated to Reuters that “this incident alone is a 
situation calling for the intervention of the Guarantor States on the island”.290 
Nevertheless, both the Turkish-Cypriot judges and, after a while, Ankara realized that 
this law was a practical solution to the judicial problem, which affected equally both 
communities. In order to appease the Turkish-Cypriots leaders, the Cyprus Government 
reassured them that the arrangement was temporary.291 The final response of the 
Turkish-Cypriots came on 28 September 1964, when Kuchuk appealed for the necessity 
of returning to the constitutional order “within a reasonable period” but also said that: 
in order not to suddenly confront the difficulties [of this situation] 
those members of the Turkish and Greek communities who are 
involved in judicial proceedings, the Turkish Judges and other 
personnel engaged in the administration of justice may be prepared 
to continue during the aforesaid reasonable period to perform the 
duties of their high office …. If this appeal is not met with the spirit 
in which it is made and positive steps are not taken to ensure that 
justice is again administered in accordance with the constitution, 
the Turkish Judges … may find it contrary to their oath, conscience 
and sense of justice to prolong the unconstitutional state of affairs 
indefinitely.292 
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The Turkish-Cypriot judges therefore, returned to the Republic’s Courts. Despite that, a 
month later some Turkish-Cypriot litigants during the hearing of their case challenged 
the validity of recent legislation and the changes it introduced. This case, the well-known 
Attorney General v. Mustafa Ibrahim, led to the first decision of the Supreme Court of 
Cyprus recognizing that the Doctrine of Necessity applied in the legal, as well as the 
administrative, system of Cyprus. It should be noted that although during the hearing of 
this case the Turkish-Cypriot judges had already returned to the Courts of the Republic, 
this decision was tried only by Greek-Cypriot judges. However, there were no reports of 
any complaints about the composition of the court although this became the basis for 
the a posteriori complaints of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and lawyers.293  
Resuming cooperation in this sector at a time when the rest of the public machinery had 
sheared apart was undoubtedly something that both communities could have used to 
build upon for the future. Nonetheless, it was not long before the increase of tension on 
the ground snuffed out the fragile cooperation. On 1 June 1966, following a series of 
explosions, a new ban on movement in and out of the Turkish quarter of Nicosia was 
issued by the Cyprus Government. Until then, it was common practice that the Turkish-
Cypriot judges were explicitly excluded from any restrictions of movement, except under 
specific conditions.294 During this ban, however, Polycarpos Yorkadjis, the Minister of 
Interior, gave instructions to the Police to also prevent the Turkish-Cypriot judges from 
passing the checkpoint. On 2 June the Turkish-Cypriot Judges were sent back to the 
Turkish quarter of Nicosia. One of the judges, however, evaded police checks and went 
directly to the Courts but on being recognized it was reported that “he was pursued and 
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a police sergeant turned him out with a certain amount of contumely”.295 When the 
Minister of Justice, Stella Soulioti, learned about the incident, she intervened and strictly 
gave instructions to the police to exclude the Turkish-Cypriot judges from the ban. 
Although the Turkish-Cypriot judges immediately returned to the Courts, the above 
incident touched a raw nerve. The next day, the Turkish-Cypriot General Committee 
issued a new decision informing the Greek-Cypriots that the Turkish-Cypriot judges 
would no longer continue working in the Courts of the Government-controlled sectors. A 
Turkish-Cypriot spokesman emphasized that their judges had accepted out of goodwill 
the arrangement of 1964 but that had been only for “a reasonable period”.296 He 
continued that the Turkish-Cypriot judges had been placed in an embarrassing position 
practising their duties in an impossible position whilst waiting patiently for a solution to 
the problem. However: 
The recent events have proved that the Greek side has no regard, 
or any respect for the personal freedom, dignity and honour of the 
Turkish judicial officers…. In order to save the Turkish Judges from 
further humiliation and embarrassment as well as from continuing 
to act against their judicial conscience, the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership found no other alternative but to conclude that the 
reasonable period… has come to an end and that the Turkish 
judges should be free to discontinue attending their offices in the 
Greek sector, if they so wished.297 
The Greek-Cypriot action had certainly been provocative and Makarios himself 
intervened to try and convince the Turkish-Cypriot judges to return to their previous 
responsibilities. He put out a statement that the matter had been rectified very quickly, 
and that the judges had been able to attend their courts in the usual way.298 But this did 
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not satisfy the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and thus on 3 June 1966 the inter-communal 
cooperation in the Judiciary was officially terminated.  
Nevertheless, there were still moderate voices among the Turkish-Cypriot Judiciary. 
Among them was the President of the Supreme Court, Judge Zekia, who decided to 
resign in order to avoid voting for his leadership’s decision, and two Limassol Judges, 
Vedad Dervish and Ozar Beha. The last two appeared willing to return to their duties but 
were forced by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to reconsider. Finally, when they were 
asked by their leadership to resume duties in the Turkish-Cypriot sector, they asked to 
be given permission to leave for Britain.299 It is noteworthy that Sean MacBride, the 
Secretary-General of the International Committee of Jurists and senior Irish Politician, 
tried to mediate this dispute by presenting several proposals but his efforts did not bear 
fruit. During the negotiations with the various actors, MacBride reported that he felt that 
the Turkish-Cypriot leadership was willing to resume contacts if Ankara issued such a 
directive. 300 This did not happen.  
In September 1966, the Cyprus Government made some further modifications to 
streamline the Cyprus Courts after the Turkish-Cypriot withdrawal.301 Here was yet 
another example of a reformed and even partially modernized Cypriot public system, but 
one driven through without Turkish-Cypriot participation. Not long afterwards several 
‘courts’ were set up in the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves to give them the basic elements of 
judicial recourse. However, they were suggestively named as ‘Arbitration courts’, as any 
other form of courts would have meant a violation of the constitution.302  
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The Turkish-Cypriot withdrawal from the Judiciary meant that henceforward all three 
pillars of the state were now totally Greek-led while the Turkish-Cypriot leadership 
prepared its own quasi-state structures. Undoubtedly, inter-communal cooperation in the 
Judiciary provided a critical test in the evolution of the Cyprus problem. Although the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership continued to plead that the Cyprus Government was not 
legitimate, and that all the modifications set in place were unconstitutional, the fact was 
that for two years the Turkish-Cypriots continued to operate under the ‘unconstitutional’ 
framework of Law 33/1964 and the decision Attorney General v. Mustafa Ibrahim This 
was a good opportunity, which if grasped by both leaderships, might have provided a 
less drastic way out of the impasse. Indicative was also the fact that during the first 
round of the inter-communal talks of 1968-1971, every time a deadlock was imminent, 
the two negotiators focused on the issue of judicial cooperation which was perceived as 
the least difficult of all constitutional questions. Nonetheless, as in the later period of 
local talks, in 1966 mistrust, suspicion and provocation prevailed and a relatively minor 
violent incident was to have important political repercussions in a regressive direction. 
This last ‘beacon of hope’ for resuming inter-communal contacts in a wider political 
context was extinguished. 
Restructuring of the security forces of the Republic of Cyprus 
Transforming the Republic of Cyprus of 1960 into an independent unitary state, along 
the lines President Makarios wished meant that there was still another sector of the 
state that had to be urgently strengthened: the Security Forces of the Republic. The 
Constitution provided for the establishment and the organization of the security forces 
and, in particular, the formation of an army of 2000 men, with representation of 60% 
Greek-Cypriots and 40% Turkish-Cypriots, along with a police force and a gendarmerie 
with a representation of 70:30% respectively. According to Stella Soulioti, the Minister of 
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Justice, the formation of this army was only for ceremonial reasons and for ensuring 
employment to Turkish-Cypriots in the public sector.303 Nonetheless, three years after 
the birth of the Republic, it proved impossible for the two communities to agree on the 
specifics for the creation this army. The Greek-Cypriots insisted for an army with mixed 
units, while the Turkish-Cypriots wanted units formed under communal criteria. By 1963 
therefore, although the police and gendarmerie were fully operational, there were not 
any other efficient or well-organized security cadres or defence infrastructure. 
Conversely, both communities organized and trained their own forces. Since 1959, 
several private armies were secretly formed by Greek-Cypriots, ex-EOKA fighters and 
several politicians but without any official coordination or strategic planning for their 
actions. With the help of military personnel from Ankara, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership 
also secretly retained and strengthened their TMT fighters. It was not long before this 
underground rivalry and the increase of hostility between the two communities’ militias 
led to several reckless actions and then to the first serious inter-communal clashes of 
December 1963.  
The achievement of an uneasy truce a few days after those clashes, the constant small 
breaches of the cease-fire in the following months, along with the concentration of the 
Turkish-Cypriot fighters into enclaves, showed that the need for well-trained security 
forces and defence structures was more pressing than ever. Therefore, by February 
1964 a new policy emerged for the defence of the Republic; forming an army, building 
fortifications and purchasing military equipment in order to protect the island from 
external or internal threats.  The key players in this process were the Cyprus and Greek 
Governments along with General Georgios Grivas.  
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From 1964 until 1967 the defence system of the Government-controlled part of the 
island grew rapidly in effectiveness and manpower. Nonetheless, this process produced 
an important side-effect. While it created some insurance against external threats, it also 
created two internal and serious fronts: the inter-communal violent incidents and the 
Greek-Cypriots’ split. Regarding the former, armed confrontation was usually sparked 
between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots around sensitive areas which were 
considered strategically vital for both sides. Throughout these three years provocative 
actions from both sides led to confrontations of varying scale with implications for 
political aspects of the Cyprus problem. Prominent among them was the incident of 
June 1966 and the even more severe clashes in November 1967. The second front, 
however, was still more dangerous because it enhanced division and political unrest 
within the Greek-Cypriot community itself. The incipient fault-line had derived from the 
antagonism between the political leadership of Makarios and the military leadership of 
Grivas, who was backed by the Greek Government, regarding the modalities, and even 
the overarching priority itself of the national aim of enosis. In the following paragraphs 
we will explore how issues of defence raised tensions between Greek-Cypriots and how 
this then reverberated on relations between the two communities.  
To begin with, a constituent part of the Makarios’ ‘Thirteen Points’ was the amendment 
of certain provisions about the security forces of the island. First of all, it was the 
amalgamation of the police and gendarmerie units. Additionally, on 25 February 1964, 
the Cyprus Government announced the formation of a force on a voluntary basis, 
named as the National Guard.304 Simultaneously, however, it was decided between the 
Greek Government, the Cyprus Government and Grivas that the National Guard should 
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be transformed into a tactical army under compulsory conscription. Athens and General 
Grivas took up the reins of this transformation process. More particularly, it was decided 
that a new division, the Cyprus Special Mixed Staff, responsible for the defence 
planning of Cyprus, was going to be established within the Greek Ministry of Defence, 
under the command of Grivas. A retired Lieutenant-General of the Greek Army, 
Georgios Karayiannis, was assigned as the Chief of the National Guard. To reinforce 
the National Guard, the Greek Ministry of Defence approved the secret assignment of a 
division of Greek soldiers to Cyprus. This was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of 
Alliance for a Greek Contingent of only 950 Greek soldiers. It should be stressed that 
Turkey did not initially protest against this. The main underlying reason for the division’s 
assignment to Cyprus was to increase the Greek Government’s leverage on Makarios’ 
regime.305 These new soldiers were about to come to Cyprus with fake Cypriot 
passports claiming to wish to volunteer in the National Guard.306  
It should be noted that Grivas had gone back to Athens in March 1959, but by 1964 was 
anxious to return to Cyprus to lead the armed forces of the island and complete his own 
perceived destiny as the architect of enosis.307 The Cypriot President, however, did not 
favour Grivas’ return both because of their strong disagreements on the handling of the 
Cyprus issue and due to the Turkish negative reactions in case of his return. Bearing in 
mind Grivas’ past, the Greek Government was also reluctant to allow him to go back in 
Cyprus. Despite everybody’s reservations, however, they all knew that only Grivas could 
have exerted effective control upon all the irregular armed groups formed from 1959 
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onwards, in order to incorporate them within one strong force. His return to Cyprus was 
only a matter of time.308  
By 1 June 1964, the legal framework for the National Guard was voted in Cyprus’ 
Parliament. All men from 18 to 50 would serve a six-month service – which in December 
was increased to twelve months, in June 1965 to eighteen and in November 1967 to two 
years. Additionally, the Parliament voted for the compulsory service for all males aged 
from sixteen to fifty-five and females from twenty to forty in the civil defense services of 
the Republic.309 The decisions about the re-organization of the security forces, 
therefore, had been taken and the legal framework set in place. In the light of these 
developments, Grivas was now more anxious than ever to return to the island. He did so 
secretly on 12 June 1964 with the pretext of inspecting the armed groups of the 
paramilitary organizations.310 His main goal, however, was to assume full control of the 
Cyprus army and to remove every obstacle in the road towards enosis, even if that 
meant getting rid of Makarios as well. However incipient, this was full of ominous 
possibilities in Greek-Cypriot political life. Although, initially the Greek Government 
ordered him to return to Athens, Grivas did not comply. With much public expectation of 
co-operation between these two seminal figures of the ‘national struggle’ before 1959-
60, the President felt he had little choice but to welcome Grivas and host a public 
reception for him.311 In doing so, however, Makarios surely had few illusions about the 
likely relationship ahead. 
It should be clarified that although Grivas remained in Cyprus, he had no administrative 
powers over the National Guard. He remained only responsible for the operational 
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command of the Cyprus army in case of war.312 However, this changed after August 
1964 and the serious inter-communal strife near the Mansoura-Kokkina enclave. 
Karayiannis, Chief of the National Guard, hitherto loosely under Grivas’ control, resigned 
due to their worsening relationship. In a series of articles that Karayiannis published in 
June 1965 in the Greek newspaper Ethnikos Kiriks, he explained the background of the 
August 1964 clash and highlighted the responsibilities of the National Guard’s actions 
which later led to Ankara’s intervention and to the indiscriminate air-bombing of the area 
with many civilian casualties. Grivas’ decision-making during these days made 
impossible any cooperation between the two men; this ledto Karayiannis’ resignation. It 
is noteworthy that the latter publicly accused Grivas of erratic methods and behaviour, 
giving rise to doubts over his psychological balance.313  
After this incident Grivas had effectively, though not officially, taken full control of the 
National Guard, thus achieving his initial aim. By then he had become convinced that 
the Cyprus Government had abandoned enosis and was working towards the 
consolidation of independence. According to Spyros Papageorgiou, (one of Grivas’ 
closer associates), Grivas was ‘assailing’ the Greek Government and the Greek King 
with reports accusing Makarios and his entourage of obstructing the effective 
organization of the National Guard and preserving their private armies in order to 
undermine the enosis struggle.314 By this stage Grivas was already issuing veiled 
threats to resign himself from the National Guard and lead a guerilla struggle – 
effectively against Makarios – for enosis.315 As indicated in the following abstract of a 
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letter that Grivas sent in September 1964 to the Greek Premier, the former was ready to 
use all possible mechanisms to fulfill what he believed to be his national duty: 
If you give me your permission, I will try to organize political 
propaganda in order to influence and direct the masses towards 
enosis. I believe that progress could be achieved. Contrary to what 
is happening in Nicosia where the anti-enosis propaganda has 
affected to a large extent Greek-Cypriot opinion, in most towns and 
villages the situation is better. Therefore, I would suggest the 
establishment of a Press Office in the Greek Embassy in Nicosia, 
which will work for the achievement of the national goal and in the 
meantime the assignment of a special Press Officer at my office.316 
The Greek Premier agreed and duly sent a Press Attaché to the Greek Embassy in 
Nicosia. As stated above, Papandreou and Makarios themselves differed radically about 
the handling of the Cyprus issue. Makarios’ disregard for the ‘National Centre’ and his 
tendency to act provocatively towards Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots, without 
consulting the Greek Government, was irritating for the Greek Premier.317 Papandreou 
and his in-coming replacement, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, especially after Plaza’s 
mediation, were anxious to solve the Cyprus issue as soon as possible via direct 
negotiations with Turkey aiming at enosis with territorial concessions. To this end 
Makarios was becoming an annoying obstacle.318  
By mid-1964, a secret operation was initiated and coordinated by the new Press 
Attaché; it aimed to increase anti-Makarios feelings within the Greek-Cypriot 
community.319 The key tool for this operation was the Greek-Cypriot press. Several 
newspapers were funded and manipulated in order to propagandize against traitors in 
the Cyprus Government and condemn their anti-enosis plans. This triggered a ‘war’ 
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within the Greek-Cypriot press. The pro-Government papers counterattacked by issuing 
articles against the Greek Government and the Greek army officers in Cyprus who were 
conspiring to overthrow Makarios’ Government.320 The accusations and counter-
accusations inflamed public opinion and spread more ‘poison’ within the Greek-Cypriot 
community. When Makarios was notified about the task of the new emissary of the 
Greek Embassy, he demanded his immediate recall by the Greek Ambassador.321 In an 
attempt to calm things down, the House of Representatives passed legislation in 
December 1965 envisaging that all newspaper editors had to disclose their regular and 
extraordinary income, while it prohibited the receipt of subsidies from foreign 
governments or citizens.322  
Despite the Government’s efforts to soften this explosive atmosphere it was evident that 
the situation was steadily getting out of hand. As long as there were press attacks 
against the Cyprus Government, large public demonstrations were organized within the 
Greek-Cypriot community in favour of Makarios’ policies.323 Makarios’ relations with the 
new Greek Premier, Stephanopoulos, in 1966 were even more embittered than with 
Papandreou. On 9 March 1966, Stephanopoulos, without any prior consultation with 
Makarios, officially appointed Grivas as Chief of all the Security Forces on the island, 
that is both of the National Guard and of the Greek division. In this way the Greek 
Government wanted to assert its control over the Cyprus problem.324 Makarios 
responded immediately arguing that this was an internal affair not to be decided by the 
Greek Government, highlighting also that Grivas was dangerous and could tie the 
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country into a civil war.325 The Greek Government did not accept Makarios’ arguments. 
The political crisis between Athens and Nicosia had gradually moved into a more 
dangerous phase.  
Makarios swiftly realized that he had lost effective control over the security forces of the 
island and decided instead to establish a paramilitary police tactical reserve strictly 
under his own authority. By November 1966 he came to an agreement for the purchase 
of Czechoslovakian arms to be allocated to this police force, later named as the 
Presidential Guard. Greatly alarmed, when Grivas, Athens and Ankara became aware 
of this development, they were at pains to ensure that these weapons would be 
immediately taken away from Makarios’ control.326 The episode that followed became 
known as the first Czech arms crisis.327 Ankara threatened to retaliate if a satisfactory 
arrangement had not been reached soon, while Athens threatened to terminate its 
diplomatic relations with the Republic of Cyprus if the keys to the armoury were not 
given to the commander of the Greek forces on the island.328 After a while, Makarios 
complied to the extent that the arms would be periodically inspected by UNFICYP. 
Contrary, however, to such assurances, Makarios secretly distributed some of the 
Czech arms without UNFICYP’s prior knowledge. Reportedly those arms were 
distributed during the later Kophinou crisis of November 1967.329 Additionally, Makarios 
took another action to reinforce his own loyalists. The Cyprus Government approved the 
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increase of spending from the state’s budget of 1967 for new recruits and the purchase 
of arms for the Government-controlled police force.330 
Inevitably such tendencies impacted on inter-communal relations, and violent incidents 
grew alongside them. The main sources of these clashes were the arms race, the 
construction of armed posts and the effort of both communities’ forces to entrench their 
ground positions in strategically important parts of the island. The most problematic 
areas were those around the Turkish-Cypriot villages or enclaves. Since the formation of 
the National Guard, one of the main military targets of the Cyprus army was to take over 
those areas. This is what had triggered the Mansoura crisis in August 1964. In addition, 
the extension of the National Guards’ coastal defences, fortifications and the patrols in 
disputed areas became the spark of the serious Famagusta disturbances both in March 
and November 1965. Several similar incidents produced unrest and tension throughout 
the island, until a much more severe crisis was sparked in November 1967 in the mixed 
villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou. Although the Cyprus Government 
persistently argued that the construction of fortifications was necessary for the defence 
of Cyprus in case of external attack, UNFICYP appealed several times to the National 
Guard not to site them in the immediate vicinity of Turkish-Cypriot villages. These 
actions were perceived by the Turkish-Cypriot fighters as provocative and they led to 
retaliatory actions, while the UN Secretary-General repeatedly urged the parties to 
terminate the constant building.331 David Hunt in his memoirs recalls: 
Confrontation between the Cyprus National Guard and UNFICYP 
was the sort of thing that kept us occupied most of the time. The 
Turks were capable of provocation but the majority of the incidents 
that kept us up late at night were the results of Grivas’ restlessness. 
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Since I left, and particularly since the 1967 affair when Ankara’s 
ultimatum forced Grivas to leave the island, I have wondered 
whether Makarios may not have encouraged him not from any 
dislike for the Turkish-Cypriots (which I doubt if he feels) but in the 
hope that he would go too far and pay the penalty … At the time 
that the Grivas policy of digging trenches and erecting new 
strongpoints everywhere, and particularly in the neighbourhood of 
Turkish villages, was in full swing the Diplomatic Crops, especially 
the American and Greek Ambassadors and myself were liable to 
great bursts of activity by day and night with the wireless links to 
London, Washington, New York, Athens and Ankara working time. 
Alexandrakis [the Greek Ambassador] usually had the main role. 
Athens would let things take their course until it appeared there 
would be a severe clash at any minute between the National Guard 
and UNFICYP; then getting cold feet his Ministry would get on the 
telephone from Athens to rouse him out of his bed in the small 
hours with instructions to go and tell Grivas to calm down.332 
Besides the defensive fortifications, turmoil was also produced with the constant supply 
of military equipment to both communities. The Cyprus Government was openly 
importing military equipment from abroad claiming that it was necessary for the defence 
of the Republic, while the Turkish-Cypriot fighters imported arms and ammunition from 
Ankara. The missiles importation by the Cyprus Government from the Soviet Union was 
one of the most explosive incidents throughout 1965, which again threatened the 
stability of the area. This incident became known as the missile crisis of 1965 and it was 
generated only a few days before the submission of the UN Mediator’s report.  
As already seen in the previous chapter, in August 1964 Nicosia turned to Moscow in 
order to secure military and diplomatic support in case of foreign invasion in Cyprus. In 
addition to the diplomatic support, the two governments came to an agreement for the 
purchase of military equipment including surface-to-air missiles.333 When in March 1965 
it became known that the missiles were about to be delivered to Cyprus – via Egypt – 
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both Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots were greatly alarmed. Kuchuk stated in March 
1965 that they were closer to war than ever before, whilst Turkey threatened again to 
intervene if such missiles were stationed in Cyprus.334 This incident created diplomatic 
frissons in Washington as well, which exerted pressure both to Athens and Nicosia in 
order to prevent firstly the stationing of missiles of Soviet origin in Cyprus and to avoid a 
direct Greco-Turkish clash over this. While Makarios had been under pressure from all 
sides not to bring the missiles in Cyprus, he stressed that he will not accept any 
threats.335 For some time confusion was generated through the press about what will 
eventually happen. A few weeks later however, it was evident that the Government had 
abandoned its initial plan and the missiles remained in Alexandria. The most surprising 
aspect of this missiles episode is that almost thirty years later history repeated itself. In 
1997-98 the Cyprus Government decided to purchase the Russian S-300 missiles. Due 
to Turkey’s similar strong reactions, however, the missiles were eventually stationed in 
Crete.   
 
The period from 1964 until 1967 was probably the most crucial period for the later 
formation of the Cyprus question. The different international orientations between the 
Cyprus Government and the Greek Governments and Grivas, along with their sharp 
disagreement about the best way to achieve enosis, were reflected in the defense 
planning process. Although in the first months of 1964 the army was formed, soon 
enough the key question was who was going to be in command of this National Guard. 
Control of the armed forces was for all parties the crucial element needed to help 
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achieve their goals. Grivas wanted to control the National Guard: to lead it as a Trojan 
Horse for overthrowing Makarios and achieving enosis, even if that led to an armed 
confrontation with Turkey. Conversely, the Greek Government wanted to achieve enosis 
through diplomatic channels and without militarily provoking Turkey. Grivas was going to 
be their leverage for forcing on Makarios any perspective agreement with Turkey over 
enosis. Finally, for Makarios, enosis was not for the moment a feasible option. The aim 
was to strengthen the independent character of the island, while strengthening the 
defence capabilities of the country and simultaneously increasing pressure towards 
Turkish-Cypriots. The use of military violence against the Turkish-Cypriot fighters or 
Turkish armed forces, if necessary, could also be used.336 However, when he realised 
that he was losing control over the Cypriot armed forces and that there were 
conspiracies against him, he organized his own force. The catastrophic outcome of this 
rivalry becamemore obvious after 1971 with Grivas’ clandestine return to Cyprus - after 
his forced withdrawal at the end of 1967 - and the realization of his previous threat for 
organizing a guerilla struggle against those who shelved enosis.  
The internal cleavage between Greek-Cypriots unavoidably weakened an important 
internal firewall; the unity of the Greek-Cypriot community towards the ‘allegedly’ 
common target of self-determination. On the other hand, part of the Turkish-Cypriot 
policy was to appear in public united towards their common enemy and be determined 
to endure the hardships caused by their self-containment in the enclaves. The Turkish-
Cypriot fighters continued to be trained and reinforced by the TMT and responded 
accordingly to any action considered provocative by the National Guard. The main aim 
of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and fighters was to establish and preserve their 
superiority in the areas considered vital for their strategic interests. However, in two 
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cases, when the National Guard tried to undermine the Turkish-Cypriot control near their 
enclaves, large scale confrontation almost led to Turkish invasion: in August 1964 and in 
November 1967. Both confrontations changed the course of the Cyprus question. 
Conclusion 
It took two years for the Greek-Cypriot-controlled Government and the House of 
Representatives to transform the Republic of Cyprus administratively and militarily and 
run it along the lines they believed best from the vantage-point of their own interests for 
the development of the state. For them, after all, it was inconceivable that a state could 
properly operate when a community of 80% was politically equal with a minority of 18%. 
Viewed in this way, the continued growth of the state necessarily meant remedying the 
inherent defects of the 1960 Constitution for the sake of the state’s growth itself. That, 
led to a radical re-structuring of the state which completely disregarded the fundamental 
characteristic of the 1960 Constitution, its bi-communal nature. According however, to 
Michael Dekleris, the Greek constitutional expert and advisor of the Greek-Cypriot side 
in the inter-communal talks of 1972-4, if a compromise solution was to be found at any 
later point, it was unrealistic for the Greek-Cypriots to believe that they could preserve 
this new type of state.337  
Nonetheless, the re-organization of the state, along the lines of the previous ‘Thirteen 
Points’, along with its accompanying social logic, came with a cost: the creation of a 
separate administration on the island which was steadily becoming more organized and 
effective within its own geographical area. In 1964 it was the ‘General Committee’; in 
December 1967, it became the ‘Turkish-Cypriot Provisional Administration; in 1971 it 
was transformed into the ‘Turkish-Cypriot Administration’; in 1974 it turned into the 
                                                          
337
 Dekleris, op. cit., p.106 
127 
 
‘Autonomous Turkish-Cypriot Administration’; in 1975 it was named as ‘Turkish 
Federated state of Cyprus’; and finally in 1983 the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ 
was purportedly established pursuant to a Unilateral Declaration of Independence. Each 
phase indicated further consolidation of the inter-communal separation with which we 
are principally concerned in this thesis. From 1964 until 1967 Denktash expressed that, 
“Makarios and Greece proved that faits accomplis could be used effectively”.338 This 
proved to be Denktash’s own justification and most effective tool for the re-organization 
of the Turkish-Cypriot administration after he came to Cyprus in 1968.  
In order, however, to have a clearer perception of the context and the divergent 
evolution of the two communities in the period 1964-1967, our next chapter will focus on 
the economic situation of the island. We will highlight the economic realities in Cyprus 
on the outset of 1960, how this changed until 1963 and how it was developed after the 
inter-communal strife until 1967. It will be evident that for Makarios’ government the 
shaping and manipulation of economic growth became a vital method for enforcing 
Turkish-Cypriot capitulation. The wider effects of this, however, were to be critical for our 
subject. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
1964-1967: The Economic Development of the Island 
 
The struggle of the Cypriot people is shifting from the military to the 
economic field.  A basic prerequisite for success of our struggle in 
the military and political fields lies in safeguarding our economic 
strength and stability …. However, further economic progress is 
impossible without freedom.339 
With these words, in December 1964, Tassos Papadopoulos, Minister of Labour and 
Social Insurance, summarized the Cyprus Government’s goals for the following year. It 
was indeed true that by then the severe outbreaks of inter-communal violence were 
diminishing and the Cyprus Government could now focus on its development 
programme. However, in speaking of freedom Papadopoulos was referring to enosis, 
which in its strictly material sense carved the significant implication of not being held 
back by Turkish-Cypriots. Certainly the creation of a more explicitly Greek-Cypriot state 
after 1964 had in the succeeding period been accompanied by economic stability and 
the achievement of impressive development goals. The tourist boom, exports and 
expenditure from the British bases and UNFICYP brought in significant levels of 
revenue. In addition, agriculture, which together with the construction sector, formed the 
backbone of Cyprus’ economy, had grown rapidly. Meanwhile, foreign development aid 
and post-independence British grants provided important stimulus for the development 
of the island.340  
The scene within the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves was entirely different. The Turkish-
Cypriot leadership had to manage structural problems and practical hardships in 
addition to the housing problem of the displaced persons. The more extreme wing of 
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leadership, as in the case of Rauf Dentkash, was calling for partition at every 
opportunity. Conversely, the official Turkish-Cypriot line called for firm adherence to the 
1960 Constitution unless forced by Greek-Cypriots to act differently. In the meantime, 
Ankara constituted the main financial and military contributor for the Turkish-Cypriots in 
order to help them endure isolation for as long as necessary.  
Inevitably, the economic policies of the Cyprus Government crucially affected the 
development of the Cyprus problem as a whole. Low unemployment, the steady 
increase of Cyprus’ GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and the gradual improvement in 
Greek-Cypriots’ standard of living had a significant impact on society’s psychology 
and people’s perceptions both about their Turkish-Cypriot ‘opponents’ and the 
solution of the national question; while the independence mentality was gradually 
being cultivated over the enosis dream amongst Greek-Cypriots, the schism 
between the two communities was further aggravated. The combination of these two 
tendencies was to define Cypriot politics.   
The aim of this chapter is to present the economic policies and development of both 
communities in the aftermath of the 1963 crisis up to 1967, as well as their wider 
significance. First however, it is essential to make a brief reference to the economic 
indicators and intrinsic weaknesses of the Republic of Cyprus during the first three 
years of independence. Hypothetically, after the signing of the Zurich-London 
Agreements, the development of an integrated economy within the Republic of 
Cyprus should have been the chief priority for both communities. One substantial 
challenge existed however: how to balance the aim of an integrated, prosperous 
economy with the divergent aims stemming from the national aspirations of the two 
130 
 
communities, especially given the mutual suspicions surrounding the independence 
settlement itself.  
1960-1963: First years of independence 
Setting the foundations 
Even before the official declaration of Independence, the Cyprus authorities 
acknowledged that one of its first priorities was the establishment of the necessary 
mechanisms for economic success. On 1 February 1960 Cyprus therefore requested 
from the UN to “undertake an intensive economic survey of the island and provide 
the Government with a report with recommendations for future action”.341 A few 
months later, this report was prepared by the UN Technical Assistance Board under 
Willard Thorp, whose team executed a thorough study of each sector of Cyprus’ 
economy, indicating the island’s handicaps as well as its most promising prospects 
for economic growth. Thorp’s report marked the starting point of the island’s 
development. The Cyprus Government integrated its suggestions into a structured 
five-year development programme published on 21 August 1961.  
In 1960, Cyprus was categorized as an under-developed country “with political 
uncertainty and limited potential”.342 Nonetheless, several exogenous circumstances, 
particularly an increase in the British military expenditure, led the island towards an 
unexpected economic boom in the period 1950-1957. Paradoxically, before long 
Cyprus had attained the second highest per capita income in the Mediterranean 
area, at a time when internal political conditions were distinctly troubled.343 This 
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reality did not change the fact that the island’s economy struggled with multiple 
structural problems, significant fiscal imbalances, very limited inter-sectoral linkage 
and coordination, and a lack of diversity in its revenue sources.344 Agriculture was 
the largest sector of employment but had a very low productivity rate – almost 44% 
of the population was employed in this sector, producing only 16% of the country’s 
GDP.345 Modern technologies in agriculture and land farming had yet to be 
introduced. Agriculture production was thus largely dependent on weather 
conditions.346 The mining industry, an important contributor to the island’s GDP, was 
also troubled by problems, including the reckless exploitation of natural resources 
during the previous years and the ensuing reduction of the island’s reserves. The 
tourist industry was still only fledgling, mainly consisting of mountain resorts while 
the lack of proper infrastructure such as roads, ports and airports exacerbated the 
problem.347  Additionally, the economic stagnation that followed in 1958-1959, due to 
the emergency situation on the island and the gradual removal of the British troops 
from the region, had led to a sharp decline of the island’s income and a spike in 
unemployment and emigration, particularly to the UK. Moreover, instability led also to 
significant flight of capital from the local banks.348 
The aim of the first post-independence development plan, therefore, was to address 
these challenges by stimulating agriculture, creating conditions for the 
encouragement of private industrial development, improving the country’s 
infrastructure and promoting Cyprus as an attractive tourist destination. To achieve 
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this aim, the establishment of new agencies and state bodies that would coordinate 
Government actions, along with the enactment of relevant legislation, were of utmost 
importance.349 It should also be stressed that Thorp drew attention to the need for 
effective cooperation between all the various arms of the government.350 This was 
especially imperative in the case of Cyprus, since the Government was the primary 
investor in development and efficient management of scarce resources was 
essential.351  
The first plan provided £62 million for development over the next five years. 
According to a prominent expert, Dr. Renos Theocharis, there were two options for 
the Government in order to mobilize such a sum for investment: firstly, foreign aid 
and outside borrowing; and secondly and most importantly, its own budgetary 
resources.352 The latter option, as Theocharis explained, had two dimensions: 
important cuts in public spending with savings allocated to productive uses on the 
island, and additional revenue derived from direct and indirect taxes. Theocharis 
lauded the Government’s early record in reducing its expenses and transferring 
substantial resources towards development. Equally important, Cyprus’ membership 
in the Commonwealth in 1961 brought significant economic and trade benefits, and 
thus critical indirect taxes to the Government’s funds.353 As we shall emphasize, 
however, a continuing blockage was created in direct taxation policy leading to 
difficulties on fiscal collection.354  
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In addition to local resources, the Government was also able to secure substantial 
outside contributions. Firstly, the Treaty of Establishment of 1960 of the newly 
independent state envisaged that Britain would provide substantial aid to the 
Republic of Cyprus over five years. Additionally, the Government applied for 
membership in the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. In June 1961 membership was granted, and in 
1961 and 1967 the Government requested loans to fund major development 
programmes.355 Foreign aid was also granted in the form of technical assistance 
through the UN and other International Organizations.356 
Intrinsic weaknesses of the Republic of Cyprus  
Although both Thorp’s study and the first development plan analysed economic and 
structural deficiencies, there remained another important challenge that had not 
been taken into serious account; this was the gap between the economic situation of 
the two communities. The per capita income of the Turkish-Cypriots by 1961 was 
20% less than that of Greek-Cypriots, while their share in the country’s aggregate 
economy was 5%, which was far less than their demographic, or indeed 
constitutional, status might have indicated.357 Nevertheless, this reality did not 
necessarily mean that by comparing their daily lives the Turkish-Cypriots were 
poorer than the Greek-Cypriots.358 Both communities were largely employed in the 
agriculture sector. However, the Greek-Cypriot community included a sizeable 
number of businessmen and professionals, whereas Turkish-Cypriots traditionally 
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“had a disdain towards private business”.359 In practical terms, this economic 
disparity meant that more subsidies from the state’s budget had to be geared 
towards the Turkish-Cypriot community, in order to address the economic and social 
discrepancies.  
Although this particular gap has often been overlooked in the political and historical 
literature, the Turkish-Cypriot Professor Ozay Mehmet argues that it represented one 
of the main underlying factors in the later division. “The fear of economic insecurity 
via domination by the more powerful Greek-Cypriots has always driven the desire of 
Turkish-Cypriots to be masters of their own destiny”.360 Such insecurity had led in the 
1950s to the formulation of a new movement aiming to consolidate a separate 
economy on the island, one dimension of which was the notorious ‘from Turk to Turk’ 
initiative launched in 1958. Among the movement’s aims was the promotion of self-
reliance and support of Turkish-Cypriot trades and industries. To expedite this, a 
Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce was instituted, and this fed into the drive for 
separate municipalities after 1958.361 
The ‘from Turk to Turk’ policy continued even after the declaration of Independence. 
Nevertheless, until 1963, it had only made fitful progress with limited results. This 
was due mainly to two realities. Firstly, both communities shared a long history, 
especially during the Ottoman period, of economic co-existence. Attalides 
specifically argues that the two communities had created over time “inextricably 
interdependent patterns of economic relations which survived until just before the 
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invasion in 1974”.362 Secondly, Mehmet contends that two schools of thought were 
current among Turkish-Cypriot economists and leaders regarding the most effective 
strategy for the economic development of their community within the newly founded 
Republic:363 the first in support of the integrated economy and development 
spending to achieve economic parity between the two communities; and the second 
which advocated ‘etatism’ (statism) as then applied in Turkey as one of the core 
characteristics of Kemalism, i.e. state intervention and public control of the 
economy.364 In the case of Cyprus, the second option was translated into channelling 
financial and technical assistance directly from Turkey to the Turkish Communal 
Chamber. The latter reached its peak mainly after the de facto separatism of 1964. 
Beyond such economic discrepancies, the rigidity of the 1960 Constitution produced 
certain limitations in the economic development of the island. First and foremost was 
the divisive nature of the Constitution itself. The communities’ political antagonism 
was further intensified by the Zurich-London Agreements mainly with regard to the 
state apparatus. Resulting differences distracted attention from the economic 
problems of the island. According to Nicholas Lanitis, a prominent Greek-Cypriot 
businessman, two of the most crucial problems of the Constitution were the 
existence of the two autonomous Communal Chambers and the controversy over 
municipalities.365 He specifically reported that “they prevent unity, an essential 
provision for progress and impose on a small country an expensive governmental 
superstructure that sooner or later will become abortive both to the Greeks and to 
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the Turks”.366 Firstly, separate municipalities for the five main towns of an island of 
600,000 people constituted a heavy financial burden both for the municipalities 
themselves and for the tax payers.367 Moreover, the existence of two autonomous 
Communal Chambers with limited financial resources had severe implications for the 
educational policies of each community.368  As Clerides explains, the programming 
and policies of each Chamber depended mainly on its ability to cover its financial 
needs. This inevitably had a great impact on the social development of the Cypriot 
population as a whole.369 
Similarly, further obstacles emerged in 1961 due to the failure to obtain the 
constitutionally mandatory separate majority in the Parliament for the extension of 
the taxation legislation. Although the Turkish-Cypriot leadership had no objections on 
the relevant legislation, they exercised their veto right and voted against this crucial 
legislation in order to force action on other pending issues and laws they perceived 
as crucial.370 This action, however, left the island without one of the most important 
pieces of legislation for the collection of the Republic’s revenue. After several months 
of negotiations, an interim agreement was reached which provided that, until there 
was final political solution, the two Communal Chambers would be responsible for 
collecting the direct taxes from their respective communities.371 
Not surprisingly, the new system for the collection of taxes was complex and 
distinctly problematic. The most pivotal implication, according to Lanitis, was that this 
new system inevitably led to heavy costs, losses of revenue and the imposition of 
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more indirect taxes and import duties on several products.372 None of this 
encouraged Cyprus attractiveness as a place for international investment.373 
Statistical data confirmed that public revenue from direct taxes was reduced from 
24.2% in 1960 to 14.5% in 1963, while the revenue from indirect taxes increased 
from 42.9% to 50% respectively.374 
All of these problems derived from both the political realities and the Constitution, 
thus reinforcing an underlying instability prejudicial to the Government’s development 
plans. However, the achievements of the first three years after 1960 did yet not 
alarm Cyprus’ leaders. Essential institutions such as the Planning Bureau, the 
Central Bank of Cyprus, the Cyprus Development Bank and the Agriculture 
Research Institute were established, and foundations were successfully set in place 
for the further implementation of the plan. Private sector activity revived and the 
country’s GDP gradually increased.375 Exports of Cypriot agricultural products and 
wines, mainly to Britain and Commonwealth countries, also increased. Even though 
the Vice-President and the Turkish-Cypriot leaders disapproved, trade with the 
eastern bloc slowly expanded.376 Progress in tourism activity continued so that in 
1963 Cyprus saw the highest percentage of increase in tourist arrivals of all 
European and Middle Eastern countries.377 Although these were promising 
beginnings, there was still considerable concern from abroad regarding the pace of 
the development programme’s implementation and the issue of communal 
antagonism. The British had warned the Cypriot Ministers that decisive actions were 
                                                          
372
 Lanitis, op. cit. 
373
 Ibid.  
374
 Theocharis, op. cit, p.201 
375
 The Cyprus Economy since Independence,1966 by Renos Solomides: DO 220/57, TNA 
376
 Attalides, The Turkish-Cypriots, op. cit., p.82  
377
 The Economist, 7 March 1964 
138 
 
urgently needed to ensure the successful implementation of the five-year plan on 
schedule since “there was a delicate balance that would be upset either by a loss of 
confidence following an outburst of violence or failure to check the growth of the 
communist influence”.378 Events were soon to justify this pessimism.  
The watershed of December 1963 
The gradual economic development of the Republic of Cyprus was shattered by the 
inter-communal clash of December 1963. The ensuing Turkish-Cypriot withdrawal 
from the state apparatus and their isolation created a volatile situation which led to 
economic stagnation and a deterioration of economic activity throughout the 
Republic. This inevitably also led to a sharp increase in unemployment. Tourism 
entered the doldrums in 1964. Statistical data showed that during the first six months 
of 1964, 7,722 foreign visitors came to Cyprus, whereas in the same period in 1963 
the figure was as high as 49,585.379 Both imports and exports were reduced, hitting 
state revenue. Up to 1963, the import duty had yielded one-third of the Government’s 
revenue;380 thus, the radical decline of imports simultaneously created a substantial 
fiscal deficit.381 Insecurity in the towns and uncertainty in the villages located close to 
the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves paralyzed economic activity in the main commercial 
hubs and the countryside. The factories situated within the ‘Green Line’ in Nicosia 
closed down. Moreover, during the first months of 1964, the mining industry 
remained virtually inactive due to the proximity of the mines to high-risk areas as well 
as their reliance on mixed Greek/Turkish-Cypriot labour.382 Additionally, many 
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foreign experts providing technical assistance for the implementation of development 
programmes left the island.383  
At the beginning of 1964 the economic and political outlook of Cyprus, then, was 
bleak. Some observers argued that without a political settlement the perpetuation of 
the economic crisis was inevitable, while others claimed that “it seems whistling in 
the dark to expect prosperity to follow in the wake of a political solution. And anyway 
a political solution looks extremely remote”.384  
Unexpectedly, however, the Cyprus economy recovered from what proved a short 
period of stagnation, yet without any solution to the national problem. This seemingly 
confirmed the Greek-Cypriot leadership’s arguments that previous constitutional 
provisions had hampered the economic and broader development of the island. 
More specifically, Government officials now argued: 
A political settlement which gave a simple majority control over the 
economic policy would encourage the Greek-Cypriot community - 
as the dynamic element of the Cyprus economy - to devote all of its 
energy and resources to repairing the ravages of the present 
disturbances and regaining momentum on the development 
programme.385  
By the end of 1965, with all the ‘Thirteen Points’ of Makarios in place either de facto 
or via the Doctrine of Necessity, such a majority control had been assumed by the 
Greek-Cypriot leadership; consequently, the pace of development was augmented 
perceptibly. The question was whether such a pattern of economic growth – that is, 
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one driven by Greek-Cypriot dynamism – would help or hinder better understanding 
at the political level. 
The recovery: 1965-1967 
The years after World War II, 1950-1973, Western Europe had experience what is 
now characterized as the Golden Age of economic growth. In the case of Cyprus, it 
was only after independence that solid foundations for economic development had 
gradually been established. As explained in the following section, however, a great 
boost to this growth had been given after the 1964 crisis.  
Although it was true that by 1965 the economic situation on the island had improved, 
the viability of the Government’s financial planning was still at stake. The Finance 
Minister, Renos Solomides, had privately admitted that “he had doubts about the 
viability of the Government’s budgetary position after the end of this year [1965] 
unless there is a change for the better in the political situation”.386 Publicly, however, 
the Government presented a different image of the situation, a tactic that proved to 
be successful. Its main policy was to formally minimize the difficulties of the situation 
in order to present a brave front to the public.387 This tactic subsequently justified the 
fact that the Greek-Cypriots remained confident of the viability and growth prospects 
of the economy. It was also reported that several Greek-Cypriots had even appeared 
indifferent to the economic consequences of political divisions.388 The British High 
Commissioner in July 1965 admitted that “this pig-headed optimism [of the Greek-
Cypriots] has been a major reason for the resilience shown by the economy during 
the last eighteen months”.389 This sanguine stance on Cyprus’ economic prospects 
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also had a positive effect in the banking sector of the island. There was no significant 
flight of capital from the Cypriot banks, as was the case during the emergency period 
of 1958-1959. The Minister of Finance praised his community’s attitude by 
announcing:  
Indicative of the confidence of the Cypriots in the future of the 
country’s economy and the ability of the Government to protect the 
Cyprus pound, even under conditions of rebellion and war, is the 
fact that no measure has been taken to prevent the transfer of 
capital outside of Cyprus. I must admit that the Cyprus Government 
has relied not only on the patriotism of the agents of the 
commercial and industrial activity, but also on their good sense as 
to what their true interests are; and as a matter of fact no panic has 
been noticed amongst them and they have not sent their capital 
abroad.390 
One of the main challenges faced by the Cyprus Government in 1965, which 
remained the main investor in the development programme, was finding ways to 
shore up state revenue. Furthermore, the Government now had another financial 
burden to tackle: the urgent need for financing the security forces of the island. 
These new realities inevitably created further delays in the implementation of the 
Government’s overall programme. The Government admitted both in 1965 and 1966 
that certain scheduled development programmes had to be deferred because of the 
extraordinary military spending.391  
Nevertheless, the foundations that had been established up to that point, together 
with the Greek-Cypriot takeover of the state apparatus, surprisingly led to a 
remarkable degree of social stability on the island, facilitating steady progress in 
every sector of the economy. Neither the occasional small-scale inter-communal 
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tensions nor the internal Greek-Cypriot and Athens-Nicosia rivalries were able to 
reverse the upward economic trend of the period 1965-1967. It should be clarified, 
however, that when referring to the ‘island’s economy’ corresponds only to the 
Government-controlled sector economy. The economy of the Sovereign Base Areas, 
along with the economic situation within the enclaves were entirely different. The 
latter point in particular will be treated in the following paragraphs. 
It is noteworthy, however, that, the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance had 
proved to be the most active Ministry of Makarios’ Government, thus contributing a 
great deal to the island’s impressive economic growth of this period.392 Tassos 
Papadopoulos had confirmed in 1964 that his Ministry “within three years of its 
existence has covered all of the objectives set for it by the five-year Development 
Plan”.393 The problem of unemployment immediately after the 1963 crisis was very 
quickly addressed by effective strategies for the growth of jobs and productivity in 
Cyprus. First of all, new services responsible for conducting surveys and studies 
regarding the labour demand in several sectors of the economy were established. In 
collaboration with the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism and the Greek 
Communal Chamber - and later the Ministry of Education - the results of these 
studies were transformed into new training courses or apprentices schemes. 
Consequently, the problem of unemployment was largely contained whilst industrial 
growth was in the same turns promoted.394 Simultaneously, special attention was 
devoted to tourism education. By the end of 1964, with the financial aid of the UN 
Development Programme and the technical assistance of the International Labour 
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Organization, the newly established Productivity Centre was nearly in full operation. 
This new institution organized seminars and conferences, addressed both to 
employers and employees, aiming at the increase of productivity and the promotion 
of private initiative and the industrial sector of Cyprus.395 
At the end of 1965, the Government’s statistical data indicated the lowest 
unemployment rate on the island for seven years.396 Further increase in productivity 
was reported in almost every sector with industrial growth steady and promising.397 
Government efforts to foster private initiative, both local and foreign, also bore 
fruit.398 Many new enterprises were established in Cyprus, a reality characterized as 
“a small industrial revolution”.399 One of the most important new investments on the 
island, beginning in 1965, was the construction of an oil refinery in Larnaca by a 
consortium of the British petroleum companies Shell and Mobil. Indicative of the 
promising prospects of the Cyprus economy was the fact that this consortium 
acknowledged that the prospects for profitability were quite sufficient to outweigh the 
element of political uncertainty.400  
Undoubtedly tourism was one of the sectors that experienced the biggest blow in 
1964. Nevertheless, it took only two years for recovery to set in. More specifically, 
the Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism reported in 1966 that tourist arrivals 
had exceeded the Government’s goal of 50,000 foreign visitors.401 How was this 
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possible given the lack of a permanent political solution to the Cyprus problem along 
with the sporadic increase of inter-communal tension on the island? From the outset 
of 1965 the Government decided to renew its promotion campaign and to invest in 
the hotel industry and education.402 Particularly, in the 1965-1966 development 
budget significant funding was allocated for the establishment of the Central Hotel 
Training School, the advancement of local tourism through attractive loan packages 
for hotel renovations and the Government-funded project of the Nicosia Hilton 
Hotel’s construction.403 Additionally, negotiations were initiated with the British 
Government for the release of the Golden Sands area in Famagusta, which was a 
property of the War Department of Britain before 1960.404 There was also a degree 
of good fortune that Cyprus as a venue was well placed to benefit from the large 
increase in British tourism to the Mediterranean that occurred in the mid-1960s.  
A significant upswing was also reported in the foreign trade of Cyprus. Britain 
remained the major trade partner of Cyprus, but a series of new trade agreements 
had also been signed with countries of the Soviet bloc.405 Both imports and exports 
increased on this front, although the former continued to represent nearly double the 
value of the latter. Meanwhile, the current deficit in the total balance of payment was 
narrowed by two other sources. The UN force expenditure, along with the British 
bases’ spending and the increase of Turkish and Greek troops on the island, had 
brought in a large amount of foreign exchange.406 Additionally, Cyprus had a very 
small external debt whilst the island’s financial management was broadly considered 
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to be conservative.407 The general policy of the Government held that both ordinary 
and development spending should derive mainly from local revenue, in accordance 
with the Government’s broader practice of avoiding external borrowing. According to 
the Finance Minister: 
We are in a position to lay down not only our non-aligned foreign 
policy, but also our economic policy free from foreign influences 
and pressures and from the need to resort exclusively to this or that 
country … Cyprus, whose borrowing ability is sound, cannot adopt 
the easy policy of over-borrowing and thus, be indirectly reduced to 
a political dependency or an economic dominion of another state. 
Moreover, under the present emergency conditions, our capability 
for external borrowing must, for national reasons not be used up; 
but, like a safety-valve, it must remain available for securing 
resources to meet a possible increase in the defence expenses, 
which may be needed for the preservation of the freedom of 
Cyprus.408 
It was thus true that the Government-controlled part of the island enjoyed remarkable 
prosperity. The end of the first five-year development plan indicated a GDP increase 
of 24% with an annual rate of growth of 6.8%, 0.6% more than the initial provision of 
the Plan.409 The UN Development Programme’s resident representative in Cyprus, 
Dr. Earl Hald, asserted that Cyprus might have little experience in governing itself 
but that it certainly was no longer the under-developed country as it had been in 
1960.410 The Cyprus Government was determined to continue this successful effort 
and adopt further measures to accelerate the level of growth. When the second five-
year development plan was drafted, it decided to focus on a more complete 
coverage of all the sectors of economy with a particular emphasis on social and 
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welfare aspects, and not solely on the economic aspects of material advance.411 
Additionally, it aimed to foster further consultation and cooperation between the 
public and private sectors and intended to involve both in the process of 
development planning.412 By the end of this second plan, the Cyprus Government 
had successfully achieved an acceleration of the growth rate. Moreover, after the 
milestone of November 1967 and the creation of new momentum in political 
discussions of the Cyprus problem, a moderate economic integration process began 
for the two communities. Although after 1968 the number of the Turkish-Cypriots 
employed by Greek-Cypriots was gradually increasing, Christodoulou’s assessment 
that “the reunification of the Cyprus economy was very nearly realised on the eve of 
the Greek coup and the Turkish invasion” is certainly rather optimistic.413 
Nonetheless, by 1973, the Government had achieved a remarkable level of welfare, 
achieving an increase of 7% of the country’s GDP, with almost zero unemployment. 
The aim of diversification of the economy and the reduction of the over-dependence 
on a few insecure, external sources of income was also achieved by promoting 
development of other sectors, such as industry-services, construction and tourism.414  
The socio-economic realities for Turkish-Cypriots 
Despite this prosperity in the Government-controlled sector, matters were by no 
means so ‘rosy’ for the Turkish-Cypriots who remained in the enclaves. Long before 
1963 economic discrepancies existed between the two communities, but these were 
further widened when the inter-communal separation got underway. This increased 
social instability within its own share and thus had implications on the political 
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aspects of the Cyprus problem. Although some studies argue that real economic 
integration between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots always remained superficial, most 
have agreed that there was at least a peaceful commercial and trade co-
existence.415 Despite their income differences, according to some observers “it was 
virtually impossible to distinguish by sight the houses, the stores or farms of the 
different communities”.416 This section will provide a brief analysis of the economic 
status and employment of the Turkish-Cypriots in and outside the enclaves in the 
period 1964-1967. 
Mainly for propaganda purposes in both communities have deployed several 
arguments to ascribe blame for the political and economic separation and the 
relative economic stagnation of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership for example contended that after 1963 its community lived in poverty 
whilst the Greek-Cypriots enjoyed an unexpected economic boom owing largely to 
their separation. They claimed that all the funds that were constitutionally allocated 
to Turkish-Cypriots were now spent on the Greek-Cypriot programme. The same 
occurred with the benefits from the UN expenditure and external financial and 
technical assistance.417 The Greek-Cypriots, on the other hand, retorted that the 
Turkish-Cypriots had voluntarily abandoned their posts, and that if they wished to 
return, or recognize the Government’s legitimacy and everything that had been 
conducted in their absence, they could also benefit from the island’s economic 
development.418 Regardless of who was right or wrong, the crucial element for our 
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analysis is the outcome of this separation and its side-effects regarding both the 
development of the Cyprus problem and the political and socio-economic realities for 
Turkish-Cypriots.  
One of the main challenges for any contemporary scholar who studies the economic 
situation of the Turkish-Cypriot community is that there are no official data for the 
situation in the enclaves for the period 1963-1974, or for the actual extent of the 
economic involvement of the Turkish-Cypriots residing outside the enclaves to the 
Republic’s development. According to several interviews conducted by Paul Strong, 
before the summer of 1974, the Turkish-Cypriot administrators were instructed to 
destroy various economic documentations in their possession.419 Moreover, as 
Patrick observes, the Government’s statistics for Turkish-Cypriot employment in the 
Government-controlled sector, especially after 1968, were most likely 
exaggerated.420 
As has already been examined, immediately after the separation, the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership had sought to improvise its own administrative structures and to form 
separate economic units within the enclaves. The most important consideration for 
the viability of the separate administration at this stage was financing. The Financial 
Department of the Turkish Communal Chamber became the main economic 
authority responsible for the collection and management of the General Committee’s 
funds.421 The Turkish-Cypriot authorities had also informed Britain that any income 
taxes for the Turkish-Cypriots employed in the UK Bases should be paid directly to 
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that Department.422 Additionally, the Turkish Communal Chamber had imposed its 
own custom duties on several products entering the enclaves, such as cigarettes, 
fruits and vegetables. As a consequence, however, the Turkish-Cypriots often paid 
two sets of revenue taxes – one to the Government authorities, and another to the 
administration of the enclaves.423 
Building a separate economy was disastrous for a minority with a very limited 
territorial control over certain areas of Cyprus. Lacking any substantial sources of 
income and not being internationally recognized as a separate authority on the 
island, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership inevitably had to turn to Turkey for financial 
aid. As we have seen, after 1964, ‘etatism’, the Turkish ideology of economic 
development, was fully applied in the Turkish-Cypriot embryonic administration, later 
to be consolidated into the post-1983 pseudostate.424 In particular, Mehmet has 
observed “the Turkish financial aid was modelled and channelled to Turkish-Cypriots 
to institutionalize statism within a top-heavy, uncompetitive and centralized 
framework”.425 This policy was further strengthened in 1968 when Turkey financed 
the creation of the Turkish-Cypriot Planning Bureau responsible for the development 
planning of the enclaves.426 
Ankara was thus now able to further infiltrate the economic affairs – and by corollary 
all political and social affairs – of the Turkish-Cypriot community, by providing large 
grants for defence purposes, salaries for civil servants and fighters, and subsidies for 
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the refugees.427 For Turkish-Cypriots, turning towards their own ‘motherland’ was 
unavoidable by mid-1964 when the Cyprus Government imposed economic 
sanctions on the enclaves. Makarios’ Government made a list of prohibited materials 
with which the Turkish-Cypriots in the enclaves could have built further fortifications 
and ammunitions.428 This embargo, together with the restriction of movement 
imposed by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, created enormous difficulties in the daily 
lives of the Turkish-Cypriots.  
Turkey’s financing and the Red Crescent relief shipments directed to the enclaves 
were effective for the dual purposes of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership: namely, to 
survive at least until Turkey was finally driven to intervene; and to convince the 
international community that Turkish-Cypriots were the victims of a Greek-Cypriot 
policy to destroy their capacity to resist. The latter was to some extent successful. As 
one observer at the time pointed out, although the Greek-Cypriots might attract 
political sympathies, “one’s human sympathies are with the Turks (not because they 
are more virtuous, simply because they need it more)”.429 Indeed, especially during 
1964, the living conditions of the enclaved Turkish-Cypriots declined progressively. 
Although the data remains obscure – and there was often significant distortion of the 
actual situation experienced by Turkish-Cypriots – the number of ‘refugees’ swelled, 
inciting a housing problem.430 The Government, however, stood firm by its embargo 
policy. The Minister of Labour further invoked the argument that permitting any 
construction activity in the enclaves would obstruct UNFICYP’s mandate.431  
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Specifically, the UN force was responsible for the return to the status quo ante 1963; 
thus if houses were built within the enclaves the artificial ‘refugee’ problem would be 
perpetuated. 
Moreover, the increase in displaced persons concentrated in small areas of the 
island exacerbated unemployment. Jobs in the public service and agriculture were 
the main source of income for Turkish-Cypriots before 1963. Thus, abandonment of 
their posts in the public service and their farmlands in the Government-controlled 
areas inevitably resulted in a precipitous reduction of their standard of living. 
According to research conducted in 1971 by the Statistics and Research Department 
of the Ministry of Finance of the Government of Cyprus, the GDP of the Turkish-
Cypriot community in 1964 was £60.432 With the gradual diminishment of tension and 
the relaxation of strict measures by both communities, in 1967 it was raised to £101. 
However, the GDP of the Greek-Cypriot community during the same period was 
£215 and £292 respectively.433 
The lack of other available job opportunities inside the enclaves had driven many 
able-bodied males to enlist in the ‘Turkish-Cypriot Fighters’. However, after a while 
the Fighters corps grew so exponentially that it outweighed any military 
effectiveness. Patrick in particular has emphasized that the main responsibility of the 
majority of the Fighters was to distribute Ankara’s financial aid and food supplies 
from the Red Crescent, whilst it “masked the unemployment and under-employment 
problem of the Turkish-Cypriot community”.434 There was another truth about the 
Fighters: once enlisted they could not voluntarily resign. At the same time it was 
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reported that several educated Turkish-Cypriots were forced to seek refuge either 
outside of Cyprus or in the UK bases in order to refrain from enlisting.435 Further 
discontent was brewing amongst the enclaved Turkish-Cypriots, who claimed that 
the military officers from Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership itself were 
appropriating Ankara’s subventions for their personal benefit.436 This situation 
gradually strengthened an opposition movement within the Turkish-Cypriot 
community, one which heavily criticized both the military’s actions and their 
leadership’s financial management, persistently demanding public legislative 
debates for the budget planning and spending.437 
Nearly one year after the clashes, the Cyprus Government followed a new policy 
designing to sever the moderate from the extremist elements of the Turkish-Cypriot 
community. By mid-1965 it finally relaxed the economic blockade and announced 
measures to persuade displaced Turkish-Cypriot to return to their villages. Makarios 
promulgated an official Government agency aiming to settle the displaced in rebuild 
homes in their original areas and to find employment for them.438 Naturally, the 
Turkish-Cypriot authorities made every effort to deter any impulse to return to 
homes, or indeed any fraternization between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots, in order 
to prevent possibilities of inter-communal integration. In this they were largely 
successful.439 Nevertheless, there were cases of Turkish-Cypriots escaping from the 
supervision of the enclaves, which the Greek-Cypriot press fastened upon for its own 
purposes. The Ministry of Labour also made a limited attempt to attract younger 
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Turkish-Cypriots by expanding several of its training scheme programmes for various 
crafts trades inside the Nicosia enclave after 1968, when the strict bans of 
movement in and outside the enclaves were eased.440  
Despite the serious problem of unemployment within the enclaves, it is also possible 
to identify certain indicators, derived from various studies and personal accounts, 
relating to employment of the Turkish-Cypriots outside the enclaves. For example, 
employment in agriculture and agricultural production for the Turkish-Cypriots 
farmers who did not abandon their farmlands after 1963 were not substantially 
affected.441 Suggestively, inter-communal cooperation in agriculture was not 
curtailed.442 It should also be stressed that although many Turkish-Cypriot 
businessmen were substantially affected by the 1963 crisis, many had continued to 
cooperate smoothly with Greek-Cypriot partners. By October 1965 Greek and 
Turkish owners of factories situated inside the Nicosia Green Line, which had closed 
due to the inter-communal clashes, initiated negotiations for their re-opening under 
the auspices of the UN Political Liaison Committee.443 Nonetheless, political 
complexities and considerations limited the scope here on both sides. Such 
cooperation also continued in another way. The Cyprus Development Bank, a mixed 
Government-private institute established in 1963 to mobilize foreign and local capital 
along with the human resources for the industrial development of Cyprus, continued 
to operate with representation by members of both communities. The respected 
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previous President of the Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, Kemal Rustem, 
along with many other Turkish-Cypriot stockholders, remained members of the 
Board of the Development Bank.444 According to the Government’s spokesman in 
September 1966, 506 Turkish-Cypriots were still employed within the Government, in 
sectors such as the Post Offices, Port, Agriculture Services and the Diplomatic 
Corps.445 In these ways, at least a residual cross-communal network of economic 
contacts continued to exist, however much against the grain of other tendencies. 
Conclusion 
Before leaving Cyprus in 1969, the British High Commissioner, Sir Norman Costar, 
interestingly concluded, “Cyprus is the only country I know which has flourished 
economically on a civil war … One might almost say that Cyprus has put all of its 
nonsense into politics and kept it out of economics”.446 Ironic as this assessment 
might be, this was most certainly the case.  
According to Strong’s study, the events that occurred in 1963-4 opened the way to 
an entirely differentiated boost to the Greek-Cypriot economy.447 The scope this 
afforded subsequently brought considerable pressure to bear on the Turkish-Cypriot 
enclaves and, as Patrick’s field research at the time described, had the benefit of 
offering limited justification for Turkey’s direct intervention.448 More retrospectively 
one leading historian, Paschalis Kitromilides, has contended that a much more 
subtle, calibrated economic policy might have evolved in the Republic, one which, 
whilst including certain embargoes, could have used to its advantage the large 
number of Turkish-Cypriots continuing to live outside the enclaves, encompassing a 
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variety of actions and incentives to resume integration between the two 
communities.449 Whilst recognizing the role played by Turkish-Cypriot 
obstructiveness at the leadership level, Kitromilides remarked that “one cannot 
escape the thought that more persistence and more imaginative policies might have 
been more effective”.450 This perception is shared by other scholars who argue that a 
lasting solution could have eventually been reached through economic and social 
strategies, given that economic sphere and market place traditionally were the only 
sites in which both communities smoothly interacted.451  Nonetheless, it was not until 
April 1967 that Tassos Papadopoulos admitted that the Government’s efforts needed 
to focus on assisting the 40% of Turkish-Cypriots residing outside the enclaves.452 
Yet there was still no tangible evidence of real progress on this front. Had the Cyprus 
Government made progress in building a relationship with this significant segment of 
the Turkish-Cypriot community, it might have gained a firmer leverage on the overall 
situation whilst promoting social stability and peaceful co-existence.  Instead, the 
economic development of the Government-controlled sectors only intensified the 
disparities between the two communities, making the political dimensions of the 
Cyprus problem even more complex.  
It should be stressed that Strong’s study also argues that, had it not been for the 
separation of 1963, over the next few years the Turkish-Cypriots as a community 
would have experienced growth amounting to 18% of the national income.453 That is, 
their economic weight would have caught up with their proportionate share of the 
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island’s population, and as such precluded any need for external subversion from 
Turkey. Such a trajectory, in the context of the sustained growth within the Republic 
as a whole, perhaps would have been able to lay the foundations for a common 
Cypriot consciousness and identity.454 Nonetheless, by applying economic ‘sticks’ 
instead of carrots and by avoiding any genuine rapprochement and return to 
normality, the Cyprus Government had adopted a dangerous strategy for achieving 
its goals. As Clerides had explained, squeezing the Turkish-Cypriots, if truly effective 
would have caused Turkish intervention, and if ineffective, as was the case, would 
have been played into the hands of Turkish-Cypriot extremists for their own gains.455  
In conclusion, one crucial element was brought to the surface by the quick economic 
recovery and social stability: this was the new reality and cultivation of independence 
mentality which disproved Tassos Papadopoulos’ initial argument that enosis was 
essential for the stable and economic development of the Republic of Cyprus. By 
March 1967 Costar concluded that for a variety of reasons support for enosis within 
the Greek-Cypriot community had been reduced from 40% in 1965 to 20% in 
1967.456 Firstly, the acute political instability in Greece and the Athens-Nicosia rivalry 
together with the implications created by the presence of the Greek officers on the 
island, tended to weaken rather than strengthen Hellenic sympathy. Most 
importantly, however, Costar explained that from 1964 to 1966 a series of practical 
studies analysed the real implications of enosis for Cyprus in several fields, such as 
the banking sector, trade, industrial organization, civil service structure and taxation. 
These studies identified that if enosis were achieved, many uncomfortable 
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adjustments would take place to the overall disadvantage to Cypriots as a whole. 
Even Makarios admitted that “while Cyprus remained prosperous in comparison with 
Greece, most [Greek-Cypriots] were not really interested in enosis though no one 
can openly say so. If there was an economic boom in Greece, the situation could 
change”.457 However, economic prosperity was not the only issue at stake in the 
case of enosis. Many Greek-Cypriots realized that achieving this national aim and 
keeping Turkey off the island were two highly contrasting aims.458 The latter will 
become particularly evident in the following chapter. Our analysis will focus on the 
diplomacy inside and outside of Cyprus aimed at breaking the internal blockage in 
the peace-making efforts. Bearing in mind the internal restructuring and economic 
development underway, it emerges that the Cyprus Government tried skilfully to 
avoid any type of enosis that would have countervailed Greek-Cypriot interests as 
well as any peace-making effort that could have off-set their advantages vis-à-vis the 
Turkish-Cypriots.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
1965-1967: A ‘Convenient’ Negotiating Stalemate 
 
The current historiography of the efforts to settle the Cyprus problem during the 
period of 1965-1967 is usually preoccupied with the negotiations between Greece 
and Turkey, without close attention to the underlying reasons for the UN’s inability to 
alleviate the blockage created after Galo Plaza. In particular, form the publication of 
the UN Mediator’s report on 26 March 1965 up to the turning point of November 
1967, it proved impossible for the UN Secretary-General to undertake any promising 
initiatives. What did occur was a fruitless Greco-Turkish exchange constantly 
interrupted by political developments in Greece. As already implied, this merely 
consolidated a mutually convenient stalemate for both communities’ decision-
makers. After the Mediator’s conclusions were published, Makarios was convinced 
that time was working in favour of his community. Such an assumption gave him little 
incentive and no sense of urgency for any genuine conciliatory gestures. Although 
small signs of potential moderation coming from the Turkish-Cypriot sector could 
have been further exploited, the primary approach of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership 
remained the same: restoration of the 1960 Constitution followed by a new 
settlement on the basis of federation.  
This chapter aims to explain the negotiating strategies and objectives of the two 
communities regarding the internal stalemate, especially those of the Cyprus 
Government which held the ‘upper hand’ on the island, as well as to ascertain the 
reasons for the UN Secretary-General’s inability to recapture any initiative for settling 
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the problem. First, however, it is important to clarify why the contending parties had 
agreed to a dialogue between the Greek and Turkish Governments despite its very 
slim chances of success. Although the specific details of this external dialogue are 
beyond the scope of this study, a brief presentation of its dynamics is required in 
order to identify its impact on the consolidation of the internal impasse. This 
discussion begins by sketching the aims and calculations of various protagonists 
immediately after the rejection of the Mediator’s report in April 1965. 
The immediate aftermath of Plaza’s report 
The most negative aspect of the UN mediation in 1965 was that its outcome was the 
precise opposite of what was originally planned. Plaza overestimated the 
permissiveness of the parties to accept a compromise solution at that stage. He was 
disillusioned when he claimed in February 1965 that his findings would be the face-
saving device needed for the adoption of more flexible positions by the parties.459 
Instead, his report was used as a pretext for adopting the intransigent positions they 
instinctively favoured. At the same time, it created a diplomatic vacuum which 
brought the Cyprus problem back to the initial blockage, rekindling the question of 
whether the issue was to be adjudicated primarily between Greece and Turkey or 
between the two communities who actually lived on the island. 
As discussed in the first chapter, after the forthright Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot 
rejection of Plaza’s report, the UN mediation came to a standstill. Ankara insisted 
that if mediation was to continue Plaza should not be a part of it.460 The truth, 
however, was that the Turkish side, long before the submission of this report, had 
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repeatedly attempted to undermine the role of the UN. It aimed instead, ‘behind the 
scenes’, to involve either NATO or the Council of Europe as more appropriate fora to 
address what was mainly perceived as a dispute between Greece and Turkey than 
an internal problem of an independent sovereign state.461 Thus, Plaza’s report gave 
to the Turkish Government one more reason to undermine the continuation of the 
UN peace-making efforts on the island.  
Conversely, the Mediator’s conclusions diplomatically strengthened the Cyprus 
Government’s position and arguments. Although the report triggered intense public 
debates because of Plaza’s suggestion for the future of enosis, it was unanimously 
agreed abroad that this particular suggestion suited Makarios’ objectives. In early 
April 1965, the newly appointed British High Commissioner in Cyprus, Sir David 
Hunt, reported after his first meeting with Makarios that the President seemed very 
pleased with the Mediator’s report and “scarcely bothered to conceal his delight”.462 
Meanwhile, upon discussing enosis, Makarios commented that: 
If Greeks after weighing Turkish views and their other policy 
commitments decided that enosis is off the table, well and good, 
the Cypriots will accept that. If they said it was on, it would be 
necessary to consult Cypriot people about [the] modalities.463   
Clearly Makarios and many members of his Government were not at great pains to 
achieve enosis. Conversely, Makarios’ main aim since 1964 was independence in 
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practice with minority rights for Turkish-Cypriots and enosis in theory.464 Plaza’s 
conclusions gave further legitimacy to this plan which, if it was to eventually succeed, 
would require Makarios to remain adamant that no other basis for talks on the island 
would be acceptable.465  
In order to avoid the imminent deadlock, UN officials along with Britain and the US 
attempted to convince all interested parties to revive the earlier momentum in order 
to find an agreeable procedure for discussions on the Cyprus problem. This was very 
important for several reasons. Firstly and most importantly, tension was gradually 
increasing in Cyprus not only because of Plaza’s recommendations but also due to 
the earlier missile crisis and the outburst of new inter-communal friction near the 
buffer zone in Nicosia.466 Due to the latter incident, the Cyprus Government issued a 
new blockade for the Nicosia enclave. The Turkish Government was constantly 
threatening that unless the missile issue was permanently settled and the living 
conditions of the Turkish-Cypriots within the enclaves immediately improved, it would 
be forced to militarily intervene on the island.467 As a result, tension increased 
between Greece and Turkey, and the latter threatened to retaliate by expelling the 
Greek nationals and the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul.468 Finally, a 
Security Council meeting for the renewal of UNFICYP’s mandate was due, and for 
this concrete evidence of progress on the Cyprus issue was required. The future of 
the peace-keeping force in Cyprus was uncertain due to its growing financial 
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deficiencies and the contributing countries’ resentment about continuing to offer their 
services on the island voluntarily.469 Calm, therefore, had to be urgently restored and 
negotiations of any kind had to be initiated.470  
Under these circumstances, three options existed: initiation of a dialogue between 
the two communities, as the Mediator had suggested; negotiations between Athens 
and Ankara; or a combination of those approaches. The US and UK along with the 
Secretary-General of NATO attempted to convince the interested parties that 
integration of all processes was of crucial importance.471 First of all, the inter-
communal dialogue in Cyprus stood to contribute to a relaxing of the combustible 
atmosphere on the island. Meanwhile, it was suggested that a bilateral meeting after 
the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers of NATO countries in May offered an 
appropriate occasion for an initial rapprochement between Greece and Turkey and 
perhaps for a preliminary round of contacts on Cyprus.472 
Nonetheless, agreement regarding direct contacts on the island remained very 
unlikely. Makarios was only open to discussions on the basis of Plaza’s report and 
particularly a new Constitution with strictly minority rights for the Turkish-Cypriots. 
Conversely, Kuchuk insisted that the starting point of any talks would be the 1960 
Constitution, which for him meant that discussions would have been held on equal 
political status. Both parties held a maximalist approach on the highly contested 
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question of the basis of any potential talks between them, thus making it impossible 
for UN officials to find common ground.473  
It seemed that the only viable option left was the bilateral dialogue of Greece and 
Turkey. It should be stressed that the Greek Government was concerned by 
Makarios’ prevarication over enosis. Athens was neither ready nor willing to accept 
the disguised abandonment of enosis through the consolidation of independence. 
The British Ambassador in Athens explained that the Greek Foreign and Defence 
Ministers appeared “pretty sure that Makarios will consider this report as favouring 
his purposes and will therefore try to accept the renunciation of enosis unless they 
can stop him; they propose to try”.474 The danger of a permanent negotiating 
impasse together with Plaza’s recommendation for supplementary talks between the 
motherlands provided to the Greek Government with the necessary excuse to accept 
the direct dialogue with Turkey in order to pursue enosis.475  
A way out of the impasse, interestingly, came from Makarios only a few days after 
the Mediator’s report. More specifically, Makarios gave an interview to the British 
newspaper The Observer avowing that he accepted in principle the possibility of a 
Greco-Turkish dialogue for the Cyprus problem provided that it was only about 
enosis.476 However, he emphasized that he would never agree to a type of enosis 
with territorial exchanges or a Turkish base in Cyprus. Furthermore, he clarified that 
any bilateral talks between Greece and Turkey should not under any circumstances 
involve the domestic affairs of the sovereign State of Cyprus.  
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Off-loading the responsibility for dialogue onto the two motherlands constituted the 
line of least resistance within both communities. Primarily, for the Cyprus 
Government, this dialogue had limited chances of success. Even if Turkey eventually 
agreed to enosis, which was very unlikely at the time, significant territorial 
concessions would be needed in return. Makarios would never agree to such 
concessions in Cyprus, and the Greek Government was both unwilling and in any 
case too weak to ‘sell’ the acceptance of significant exchanges on its own national 
territory. The dialogue would have sooner or later collapsed, enosis would have been 
unattainable and Makarios would have escaped internal criticism for the failure of 
achieving enosis. Thus, by grudgingly consenting to this process, he would have 
continued pursuing his own vision for a unitary independent state without obstacles 
or the responsibility to negotiate and offer any concessions.  
Determining the future of Cyprus through negotiations between Greece and Turkey 
was the most promising option for the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, ensuring what they 
wanted the most: security and effective guarantees for their position in any 
settlement. Indeed, the Turkish-Cypriots had long insisted that the Cyprus problem 
was an issue created by Greek territorial expansionism, and for that reason it had to 
be solved in the wider context of Greco-Turkish relations.477  
Before final agreement on any new bilateral dialogue, Greece and Turkey at least 
shared one underlying motivation concerning Cyprus: a desire to push aside a 
problem that carried unwanted financial and political costs, and focus again on their 
own respective domestic challenges. Somehow, however, they needed to find a way 
to reconcile their deeply opposed perceptions on the issue, to allow a mutually 
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desirable escape. Greece was only able to discuss enosis, while this new procedure 
required the blessing of the UN.478 For Turkey, however, things were more complex. 
As a matter of principle the Turkish Government insisted on an assumed return to 
the 1960 arrangements, which meant that both enosis and partition should be ruled 
out and a solution should be sought on the basis of federation. Enosis for Ankara 
would have meant disturbance of the territorial equilibrium in the area of the eastern 
Mediterranean, set in 1923 between the two countries by the Lausanne Treaty, and 
this marked their red line.479 Meanwhile, an effective way out of the UN procedures 
had to be achieved; thus Turkey had to convince Greece of the merits of holding 
discussions under NATO auspices.480 It should also be borne in mind that the 
Turkish Government was in a difficult position domestically: the elections scheduled 
in October 1965 gave Ankara little room to manoeuvre in any prospective talks. The 
Turkish-Cypriot press and leadership as well as Turkish public opinion, pushed for 
drastic actions in Cyprus, indicating that a solution on the basis of enosis would not 
be tolerated.481 On the other hand, Ankara had good reason to urgently comply with 
the American and British suggestions for a quick initiation of bilateral talks. Both had 
warned the Turkish Government that if it continued publicly to insist that the 
Mediator’s task had come to a decisive end and no other procedure was agreed 
upon, then a Security Council debate on the situation would have been certain.482 In 
such a debate, Turkey would have been isolated, the Government would have been 
heavily criticized internally and Makarios would have achieved another diplomatic 
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victory. Turkey therefore had to take into consideration all of the above in order to 
prevent any further setbacks over the Cyprus issue.483 
 After the shuttle diplomacy of Britain and US throughout April 1965, both Turkey and 
Greece agreed to discuss the problem without pre-conditions at the margins of the 
NATO ministerial conference in May 1965, and expressed their strong commitment 
to finding a functional settlement for Cyprus as soon as possible. Despite Turkey’s 
attempt to actively implicate the NATO Secretary-General in the bilateral talks,484 this 
new initiative was carefully designed in order to be publicly translated as the 
realization of Plaza’s suggestion for talks not only between the two communities but 
all of the parties concerned.485 
Dynamics of the Greco-Turkish dialogue 
On 12 May 1965 the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers met in London and 
initiated a new process, hoping to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement for 
Cyprus. Both Ministers appeared cautiously optimistic about the continuation of this 
initiative and agreed to set up a suitable ‘mechanism’ for the continuation of 
discussions between the two Governments.486 They also agreed that it was of utmost 
importance to maintain secrecy of the substance of the talks in order to avoid any 
complications issuing from the internal politics of each country. In spite of this 
secrecy, Athens had to be extremely careful not to appear that it was side-stepping 
the Cyprus Government, since that would have strengthened the anti-enosis 
movement among the Greek-Cypriots, a phenomenon that was beginning to present 
a real challenge to Athens. 
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The only element agreed on by both countries and the starting point of their talks 
was their willingness to settle the Cyprus problem as soon as possible. Τhis was 
indeed a propitious omen. Another important factor was that both the US and the 
UK, although privately admitting that any type of enosis, with Turkey’s agreement, 
would better suit their own and Western interests in general - since this would have 
established definitive harmony in the Southern flank of NATO - nonetheless stated 
that they would remain neutral towards the efforts of the parties to settle the Cyprus 
problem.487 The British Foreign Office concluded that: “we must keep on the right 
side of Turkey and avoid annoying Ankara, but otherwise we should equally avoid 
unnecessary disputes with Makarios”.488 Above all, both America and Britain wanted 
a stable and permanent settlement which was acceptable to all contested parties. 
They were consequently bent on assisting the parties maintain the momentum 
created by the London meeting; that in the long-term could provide a settlement and 
in the short-term deflect the possibility of another crisis on the island.489 Contrary to 
what was usually reported in the Greek-Cypriot press, neither the British nor the 
Americans had any intention of imposing any particular solution on Cyprus.490  
Although the Cyprus Government had accepted this bilateral and external process, 
the different perceptions of Nicosia and Athens over the specifics of this dialogue 
seemed unbridgeable from the very beginning. In order to fully apprehend this 
substantial gap and the limited chances of success of this process, we must take 
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note of the background meeting of the Cyprus and Greek Governments on the eve of 
the Ministerial conference in London. George Papandreou, the Greek Prime-
Minister, invited Makarios to Athens in order to exchange views. The ultimate aim of 
the Greek Government was to commit Makarios to a common policy of achieving 
enosis.491 Although at the end of this meeting a joint communiqué was published 
announcing the common views of the two governments, there was no true 
convergence of their positions. Papandreou initially explained that the aim of his 
Government was firstly to find out whether Ankara indeed sought to “consolidate 
peace” on the island by accepting enosis, and what they might ask in exchange.492 
Then, he explained, if there was a preliminary agreement on such a solution, they 
intended to propose for a summit conference under the aegis of the UN to solidify 
the details. Makarios replied that he agreed primarily to the Greco-Turkish dialogue, 
as long as this was justified on the grounds of Plaza’s report. He stated, furthermore, 
that his Government’s chief aim in the long-term was enosis but without any quid pro 
quo for Turkey that affected the situation within Cyprus itself.493 Cyprus had nothing 
to offer in exchange for enosis. Makarios and his entourage were surprised when 
they were asked by Papandreou about the option of a Turkish base in Cyprus in the 
area of Cape Greco, and it came as a further shock when the Defence Minister, 
Petros Garoufalias, added that Grivas had already agreed to the suggestion.494 
Naturally, Makarios reacted negatively emphasizing once again that there would be 
no territorial concessions of any kind from the Cyprus Government. Although Grivas’ 
exact views have not been fully clarified, it was true that he had accepted some 
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territorial concessions in Cyprus albeit of “minor importance”, as he characterized 
them.495 Besides, it was a widely known secret that if such an agreement was 
eventually reached with Turkey, the Greek Government would seriously consider of 
deploying the Greek army stationed in Cyprus, led by Grivas, to impose the solution 
on Makarios.496  
According to Stavros Costopoulos, the Greek Foreign Minister, the nature and extent 
of concessions was the particular point of contention between the two Governments 
and eventually a source of misinterpretation - perhaps deliberately - in the final 
outcome of the meeting in Athens.497 Costopoulos stated that during their stormy 
discussions, his Government told Makarios that enosis was either possible through 
negotiations or war. The latter was not an option. However, if negotiations were held, 
inevitably that meant that compensations had to be given. When Makarios told them 
that he would not object if Greece wanted to make territorial compensations in its 
own territory, Papandreou responded that “he had no mandate to surrender parts of 
Greek territory which had been Greek for decades, when Cyprus had not even 
reached the stage of being a Greek territory”.498 After a long debate Costopoulos 
stated that Makarios had agreed that enosis would require certain exchanges but 
without clarifying what he really meant. Although vague, his agreement on the 
principle of concessions to Turkey was perceived for the time being as quite 
sufficient for the Greek Government. Nonetheless, the latter was still afraid that this 
would not prevent Makarios from torpedoing the bilateral dialogue at any stage. In 
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fact, what Makarios for his own part had meant by concessions was probably a 
Charter of Minority Rights for the Turkish-Cypriots, as Plaza recommended, and as 
he recurrently asserted publicly and privately after his return from Athens. This 
Charter, however, was ‘off the table’ for Turkey and thus not a useful negotiating 
card for the Greek diplomats. The gulf between the two Governments was still wide 
open. 
Despite their differences, on 9 May their joint communiqué confirmed their 
agreement to continue working in order to secure the right of self-determination in 
Cyprus in accordance with the UN Charter.499 At a press conference when he 
returned to Cyprus, Makarios stated that he gave his consent for talks on enosis 
between Greece and Turkey but he also diverged from the sanguine statements of 
the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers in London. When asked whether he shared 
the general optimism embodied by Greece and Turkey after the London meeting, 
Makarios answered: “It is a fact that I am optimistic but I think there are others who 
are more optimistic than me”.500  
Indeed, the other parties, especially Greece, seemed to believe that with certain 
moderate concessions to Turkey, enosis was within reach. In reality, in spite of the 
two motherlands willingness for a quick Cyprus settlement, this dialogue faced long 
odds from the start and these eventually proved insurmountable. In spite of the 
mistrust and rivalry between Athens and Nicosia, the intensifying split within the 
Greek political arena and the constant change of weak governments during the 
period of 1965-1967 undermined the progress of negotiations, leaving little room to 
                                                          
499
 Κranidiotis, Ανοχύρωτη Πολιτεία, op. cit., p.359 
500
 Murray to FO, 15 May 1965: DO 220/168, TNA 
171 
 
manoeuvre or to maintain leverage for Athens. Greece, therefore, was entering 
hamstrung’ into this dialogue.  
Ankara, on the other hand, it had privately agreed to consider enosis with territorial 
concessions, but in order to appease Turkish public opinion and the Turkish-Cypriot 
fighters emphatically insisted that discussions be based on the existing 1960 
Treaties.501 Publicly committing itself to the latter meant that the Turkish Government 
would have required significant territorial gains in order to avoid domestic criticism 
for presenting a future solution based on enosis. Finally, the key to any solution 
agreed between Athens and Ankara was Makarios’ compliance, and he consistently 
attempted to sabotage the Greco-Turkish dialogue in order to ensure that he would 
not be confronted with an unacceptable Acheson-type solution. In September 1967, 
the meeting of the Greek and Turkish Prime-Ministers, which became known as the 
‘Evros fiasco’, effectively terminated this bilateral dialogue without even minimum 
agreement over the outline of a final solution to the Cyprus problem. It seemed that 
things were heading to the same dead-end as in April 1965. Nonetheless, 
circumstances on the island had in the meantime undergone a considerable 
transformation, and it is to shifts at the internal level of Cypriot affairs – including the 
UN’s efforts – that we must now turn.  
Political realities in Cyprus at the outset of the Greco-Turkish 
negotiations 
Following upon an intense and combustible atmosphere in March and April 1965, the 
initiation of the Greco-Turkish dialogue admittedly brought about a general relaxation 
of tension in Cyprus. This helped to ‘freeze’ the status quo whilst the two 
communities adopted a policy of ‘wait and see’. Makarios had agreed to the external 
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dialogue for the future of Cyprus on the basis of enosis, but his own agenda for the 
island was different.  Internally he was planning to implement the ‘positive elements’ 
of Plaza’s report, that is consolidating the unitary character of the state and 
presenting a formula for guaranteeing minority rights whilst glossing over enosis. 
Additionally, the ‘salami-slice’ strategy towards the Turkish-Cypriots had to be 
maintained but this time combined with periodical relaxation of the embargoes. His 
public and private equivocation on the issue of local talks reflected his reluctance to 
accept them until the time was ‘ripe’ – until, that is, they were likely to bring to fruition 
his own long-term aims, murky though they might appear to others.  
Conversely, Kuchuk had welcomed the external dialogue since internally he had 
limited room for manoeuvre. His role as a community leader was itself constrained 
by subordination to the rest of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, military officers from 
Turkey and Ankara’s policies. Although in principle the Turkish-Cypriot leaders 
disagreed with the inter-communal talks unless these were under the strict basis of 
the 1960 Constitution, several moderate leaders privately expressed their openness 
to have direct talks that would deal with daily problems and normalization measures. 
Nonetheless, even then certain pre-conditions were set. Kuchuk had also to tackle 
the ever-deepening split within his community and persistent criticism from both the 
moderate camp, which requested a return to normality, and the extreme factions, 
mainly motivated by their political antagonism. 
This section will further explore these political realities at the outset of the externally 
driven negotiating attempt, giving particular emphasis to the future of enosis in 
Greek-Cypriot minds. The aftermath of the first joint communiqué of the Greek and 
Cypriot Governments in May 1965 will be our starting point. 
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After several tense meetings in Athens during Makarios’ visit in May, except from the 
bilateral dialogue between Greece and Turkey, the two Governments came to 
agreement on four priorities: 1) to ensure that the Cyprus issue would remain under 
the UN aegis, 2) to use all the ‘positive’ elements of Plaza’s report and request the 
Mediator’s return to lead the way for inter-communal talks, 3) to relax the restriction 
measures against the Turkish-Cypriots and 4) to avoid sources of friction on the 
island.502 Despite this ostensible agreement, Makarios knew that the Greek 
Government would still enter negotiations by offering unacceptable compromises to 
Turkey in exchange for enosis. The British High Commissioner reported that after 
that meeting “Makarios was much shaken by this threat to remove by bribery his 
Turkish safeguard [he had previously characterized the Turkish-Cypriots as his 
safeguard against enosis]. I was very struck to see him so depressed and somber 
when he came back from Athens”.503 
In order to avoid being confronted with a fait accompli and unacceptable territorial 
concessions from Cyprus’ territory, Makarios’ first goal was to strengthen his 
Government’s position. He aimed to improve Cyprus’ Republic leverage, both 
diplomatically and economically, to gain influence in the international arena. 
Moreover, he attempted to send several messages, internally and abroad, about his 
own stance on the internal problem and the unacceptability of any imposed 
solutions. Additionally, Makarios had to ensure that the UN remained the only forum 
responsible for the Cyprus issue. Simultaneously, he needed to prepare his people 
for the possibility that even if enosis was agreed upon in the Athens-Ankara talks, 
this would probably be at the expense of Greek-Cypriot interests. Thus, the main 
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themes of Makarios’ and his Ministers’ speeches during this period were about 
‘unadulterated enosis’ and a condemnation of foreign involvement that sought to 
impose solutions against the will of the Greek-Cypriots. 
Given the deterioration of relations between Nicosia and Athens, mainly due to the 
issue of the Cyprus army’s control, there was also intense suspicion in the press 
about the ulterior motives of the Greek Government for entering into a dialogue with 
Turkey. Criticism of the Greco-Turkish talks and the possibility of NATO involvement 
were constant during the period. Furthermore, only a few days after the Nicosia-
Athens communiqué, it was allegedly leaked through official channels to the Greek-
Cypriot press that the Government had discussed the possibility of holding a 
referendum if forced to agree on a solution for enosis with unacceptable 
concessions. The Government was planning to put to a public vote the alternatives 
of ‘Enosis plus NATO and Turkish sovereign bases on the island’ or ‘Full 
Independence’. The newspaper Alitheia, observed that in such a case it was almost 
certain that Independence would have been supported firmly by 90% of the Greek-
Cypriots.504 The Minister of the Interior, Polykarpos Yorkadjis, confirmed to some 
British officials the validity of this article by remarking that although Grivas wanted 
union with Greece, he and President Makarios preferred complete independence.505 
By the end of June 1965, Makarios managed again to rally a large percentage of the 
Greek-Cypriot population in major demonstrations that were organized in many 
towns of the island. The Greek-Cypriot crowd had protested against the threat of 
imposed solutions and strongly supported the Cyprus Government’s policies on their 
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national question. The slogan of these demonstrations was “Independence, Self-
Determination, Enosis without any territorial exchanges”.506  
The dominance of Makarios in Greek-Cypriot politics was indeed remarkable. This, 
however, led to the creation of a minority, at that point quite small, of fanatic enemies 
who accused him not only of abandoning enosis but of continuously frustrating the 
efforts of Mother Greece for unification. This minority and the threat of a coup now 
began to hang over the ‘undisputed’ authority of Makarios like a Sword of Damocles. 
Until this stage, however, strong criticism of Makarios and his Government was still 
confined to the extreme right-wing Cypriot and Greek press, as well as certain 
sectors of the Cyprus Army under Grivas’ guidance and with the support of the some 
circles in Athens. 
In July 1965, Sir David Hunt, three months after his appointment as Britain’s High 
Commissioner in Cyprus, provided his superiors in London with an acute analysis of 
the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot politics, including Makarios’ moves after the Athens 
meeting and the prospect of enosis. Like most who personally knew Makarios, Hunt 
was greatly impressed by his personality, his shrewdness and what he called his 
surprising frankness.507 He also admitted that: 
The strongest impression left on me by the three months I have 
been here is indeed the dominance of Makarios … There is no rival 
anywhere near the throne. As a result he is in the happy position of 
having almost complete freedom of movement in the certainty of 
faithful and enthusiastic obedience from his people. Only one 
condition is imposed: he [Makarios] must from time to time pay the 
appropriate lip-service to enosis. 508 
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Hunt also came to the conclusion that Makarios was indeed opposed to enosis, at 
least at that stage, and that although he reluctantly agreed to the Greco-Turkish 
dialogue with the ostensible goal of enosis, “he made his own hopes obvious by 
repeatedly proclaiming that it was bound to fail”. Through his dominance among the 
Greek-Cypriots and the control he exerted on most Greek-Cypriot newspapers, Hunt 
believed that “he inspired in the press a tearing campaign against the Greek 
Government”. Additionally, he explained that Makarios’ timing – June 1965 – in 
appointing to the Directorate of the Press and Information Office and the Cyprus 
News Agency individuals well-disposed to the Communist Party was not irrelevant to 
present developments on the island. In the meantime, Cyprus’ foreign policy further 
emphasized on enhancing its bilateral relations with countries that were principally 
opposed to enosis, such as the Non-Aligned states. Lastly and most importantly, 
Hunt had gone to some lengths to explain whether the Greek-Cypriots were still in 
favour of enosis or not.  The following abstract is indeed insightful: 
I think this question may not be entirely relevant to the current 
situation because part of Makarios’ tactics is to reduce them to a 
thoroughly confused state. He probably hopes that he has by now 
convinced them [Greek-Cypriots] that enosis cannot come by way 
of the Athens-Ankara dialogue so that even if in fact agreement 
was reached in the course of the dialogue he could dupe public 
opinion into believing that enosis was not really enosis. It is not 
easy therefore to form an objective judgment but I will risk the view 
that if they are not too confused and misled, the vast majority of the 
Cyprus population still desires enosis. I am not overlooking either 
the selfish interests of the politicians or the serious economic 
suffering which would result from union with Greece with the loss of 
the advantages of Commonwealth membership. But I hold that 
Greeks are not essentially, as so many people think, a money-
loving nation of shop-keepers but enthusiasts who will always let 
their heart rule their head …. It is, after all, noteworthy that AKEL, 
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whose leaders are even more opposed to enosis than Makarios, 
and with good reason, are obliged to pay lip-service to it.509  
The situation within the Turkish-Cypriot sector was different. They were entirely 
dependent on Ankara, and, according to Hunt’s assessment, Turkey was prepared to 
accept enosis and “sell them down the river” at a certain price.510 The official position 
of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership was that no other substantial initiative should take 
place on the island at the moment apart from the motherlands’ dialogue. Additionally, 
Hunt commented that, unfortunately for the Turkish-Cypriots, their leaders - 
especially Kuchuk - were totally ineffective, while Osman Orek, the Minister of 
Defence, who was the most effective, was also one of the most extreme and thus an 
obstacle to an inter-communal compromise.511 Generally, the Turkish-Cypriot 
leaders were characterized as inept, petty-minded and inflexible.512 At that point, 
however, Kuchuk was for Ankara the best available option for the leadership of the 
Turkish-Cypriot community since “he is an elected Vice-President and it is important 
for the Turkish formal position that his status should not be challenged until his term 
comes to an end and a new election according to the Constitution can be held”.513 
Nevertheless, Hunt reported that there were moderate and well-respected voices 
among the Turkish-Cypriot community, such as the President of the Supreme Court, 
Judge Zekia, the businessman and Chairman of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce, 
Kemal Rustem, Vasif Ali, and the chairman of the IS Bank or Fuad Bay, a prominent 
lawyer. However, these voices were neither politically powerful nor consolidated into 
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an effective organization.514 By the summer of 1965, however, the disappointment 
triggered by the rejection of Plaza’s report and the lack of any substantial efforts 
towards a solution led certain moderates to make their first tentative steps towards 
the creation of two political organizations: the Turkish-Cypriot Union formed in 
London and the Organization of the Turkish Patriots in Nicosia.515 These were 
perceived to have Communist affiliations and to favour peaceful co-existence 
between Greek and Turkish-Cypriots. The Turkish-Cypriot leadership, however, was 
not for the moment greatly alarmed by bodies they saw as poorly-supported and 
unlikely to survive. “It is a silly season for the formation of Patriotic Fronts”, Kuchuk 
declared, but the truth was that the opposition movements would gain ground during 
the following decade, becoming a major nuisance both for the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership and Ankara.516   
Hunt’s assessment represents one of the few documents of that period analyzing the 
politics of each community. It accurately reflected the dominance of Makarios in 
Greek-Cypriot politics and his ability to influence the overwhelming majority of his 
community towards the solution he preferred, in contrast to the situation within the 
Turkish-Cypriot political arena. This meant that the dynamics of any prospective 
inter-communal negotiations were bound to favour the Greek-Cypriots. The Turkish 
and Turkish-Cypriot sides were well aware of this and instinctively fell back on the 
threat of a Turkish invasion. Nevertheless, especially after October 1965, the new 
government of Suleiman Demirel in Ankara wanted to avoid such drastic action.517  
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Equally, therefore, Makarios and the Turkish-Cypriot leaders did not seek a 
substantial inter-communal dialogue at that stage, leaving to the motherlands the 
primary responsibility of finding a settlement for the Cyprus problem. However, 
behind the scenes there had been an intense diplomatic activity, led mainly by the 
Cyprus Government and the UN, which considered various alternatives and 
scenarios. Whether expressed for tactical or for other reasons, all of these were 
eventually shelved and to these our analysis will now turn.  
Reluctance to upset the status quo 
1965: Diplomatic manoeuvres for gaining time and securing tactical advantage 
 
It was unanimously believed abroad that in order for the bilateral Greco-Turkish 
dialogue to have any viable outcome, a period of calm had to ensue, and most 
importantly to last. Thus, the UN, along with the British and Americans, believed that 
the only way forward was to find ways to convince the two communities of the 
necessity of direct contacts at any level possible. 
The Cyprus Government publicly appeared willing to accept inter-communal talks, 
but Makarios reiterated that such talks should only be conducted on the basis of the 
Mediator’s report.518 As soon as Makarios came back from Athens therefore, he 
requested Plaza’s return in order to prepare the two communities for talks about 
guarantees for the Turkish-Cypriot minority rights.519 Makarios was well aware, 
however, that it was impossible for the UN Secretary-General to initiate such a 
process when one of the contesting parties vehemently opposed it. Therefore, by 
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insisting on a dialogue on these terms, Makarios skilfully insulated himself from the 
blame for the internal stalemate.  
In spite of this, Makarios recognized that it was time to offer an olive branch to 
Turkish-Cypriots, a move that would have further enhanced his Government’s 
position diplomatically. The first signs of this approach surfaced quickly, on 31 
March, with a speech by the President of the House of Representatives, Glafkos 
Clerides. As already commented in the first chapter, the latter firstly admitted, in the 
presence of President Makarios, that “enosis is not round the corner” and secondly 
he underscored the good intentions and determination of his Government to 
guarantee Turkish-Cypriot rights through a Charter of minority rights in religious, 
language and cultural affairs.520 Although all these measures were unacceptable to 
Turkish-Cypriots, it was perceived that Makarios himself wished to encourage 
Clerides as the Greek-Cypriot politician capable of negotiating directly with the 
Turkish-Cypriots, when the moment came, with some chance of success.521 It should 
be noted that throughout the decade 1964-1974 the British had observed that 
Clerides was usually assigned to express any moderate views by the Cyprus 
Government, views that neither Makarios nor his Ministers could afford to express.522 
Clerides had been accused of being pro-Western precisely because of such 
moderate observations. In retrospect, we can discern that he was one of the few, 
perhaps the only, leading contemporary politician with a practical grasp on how to 
find a path towards a viable settlement, especially in the period before the 1974 
invasion. This was something that the bulk of opinion could not readily grasp, and 
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such views expressed by any politician without the prestige of Clerides’ family name 
could easily mean political suicide. Throughout his political career Clerides was 
characterized by many Greek-Cypriots as a ‘dove’ who made unacceptable 
concessions, as was to be keenly illustrated in the view of many at a much later 
point, when he came to support the UN Annan Plan in 2004. Nevertheless, he was 
undoubtedly a pragmatic politician in his understanding of the costs of any 
agreement, and the fact that international considerations and regional balances of 
power could not be excluded. In Greek-Cypriot political culture in the immediate 
wake of independence, such predilections did not come easily to the great majority. 
As a second, more substantial good-will gesture, on 21 April 1965 Makarios 
announced that all roadblocks and fortifications were to be removed from all main 
towns, except Nicosia and the well-fortified and armed Kokkina enclave.523 
Moreover, he complied with the Turkish request for the extension of the list of 
supplies imported through the Turkish Red Crescent to Cyprus without paying extra 
duty.524 In the prevailing logic, these measures were not well received by the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership, which perceived them as mere propaganda since they 
provided no real relief. Instead, they claimed that the previous fixed check points 
were now replaced with mobile and erratic patrols further eroding their freedom and 
security of movement.525 
It is interesting in this context to note The Observer correspondent’s assessment of 
Makarios’ ‘peace offensive’. He stressed that the latter was now adopting techniques 
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similar to those used by Field Marshal Harding against EOKA in the mid-1950s.526 
Specifically, Makarios was switching between an attrition policy and a more 
moderate approach towards the Turkish-Cypriot community and then back again. 
The correspondent commented that those measures aimed at breaking the Turkish-
Cypriot front, but to no avail. Although this proved accurate enough, at least it did 
help in practice to alleviate some tensions, a very important prerequisite for the 
initiation of the Athens-Ankara dialogue a few weeks later. 
Although the Turkish-Cypriots in general rejected Plaza’s recommendation for inter-
communal talks, only a few days after the submission of the report moderate 
Turkish-Cypriot leaders showed genuine interest in the initiation of joint meetings 
with moderate Greek-Cypriot leaders under the supervision of UNFICYP during the 
Political Liaison Committee’s meetings.527 The latter Committee had been 
established on the island in the aftermath of the December 1963 crisis and it was the 
only forum then available in which officials from both communities could jointly 
discuss – in 1963 under the chairmanship of a British official - daily problems arising 
from the de facto separation.528 Because of the ineffectiveness of the Committee, 
however, when UNFICYP arrived in Cyprus it decided to meet separately with the 
liaison officers of each community.529 Nonetheless, by 1965 it was evident that this 
procedure was equally ineffective and time-consuming. Since certain moderate 
voices within the Turkish-Cypriot leadership floated the option of the resumption of 
joint meetings, and since any type of high-level direct contacts between the 
communities was not forthcoming, both the UN and the Anglo-Americans believed 
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that the former should be further pursued. Any approach to normalization, however, 
would certainly have stabilized conditions for the Turkish-Cypriot community and 
reduced the pressure on the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. Needless to say, it would 
also have enhanced Kuchuk’s waning political standing within his community.530  
Although in theory not opposed to the joint meetings of the Liaison Committee, the 
Cyprus Government was unenthusiastic at best.531 The Government was privately 
dissatisfied by the Committee’s work because it was constantly reacting to Turkish-
Cypriot requests.532 The Committee’s primary aim, after all, was to promote 
normalization which ipso facto benefited the Turkish-Cypriots in the enclaves, and 
this undermined the Government’s aim to force the Turkish-Cypriots to capitulate. 
Against any radical relaxation of the pressure on the Turkish-Cypriots, the Cypriot 
President gave strict orders that his representatives should not attend any meeting of 
the Liaison Committee at which a Turkish-Cypriot representative was present.533 
Carlos Bernardes, the Political Advisor of UNFICYP who unofficially undertook to fill 
the vacuum after Plaza’s withdrawal in April 1965, tried to convince both 
communities to have direct contacts through this Committee without any pre-
conditions; that was inevitably an uphill task.  
While on the local front Bernardes tried continuously to bring the two communities 
together, from May until December 1965 the Cyprus Government’s attention to the 
national question was directed elsewhere. First of all, as soon as the Athens-Ankara 
dialogue had been initiated, Cyprus Government was at pains to stress that only 
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Nicosia was the centre for determining the right course to the Cyprus Problem and 
that no final solutions would be implemented over its head. Nonetheless, the 
Government’s policies and actions at times contradicted its own principles and were 
perceived as acutely in variance with the Greco-Turkish discussions. Secondly, a UN 
General Assembly meeting on Cyprus was in the offing, with the Mediator’s report on 
the agenda and thus further lobbying missions had to be initiated.  
One of the first diplomatic moves of the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to 
approach both Britain and the United States, to try to convince them of the futility of 
the Greco-Turkish dialogue and to induce them towards active involvement in finding 
a settlement along the lines favoured by the Cyprus Government. In London, Greek-
Cypriot officials requested Britain’s help to convince Turkey to accept the 
negotiations on the basis of minority rights.534 At the same time, Cyprus’ diplomats in 
Washington tried to test the waters for different approaches. Initially, Kyprianou 
suggested to the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, that since the current 
negotiations on enosis had little chance of success, an informal US-Cyprus dialogue 
for enosis held possibilities.535 Believing, however, in the importance of the Greco-
Turkish contacts, Rusk avoided encouraging Kyprianou’s ideas. It should be noted 
that the latter was one of the closest advisors of Makarios and one of the hawks his 
Cabinet. In contrast to the moderate influence that Clerides tried to exert on the 
Cypriot President, Kyprianou, according to Hunt, was convinced that enosis was 
inevitable and for that reason he sought to achieve “enosis at the earliest moment 
possible”, based on the principles laid down by Makarios.536 Through this policy, 
                                                          
534
 Adair, 24 May 1965: DO 220/168,  TNA 
535
 Memorandum of Conversation, (DoS) 10 June 1965: DoS, Office of the Historian, Doc.193  
536
 Note for the Record, 18 February 1966: FO 371/185629, TNA 
185 
 
however, Hunt believed that Kyprianou pursued his own political ambition, which was 
to carve out a role for himself in Greek-Cypriot politics.  
Meanwhile, other Greek-Cypriot diplomats were sending mixed messages 
concerning the next moves and perceptions of their own Government. Despite 
previous disagreement over having any direct contacts with the Turkish Government, 
it was reported that certain Greek-Cypriot diplomats were putting out feelers, 
especially towards the United States, for the possibility of direct talks between 
Nicosia and Ankara probably on the basis of independence.537 Nonetheless, this was 
perceived as another tactical move by the Cyprus Government for disrupting 
chances for any substantial progress through the Athens-Ankara talks.538 However, 
rumours of a Nicosia-Ankara dialogue intensified after the collapse of the bilateral 
dialogue in July 1965 and the appointment of Ozdemir Benler, the new moderate 
Chargé d’Affaires in the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia in September 1965. Unlike his 
predecessor, Benler was willing to have contacts with moderate Greek-Cypriot 
leaders.539  
According to several reports coming from the Foreign Office and the British 
Ambassadors in Ankara and Athens, the option of a Nicosia-Ankara dialogue might 
not be totally opposed by the Turkish Government, as it had been previously 
reported. Nonetheless, this process might be further explored only if Makarios were 
to initially make a gesture towards acknowledging the validity of the 1960 
Constitution, such as recognizing Kuhcuk as the Vice-President of the Republic, and 
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provided that these talks would discuss some form of federation.540 That option, 
however, still faced one great challenge. Turan Tuluy, the Turkish Ambassador in 
Athens, was convinced that the key barrier to such a procedure was the Greeks who 
“were much more heavily pledged to enosis than the Cypriots”.541 Thus, a solution on 
independence would probably not be a lasting one, unless Greece agreed in 
advance. From another perspective, the Canadian High Commissioner in Cyprus 
assessed that a Makarios-Ankara dialogue, perhaps without pre-conditions, would 
have been much more effective than any other alternative, especially that of talks 
between the two communities.542 He explained that although Ankara did not 
recognize the Cyprus Government, it accepted that Makarios had de facto authority 
on the island. Secondly, contrary to the imbalance between Greek-Cypriots and 
Turkish-Cypriots, the two Governments were evenly matched due to the fact that 
firstly they both had a fearsome instrument of war - the air superiority of for Turkey 
and ground superiority of the Greek-Cypriots - that could be used anytime they 
decided, and secondly, they both possessed the political power to implement their 
decisions on their people.543  
All these, however, proved to be mere diplomatic ‘brainstorming’, firstly for 
undermining the Athens-Ankara negotiations and secondly for gaining time until the 
next UN General Assembly debate. After September 1965 the Cyprus Government 
sought to secure a diplomatic victory in the forthcoming UN debate. The timing was 
indeed propitious. As already discussed, by August 1965, the Cyprus Government 
had secured an anodyne Security Council Resolution concerning its new electoral 
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law that had previously brought significant political tension. Meanwhile, the Greco-
Turkish dialogue had been interrupted after the fall of Papandreou’s government in 
July, and there were not at the moment any realistic prospects for its quick 
resumption. By the beginning of September there was still no stable government in 
Greece while Turkey was concentrating on its general elections in October. With no 
other process on-going, Nicosia calculated that it would be easier for the Turkish-
Cypriots to accept the dialogue that Makarios was offering without setting any pre-
conditions. Still, the best time to initiate such a dialogue would certainly have been 
after a favourable outcome for the Greek-Cypriot position in the General Assembly, 
thus further enhancing the Government’s position vis-à-vis the Turkish-Cypriots. It is 
noteworthy that moderate voices within the Turkish-Cypriot leadership also opined 
that the period after the UN debate would likely be propitious for preliminary 
discussions with the Cyprus Government for a genuine relaxation of tension on the 
island, providing that the General Assembly resolution was not an outright victory of 
the Greek-Cypriot position.544  
In order to achieve this victory, therefore, Nicosia needed once again to appear more 
flexible towards the Turkish-Cypriots. The first move of the Cyprus Government was 
to present a ‘Declaration of Intention and a Memorandum’ with measures for the 
safeguarding of minority rights, and secondly to establish a Committee responsible 
for the rehabilitation of the displaced Turkish-Cypriots.545 According to Makarios: 
the Government, following the recommendations of the Mediator of 
the UN, is prepared to accept the presence in Cyprus of a UN 
Commissioner with an adequate staff of observers and advisers 
who will observe on such terms as Your Excellency may direct, the 
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adherence to all rights referred to in the Declaration and 
Memorandum….546 
Trying, however, to prevent the ghosts of the past, such as his ‘Thirteen Points’ 
proposal and all the constitutional amendments since 1964, from haunting his new 
initiative, Makarios presented this Memorandum not as a fait accompli but in the form 
of a declaration of intention to be discussed with the Turkish-Cypriots.547 Meanwhile, 
the wording had to reflect the benevolent intentions of the Government: because not 
only was this to be its main lobbying ‘tool’ before the General Assembly debate, but it 
was also to be officially presented during the proceedings of the debate.548   
Naturally, both the Memorandum and the proposal for the Committee for the 
Displaced Persons Rehabilitation were rejected by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership as 
nothing but more Greek-Cypriot propaganda. With regard to the formalities of the 
Memorandum itself, Kuchuk repeated their long-standing argument; the Zurich-
London Agreements recognized that their community did not consist of a mere 
minority and that the Greek-Cypriots were trying to deprive them of their legal and 
political rights as granted by the 1960 Constitution.549 Since there was no Cypriot 
nation, Kuchuk continued, the two communities were equal.550 His counter-proposal 
was based on the long-standing Turkish-Cypriot argument that the two communities 
cannot live peacefully together and a voluntary population exchange must thus 
transpire under the supervision of UN.551 Privately, however, several Turkish-Cypriot 
leaders appeared more conciliatory. They explained that it would not have been so 
difficult to accept Makarios’ proposals if only they could be assured that the Greek-
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Cypriots could keep their word. For the Turkish-Cypriot MP Umit Suleiman, it was a 
question of confidence and the Turkish-Cypriots did not trust Makarios 
whatsoever.552 Having in mind that Makarios’ proposal came in the aftermath of the 
electoral law saga exacerbated their mistrust. Therefore, the fundamental reason for 
rejecting this proposal was that neither the judicial proceedings proposed in the 
Memorandum nor the system of the UN observer were for them adequate 
guarantees for their personal security in case of any attack on their position.553  
Nonetheless, the preparations for the General Assembly debate brought a short 
period of calmness in Cyprus. Indicative of this was the fact that the for the first time 
since 1963, on 29 October 1965, three Greek-Cypriot Ministers met with Kuchuk and 
other Turkish-Cypriot leaders during a reception organized by the Turkish Embassy 
inside the Nicosia enclave for the celebrations of Turkish National Day.554 This 
invitation was also one of the first promising moves of the Turkish Government of 
Suleiman Demirel. Nonetheless, this peaceful atmosphere proved to be the calm 
before the storm that followed - because of the Famagusta crisis of November and 
the General Assembly resolution of December. On 2 November heavy firing broke 
out between the National Guard and the Turkish-Cypriot fighters in Famagusta due 
to the former’s decision to extend coastal fortifications, contrary to the previous 
recommendations of the UNFICYP to avoid such actions. The UN force managed to 
bring about an agreement a month later.555 The Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot sides 
were greatly frustrated by this recent crisis; thus, when the General Assembly 
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resolution of 18 December 1965 was adopted they were further embittered. This 
resolution not only made reference to Plaza’s report, which the Turkish delegation to 
the UN tried to prevent, but also made reference to Makarios’ ‘Declaration of 
Intention’ and lastly to the declaration of the Non-Aligned Conference of October 
1964, which reaffirmed the Cyprus right to unfettered independence.556 Before the 
UN debate, Turkey emphatically urged the Americans, British and all other member-
states to vote for a non-substantial, procedural resolution without any reference to 
the Mediator’s report.557 This resolution was perceived as a major diplomatic defeat 
for Demirel and his Foreign Minister, Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, who had once again to 
appease Turkish opinion, the press and their opposition. Hence, their next steps and 
decisions on the Cyprus problem had to be very thoroughly considered.558 By the 
end of 1965 it was evident that there would be no radical development on the 
ground; the resumption of the Greco-Turkish dialogue was still ambivalent while 
agreement to any type of direct contacts on the island was distinctly unlikely. 
1966: Consolidation of the stalemate  
 
The aftermath of the General Assembly resolution provided an additional bargaining 
chip to the Cyprus Government which continued to insist on inter-communal talks for 
minority rights. As was the case with the Security Council Resolution of August 1965, 
publicly this resolution was presented as another great diplomatic success, 
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especially for the Cypriot Foreign Minister.559 On 30 December Makarios again 
called the Turkish-Cypriot leaders to negotiate on the basis of the recently adopted 
UN resolution, while this time added that consultations of the Turkish-Cypriot leaders 
with the Turkish Government were also welcome.560 Kuchuk rejected this proposal, 
reiterating that the 1960 Treaties were still valid and called for five-party 
discussions.561 Turkey, on the other hand, had one more reason to reject Makarios’ 
offer as well as simultaneous offers of the Greek Government to resume their 
previous dialogue.562 On 2 February 1966 a new Athens-Nicosia communiqué 
reaffirmed that any solution which excluded enosis was unacceptable.563 Although 
this communiqué was produced for internal consumption, since the relations of the 
Cyprus and Greek Governments were on a tightrope, it triggered a strong reply by 
Turkey, bellicose statements against Greece, the recalling of the Turkish 
Ambassador from Athens and a brusque communication with the UN Secretary-
General.564 Inevitably these developments had also reduced the prospects for a 
quick resumption of the previous bilateral dialogue with the Greek Government. At 
the beginning of 1966 therefore, there was a complete impasse over the Cyprus 
problem, both inside and outside of the island. 
The main problem for the UN Secretary-General surfaced when Galo Plaza officially 
submitted his resignation on 22 December 1965. The status quo had to unfreeze and 
thus some new initiative needed to be undertaken. U Thant decided in February 
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1966 to appoint his Under-Secretary for Special Political Affairs, Jose Rölz-Bennett, 
to a fact-finding mission to all concerned parties inside and outside of Cyprus along 
with visits to countries contributing to UNFICYP. Rölz-Bennett explained that his aim 
was to listen to the views of the parties, especially regarding the future of the 
mediation, in order to advise the UN Secretary-General on his next moves after 
Plaza’s resignation.565 Meanwhile, he was about to examine the role of the UNFICYP 
for finding ways to remedy its substantial financial problems.   
Rölz-Bennet’s mission proved abortive. There was no way to bridge the gap between 
the divergent positions over the prospect of mediation. U Thant in his subsequent 
report summarized that: 
It needs to be said of Cyprus, in full frankness, I believe, that it 
remains still to be demonstrated that there is a genuine will to 
peace among the leaders of the two communities of sufficient 
earnestness and intensity to lead them towards those mutual 
accommodations in viewpoint and position which are essential to a 
pacific settlement …. The key to a settlement, however, lies in the 
last analysis with the parties. Unless they are prepared to move 
towards resolving their basic differences, the prospects of an early 
solution are dim indeed.566  
The only option left to the UN Secretary-General was to expand Bernardes’ 
mandate. In order to explore whether direct discussions under the Political Liaison 
Committee or even any indirect exchanges between the two communities were 
possible, U Thant in March 1966 instructed Bernardes to use his good offices to 
achieve “in the first instance discussions at any level of problems and issues of 
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either a purely local or a broader nature”.567 This, was another attempt that soon 
reached a dead-end. It may be interesting, however, to investigate the parties’ 
perceptions at that point. 
Justified by its recent diplomatic victory, the Cyprus Government’s position was now 
presented in a stricter tone. In particular, it appeared ready to contemplate direct 
talks but not under the Political Liaison Committee, and only if there were indications 
that at least some common ground existed for those talks. For the Cyprus President 
the latter element was a sine qua non; otherwise “they would have no value and 
might even be harmful if they served only to emphasize differences and no common 
ground could be found”.568  Since Makarios believed that time was on his side and 
no form of mediation was possible, ‘the common ground’ was not going to be 
achieved through bilateral discussions or concessions but only through total 
agreement of the Turkish-Cypriots to his own terms. Makarios, furthermore, clarified 
that neither the 1960 Constitution nor his previous ‘Thirteen Points’ were acceptable 
as a basis for discussions.569 He explained:  
I proposed those Thirteen Points for the amendment of the 
constitution as a first step and not as a final solution of the problem. 
Their rejection by the Turkish community and the rebellion which 
followed have created a situation which goes beyond the Thirteen 
points and calls for a radical and final solution of the problem.570  
On the other hand, Kuchuk reiterated that his community was ready for joint 
meetings to discuss daily affairs through the Political Liaison Committee and any 
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other broader contacts to be held under the basis of the 1960 Constitution.571 
Nevertheless, a necessary pre-condition was to see several goodwill and effective 
unilateral gestures from the Greek-Cypriots.572 It should be emphasized, however, 
that by the spring of 1966 Ankara had extended its financial assistance towards the 
Turkish-Cypriot enclaves, further reducing the Turkish-Cypriot sense of urgency to 
have any inter-communal talks.573   
With very slim chances for any substantial progress, a few months later Bernardes 
returned to his original tasks, focusing on the technical issues of the daily affairs of 
the two communities. It was evident that the UN Special-Representative was at his 
wit’s end. As a last resort he turned to the UK and offered his services to Britain in 
case the latter wanted to offer any substantial approach or suggestion towards the 
Cyprus problem.574 It seemed as if the UN were trying desperately to find an 
alternative route for achieving some progress, and Britain seemed to be the only way 
out. In light of the complete deadlock, Britain by this point had decided to re-examine 
its non-active involvement policy in Cyprus. Nonetheless, London eventually 
concluded that it was wiser to retain its neutral posture.  
Subsequently, the UN Secretary-General decided that since efforts were being made 
for the resumption of the Greco-Turkish dialogue, it was best to avoid interfering with 
another active initiative on the island until new circumstances arose.575 Still, 
however, UN officials were greatly concerned with the situation in Cyprus and 
continued to seek fresh ideas that they could have injected to the parties at a later 
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point. Interestingly, Bernardes privately admitted that he believed that the practical 
solution for the Cyprus problem was Enosis with federation.576 He explained that 
since the Turkish-Cypriots were ready to accept federation with Makarios, a 
federated solution with the Greek Government was probably much better for them. 
Agreeing to a federal union of Cyprus with Greece, local autonomy for the Turkish-
Cypriots and perhaps a port on the island under their control, for Bernardes seemed 
an adequate guarantee for their safety.577 Both the US and the UK found merits in 
this proposal adding that this solution could have been a non-federation/federation, 
that is, a solution designed in such a way in order to be presented as federation to 
the Turkish-Cypriots and as a local autonomy for Turkish-Cypriots to the Greeks.578 
At the same time, the UN Secretary-General was considering proposing to the 
parties his new idea of an Independent Cyprus under joint guarantees by the four of 
the permanent members of the Security Council, i.e US, Britain, France and the 
Soviet Union.579 According to him, the major flaw of the Zurich-London Agreements 
was the right of unilateral intervention.580 If this provision was replaced with a 
collective intervention of the four members of the Security Council, then it might be 
acceptable to all parties.581 This option was discouraged by the US and Britain, since 
it seemed bound to introduce officially a Soviet foothold on or stake in the island. 
This proposal was rejected by Greece and Turkey as well.582 Another alternative for 
Bernardes was that since neither enosis nor Independence was at that stage 
possible, to seek perhaps a provisional settlement for three to five years on the 
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existing situation with certain guarantees.583 In other words, ‘kicking the can down 
the road’. This alternative was, however, rejected by Greece and Turkey, who 
preferred to focus on the prospect of their own dialogue, soon to be resumed.  
By early summer 1966 there was still no break-through. The status quo had been 
further consolidated, tension on the island had been reduced and the living 
conditions of the Turkish-Cypriots had been modestly improved. On the other hand, 
the Cyprus Government had internally focused on the deterioration of its relations 
with Athens and on the issue of command over the National Guard.  It was not until 
June, when the Greco-Turkish dialogue was revived, that there were again some 
diplomatic activity coming from the island. 
With the initiation of these talks, Makarios tried once again to upset the applecart 
with a new tactical move. He revealed to several Western diplomats that he planned 
to promote another process when the Athens-Ankara negotiations collapsed. He 
estimated that quite soon, and not later than August, the current exchange would 
founder due to Ankara’s rejection of unconditional enosis.584 In these circumstances, 
he suggested that the issue of enosis should be set aside and a new basis of 
Independence found as a workable if interim solution. For that purpose he proposed 
that local talks should begin and that sometime in autumn 1966 a conference should 
be held in New York with the Cyprus Government, Greece, Turkey and probably 
Britain, under the aegis of U Thant. From New York, the US Government could also 
provide assistance and influence for arriving at an agreement. At the initial stages of 
this conference Makarios stressed that the Turkish-Cypriots should not be present, 
although he did not reject their participation at a later stage. This proposal seems to 
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have been put forward by the President without any consultation or agreement 
among his own Ministers. It is noteworthy that only a few days before floating this 
proposal, Kyprianou showed no awareness of it when indicating that the Cyprus 
Government has no intention to initiate any dialogue for the time being.585 This 
represented an example of Makarios’ usual tactic of taking important decisions 
without consulting or even informing his closest associates. It is clear, however, from 
the British archives that this idea did not gain any traction in other quarters, and in 
British and Canadian official circles it was perceived as yet another means of 
fostering a general pessimism about the Athens-Ankara process. From London it 
was stated that:  
He [Makarios] is doubtless feeling some sense of isolation and 
perhaps wishes to recapture the initiative. If the dialogue ends in 
deadlock, he might be expected to gain some kudos by adopting 
the ‘statesman-like’ pose of calling for a conference which he knew 
would either be rejected by the Turks or, if held, would be open to 
Afro-Asian influence at New York.586  
Contrary, however, to Makarios’ estimations, not only had the Greco-Turkish talks 
not collapsed by autumn 1966 but rumours about enosis in exchange for either a 
Turkish or a NATO base had intensified. In light of these rumours, before the most 
crucial meeting of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers in December 1966 in 
Paris, the Cyprus Government and this time the Turkish-Cypriot military leadership 
as well tried to ensure that the two motherlands would not neglect their own security 
and political concerns.587  
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Firstly, within the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves there was a strained situation between 
the political and military leadership. Kuchuk and his entourage were under criticism 
from the extremists and the fighters for getting ‘soft’ towards the Greek-Cypriots. 
Meanwhile, the Turkish-Cypriot fighters bypassed their official leadership and 
informed Ankara that they deeply opposed any solution that did not guarantee their 
safety through physical separation of the two communities.588 However, the British 
High Commissioner asserted that although some tension existed among the fighters 
and the politicians within the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves, this was not as serious as the 
Greek-Cypriots believed or wished it was. Nonetheless, the Greek-Cypriot press 
initiated an active propaganda campaign overstating all the convulsions within the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership and highlighting all the cases of defection from the 
Turkish-Cypriot enclaves, in order to prove that the attrition policy of the Government 
was gradually bearing fruit.589  
On the other hand, Denktash from Ankara declared that neither a form of enosis with 
a Turkish base on Cyprus nor an independent demilitarized Cyprus with 
administrative autonomy and proportional representation of the Turkish-Cypriots 
would guarantee his community’s safety.590 He also added that the Greco-Turkish 
process was “quite unnecessary” since Greece has no authority to determine the 
future of Cyprus. Instead, he claimed that this must be accomplished through the 
Greek and Turkish-Cypriots’ exercise of their right for self-determination.591 Clearly, 
this also entailed the physical separation of the two communities. Nevertheless, the 
irony in this element was that both Makarios and Denktash agreed on the futility of 
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the dialogue between Greece and Turkey and the importance of letting the people in 
Cyprus deciding about their own future. This reflects the old truth that, however deep 
their differences may run, Cypriots of whatever kind do not like having decisions 
taken for them. 
Meanwhile, Makarios constantly emphasized that he would never agree to a Turkish 
base on the island. However, by late November he appeared amenable towards two 
particular proposals as a basis for discussions. The first was the idea of a NATO 
base on the island and Turkish participation in it under certain conditions. The 
second was the idea of a federation between Greece and Cyprus.592 Nonetheless, 
the possibility of a NATO base was unacceptable to Turkey and certainly not 
satisfactory to the Non-Aligned bloc. The latter argument was emphasized by 
Turkish diplomats during their efforts to approach the Non-Aligned countries in 
1967.593 In spite of the initial Turkish reactions, for the Greek Government these two 
new developments boded well for the eventual success of the bilateral dialogue. 
Indeed, by December, there apparently had been a mini-breakthrough in Paris 
between the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers. Nonetheless, this was very 
quickly offset by two other new developments on the ground: the fall of the 
Stephanopoulos Government in Greece, which again interrupted the negotiations; 
and the crisis sparked by the importation of Czechoslovakian arms in Cyprus. In 
addition, Carlos Bernandes resigned a few days later for personal reasons, thus 
creating another headache for the UN Secretary-General. 
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1967: Ripe time for local talks? 
 
The suspension of the Athens-Ankara dialogue at the beginning of 1967 and the 
political uncertainty in Greece had probably produced the new circumstances that U 
Thant anticipated for promoting a new UN active initiative. Indeed, the temporary 
successor of Bernandes, Signor Pier Spinelli, after a round of contacts on the island 
in January 1967, commented that he had found both Makarios and Kuchuk more 
responsive to the issue of direct local talks.594 Makarios had also privately admitted 
to several foreign officials that he was ready to negotiate with Kuchuk if there was 
concurrence from Greece and Turkey.595 This was his way to seize initiative of the 
Cyprus problem outside the framework of the Athens-Ankara process. However, 
unless definitive agreement on this procedure could be obtained in advance, 
Makarios could not afford to be seen as taking the initiative in approaching 
Kuchuk.596 Likewise, Kuchuk was under a great of internal pressure from the 
extremists of his own community, yet he was not adamantly opposed to direct 
talks.597 But to proceed in this way he had to gain something in advance, such as 
recognition that they were talking on equal terms. From January 1967 until the crisis 
of that November, the possibility of inter-communal negotiations was constantly 
discussed in diplomatic circles as the most appropriate remaining option, but the 
leaders of the two communities were still very reluctant to pursue this further. It 
should be borne in mind that, due to the coup d’etat and the imposition of an 
ultranationalist military regime in Greece in April 1967, the worsening of Nicosia-
Athens relations, the constant rumours of a coup to overthrow Makarios and the 
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internal strains among the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, neither community’s leaders 
were in a position to appear very conciliatory towards the other. Perhaps what was 
needed to encourage the parties to talk to each other was the ‘green light’ from 
Greece and Turkey. 
However, Athens and Ankara were pouring cold water on the prospect of local talks 
mainly due to the ambivalent future of their own dialogue. Ankara insisted that unless 
Kuchuk and Makarios were treated on equal terms it would never agree to local 
talks.598 On the other hand, there were much more at stake for Greece if such a 
process was initiated. Firstly, it would have meant the Greco-Turkish talks had failed, 
and secondly that talks on enosis had ceased for good. Nevertheless,, the diplomatic 
crisis generated by the importation of Czech arms in December 1966 increased 
suspicion of the Greek Government over the ulterior motives of Makarios. Athens 
therefore did not want, for the moment at least, to give the ‘go-ahead’ to Makarios for 
taking full control over any negotiations about the future of Cyprus.599 
On 20 February the new Special-Representative of U Thant, Dr. Bibiano Osorio-
Tafall, came to Cyprus and was determined to work for at least the implementation of 
certain normalization measures. This could have produced fertile ground for any later 
talks on the island. Osorio-Tafall’s first proposal for the relaxation of tension came on 
10 April 1967 when he suggested the easing of the restrictions of movement of 
persons and goods by both sides.600 This initiative, however, had the same fate as 
all the previous ones. Kuchuk replied that his community had nothing to offer.601 
Instead he asked the Greek-Cypriots first to make certain unilateral good-will actions 
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that could then be reciprocated.602 Additionally, however, Kuchuk decided to grasp 
this opportunity to diplomatically enhance his community’s position. Thus, he 
informed all the foreign diplomatic missions in Cyprus about his views on the matter 
in order to show them that the ball was now in Makarios’ court.603 Although Makarios 
had the same negative response, this time he seemed different: it appeared that he 
was indeed considering displaying some genuine moderation but probably some 
more push was still needed.604 That push came from Osorio-Tafall, who eventually 
convinced him a few months later, on 2 September, to announce a new ‘Peace Plan’ 
with several normalization measures affecting mainly Limassol and Paphos.605 
Although these measures were characterized as “not altogether insignificant”, as 
was the case with previously adopted normalization measures, the main barrier to 
their implementation was Grivas, who did not appear willing to proceed with a 
substantial disengagement plan.606  
It seemed as if by 1967 the Cyprus Government indeed started to think that time was 
ripe for talks, yet an outside boost was needed in order to change Grivas’ mood and 
move Makarios ‘from words to action’. By 10 September 1967 and after the Greco-
Turkish meeting at Evros, the bilateral dialogue of the motherlands collapsed 
definitively and a new process now had to fill the vacuum. The chief goal of Makarios 
was henceforth to ensure that an externally driven process would not be repeated 
and thus to seize the prime role in determining the next steps. Nonetheless, events 
did not unfold entirely in the way Makarios had planned. After Dentkash’s 
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clandestine return to Cyprus at the end of October and the well-known crisis of Ayios 
Theodoros/Kophinou in November 1967, the previous momentum was rudely 
shattered. This crisis constituted an important turning point of the Cyprus problem. 
Subsequently, there was no other option available beyond the immediate initiation of 
inter-communal talks, not on Makarios’ terms but on the basis of the new state of 
affairs that was created after the November crisis.  
Conclusion 
The rationale of the Greek-Cypriot policy towards the Cyprus problem may be 
summarized in Makarios’ own words: “the Cyprus struggle is a question of stamina 
and the party that shows the greater stamina will win”.607  Since March 1964 the 
Cyprus Government had already held the sway over the island, whilst Plaza’s report 
and the UN General Assembly resolution of December 1965 gave further legitimacy 
to the Greek-Cypriot negotiating position. The Greek-Cypriots, therefore, possessed 
all the vital tools to demonstrate the “greater stamina” and then to pursue the 
following threefold strategy: a) let time pass by abjuring any substantial initiative 
whilst constantly rejecting UN initiatives towards rapprochement with the Turkish-
Cypriots; b) focus on lobbying missions and mechanisms to secure diplomatic 
victories during the UN debates; and c) simultaneously undermine the very shaky 
chances of progress of the Greco-Turkish talks every time their momentum seemed 
to be revived. Interestingly, Cyprus’ High Commissioner in London explained that the 
reasons for Makarios’ acceptance of the Athens-Ankara negotiations despite his own 
lack of faith were firstly because he did not wish to be accused of intransigence and 
secondly because such an approach had in any event been suggested by Plaza.608 
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In fact, the most important benefit of this externally driven peace-making process 
was that it allowed Makarios to shape his foreign policy according to the 
abovementioned three directions and these would have eventually facilitated the 
implementation of his internal vision for Cyprus: the transformation of the Republic of 
Cyprus into a stable and economically prosperous unitary state. Upon this 
achievement, this state would be effectively positioned to incorporate the Turkish-
Cypriot minority.  
On the other hand, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership had welcomed the negotiations 
between the two motherlands although it acknowledged that this dialogue would not 
immediately alleviate the difficulties of their self-imposed isolation. Kuchuk was 
under fire from two fronts within his community, the moderates and the extremists (of 
TMT). For this reason, he was ready to accept the moderates’ voices for direct talks 
under the UN Political Liaison Committee but at the same time had to appease the 
extremist interests by insisting on returning to the 1959 Agreements and on certain 
unilateral goodwill gestures from the Greek-Cypriots.  
Makarios’ policy of letting time do its job in practice served to ratchet up the tensions 
until the crisis erupted in November, introducing an even more dangerous phase. It 
was evident that the Cyprus Government had underestimated two important internal 
challenges. Firstly, throughout 1967 the Turkish-Cypriot fighters had been attempting 
to extend their control outside the enclaves with the clear threat of sparking of local 
tension.609 Grivas’ military provocations against the Turkish-Cypriot fighters’ 
positions were adding further fuel to the fire. Secondly, as Costar explained, by 1967 
Makarios had to tackle the following situation: 
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In fact the Turkish-Cypriot community, supplied and paid by the 
Turkish Government and the Turkish Red Crescent Society, shows 
little signs of cracking. Most of its members have by now adjusted 
themselves to a reduced standard of living and having, as they 
believe, already faced the worst, contemplate an indefinite period of 
ghetto life with comparative equanimity. Their administrative 
services work quite efficiently nowadays, and thanks to UN efforts, 
they even get their mail. When shortages become impossible they 
resort to clandestine deals with Greek-Cypriots across the Green 
Line. In face of this tenacity there is little the Archbishop can do. If 
he agrees to formalize matters as they now stand he would be 
giving de jure recognition to de facto partition. If he heeds the 
frequent admonitions which I and my colleagues deliver to ‘kill the 
Turks with kindness’, he fears that he will merely confirm them in 
intransigence. So he may well judge it best to allow affairs to 
continue as at present, taking opportunities to advance the Cyprus 
Government’s position whenever they occur, but otherwise avoiding 
initiatives.610 
While Makarios was awaiting for the Turkish-Cypriots to capitulate   there was also 
one new reality that had been cultivated within the Greek-Cypriot community. The 
ultimate unfeasibility of enosis was gradually becoming more obvious for most (but 
not all) Greek-Cypriots. Makarios repeatedly emphasized that he would only accept 
enosis if it came without any territorial compromises in Cyprus. In practice, however, 
enosis without territorial exchanges on the island was extremely difficult to achieve, 
as Makarios fully understood. The President acknowledged that Independence was 
currently the best solution for Cyprus and since it was still not possible to admit that 
openly, Hunt explained that “by skilful propaganda he [Makarios] hopes to reduce the 
Greek-Cypriots to such a state of confusion that they will reject enosis in the name of 
enosis”.611 This policy - however subtle and ambiguous - appeared to strike a chord 
with the majority of the Greek-Cypriots, but with one important side-effect. Ironically, 
Makarios was repeating the old British tactic of firstly paying lip-service to enosis as 
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the ideal solution for the Cyprus problem, while at the same time skilfully rejecting it 
for being inappropriate to the complicated circumstances as they stood. Just as the 
British did during their colonial rule in Cyprus, so Makarios in the 1960s strove to 
retain ultimate control over the island for as long as he was holding the reins and 
leave everything else to be decided at some later point. It is noteworthy that it was 
spread as gossip outside the island that Makarios preferred ‘deathbed enosis’: 
unification to be achieved after his death but his name to remain in history as the one 
who led the island towards its national destiny.612 Such a strategy to some extent 
explains the intense hatred that was gradually cultivated during that period among 
nationalist right-wing circles on the island against Makarios. It seemed as if the 
nationalists, from their perspective, once again were being ‘deceived’ about the 
realization of enosis in the same way that they had been ‘deceived’ earlier by the 
colonial rulers. Eventually their growing dissatisfaction over Makarios’ prevarication 
towards enosis found its expression in the paramilitary organizations formed in 1969-
1971. 
In retrospect, then, we might conclude that the last months of 1965 would have been 
the most propitious period for Makarios to have taken some decisive initiative. By 
then the Cyprus Government had managed to implement all the necessary changes 
to the 1960 Constitution, had economically managed to recover from the losses of 
1963-1964 crisis and the Athens-Ankara negotiations were still at a convenient 
standstill. Therefore, the Greek-Cypriot leadership could have used their economic 
and political leverage to move quickly to bring about a negotiated agreement.  As 
Clerides admitted many years later, the denial of the pressing reality for direct 
contacts between the two communities both by the President and by all of the other 
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political leaders was one of their most serious mistakes.613 When Bernardes asked 
Makarios in May 1966 if the latter had truly been considering the prospect of local 
talks, as he often claimed, his answer suggestively was “to discuss what?”614 For 
Makarios, there was not sufficient common ground for substantial talks. However, in 
order to achieve such ground, at least some type of contact between the parties, 
either direct or through a UN intermediary, was essential. This was what both the UN 
and the Americans and British constantly highlighted in their meetings with Greek-
Cypriot officials from 1964 until 1967.615 Fatally, Makarios’ conception of common 
ground at this stage was in effect the submission of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to 
his terms after years of the latter’s isolation in the enclaves. Given this assumption, 
in Makarios’ eyes, ‘progress’ did not equate to any easing of the circumstances in 
the enclaves or indeed anything that brought the parties together prematurely. 
There were several elements indicating that the initiation of direct contacts would 
have gained the sympathy of moderate Turkish-Cypriots and potentially created a 
fruitful dynamic to settle the problem. According to Kemal Rustem, a well-respected 
figure among Turkish-Cypriots: 
Even moderate Turkish-Cypriots would accept nothing less than an 
international guarantee for Turkish-Cypriot rights which must be so 
phrased as to appear to them as constituting community rights…. 
The essential thing was to give the Turkish-Cypriots an effective 
political voice, for example by ensuring they had adequate 
representation in the House of Representatives. Although they 
might not have a veto on legislation, they wanted to be able to bring 
their point of view to bear and not be at the unchecked mercy of the 
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Greek-Cypriots. If this were assured … other matters would be 
fairly easily negotiated.616 
Certainly Rustem was not the only important figure within the Turkish-Cypriot elite 
that held such moderate views. It is central to the argument of this thesis that, in the 
ways already described, Makarios’ strategy – whilst having its own logic grounded in 
the Cypriot history of its times – carried a very costly burden in failing to mobilize the 
sort of opinion represented by Kemal Rustem.  
The key element, therefore, to prevent the freezing of the stalemate during the 
period 1965-1967 in Cyprus was the initiation of some meaningful contact, direct or 
not, between the two communities. Something however, was still needed to push the 
Cyprus Government into this logic. The ‘incentive’ needed for realizing the 
importance of inter-communal talks came with the November 1967 crisis. Part II of 
the thesis will concentrate on this change in the course of the Cyprus problem, after 
the island was brought again to the brink of war. The following chapter aims to 
identify the reasons why the impulse to talk became more pressing than ever and 
how the logjam to such an effort was finally cleared. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
November 1967 Crisis: A Turning Point 
 
From 1965-1967 discussions on the Cyprus problem were taking place outside the 
island, ostensibly on the basis of enosis. Although never publicly admitted, Turkey 
accepted this basis, while the British and Americans believed that enosis was still the 
best possible solution for their own interests. Nonetheless, by autumn 1967, all of 
them had to revise their foreign policies vis-à-vis the Cyprus problem. When the 
clouds of war gathered around Cyprus in November 1967 it was clear that a 
permanent settlement had to be achieved as soon as possible if some disaster was 
to be averted. It should also be kept in mind that a few months earlier, in June 1967, 
a serious Arab-Israeli war had threatened the region’s stability. Therefore, the West, 
especially the Americans, wanted to avoid any other source of friction that could 
have led to a catastrophic war in the same area. 
If a solution on independence was to be sought, the main protagonists in any 
negotiations would have to be the two communities themselves. Indeed, in June 
1968, for the first time in four years, the two communities agreed to sit at the same 
negotiating table and discuss for a solution on the basis of independence. These 
discussions were to last until 1974. What was about to change that would have 
made both communities’ leaders to accept a process that they were constantly 
rejecting since 1964? The aim of this chapter is to analyse the transformation of the 
political landscape in Cyprus and how the new dynamics of the problem triggered 
inter-communal talks. Our analysis will focus on the aftermath of the November 1967 
crisis, the new realities it created and the ensuing approach to inter-communal talks.  
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We shall therefore explore the objectives of the parties, their negotiating tactics and 
the position of each interlocutor on the eve of the local negotiations. 
Background of the crisis 
By mid-1967 it appeared that the failure of the Greco-Turkish negotiations on Cyprus 
was imminent and thus a new strategy had to be invented both inside and outside 
the island to fill the vacuum. As stated earlier, Makarios decided to implement a new 
peace plan entailing a degree of normalization whilst diplomatically floating the idea 
of negotiations within the island between the two communities. Up until 1967, 
therefore, it appeared that things were slowly going as Makarios wished and that he 
was gradually regaining the advantage over the handling of the Cyprus issue. The 
factors that nonetheless circumscribed his control over the situation, according to the 
British Ambassador in Ankara, were Grivas’ activities, the Turkish threat of invasion, 
the Turkish-Cypriot resistance and UNFICYP.617 Soon enough, the first two factors 
would ‘get out of hand’, leading to a severe crisis. Only a few days later, however, 
both problems would be eliminated, at least temporarily. 
Simultaneously, a diplomatic ‘brainstorming’ was taking place in London, 
Washington and Ottawa on how to make progress after the collapse of the bilateral 
Athens-Ankara dialogue.618 After September 1967 it was at last clear to all parties 
involved that enosis was off the table for good and that it was time to align their 
foreign policy interests, given that the only practical solution remained some sort of 
independence.619 Additionally, the new Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
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General in Cyprus, Bibiano Osorio-Tafall, by October 1967 had managed to achieve 
something on the ground. The British High Commissioner had commented: 
Those of us here who see Osorio-Tafall at work think that he is 
doing a first-class job. His methods are slightly unorthodox and 
one may not always agree with his views. But where all the 
previous Special Representatives of the Secretary-General have 
made minimal progress, he has in a matter of six months at least 
succeeded in pushing the Archbishop (and pushing is the word) 
into his ‘peace offensive’. If only the obstacle of General Grivas 
can be overcome this is to my mind at least the beginning of the 
beginning in solving the Cyprus problem.620  
The most important success of UNFICYP throughout 1966 and early 1967 was that it 
had managed to reduce the petty violent incidents between the Turkish-Cypriot 
fighters and the National Guard. However, the construction of fortifications by the 
National Guard and the effort of the Turkish-Fighters to gradually extend their control 
in other areas beyond their enclaves remained a constant source of concern. This 
was to become the underlying cause of the most serious crisis after three years, 
near the area of the Turkish-Cypriot village of Kophinou and the mixed village of 
Ayios Theodoros. Throughout 1967, it was evident that the Turkish-Cypriot fighters 
had been trying to create tension in that area in order to establish another enclave in 
a very strategic location of the island, as Brigadier Michael Harbottle, Chief of Staff of 
UNFICYP during 1966-68, has explained.621  
These accumulating frictions in the area eventually led to a very serious 
confrontation between the National Guard and the Turkish-Cypriot fighters on 15-16 
November 1967. The events over these two days, along with the crisis diplomacy 
that followed and the American effort to prevent a wider Greco-Turkish war, are very 
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well known and, having been analysed in several other studies, are not repeated in 
this thesis.  Nevertheless, hitherto there has been little clarity as to who might have 
instigated the operation and for what reasons the National Guard unleashed heavy 
weaponry against the Turkish-Cypriot village of Kophinou. Whatever might have led 
to this serious inter-communal clash, its outcomes were to be crucial for the 
concerns of our analysis. 
Counting ‘gains and losses’ 
The events of November 1967 have generally been considered an important turning 
point for the Cyprus problem. The death of twenty eight Turkish-Cypriots and the 
extensive damage in both Kophinou and Ayios Theodoros, along with the recall of 
Grivas to Athens, were only the beginning of wider effects. A Greco-Turkish war and 
an international crisis were averted only after the US decided to send Cyrus Vance 
to convince Athens and Ankara to show restraint and avoid a catastrophic war. 
Vance’s shuttle diplomacy between the two motherlands led a few days later to a 
four-point understanding. The core of this agreement referred to the immediate 
withdrawal of surplus military forces within their national contingents stationed on the 
island.622 The Greek Government had almost immediately accepted Turkey’s 
demands for the withdrawal of its excessive military personnel from Cyprus within 45 
days, almost 7,000 troops, thus returning to the 1960 levels of 950 military 
personnel. In exchange, Turkey’s military forces stood down and did not invade in 
Cyprus.  
Although it seemed that the crisis had been contained from having the most extreme 
effects, matters were further destabilized when the US envoy went to Cyprus on 29 
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November to seek President Makarios’ approval for the four points. When he was 
informed about the last of these, Makarios recoiled. This concerned the Greco-
Turkish agreement for the extension of UNFICYP’s role which was going to assume 
responsibility to supervise the subsequent disbanding of all military forces 
established on the island after 1963, above all the Cyprus National Guard. Makarios 
explained firstly that disarmament was a purely domestic affair of the Cyprus 
Government. Any implementation of such a plan, he insisted, would have to include 
both the Greek and Turkish contingents, something that for Makarios would have the 
advantage of chipping away at the 1960 Treaties.623 Ankara was never likely to 
accept Makarios’ conditions and thus Vance tried repeatedly to exert moderate 
influence on the Archbishop who “dug in his toes, despite the danger of invasion”.624 
It was finally U Thant’s appeal of 3 December that managed to cut the Gordian knot. 
This appeal incorporated an amended version of the four-point agreement with 
wording acceptable to all three Governments. Meanwhile, he proposed to offer his 
own good offices.625 After almost a month of uncertainty over the peace of the 
Eastern Mediterranean, war was ultimately prevented. 
The way that the crisis burst open, heightened and then ‘evaporated’ illustrated 
many important elements about the Cyprus problem up to that point and of the 
altered context that was taking shape. First of all, it proved beyond any doubt that 
peace in Cyprus was in fact highly precarious and that any small outbreak of 
violence could lead to a wider Greco-Turkish clash. Secondly, it also made clear, 
especially outside the island, that Turkey was determined to use its right take action  
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as provided by the Treaty of Guarantee in order to protect the Turkish-Cypriots and 
to go further to protect its own interests on the island. Although in the past protecting 
Turkish-Cypriot well-being arguably had not been a priority for the Turkish 
Governments, now it was gradually becoming an important issue within Turkish 
domestic politics. In the event of an analogous situation in the future in Cyprus, 
Roger Allen, the British Ambassador in Ankara, concluded that it would be extremely 
difficult for Turkey not to invade the island.626 To this extent the dangers of the 
situation had taken a very ominous turn. 
Meanwhile, it became equally manifest that for Greece, led by the Greek military 
regime, maintaining peace with Turkey was much more important than risking a 
catastrophic war over Cyprus with very limited chances of winning such a conflict.627 
From this arose the eventual disengagement of Greece from the Cyprus problem. It 
was generally expressed that the existence of a military regime in Athens made the 
quick accommodation of this matter with Turkey much easier. If there were a 
democratically elected regime and no censorship of the press, public opinion would 
have never accepted such a rapid disengagement.628  
Conversely, the Cyprus Government and the Greek-Cypriots remained surprisingly 
calm over the entire period of this crisis. Harbottle specifically reported that: 
Despite the gloomy prospect ahead there was no visible panic or 
alarm but rather a remarkable sang-froid among the Greek-
Cypriots, many of whom appeared confident and assured that 
Turkey would not invade. It was difficult to understand why they 
should be so confident when all around them and in their 
                                                          
626
 Cyprus Conference: Morning Session 29 January 1968:  FCO 9/74, TNA 
627
 Cyprus: Draft Policy Planning Paper, Present Situation, January 1968: FCO 9/74, TNA 
628
 Note of Meeting, (DoS), 5 December 1967: DoS, Office of the Historian, Doc. 342;                                              
Sir Michael Steward (Athens) to Brown,  28 December 1967: FCO 27/71, TNA 
216 
 
newspapers they could witness and read about the imminence of 
war.629  
The calm and confidence of Cyprus’ President derived mainly from two elements: 
Soviet assurances that Turkey’s threat for invasion was a bluff; and Makarios’ 
perception that in any case the Americans would prevent the war as they had done 
in June 1964.630 Although this was like walking a tightrope, Costar remarked that 
Makarios in fact won the contest in competitive brinkmanship with Ankara.631 As he 
acknowledged:  
Makarios never lost his nerve: even under great pressure he 
refused to do more than acknowledge the Greco-Turkish 
agreement on the first three of Vance’s four points while reserving 
his position on the question of the dissolution of the Cyprus 
National Guard and the future role of UNFICYP, thus avoiding any 
diminution of the sovereignty of the Cyprus Government.632  
Meanwhile the Turkish-Cypriots and the opposition in Ankara were greatly 
disappointed because for the first time they had confidently anticipated that Turkey 
was about to militarily intervene, firstly in order to rescue them and secondly to settle 
the Cyprus problem permanently.633 Their disappointment was therefore palpable. 
However, Ankara’s diplomatic success in securing the withdrawal of the Greek 
troops from the island was exploited as a counter-weight to appease Turkish-Cypriot 
public opinion.  
Ironically, all three Governments – in Ankara, Nicosia and Athens - gained 
something important from this crisis. Primarily, Turkey succeeded in removing the 
Greek division from Cyprus and, although it was not explicitly stated in U Thant’s 
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appeal, this had been achieved on the basis of the 1960 Treaties.634 Furthermore, 
according to Michael Stewart, the British Ambassador in Athens, the Greek military 
regime was in a state of euphoria.635 Greece was now able to withdraw its thousands 
of troops from Cyprus and so alleviate a heavy political and financial burden. 
Nonetheless, substantial disengagement did not mean that it was in a position to 
admit that enosis was shelved.636 It should also be stressed that there remained a 
pending issue for Turkey in relation to Greek military personnel serving in the 
National Guard. Ankara insisted that their agreement implied that these personnel 
had to be recalled as well.637 While Greece responded that this was not the case, 
Stewart explained that the Greek Government “did not actually want to keep those 
troops a day longer than necessary in Cyprus, but they wanted to reach agreement 
with the Turks over long-term issues.”638 After all, for Makarios as for the Greek 
Government, this was one of the last remaining bargaining cards for any negotiations 
over the issue of the complete demilitarization. As proved with the 1974 coup d’état 
however, this element was to cast a long shadow. 
The Cyprus Government on the other hand, managed to prevent any reference 
within a UN Security Council Resolution implying the downgrading of the sovereignty 
of the Republic of Cyprus. By not accepting the fourth paragraph of the Greco-
Turkish agreement for disarmament of all forces constituted after 1963, and thus the 
dissolution of the National Guard, Makarios eschewed the creation of a precedent 
that might be used against the sovereignty of Cyprus at a later stage. When 
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Makarios, however, stood firm on this issue he did not imagine that it would prove a 
double-edged sword since the National Guard and the Greek officers employed 
therein would eventually emerge as the driving force behind the coup d’état of 
1974.639 Nonetheless, Grivas’ recalling to Athens, Greece’s gradual disengagement 
from the Cyprus problem and the withdrawal of the Greek division from the island 
meant that Makarios managed,  at least temporarily, to negate factors constantly 
undermining his own authority and stoking internal unrest within his community. The 
question of enosis was ineluctably being ruled out, and in that sense Makarios was 
now able to determine the course of the Cyprus problem in the way that he really 
wished: a solution through UN channels on the basis of an independent unitary state 
under the effective rule of the Greek-Cypriot majority.  
December 1967, therefore, brought very significant developments on the island. A 
few days after U Thant’s appeal, on 8 December, the first shipload of Greek military 
personnel left the harbour of Famagusta back to Greece. Calm was again restored 
on the island, while on 22 December a new Security Council Resolution was issued 
which endorsed U Thant’s offer of his good offices to the parties. This endowed 
peace-making efforts with a fresh momentum.  
Although the Security Council Resolution was accepted in principle by all parties 
concerned, there were still several conditions set by Ankara and Nicosia that had to 
be clarified. For instance, Nicosia insisted on complete demilitarization but this was 
unacceptable to Turkey, which sought to ensure the removal of all the Greek officers, 
including those employed in the National Guard.640 Without losing time, U Thant 
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called all parties to hold a series of discussions in New York. Contacts were 
immediately initiated in January 1968, both in New York and in Cyprus, between UN 
officials and Greek and Turkish-Cypriot representatives in order to iron out all the 
differences and reach an agreement on how to use U Thant’s good offices effectively 
towards a stable and lasting settlement.  
New realities: January-June 1968 
Turkish-Cypriot Provisional Administration 
Back in Cyprus, a few days after the Security Council Resolution, Makarios decided 
to take the first positive step towards reconciliation by announcing on 24 December 
1967 that a new series of peace measures would be put into effect very soon. 
Although everything looked to be on track for a smooth reconciliation process, five 
days later a new development came from the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves, creating an 
important setback: the establishment of the Turkish-Cypriot Provisional 
Administration (‘TCPA’). Although at first this move was perceived as ill-timed and 
provocative by everyone outside the island, the reaction and the duration of the 
measures taken by the Cyprus Government ended up causing even greater 
frustration, not least to Western powers.  The skilful way that it was handled by the 
Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot side, along with the ineffective reaction of Nicosia and 
the brinkmanship of Makarios, led to a diplomatic defeat of the latter on an issue that 
he had hoped to exploit to his own advantage. 
On 29 December the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, in the presence of high-profile 
Turkish officials, declared that the ‘TCPA’ would henceforth operate within the 
Turkish-Cypriot-controlled areas. This ‘TCPA’ was essentially an embryonic 
Government with executive, legislative and judicial functions. The official justification 
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of the Turkish side was that this development was necessary in order to re-organize 
and make more efficient the existing mechanisms operative since 1964 to administer 
the population residing in the enclaves.641 According to the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership, this act did not practically change anything beyond merely 
institutionalizing on a temporary basis the arrangements already in place.642 They 
underscored that they did not aim to set up a new Government and that in no way 
did this new formation infringe upon the 1960 Constitution.  
The first pillar of this administration was the ‘Executive Council’, comprised of nine 
members with almost the same portfolios as those of the Ministries provided by the 
Constitution, with Kuchuk as its President and Denktash as its Vice-President.643 A 
‘Legislative Assembly’ was also set in place to operate under the basis of the 1960 
provisions, composed of fifteen Turkish-Cypriot members of the Parliament and an 
equivalent number drawn from the Communal Chamber.644 The third pillar was the 
‘Judiciary’, constituted by the independent Turkish Courts. Finally, a ‘Public Service 
Commission’ was also established, similar to that prescribed by the Constitution.645  
Both the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and the Turkish Government explained that 
internal problems and lack of coordination, especially between the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership and the fighters in the enclaves, made this reorganization essential.646 In 
particular they claimed that this move had been scheduled for some time but had 
been delayed due to the November crisis. The Turkish Foreign Minister commented 
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that the unrest created by the announcement was due to a misunderstanding, 
explaining that: 
The Turkish-Cypriots had been compelled by events [of 1963] to 
set up the General Committee of the Turkish Community. In time 
the division of powers within the Committee had become confused 
and as a result certain defects had appeared. In addition, confusion 
had arisen because neither those who had been officials in the joint 
administration nor the officials of the Community Chamber knew to 
whom they were responsible. … Recently, in order to solve these 
problems which had become acute, the General Committee was 
reorganised. The object of this new and provisional arrangement is 
to provide a unified administration for the community and to put an 
end to the confusion and conflict of the past. It consists of 
measures which have no connection with the search for a final 
solution to the Cyprus problem.647 
Quite provocatively, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership asserted that the Greek-Cypriots 
should welcome this move since it would improve their own internal organization and 
“will allow intermediaries and at a later stage the Greek-Cypriots themselves to deal 
with a properly constituted body which can take decisions”.648 
Inevitably, the announcement for the ‘TCPA’ served to inflame once more the inter-
communal relations on the island. The Cyprus Government characterized this 
decision as highly provocative and inconsistent with the recent UN Security Council 
Resolution. Additionally, the fact that it was announced in the presence of top-
ranking officials of the Turkish Foreign Ministry was considered an inadmissible 
interference of Ankara in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus.649 “If what 
they say is true, all they need is a Committee and not an Administration including 
Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Defence etc.”, the Cypriot Foreign Minister asserted in 
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New York, adding that “the Turkish Government refers to the Cypriot Government as 
the ‘Greek-Cypriot Administration’ and to the ‘TCPA’ as the ‘Turkish-Cypriot 
Administration’, so trying to equate their roles”.650 The Cyprus Government therefore 
decided to issue a ban on contacts with the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and to inform 
all Heads of Missions in Cyprus that any visits or contacts with members of the so-
called ‘TCPA’ would be contrary to their accreditation to the Republic of Cyprus.651  
The establishment of the ‘TCPA’ was essentially a gimmick for maximizing the 
Turkish-Cypriot bargaining position for any reconciliation procedure in the offing. Two 
months later, and after the long debate over this move had run out of steam, 
Denktash explained that “the only way to make Makarios see the need for a Cyprus 
settlement was for the Turkish-Cypriots to establish progressively their identity as a 
separate entity. The announcement of the ‘TCPA’ was a step in this direction, and 
others were being considered”.652 The Turkish-Cypriot side believed that by forcing 
this reality on the Greek-Cypriots, they would sooner or later make their case loud 
and clear; the previous stalemate created a de facto reality that would not be 
accommodated merely with a Charter of Minority Rights in a Greek-Cypriot state.  
This new development caused a new headache abroad, especially for Britain and 
the US. There had been no prior consultation or any diplomatic indication as to what 
the Turkish-Cypriots were planning and the announcement came as a shock to the 
British and Americans.653 The latter blandly indicated to the Turkish Government the 
regrettable nature of this action, whilst they made clear to Nicosia that they did not 
under any circumstances recognize any political status or legality of the so-called 
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‘TCPA’.654 It is noteworthy, however, that Turkey tried to convince its Western 
partners that the Turkish-Cypriot motives were sincere.655 For some time Ankara 
attempted to play down the issue by avoiding any public statements that referred 
specifically to the ‘TCPA’, justifying their claims that the establishment of the ‘TCPA’ 
was merely for internal organizational purposes.656  
Although the British acknowledged that the ‘TCPA; was indeed contrary to the 
provisions of the 1960 Constitution, they decided that it was better not to press 
Turkey on issues of legality. They believed that to do so would simply trigger yet 
more unconstructive exchanges about the legality of the Cyprus Government’s 
actions since 1964.657 The British decided, therefore, merely to express regret for a 
development at odds with the spirit of the December Security Council Resolution. 
Although it was generally believed that the Cyprus Government indeed felt legitimate 
anxiety about the Turkish-Cypriot initiative, both the US and Britain along with 
France, Canada and Italy agreed that Nicosia’s reaction and the ban of 
Ambassadorial contacts with the Turkish-Cypriot leadership was contrary to 
diplomatic custom.658 Soon enough, therefore, the attention of the West fixed on how 
to convince Makarios to lift this ban. The British and US archives indicate a 
strenuous effort to move Makarios from his intransigent position. For two and a half 
months they unsuccessfully pushed compromise formulas. Sir Norman Costar 
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advised Makarios that despite the actual Turkish-Cypriot motives “the Cyprus 
Government would be unwise from their point of view to attribute to it [the ‘TCPA’] a 
governmental status which the Turks themselves consistently and privately 
denied”.659 He continued that the ban on contact prevented foreign representatives 
from exerting conciliatory influence on the Turkish-Cypriot leadership or even 
communicating the illegality of their own actions. Most importantly he stressed that 
Western ambassadors were irritated at being involved in inter-communal 
manoeuvring.660 Both the Americans and the British were under Turkish pressure to 
resume their contacts with Kuchuk, since his position as Vice-President of the 
Republic of Cyprus was never challenged, except by the Greek-Cypriots.661 Having 
official contacts with the Turkish-Cypriot leader became even more pressing after the 
elections of February, when Kuchuk’s mandate was renewed. It was evident to the 
British that behind Makarios’ natural aim to get the Western powers to condemn the 
establishment of the ‘TCPA’ there lay another purpose: to erode Kuchuk’s 
acceptance as Vice-President, and so drive another nail into the coffin of the 1960 
Treaties.662 
By March, after many unsuccessful attempts British and American diplomats , 
supported by other Western countries as well, agreed that their “excuses for not 
calling Kuchuk were running thin”.663  In any case, contacts with the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership had to be resumed before the forthcoming Security Council debate 
concerning the renewal of UNFICYP’s mandate of mid-March. Instructions were 
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therefore issued both to Costar and Toby Belcher, the American Ambassador, to 
defy the ban.664 It was reckoned that the retaliatory actions that the Cyprus 
Government might impose were worth a risk, since safeguarding good relations with 
Turkey was more vital.665 However, before setting a definite date for contacting 
Kuchuk, both diplomats tried twice to change Makarios’ mind. The latter, however, 
refused, offering evasive excuses. At the eleventh hour, even after arranging their 
appointments with Kuchuk, the two diplomats still tried to placate matters by 
approaching Clerides and asking him to influence Makarios. It was only then that 
Makarios realized that the Americans and British were indeed determined to defy his 
ban. In order to avoid an open diplomatic defeat before the initiation of the inter-
communal talks (which was about to be agreed in New York), he finally complied 
with their intended action.666  
The British High Commissioner stressed that after Makarios’ statement on the lifting 
of this ban, the latter tried publicly to claim credit for this concession to the Turks. At 
this stage Costar explained that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership had proved rather 
helpful since “they kept their promise to us not to reveal the true story of the 
Archbishop’s climb-down, which the Archbishop’s own obstinacy compelled us to 
reveal to them, and they have allowed him to make public virtue of the necessity for 
withdrawal”.667 For Costar this seemingly petty saga was perceived as “an 
unimportant but irritating episode” from which many interesting conclusions could be 
drawn.668 Makarios had confronted a Turkish-Cypriot fait accompli by using the same 
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tactic as in 1964: imposing isolation on the Turkish-Cypriot leadership believing 
erroneously that it would force them to retreat. It had failed yet again.  
Costar’s dispatch, suggestively entitled “An exercise of Archiepiscopal 
brinkmanship”, dealt insightfully with the aftermath of this development.669 Costar 
indicated that in practical terms Nicosia did not gain any benefits, whilst by “rejecting 
every avenue of retreat which was offered to them, they invited a direct clash with 
three Permanent Members of the Security Council and Italy, which could only have 
benefited the Turks and indirectly the Russians”. Moreover, he explained that the 
Russians had played an important role in Makarios’ obstinacy. The Russians along 
with the Arabs had accepted Makarios’ ban immediately, and after the elections of 
February, the Russians “attempted to provoke further trouble for us by suggesting 
that it would be appropriate for all Heads of Mission to present fresh credentials to 
the Archbishop”. Costar’s striking analysis continued: 
The Archbishop’s judgment succumbed to the taste for 
brinkmanship which had served him well so often in his past…. Mr. 
Kyprianou must bear much of the responsibility for allowing 
Archbishop Makarios to get himself into an untenable position. The 
indications are clear that he encouraged the Archbishop to maintain 
his stand and advised him that we and the other Governments 
involved would not defy him. He himself implied a counter threat of 
declaring any Head of Mission who did so persona non grata. His 
error has probably not sufficed to induce the Archbishop to replace 
Mr. Kyprianou in his promised ministerial re-shuffle. But it may have 
usefully increased the influence of Mr. Clerides … [who] favours a 
realistic compromise with the Turks to settle the Cyprus problem ….  
Nevertheless, the Archbishop is unlikely to be tempted by his 
reverse into any major change of policy…. This latest reverse has 
emphasised his isolation and, if an open clash with four Western 
Governments had materialised, it might well have increased the 
Archbishop’s dependence on Russia’s support. It may be that the 
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consequence has been to push him a little closer to the Russians. 
But on the whole I am more inclined to think that the shock of a 
minor defeat may have brought home to the Archbishop the 
realities of the balance of power here without precipitating any 
major change in his international position. There is therefore, some 
hope that the most significant outcome of the episode will be a 
greater sense of realism on the Greek-Cypriot side in the search for 
a solution or a modus vivendi in Cyprus”.670 
Although perhaps accurate as to operations of Makarios’ mind, Costar’s final hope 
was not fulfilled. During the initial stages of the inter-communal negotiations 
Makarios used the same brinkmanship, believing that if he “dragged things out a little 
bit longer he could have gained a better deal”.671  Significantly, Clerides can already 
been seen striking out a position very different from the rest of the Greek-Cypriot 
leadership, seeking thereafter to exert a more pragmatic influence on Makarios. 
Besides, the Greek-Cypriot side had a great deal at stake, the consolidation of the 
separation, that was already well-advanced, being the most important of all. Three 
years later, when negotiations were to be at an impasse, the Turkish-Cypriot leaders 
decided to drop the word ‘Provisional’ from the ‘TCPA’ abbreviation, in the same 
skilful and cunning way as in 1968.672  
Policy of the ‘feasible’ and Elections, 1968 
The first month of 1968 brought significant changes indeed to the island’s affairs. 
Even though the ‘TCPA’ was established, the November crisis brought a striking 
wind of change. By 18 January almost all Greek troops had returned to Greece and 
despite the announcement for the ‘TCPA’, Makarios decided to implement the peace 
plan that he had previously announced on 24 December. Full freedom of movement 
and all other restrictions from 12 January were lifted from the Turkish-Cypriot-
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controlled areas, except Nicosia, which was the centre of the ‘TCPA’, and the 
Kokkina enclave.673 On 12 January the President made the following famous 
declaration: “Courageous decisions and important initiatives are required if we are to 
break the present deadlock. A solution, by necessity, must be sought within the limits 
of what is feasible, which does not always coincide with the limits of what is 
desirable”.674 Presenting it as his own personal decision, this was the first time that 
Makarios implied openly that enosis was no longer attainable and that his 
Government would seek a solution on the basis of an independent, unitary state with 
a Charter of Rights for the Turkish Community. At the same time, however, he 
declared that this new official direction of the Government required a fresh mandate 
and thus Presidential elections were to be held on 25 February 1968. Through these 
elections, Makarios sought to gain a clear and stronger mandate to use against 
those rivals who persisted in accusing him of mishandling the Cyprus problem and 
the enosis goal. ‘Consistent’ with his usual tactics, Makarios had not previously 
informed anyone about his decision to hold elections. The statement came as shock 
once again to his Ministers and closest advisors who revealed that they knew 
nothing about this plan.675 
This speech was perceived as marking a new, more conciliatory era for Cyprus not 
only because of this new direction but also because Makarios avoided using the term 
‘minority’ when referring to the Turkish-Cypriot rights. At this point it is worth noting 
the different approaches of the various Ministers in Makarios’ Cabinet, as reflected 
through their private discussions with foreign officials. The Foreign Minister 
Kyprianou, as we have already seen, had been one of the hardliners of the 
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Government and tried to minimize the importance of characterizing the Turkish-
Cypriots as a ‘community’, denying that it had any particular significance.676 
Conversely, the Acting Foreign Minister, and Minister of Commerce, Andreas 
Araouzos, maintained that this reference was “deliberately conciliatory”.677  
Likewise, mixed messages were also coming from the Cyprus Government about the 
electoral law to be used in the forthcoming elections. Initially, Makarios was 
determined to implement the new legislation adopted in 1965, but Osorio-Tafall 
advised him that this would have been a dangerous development.678 The main 
concern was that if the new law was implemented it would increase tension. 
Kyprianou, however, insisted that if the 1965 electoral legislation was not 
implemented the Cyprus Government would be publicly humiliated by the fact that it 
was not consistent with its declarations of the last four years about removing all 
seeds of division incorporated in the Constitution.679 Conversely, Clerides, other 
Greek-Cypriot diplomats and the Attorney-General, Criton G. Tornaritis QC, stressed 
that in order to avoid any increase of tension the 1959/63 laws should be enacted in 
the forthcoming elections.680 Eventually, the elections took place on 25 February 
under the 1959 legislation.681 Makarios achieved his aim of gaining a strengthened 
mandate by winning with an overwhelming majority of 95.45% over his opponent, 
Takis Evdokas682, who was supported by the ‘immediate-enosis’ front. 
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These two examples are indicative of the mixed hawkish-dovish trends present 
among Makarios’ advisors and within his Cabinet. In the British archives there is 
much repetition of Kyprianou’s intransigence, and his role in encouraging the 
Archbishop’s inclination towards brinkmanship and implacability. On several 
occasions, Western representatives in Cyprus preferred to by-pass Kyprianou when 
attempting to exert direct influence on Makarios, or to holdmeetings with more 
moderate members of the Government instead. “We live in hope” was the British 
remark when commenting about the rumour of Kyprianou’s replacement from his 
Ministry in January 1968.683 
Makarios’ speech of 12 January was met with a guarded reaction by the Turkish-
Cypriots, and many expressed suspicion over the true motives of the Greek-Cypriot 
side.684 However, Kuchuk responded that a settlement must be reached and that the 
1960 Constitution indeed required some amendments.685 A few days later he stated 
that Vice-Presidential elections would also be held on 25 February. Nevertheless, 
due to the growing dissatisfaction over Kuchuk’s leadership both by the moderate 
Turkish-Cypriots and extremist Turkish-Cypriot fighters, the chances for the renewal 
of Kuchuk’s mandate were in the balance. On 23 January, the Judge Mehmet Zekia 
announced his candidacy and, paradoxically, he gained immediate and widespread 
support.686 His nomination sparked some enthusiasm within the Greek-Cypriot 
community, while the West believed that Zekia’s pragmatic approach provided carve 
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for optimism.687 Nevertheless, four days later Ankara forced Zekia to withdraw his 
nomination. The Turkish Government wanted to present a united front within the 
Turkish-Cypriot community and insisted Kuchuk remain at his post. Denktash was 
also advised that before returning back to Cyprus he should cooperate with Kuchuk 
and not let their disagreements damage the Turkish-Cypriot cause.688 It was also 
reported that the Turkish Government tried to appease Zekia’s supporters by 
promising that as soon as a solution was in sight Kuchuk would step down.689 
Ankara thus managed for the moment to paper over the cracks within the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership’s ranks and Kuchuk was indeed re-elected unopposed on 25 
February. Nonetheless, the latter’s authority had diminished sharply within his 
community. Both the Vice-President and his old clique were progressively losing 
ground within their community’s politics, leaving the door open to the later 
‘omnipotence’ of Denktash. 
Consultations of the UN Secretary-General in New York 
The Security Council Resolution of 22 December 1967 gave a rather ambiguous ‘go-
ahead’ to U Thant to use his good offices with the interested parties in order to find a 
way to reach a settlement. More specifically, the resolution invited the parties “to 
avail themselves of the good offices proffered by the Secretary-General”.690 As was 
the case with Resolution 186, however, this did not clarify the extent of the UN 
Secretary-General’s new mandate. The resolution’s wording was characterized as 
quite disappointing by U Thant himself since it did not give him clear guidelines and 
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he warned the Security Council members that his task would be very difficult.691 
Although Cyprus, Greece and Turkey accepted in principle the Secretary-General’s 
good offices, it was very soon realized that the different interpretation given by the 
various parties would lead to another deadlock. It took almost six months of 
discussions between Nicosia, Ankara and New York in order to reach a final solution 
on the scope of this process. Indicative of the difficulty is also the fact that even after 
the inter-communal talks began, the parties still maintained different views of the 
discussions’ aims. Since early indications were so poor, during January and 
February 1968 the British, Americans and Canadians were intensively discussing 
contingency plans in case U Thant’s efforts ran into the sand.692 After the 1967 crisis 
a momentum was inevitably created that should have been maintained at any cost. 
Moreover, the UN Secretary-General noted that Cyprus had not been so quiet since 
December 1963,693 while for the first time Makarios’ Government agreed to talk with 
the Turkish-Cypriots and Kuchuk accepted modifications to the 1960 Constitution.694 
There seemed at last to be a genuine opportunity to move forward in a constructive 
direction. 
Because of their distrust of UN peace-making efforts, after Plaza’s mediation and 
subsequent reverberations, the Turkish side was determined to ensure that any good 
offices should be an extension of the discussions held during the November crisis 
and confined to the internal security issues on the island, such as the future of the 
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National Guard, the Greek officers in Cyprus and pacification.695 Conversely, for a 
long-term solution Turkey preferred a forum wholly outside UN auspices. It is 
noteworthy that by February both Turkey and Greece agreed to a Canadian formula 
for a secret four-party conference with the Canadians taking the chair.696 This option, 
however, was shelved a month later when the UN Secretary-General proposed inter-
communal talks under his chairmanship.697 Although the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot 
side initially insisted that the political aspects of the problem should be addressed on 
a quadripartite basis without the UN’s presence, they eventually changed their 
mind.698 By April 1968 the Turkish side agreed to talks between representatives of 
the two communities on constitutional issues, whilst insisting on the purely 
administrative involvement of the UN. Such talks, they argued, should also be held 
outside Cyprus.699  
The Cyprus Government, on the other hand, initially wanted the agenda to cover all 
aspects of the problem, from constitutional to political and other daily problem 
questions. For that purpose, on 14 March 1968 Makarios transmitted to the UN 
Secretary-General a series of proposals that could have been used as a basis for 
further talks between the two communities.700 Although these proposals were drafted 
in a moderate tone they still reflected the majority of Plaza’s recommendations of 
1965.701 Besides, the lifting of all the remaining restrictions by the Cyprus 
Government on 8 March placed the ball firmly in the Turkish-Cypriot court, since the 
remaining restrictions were only those imposed by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership on 
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the Greek-Cypriots. On the issue of inter-communal talks, the Cyprus Government 
insisted that they should definitely take place on the island under the aegis of the UN 
Secretary-General and the oversight of his representatives.702 Nevertheless, 
Makarios left the door open for some later discussion with all interested parties for 
the future of the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance. 703 
After several discussions and informal meetings in New York, it was finally agreed 
that the representatives of the two communities, Rauf Denktash for the Turkish-
Cypriots and Glafkos Clerides for the Greek-Cypriots, would initiate a round of 
informal exploratory talks, without any pre-agreed basis on which they would discuss 
a constitutional solution of the Cyprus issue that envisaged an independent and 
unitary state.704 Regarding the highly-contested issue of the venue of the talks, it was 
decided that they would take place in Nicosia, beginning on 24 June 1968 without 
the presence of any UN Representative, although a preliminary meeting was about 
to be held in Beirut on 3 June 1968 under the auspices of the Special Representative 
of the UN Secretary-General, Osorio-Tafall.705 It is important to stress for our 
purposes that the rival parties interpreted the source of the ensuing inter-communal 
contacts very differently. For the Greek-Cypriots this fell under the personal 
responsibility of the Secretary-General and of his good offices, on the basis of the 
Security Council Resolution of December 1967. For the Turkish-Cypriots, the 
engagement of the Secretary-General stemmed directly from the November crisis 
and the recognized need for pacification; for them, the recent Security Council 
Resolution had nothing to do with the talks. These interpretations were an indication 
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of the wider underlying differences in the parties’ perceptions of the UN involvement 
in Cyprus.706   
Before Local Talks: Objectives of the parties and limitations of the 
two interlocutors 
 
Before analysing the development of the first round of inter-communal talks which 
lasted until the end of 1971, it is necessary to have a brief outline of each party’s 
objectives, the internal political situation in each community in 1968 and their 
priorities in any putative final settlement of the Cyprus problem. In addition, an 
understanding of the position occupied by the interlocutors within their own 
communities is required to grasp the role they played.  
The most important reality of all was that for the first time both communities’ 
leaderships openly acknowledged that they were ready to settle the problem through 
negotiations rather than war. Moreover, the Greek and Turkish Governments 
clarified that they did not want a Greco-Turkish war over Cyprus and expressed their 
determination to urge the parties to reach a settlement as soon as possible on the 
basis of an independent, unitary state through the inter-communal talks. Although 
they remained strictly neutral, Britain and the US both favoured this new process of 
the inter-communal talks for reaching a final settlement to the Cyprus problem.707 All 
these elements therefore, seemed to bode well for the prospect of successful 
negotiations. In this light, it would be interesting to investigate why the two 
communities accepted the direct talks in 1968 without posing unacceptable pre-
conditions, as had been the case from 1964 until 1967.   
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Greek-Cypriot objectives 
As remarked in previous chapters, the Cyprus Government throughout 1964-1967 
controlled a well-functioning state apparatus and an economically prospering state. 
By imposing on the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves several restrictions, it erroneously 
believed that sooner or later the Turkish-Cypriot leadership would be compelled to 
capitulate and accept the minority rights on offer. Until 1967, the Cyprus Government 
was not genuinely in favour of any inter-communal contacts except under its own 
terms. Besides, Makarios was convinced that the policy of attrition was likely to lead 
to a swifter and more decisive outcome than negotiations.  
Nonetheless, the collapse of the Greco-Turkish dialogue and the November crisis in 
autumn 1967 forced Makarios to modify and adopt an ostensibly flexible strategy vis-
à-vis the Turkish-Cypriots. He agreed to informal talks between representatives of 
the two communities, abandoning his previous conditions that discussions could only 
be held on the basis of minority rights and only after the Turkish-Cypriot leadership 
endorsed all the modifications of the Constitution as passed by the Cyprus 
Government during its absence. Additionally, and most importantly, the President 
realized that the attrition policy of the last four years against the enclaves had not 
borne the expected fruit. Instead of buckling, the Turkish-Cypriot cadre had become 
more hardened against the notion of a unitary Greek-led state that Makarios wished 
to consolidate. Acutely conscious that something had to be done to head off such a 
reaction, Makarios had decided to remove all the restrictions without first securing 
any concession in exchange.  
This urgent and tactical volte-face, however, did not mean alteration of the ultimate 
objective of the Cyprus Government for a Greek-led unitary state with minority rights 
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for Turkish-Cypriots. If the lifting of restrictions and the partial normalization of the 
island were shrewdly exploited by the Government, it could conceivably strengthen 
the unity of the de facto Greek-Cypriot state through the gradual economic 
integration of the Turkish-Cypriots to the relatively prosperous Republic and thus 
undermine the Turkish-Cypriot leadership’s authority within the enclaves. 
Establishment of genuine inter-communal links, especially after 1968, was a policy 
that was favoured and promoted by AKEL in particular.708 Nonetheless, AKEL’s 
power was overshadowed by Makarios’ political dominance, and its purely 
subordinate role in shaping what happened was to impose limits on the process.  
The official Greek-Cypriot negotiating position revolved around the degree of 
participation - meaning proportional representation - of the two communities in the 
state machinery as well as complete autonomy on religious, educational, cultural and 
personal status affairs, along with a degree of local autonomy compatible with the 
concept of the unitary state for the Turkish-Cypriots.709 How far could autonomy be 
taken whilst remaining compatible with a unitary state, and at what point did it drift 
into a federation proper? That proved to be the crucial moot-point for the two 
communities. The most important obstacle for a genuinely unitary state was the 
gradual consolidation of the administrative autonomy enjoyed by the Turkish-
Cypriots since 1964. Nevertheless, in strictly legal terms, a compromise could have 
been reached, but it had for some time become clear that the problem was not legal 
but intensely political. Makarios had even explained to his negotiator that although 
certain arguments for compromise might have been legally valid, “if our objective is 
to reduce the excessive rights which the Zurich Agreements gave to the Turkish-
                                                          
708
 Attalides, op. cit., p.113 
709
 Polyviou, op. cit., p.96 
238 
 
Cypriots and make the Constitution workable, we should not add other rights in place 
of those we subtracted and thus create again an unworkable Constitution”.710 This 
was indeed the Greek-Cypriot approach throughout the inter-communal talks: to 
reverse the imbalance set by the Zurich-London Agreements.  
As Clerides explains, Makarios’ guidelines for the process of the talks were: to insist 
on a unitary state under a presidential system; and try to reduce the political status of 
the Turkish-Cypriot community to that of a minority with autonomy on the above-
mentioned affairs.711 Moreover, it was of utmost importance for their side to avoid 
making any commitments and keep all subjects open until there was clear 
understanding on all pending issues.712 This meant that the Greek-Cypriot side 
should avoid making any proposals and, if forced to do so, they should be such as to 
extract as many concessions as possible from the other side. This naturally 
displayed a maximalist logic.  
Erroneously, Makarios believed that since there was no further danger of Turkish 
invasion and a Greco-Turkish war, time was working in favour of his community.713 
Interestingly, Costar, explaining the current political situation among the Greek-
Cypriots and the vested interests in case of a settlement, reported: 
The Archbishop is known to have said in private that the Greek-
Cypriots do not find the current situation in Cyprus intolerable for 
them, and that if Turkish-Cypriots want to remain second-class 
citizens living in their ghettos he is content to wait until they change 
their minds i.e. virtually surrender to his terms.714 
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That negotiating policy, as would later be shown, inevitably led to damaging delays 
that allowed the political realities of each community to feed into their negotiating 
positions. The result, as the British High Commissioner, Peter Ramsbotham, 
concluded in 1971, was to make Makarios “offer too little too late”.715  
According to Costar, however, there was another underlying reason for this dilatory 
negotiating policy and the rigid line of certain Greek-Cypriot politicians. A solution 
would have radically changed the status quo and therefore upset the apple cart 
within Greek-Cypriot politics in general. He explained that: 
Some of the present Ministers and others in positions of power, 
have few qualifications for office beyond their identification first with 
the EOKA movement and subsequently with the struggle against 
Turkish-Cypriots….The majority of the present generation of 
leaders have been in power since independence, have no tradition 
to reconcile them to the loss of office and few opportunities for 
alternative employment.716 
Costar’s interesting analysis went on to explore the underlying impulse of Makarios’ 
position within the Greek-Cypriot political world, and how it would be affected by a 
political solution. This hinged on his relations with AKEL. Although he always 
appeared confident of “riding this tiger”, Costar felt that the Archbishop must be 
aware that once Cypriot politics ceased to be entirely dominated by the inter-
communal question, his relations with AKEL would automatically become far more 
problematic. He continued:  
The problem of the Archbishop would be made more acute 
because it would coincide with the resurgence of political rivalry 
and pressure within his own loosely-knit Patriotic Front, and in other 
sectors of the population, including trade unions. He would also … 
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be obliged to take account of the Turkish-Cypriot views, both within 
the Council of Ministers and outside it, and, if he were to avoid a 
further inter-communal breakdown, he might have to give more 
weight to these than would be justified by the constitutional position 
and voting strengths of the Turks….[He] would face a situation that 
is unprecedented for him, in that he would no longer enjoy 
automatically the overwhelming popular support of the Greek-
Cypriots that has since 1965, and would be subject to overt 
criticism from Greek-Cypriots for the first time … It is questionable 
whether his commitment to an independent unified Cyprus is strong 
enough to lead him to accept, say, criticisms from the Bishops of 
his own church in defending Turkish-Cypriot interests. His task 
would be made harder by the fact that Turkish-Cypriot community 
would, for the first time since independence, be led by a man 
[Denktash] who was a worthy opponent.  
Those elements were characterized by Costar as the ‘invisible’ price to be paid by 
the Greek-Cypriot leadership, and the prospects involved would certainly have an 
impact on its decision-making processes as the talks evolved. These views were 
definitely perceived as a taboo subject that none could openly admit. These 
implications and dynamics were indeed to prove lasting, and arguably still exist in 
Cyprus today.  
Turkish-Cypriot objectives 
After the 1967 crisis and the establishment of the ‘TCPA’, the Turkish-Cypriot side 
gained additional leverage at the negotiating table. The Turkish-Cypriot leadership, 
therefore, realized that given the new realities a complete return to the 1960 
Constitution was not in their community’s best interest any more. Despite their 
arguments that the formation of the ‘TCPA’ solely aimed to fill the gaps in their own 
administrative and organizational affairs, the truth was that it created an embryonic 
state within a state. If that formation was further consolidated, it could have 
strengthened their de facto separation and thus, purport to justify their later demands 
for a de jure recognition of this separatism through a federal structure of the state.  
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Nevertheless, while the ‘TCPA’ was still in its early stages, there were signs that the 
Turkish-Cypriot side was at least going to be flexible on certain constitutional 
aspects. Its main concern was the immediate economic challenges of its community 
and it initially believed that this could only be fully achieved after a solution.717 Such 
thinking, however, did not undermine the determination of the Turkish-Cypriot 
political leaders to maintain the separate administration that they had spent four 
years building, or their intention to see it strengthened in the approach to a 
settlement. Therefore, in June 1968 they decided to establish the Turkish-Cypriot 
‘Economic Development Committee’ under the personal supervision of Denktash.718  
Their official negotiating policy remained that the Turkish-Cypriot community was as 
a co-founder of the Cyprus Republic, not a minority and that the inter-communal 
balance established with the 1960 Constitution should be reflected in any new 
constitutional settlement.719 According to Denktash’s proposals during the initial 
stages of the talks, his side was aiming to accommodate the Greek-Cypriot demand 
for amendment of the 1960 constitutional rights of the Turkish-Cypriots by re-
arranging them in such a way that the unity of the state could be maintained. This 
meant they were ready to accept proportional participation in the core structure of 
the state, but in order to prevent the downgrading of their political status into that of a 
Greek-controlled minority, they asked in exchange for genuine local autonomy with 
limited state supervision.720  Particular importance should be attributed to the use of 
the term ‘unity of the state’ by the Turkish-Cypriot side. As we shall see, the 
interpretation given to it by Denktash in the beginning of the talks was different, and 
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certainly closer to the Greek-Cypriot line, from the one that was later given in 1970-1, 
when he argued that even federation is compatible with the concept of a unitary 
state.  
Although the Turkish-Cypriot side had gained some credit in world opinion due to its 
ostensibly flexible stand on the constitutional aspects, it was also ‘losing points’ in 
the blame game due to a much more negative approach over normalization.  It was a 
fact that the Greek-Cypriot side provided complete freedom of movement throughout 
the island and had lifted all the remaining restrictions. The Turkish-Cypriots had not 
reciprocated. Despite the continuous efforts of Osorio-Tafall, UNFICYP and the 
British and American Representatives in Cyprus, the Turkish-Cypriots stubbornly 
rejected any suggestions that allowed freedom of movement for Greek-Cypriots 
through their areas, arguing that the continuous provocative statements and actions 
by the Greek-Cypriot side did not dispel their doubts about the latter’s sinister 
motives. They claimed that they had intended to respond to Makarios’ normalization 
measures, but when it became known that heavy Czech arms were distributed for 
the EOKA military parade of 1 April 1968 they suspended this plan.721 Since then 
any effort to convince them to reciprocate ran into the sand. Denktash, however, 
admitted that this was the only bargaining chip left to them and one that could only 
be played when a substantive settlement was close.722 It should be borne in mind 
that the normalization process was an issue mainly directed by the militias and the 
hardliners of the community’s leadership, such as Orek.723 It was a fact that the 
Turkish-Cypriot fighters and military officers from Turkey were constantly causing 
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difficulties for pacification.724 By taking advantage of the freedom of movement 
established by the Cyprus Government they constantly sought to extend their areas 
of their control. Although on the political front it seemed that by 1968 Denktash had 
convinced them about his own will for a settlement through negotiations, Osorio-
Tafall and other Western diplomats were expressing doubts and suspicion over the 
real motives of the Turkish-Cypriot fighters and the other hardliners who stood 
behind them.725 
As with certain Greek-Cypriot politicians, many of their counterparts on the Turkish-
Cypriot side were by no means sincerely committed to a radical alteration to the 
existing circumstances. It was a fact that life within the enclaves was a constant 
struggle, but the existing situation suited its leadership well enough. Costar 
explained that: 
The present Turkish-Cypriot leaders, with the exception of 
Denktash, are so closely identified with the ‘siege’ policy of the 
Turkish-Cypriot community and, in some cases so discredited by 
their personal financial dealings over the past four years, that is 
seems doubtful whether many of them could continue in office 
following an inter-communal settlement.726  
As we shall see, Denktash had much to gain from an inter-communal settlement, or 
at least getting talks off the ground. This is why Ankara entrusted him as the 
negotiator, granting him almost complete freedom of manoeuvre. But like Makarios, 
Denktash also needed to satisfy both his friends and the opposition, and ultimately 
he had to secure a settlement that he could ‘sell’ to his community at large. 
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Denktash’s position 
During the first round of the inter-communal talks, the internal politics of each 
community played an important role both in the formation of the two communities’ 
positions and the eventual progress of the talks. However, one of the most important 
variables was the personal standing of each leading negotiator and their political 
impact on the decision-making process of their constituencies. 
In 1964 Denktash was perceived as an extremist politician who was fighting for 
partition. When he returned in April 1968 things were different. After four years in 
Ankara, Denktash acknowledged that, unlike Inonu’s government of 1964 favouring 
federation, the current Turkish Government sought a peaceful solution of the Cyprus 
problem as soon as possible, on the basis of an independent unitary state.727 
Denktash returned to Cyprus, realizing that Turkey would not risk a war with Greece 
over Cyprus and accepting that the Greek-Cypriots themselves no longer wanted 
enosis, making partition no longer feasible.728 He had, however, to convince the 
hawks of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, such as Kuchuk and Orek, along with the 
other extremist factions and the military officers from Turkey who were still bent on 
federation, about the shift in Ankara’s policy. His own personal gain from fulfilling 
Ankara’s wishes was that he would have been able to build a mutually trusting 
relationship with the Turkish Government, which would later have enabled him to 
receive Ankara’s green light to at last replace Kuchuk.729  
Being abroad during the first four years of the de facto separation, Denktash as a 
political figure did not link his name with the misfortunes and disappointment 
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endured by the Turkish-Cypriots and to a large extent caused by the old clique 
around Kuchuk.730 Therefore, Denktash returned to Cyprus as the beacon of hope 
for many Turkish-Cypriots, receiving a hero’s welcome in Nicosia.731 As Denktash 
explained, the Turkish-Cypriots expected him to solve both their economic and 
political problems.732 However, this was by no means easy. Despite their efforts to 
paper over their rivalry through public statements, Denktash’s relations with the 
existing Turkish-Cypriot leadership and certain military officers were strained.733 After 
his re-establishment in Turkish-Cypriot politics, Kuchuk’s entourage tried to reduce 
Denktash’s political influence among the Turkish-Cypriots by constantly undermining 
his efforts to settle the community’s practical problems and his attempts at 
compromise on the negotiating table.734 In the very early stages of the inter-
communal talks, Denktash had confessed to Clerides about the reasons for his 
previous insistence on holding the inter-communal talks outside the island. He 
stressed that if there was any constructive common ground between the two sides, 
he would have been able to by-pass the rest of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and to 
firstly consult and formulate an agreement with Ankara.735 Now that the talks were 
held in Cyprus, this was impossible. In the event that the Turkish-Cypriot leadership 
took an unhelpful stand on a matter of substance, Ankara would not have been able 
to ignore their disagreement.736 Although Denktash had Ankara’s support on the 
inter-communal talks, the latter also wished to retain, at least for the time being, an 
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equal balance of power between the current leadership and Denktash.737 From the 
aspect of a constitutional settlement, Ankara had warned Denktash that it would 
support any solution he reached in talks, on the basis of a unitary state with 
adequate local autonomy for Turkish-Cypriots, as long as he managed to convince 
the rest of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership.738 Therefore, Denktash had to work 
discreetly in order to achieve two goals. First, in the short-term he had to replace the 
old ineffective leadership of the ‘TCPA’ through the promotion of his own people 
within the rungs of the administration. This would give him the ability to implement 
any decisions he reached in the inter-communal talks within the ‘TCPA’. Secondly, if 
he could achieve this, he would need to assume the reins of his community from 
Kuchuk in close association with Ankara.  
The greatest challenge for both Denktash and Ankara was therefore to reach a 
constitutional settlement as soon as possible. Otherwise, if negotiations wore on, 
there was a lurking danger that the opponents of the negotiated settlement, that is, 
the Turkish-Cypriot fighters and the hawks within the local political leadership, would 
take advantage of the delay to regroup and reduce the chances for a viable and 
lasting settlement.739 Both the Turkish Government and several moderate Turkish-
Cypriots attempted repeatedly to warn the Greek-Cypriot leaders of this critical 
danger.740 
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Clerides’ position 
Unlike Denktash, whom Turkey initially granted an almost free hand to negotiate, 
Clerides enjoyed no such flexibility. The latter had to strictly follow Makarios’ 
guidelines even on the simplest questions.741 Conversely with Makarios, Clerides 
believed that a moderate approach in the negotiations would yield greater benefits. 
The truth was that although Makarios trusted him, Clerides had very limited personal 
influence over the President and indeed very few supporters in Makarios’ immediate 
circle willing to help him push the Archbishop towards a more flexible stance. 
Although within the Cabinet there existed a fine balance between the doves and the 
hawks, the latter group had much more direct influence on Makarios. Clerides 
admitted that he had insisted that talks should take place in Cyprus in order to 
ensure that he would be able to discuss all the proposals with Makarios in person. 
Otherwise, he explained he had “little chance of keeping Makarios on the right light 
lines … and lead the doves in the Cabinet”.742 Ironically, both interlocutors insisted 
on the different venues for the talks for the same reason: to prevent the hawks of 
their leaderships from having a damaging effect on their negotiations. 
Moreover, the Greek-Cypriot interlocutor disagreed with Makarios, both on 
negotiating techniques and on the handling of political problems that had an 
important impact on the inter-communal talks, such as the growth of extremist illegal 
activities throughout 1969. His only tactical ‘weapon’ for convincing Makarios to 
adopt a less intransigent line was the threat of his resignation. Moreover, the only 
important ‘ally’ of the Greek-Cypriot interlocutor on the decision-making procedure 
for the talks was the Greek Government and, more specifically, the Greek Foreign 
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Minister, Panayiotis Pipinelis. Nonetheless, the latter, who favoured a quick and 
peaceful solution to the problem and was thus open to certain concessions to the 
Turkish-Cypriots, had two important limitations. Firstly, Athens had, as always, a very 
fragile grip over Makarios. Secondly, Pipinelis needed to ensure that his own role 
was perceived as entirely secondary in order to avoid being accused by Makarios of 
interfering in the internal affairs of the island. Therefore, he avoided making – at least 
in writing - any specific suggestions for concessions to Makarios.743  
If Clerides wanted to gain more room for manoeuvre in negotiations he needed to 
increase his own influence over Makarios. He could only achieve this by bringing to 
bear his own increased standing within the Greek-Cypriot community. By autumn 
1968, therefore, as soon as he realized that the inter-communal talks were heading 
into a deadlock mainly due to his side’s rigid line, he tried to convince Makarios to 
accept parliamentary elections followed by a ministerial reshuffle as soon as 
possible. When Clerides realized that for various reasons elections in the near future 
were not possible, he decided to form a political party of his own. Had the elections 
been conducted and had he won an absolute majority, he might have constituted an 
important counter-balance to Makarios’ power and increased his own influence on 
policy.744 Although parliamentary elections took place in 1970, Clerides, as we shall 
see, failed to achieve such a tactical position.  
Throughout mid-1969 and into 1970 Clerides had to tackle another great difficulty: 
the gradual increase of extremist organizations’ actions against the Government and 
the increasing proliferation of accusations that the national goal of enosis had been 
‘betrayed’. This reactivated a sterile public debate over enosis and instigated the rise 
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of a national right-wing polarizing yet further the Greek-Cypriot community. 
“Makarios’ Achilles heel was his sensitivity to the accusations of treachery”, Clerides 
admitted to the British High Commissioner in 1969.745 Inevitably, Makarios fell into 
the trap of making successive public statements about the unfinished struggle for 
enosis and of tolerating such statements by some of his own Ministers.  All these 
undermined Clerides’ authority in negotiations, infuriated the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership and bogged down the already ‘snail-like’ pace of the talks.  
The President himself took a rather softer line on the rising of the extremist elements 
within his community. In this he failed to realize the importance of taking certain pre-
emptive measures for their suppression. Conversely, he once again deployed his 
characteristically Byzantine tactics, convinced that due to his personal status and the 
undeniably great impact of his speeches on the majority of the Greek-Cypriots he 
could safely ignore this threat.746 This assumption was to prove fatally flawed.  
Conclusion 
Neither Plaza’s report, the subsequent efforts of the UN Secretary-General nor the 
Greco-Turkish dialogue had managed to achieve what the 1967 crisis had finally 
brought about. It made both communities get to grips with their problem through 
inter-communal talks, producing for the first time some sort of credible momentum. 
At first it seemed that there was room for compromise and that both Clerides and 
Denktash could have led their communities towards a lasting compromise. They 
were characterized in particular as the ablest and most dovelike leaders at this 
juncture, and indeed if a solution had been up to them they would probably have 
reached a satisfactory settlement in the initial two rounds of the talks. Nevertheless, 
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constant delays and mutual mistrust over the ulterior motives of each party came to 
haunt any chance for progress. This caused everyone to realize that each party’s 
objectives were hardly different than in 1964-7: iron-clad guarantees on the internal 
security elements for the Turkish-Cypriots, meaning in essence an enhanced degree 
of local autonomy amounting to disguised federation, versus the complete unity of 
the state under Greek-Cypriot control. Eventually the prevailing context irrevocably 
widened the gap between the parties, pulling the two interlocutors down. It is this 
point which the remainder of this thesis will illustrate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
251 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
Inter-Communal Negotiations, 1968-1971 
 
On 3 June 1968, Denktash and Clerides duly held their first meeting in Beirut, thus 
marking the beginning of a new chapter in the Cyprus problem. For the first time, 
representatives of the two communities were entrusted with a very delicate task: to 
work together in search of a settlement. Time appeared ripe for mutual concessions. 
But was that the case? The Cyprus issue is usually characterized as ‘a problem of 
missed opportunities’. If we accept this characterization, then the first round of inter-
communal talks was indeed one great, yet missed, opportunity, as this chapter 
intends to illustrate.  
From the very first meeting, the two interlocutors clarified the views of each 
community in relation to the problems derived from the 1960 Constitution. They 
acknowledged that certain problematic provisions existed for both communities, but 
their mistrust and fear concerning the ulterior motives of each side, enosis and 
partition respectively, prevented them from working peacefully together.747 
Henceforth, they both established that their common goal was to find a constitutional 
settlement, although without explicitly agreeing on any terms of reference for their 
discussions, and “to talk frankly to each other during the course of the talks”.748 This 
procedure, however, would only be the first step towards a settlement. All other 
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interested parties would then have to endorse any agreement reached between the 
two communities and then decide about the international aspects of the solution.749  
Believing and genuinely wanting to reach a quick settlement, the two interlocutors 
decided to hold meetings twice, and if necessary, three times a week. Despite their 
qualified optimism, they had few illusions about the difficulties ahead. According to 
Clerides, the greatest challenge faced by the negotiators was selling their tentative 
agreements to their superiors.750 In the event, these exchanges were to last until July 
1974, when they were terminated abruptly after the coup d’état and the Turkish 
invasion. They were conducted in two rounds: the first, begun in June 1968 and was 
unsuccessfully terminated at the end of 1971; and the second was initiated in June 
1972 and lasted until July 1974.  
This chapter will examine in chronological order the four phases of the first round the 
inter-communal discussions, between 1968 and 1971, focusing on the negotiating 
practices of each side and the proposals made. Throughout we will be especially 
concerned with the internal developments in each community in order to understand 
their impact on the negotiations. In doing so, the focus is not on arcane legal 
matters, although these were often argued about, but on the political roots of a 
failure that was to shape the later evolution of the Cyprus problem. 
The first phase: June –August 1968 
The exploratory phase of the talks raised hopes that the negotiations might swiftly 
prove successful. The two interlocutors exchanged views, establishing that there 
was sufficient common ground on a variety of subjects. The main reason for a 
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prevailing optimism was the fact that Denktash was more flexible than ever while he 
seemed open to concessions and suggestions. He certainly appeared to be 
responsible for giving the talks an early boost.  
As shown by Clerides’ personal records, containing reports and correspondence 
drafted after his meetings with Dentkash, the two interlocutors had decided that their 
purely personal discussions should proceed ad referendum, meaning that they would 
not be bound by any decision without explicit agreement. Additionally, in order to 
avoid further complications, Clerides proposed that when they did disagree on a 
matter of importance they should refrain from reporting every minor detail to their 
principals.751 In that way, it would be easier to ‘sell’ a later compromise to their 
superiors. 
Among the preliminary concessions made by Denktash during this short first phase 
of talks were several from Makarios’ original ‘Thirteen Points’. First and foremost, he 
accepted the proportional representation of each community in state institutions. 
Equally importantly, he concurred with the abolition of the veto powers of the Vice-
President and his right to promulgate laws along with the President. Regarding 
legislative matters, Denktash agreed to the abolition of the separate majorities and to 
the principle that the President and Vice-President of the House would be elected by 
all members of Parliament, ensuring that if the former is Greek, the latter would be 
Turkish and vice versa. Likewise, Denktash conceded to the unification of courts for 
the two communities and the option of the litigant to be tried by a judge competent in 
his own language.752 
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It appeared, therefore, that in the executive, legislative and judicial spheres there 
was a common ground in principle between the two sides. It is also noteworthy that 
Clerides accepted Denktash’s request that Turkish-Cypriot education would be 
financed by the State.753 Despite this initial ostensible consensus on the core 
structure of the state, the Greek-Cypriots wished to secure two more elements that 
were ‘red flags’ for the Turkish-Cypriot side: the unification of electoral rolls; and the 
complete abolition of the Vice-Presidency. It should be stressed that the retention of 
the latter office, even without the majority of the powers envisaged in the 1960 
Constitution, highlighted the bi-communal character of the state. Denktash had 
intimated that insisting on the abolition of this post was a waste of time because his 
community would not retreat.754 Conversely, he did not completely shut the door on a 
later compromise regarding common electoral rolls, although this was also perceived 
as an important safeguard of the Constitution for his community. The Turkish Chargé 
d’Affairs in Nicosia explained that this provision was a guarantee that genuine 
representatives of the Turkish-Cypriot community were elected and not mere 
stooges. He gave the example of the Turkish-Cypriot politician Ihsan Ali, a supporter 
of Makarios but regarded as a quisling by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership.755 
The Turkish-Cypriot negotiator had indeed made far-reaching concessions, but on 
one condition. The Greek-Cypriots would concede to a substantial degree of local 
autonomy for his community, not subject to amendments by the Greek-Cypriot 
majority of the Parliament. Genuine local autonomy, as the Turkish-Cypriots claimed, 
was the key to any prospective solution of the Cyprus problem. Concluding this 
phase, Clerides explained to Makarios that although this issue was indeed difficult, 
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the most promising element was the overlap between the two parties on the 
responsibilities of the local administration.756 Conversely, their main disagreements 
had centred upon the areas that this local autonomy would cover and the degree of 
state supervision on it. Regarding the former, Denktash proposed a local 
administration based on communal criteria, and more specifically a grouping of 
Turkish and Greek villages, irrespective of whether they formed geographically 
cohesive areas.757 The Greek-Cypriot negotiator objected that this was unacceptable 
because such a grouping could lead to the cantonization of the island. The Greek-
Cypriot side propounded a form of decentralization which gave more say to the 
inhabitants of a certain village, rather than setting up a new layer of local government 
for a group of villages lacking geographical proximity.758 Therefore, Clerides 
proposed that such ‘lower’ administration would exist only at the village level, without 
any grouping of villages, under the complete control of the Minister of Interior. 
Denktash rejected this proposal on the grounds that it did not provide the Turkish-
Cypriots genuine autonomy. Meanwhile, he argued that if he were indeed aiming at a 
disguised federation through local autonomy he would have insisted on special 
executive, legislative and judicial powers for the local governance, with a separate 
police force, but he did not do this.759 
This first phase of talks was indeed critical since the Turkish-Cypriot concessions 
seemed to have produced a real opportunity for progress. At first glance, it was 
evident that most of the points of the 1960 Constitution that hindered the smooth 
functioning and unified character of the state were among Denktash’s concessions. 
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Although Denktash was negotiating in good faith, a more thorough examination of 
his preliminary concessions indicates that they did not compromise his side’s 
ultimate goals. The same applied to Clerides’ position as well. At this stage, 
therefore, we must summarize certain elements regarding the negotiating tactics of 
the two interlocutors.  
As emerges from Clerides’ records, Denktash appeared transparent and flexible on 
issues of lower importance for his community, with the aim of securing more critical 
demands. Indeed, Denktash’s acceptance of several of the ‘Thirteen Points’ did not 
extract a heavy price for his own community. Firstly, these were not in contrast to the 
concept of local autonomy that he wanted to secure from these talks. Secondly, as 
he had admitted, the provisions of the 1960 Constitution that he was ready to forego 
were in any case against the best interests of his community.760 It should be stressed 
that Denktash avoided making any reference to normalization and the question of 
freedom of movement throughout the enclaves. Had he done so, compromises from 
his side would have been expected, and his community was not prepared to give in. 
The Turkish-Cypriot interlocutor explained to Clerides that the majority of the 
concessions he made were not yet accepted by the rest of the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership, and if made public might lead to his own dismissal. However, Denktash 
was optimistic that if the Greek-Cypriots were flexible about local autonomy, he could 
prevail upon Turkish-Cypriot public opinion to move forward on this basis.761 That, 
however, had to be done as quickly as possible. Denktash confessed that the 
prolongation of negotiations would inevitably strengthen his less moderate political 
opponents within  theTurkish-Cypriot public opinion, making it even more difficult to 
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‘sell’ a compomise.762 The same degree of urgency had been consistently expressed 
by the Turkish Foreign Minister, Caglayiangil, to his counterparts in Greece, Cyprus 
and Britain.763   
Strictly following Makarios’ guidelines, the Greek-Cypriot interlocutor tried to elicit 
information regarding Denktash’s intentions for all constitutional issues, but without 
revealing his own side’s goals or hinting at any substantial concessions.764 The only 
exception to this strategy was his very early acceptance of the proposal that the 
State would finance Turkish-Cypriot education. Even that, however, not only 
provided material benefits to the Turkish-Cypriots but aimed essentially to the 
strengthening of the unitary character of the state. Makarios believed that, due to 
economic pressure and the sense of urgency for a settlement stressed repeatedly by 
both Ankara and Denktash in private, the Greek-Cypriot side could afford to maintain 
an inflexible position on all other constitutional issues, at least for the moment. 
By the end of July, after exchanging their personal suggestions, the two negotiators 
decided to recommence their talks in September with a more thorough exchange of 
proposals on all issues. Both parties were also receptive to examining the option of 
implementing tentative agreements as soon as they were reached without waiting for 
an overall settlement.765 The Turkish-Cypriot negotiator then visited Ankara along 
with other members of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership to discuss their next steps. 
Similarly Clerides met with Makarios and Pipinelis. Both in Cyprus and abroad, 
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hopes were rising that a constitutional settlement might soon prove possible. 
However, such expectations would before long be checked by a marked hardening 
of the Turkish-Cypriot position.  
The second phase: August-December 1968 
Due to the initial optimism, Clerides harboured hopes that this phase would be 
concluded successfully and swiftly. It seemed that the main disagreements revolved 
around the formation of the local administration areas, the issue of the 
common/separate electoral rolls and the Vice-President’s post. Nevertheless, 
Denktash had returned from Ankara with more strict guidelines. A few days before 
the resumption of negotiations, Denktash said to Costar that he was disappointed by 
the Greek-Cypriot position thus far and that, unlike during the first phase, he “would 
be getting down to bargaining and it was to be hoped that the Greek-Cypriots might 
then prove flexible”.766 He was not alone, however, in taking a rigid line. It was 
acknowledged by UNFICYP officials that aside from the constitutional aspects, the 
Turkish-Cypriots were now taking a tougher line on various normalization issues.767 
Although the set-back in the talks flowed mainly from the ‘backsliding’ of the Turkish-
Cypriot side, the Greek-Cypriot negotiating tactic of holding back from substantial 
and realistic proposals also contributed to this phase’s disappointing end. 
Manoeuvring instead to make a decisive gesture at some future climax had simply 
reduced Dektash’s capacity to persuade his own community along the way.  
Progress of the negotiations 
After a month’s adjournment and after each side’s consultation with its motherland, 
Clerides and Denktash opened the second phase of the talks on 29 August, lasting 
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until the end of the year. As soon as the meetings began it became apparent that 
Denktash’s views had been entirely modified on all constitutional issues. Before the 
exchange of written proposals, he explained that on the legislature and the judiciary, 
on which it was believed that agreement was within reach, he had to retract many of 
his previous personal suggestions. He argued that the rest of the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership held a sterner approach on legislative issues; at the same time he 
insisted on the principle of communal separation in the judiciary, including the 
preservation of the litigants’ right to be tried by a judge of their own community and 
not merely someone who spoke their language.768 Regarding the Vice-Presidency, 
Denktash repeated that its retention was non-negotiable, but its powers were open to 
discussion. The only point on which he seemed willing to negotiate was the unified 
electoral rolls, but even here a mutually acceptable arrangement was more complex 
than expected.769 
The major issue of contention, however, remained the structure of local government. 
On 16 September Denktash decided to table the first list of written proposals for the 
local government which reflected a stricter approach than the one he expressed 
during the exploratory phase. Unlike in Denktash’s previous indications, the Turkish-
Cypriot side was asking for a local government formation with executive, legislative 
and judicial functions as well as a separate police force. In essence, this entailed a 
two-level administration on the island, consisting of a central government and an 
autonomous local administration.770 This local administration was to be organized 
under communal criteria with groupings of Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot 
villages. Each group – there being about 70 in all for the Turkish-Cypriot villages - 
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would be represented on a central body. There would be two central bodies, one for 
the Turkish-Cypriot and one for the Greek-Cypriot entities; these would be 
responsible for the coordination and exercise of the local government powers. The 
Turkish central authority would have links with the Turkish Communal Chamber and 
be responsible to a Turkish-Cypriot Minister of Turkish Affairs. Additionally, it was 
suggested that the local authority organs would enjoy wider functions than those 
agreed upon in the previous phase, including legislative powers and their own 
communal courts. Finally, all these provisions would be entrenched in the 
Constitution.771 Needless to say, the Greek-Cypriot rejected this package 
immediately on the grounds that it was in effect a proposal for a cantonal system. 
Both Osorio-Tafall and the American ambassador agreed with Clerides that the 
Turkish-Cypriot proposals were proposing a federal system of governance.772  
Despite the early tabling of the Turkish-Cypriot proposals for local administration, the 
Greek-Cypriot side decided not to make any counter-proposals as yet. The 
negotiators therefore decided to exchange proposals on two issues on which they 
believed, despite the hardening of the Turkish-Cypriot views, concrete progess could 
quickly be achieved: the judiciary and the police. Had this proved possible, these 
agreements would have been implemented, affording a fresh impetus and better 
prospects for tackling later the difficult problem of local government. Soon enough 
the negotiators were disillusioned. A final compromise was again impossible as it 
emerged that these subjects were closely related with the local administration 
arrangements. As Costar explained, “neither side was prepared to prejudice its 
position or to place any confidence in the good faith of the other by operating a 
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partial agreement in advance of a wider constitutional settlement.”773 In this way, the 
various issues converged simply to frame the underlying deadlock in new terms. 
After this impasse and in response to consistent pressure from Greece, on 9 
December the Cyprus Government decided to present its counter-proposals on the 
local administration.774 According to these, the Greek-Cypriot side adhered to the 
line that there should be no grouping of villages whatsoever and suggested instead 
that each village or town should constitute the basic unit of local administration. 
These units would be supervised by the District officers appointed by the 
Government.775 Moreover, it rejected both the concept of central local authority 
organs and the assertion that the functions of the local administration should be 
embedded in the Constitution. As expected, these positions were repudiated by 
Denktash, who argued that they were not acceptable even as a basis for further 
discussions. A few weeks later, this phase of the negotiations ended with a complete 
deadlock on almost all pending issues.   
Clerides admitted that both negotiators privately acknowledged that their proposals 
for the local government were not realistic and should be merged into a new 
proposal. Nevertheless, whatever practical or legally satisfactory arrangement for 
local government was agreed solely between Clerides and Denktash had very 
limited chances of wider acceptance. This represented a very sensitive issue, and 
each community was intent on securing an optimal arrangement for itself. 
Nevertheless, there remained a possibility that if the two interlocutors presented an 
integrated package of proposals in which concessions on local government were 
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compensated by other elements, then it might be possible to ‘sell’ it to the respective 
lobbies.776   
Background of the second phase 
In order to clearly understand why by December 1968 the inter-communal talks were 
heading into a blind alley, focus must shift to internal political developments within 
each community and the associated diplomatic activity which determined negotiating 
techniques. Unlike the Greek-Cypriot side, which until December followed essentially 
the same tactic, Denktash adopted a new, more complex approach. 
This second phase of the talks was bound to be crucial since it would clearly indicate 
what the two communities were really striving to achieve. Despite the fact that the 
two negotiators appeared to be discussing in good faith, both communities’ opening 
offers, especially on the most important element of local administration, were boxed 
into maximalist programmes. Both the Turkish-Cypriot proposals of 16 September 
and the Greek-Cypriot proposals of 9 December were totally unacceptable to the 
other party, leading to a very damaging hiatus.  
Although Denktash, other moderate leaders and Ankara, clearly were pursuing a 
quick solution, disagreements within the Turkish-Cypriot leadership created several 
difficulties at this point. Moreover, the Greek-Cypriot position during the previous 
phase of refraining from any substantial concession had further compromised 
Denktash’s leverage on his colleagues.777 In an attempt to try and formulate a 
common position within the Turkish-Cypriot leadership, Denktash was accompanied 
during his visit to Ankara by the hardliners Orek and Kuchuk.778 Upon their return, 
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the Turkish-Cypriot position had stiffened further, as reflected in their public 
statements that highlighted the need for watertight guarantees for the security of 
Turkish-Cypriots. As before, this tendency soon affected the negotiation itself. On 
these grounds the Turkish-Cypriot leadership justified its insistence on rejecting any 
normalization or allowing total freedom of movement throughout the Turkish-Cypriot 
areas. Concerning the constitutional proposals, Denktash argued that his side did 
not endorse several of his personal suggestions which therefore had to be 
retracted.779 This was particularly evident on his 16 September proposals. The 
Turkish Chargé d’Affairs in Nicosia admitted that those proposals did not fully reflect 
Turkish-Cypriot views and were presented mainly for internal purposes.780 He 
explained that although Denktash strongly disagreed, several circles among the 
Turkish-Cypriot leaders insisted on them. Denktash, however, strove to avoid an 
open rift with the rest of the leadership and did not want to take responsibility for 
rejecting them. Hence, he tabled them although he knew that they would be rejected 
in toto by the Greek-Cypriots.781  
During the third meeting of this phase Denktash had also explained to Clerides his 
reasons for withdrawing their previously agreed points on the judiciary and 
legislature. More specifically, Denktash complained that unlike the Greek-Cypriots, 
his side had returned with certain proposals both on issues on which common 
ground already existed and those on which there was great gap.782 Conversely, 
Clerides’ instructions entailed continuing to sound out the Turkish-Cypriot views, 
without making any proposals or commitments. Denktash, however, explained that 
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before the resumption of the negotiations in August, he had with difficulty persuaded 
some of his colleagues to allow certain flexible proposals to be put to the Greek-
Cypriot side on judicial and legislative matters, on the grounds that they would elicit 
corresponding concessions. By the third meeting of this phase, however, this had not 
happened and there was a danger of the Turkish-Cypriot line reverting boomerang-
style in the opposite direction. Therefore, Denktash stated that he was now forced to 
perceive his side’s previous flexible proposals as no longer binding.783 
Meanwhile, on the Turkish-Cypriot political front several members of the leadership 
and many extremists and military officials took advantage of this Greek-Cypriot 
rigidity to spread rumours that the Greek-Cypriots were still bent on enosis and did 
not genuinely want a solution.784 Moreover, by exploiting the Greek-Cypriot stand 
they contended that Denktash’s ‘soft’ tactics during the first phase of the talks had 
failed.785 By the end of December, after the Greek-Cypriot proposals on local 
administration were tabled, the ‘TCPA’ instructed Denktash to inform the Turkish 
Government that the Turkish-Cypriots recommend the immediate break-off of the 
inter-communal talks, allowing a new round of discussions between the Greek and 
the Turkish governments.786 Denktash had reluctantly transmitted this decision to 
Ankara, where it was flatly rejected. Nonetheless, the Turkish Government warned 
Denktash that it would not be able to support him in the event of a final agreement 
with Clerides if the majority of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership had not endorsed it in 
advance.  
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It is also noteworthy that while Denktash was in Ankara in December 1968, rumours 
circulated that Denktash had proposed to the Turkish Government to use certain 
provocative tactics, such as the proclamation of the ‘TCPA’ into a separate 
Government in Cyprus, in order to make Makarios realize the urgent need for 
concessions. According to these rumours, Ankara rejected this scenario.787 Although 
widely spread in the Turkish press, these rumours, it was believed, were likely 
generated by Denktash himself, for two reasons. Firstly, they were directed towards 
his own critics within the Turkish-Cypriot community in order to prove that Denktash 
was not as ‘soft’ as alleged. Secondly, they were formulated as an indirect threat 
towards the Greek-Cypriot leadership in order to expose the dangers of the delay in 
finding a solution.788 
It was not, however, only the Turkish-Cypriot side that accused the Cyprus 
Government of causing delays and being unconstructive. Since summer 1968, the 
Greek Foreign Minister had persistently warned as to the perceived flaws in the 
Greek-Cypriot tactic of merely listening to the Turkish-Cypriot proposals and 
rejecting them without advancing counter-proposals. This strategy, he argued, only 
enabled the Turkish-Cypriots to hold the initiative in shaping proposals and so 
control the agenda of the talks. It also meant that in the event of an early collapse of 
the talks, the Greek-Cypriot side would lose the blame game. It was already evident 
to several outside parties that the Cyprus Government seemed unwilling to provide 
anything else than minority rights to the Turkish-Cypriots.789 Moreover, by leaving all 
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matters open it already proved that it gave the option to the Turkish-Cypriot side to 
retract its previous concessions.790  
Contrary to Pipinelis’ suggestions, both Makarios and Kyprianou believed that it was 
still too soon for the Greek-Cypriot side to make binding proposals on any aspect 
and especially on local administration.791 By avoiding taking firm positions, Kyprianou 
explained that they also prevented an early impasse to the talks.792 Regarding the 
local administration Makarios argued that since there were substantial points of 
disagreement on other constitutional elements, the Greek-Cypriot side should not 
commit itself on an element that was not part of the Zurich-London Agreements.793 
Kyprianou was also confident that the Turkish-Cypriot maximalist proposals of 
September were likely to be withdrawn soon.794 Although this technique was widely 
supported within Makarios’ Ministerial Council , it created difficulties in negotiations 
and dissatisfaction to Clerides, who believed that his community should have taken a 
more positive and flexible line. Disillusioned, by October 1968 he announced his 
intention to resign from his post but retracted this once he realized that he would 
thereby lose any influence over Makarios and the Cabinet.795 
Despite the admonitions of the Greek Foreign Minister and the warnings of several 
moderate members of the Turkish-Cypriot community, it was not until the end of 
November that the Greek-Cypriot side decided to prepare its proposals. Clerides had 
by then visited Athens, where Pipinelis gave him a rather strictly worded 
memorandum for Makarios in which he warned about the dangers of the delay in 
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agreeing on a settlement.796 This memorandum eventually pinned Makarios down on 
the highly contentious issue of local administration and on 9 December 1968 
Clerides presented the Greek-Cypriot proposals.  
Nevertheless, these were advanced again only for tactical purposes since it was 
certain that the Turkish-Cypriots would immediately reject them. Interestingly, the 
British High Commission reported that the committee that prepared them consisted 
of “two rather ineffectual doves” the Minister of Justice, Stella Soulioti and the 
Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Christodoulos Benjiamin, as well 
as “two very effective hawks”, the Minister of Labour, Tassos Papadopoulos and the 
Director-General of the Ministry of Interior, Antonakis Anastasiou.797 The main 
reasoning behind the maximalist proposals was Makarios’ estimation that time was 
still working in his favour. In order to make Makarios realize the mistake of this 
approach, Clerides again offered his resignation. Makarios rejected this but agreed 
that if in the end it proved necessary, some substantial concession to the Turkish-
Cypriots might be made.798 
Another factor that justified the Cyprus Government’s continuing inflexibility was a 
most likely misleading report by the American Ambassador in Cyprus. According to 
Belcher, the main reason behind the hardening of Turkish-Cypriot views during the 
second phase was Turkey’s desire to stall any progress of the negotiations until after 
the Turkish general elections in autumn 1969.799 This view, according to the British 
Ambassador in Ankara, was flawed as Belcher had probably misunderstood 
Ankara’s intentions, since the latter was still in favour of a quick settlement of the 
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Cyprus problem.800 Nonetheless, Belcher’s view was disseminated by the Cyprus 
Government. The British High Commission in Nicosia reported that Belcher’s 
assessment was exploited by the hardliners of the Cyprus Government, who 
convinced the President that “it is no good for the Greek-Cypriots to be forthcoming 
over the local government issue because the Turks will merely pocket any 
concession which is offered and find some other excuse for delaying actual progress 
until after next October”.801 In fact, however, the Turkish elections seemed to have 
lacked any impact on the formulation of the Turkish-Cypriot proposals for local 
administration. Both political opponents in Turkey, the then Prime-Minister Suleiman 
Demirel and his opponent, Ismet Inonu, had agreed firstly that the Cyprus issue 
should not be used by either party in this electoral campaign, and secondly that 
whoever was elected would pursue the same policy regarding the degree of Turkish-
Cypriot local autonomy.802 In retrospect, Makarios admitted that his side’s estimation 
had indeed been erroneous.803 This unanimity in foreign policy matters within Turkish 
politics (government’s and opposition’s) was – and still is – not very common within 
the Greek and Greek-Cypriot political culture. 
By this stage the odds of the negotiations having a fruitful outcome were 
progressively declining. Denktash and Clerides were exhausted and disappointed by 
their respective leaderships. The delays were causing increasing frustration among 
both communities and especially among the Turkish-Cypriots. Both the Turkish-
Cypriot press and various elements of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership accused the 
Greek-Cypriots of not genuinely seeking a solution. Matters were further complicated 
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when Makarios decided on 30 December to hold a press conference in which he 
admitted that talks were in “a state of stagnation” due to the unreasonable Turkish-
Cypriot demands aiming at partition or federation.804 This infuriated the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership, which believed that Makarios had breached the confidential 
character of the inter-communal talks and was publicly rejecting the Turkish-Cypriot 
proposals, indicating that he did not intend to compromise.805 The Turkish Chargé 
d’Affairs in Nicosia explained to Costar that: 
It was understood between Clerides and Denktash that they came 
to the conference table with no pre-conditions on either side. The 
majority of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership were reasonably happy 
so long as this remained the basis on which the two negotiators 
were working. Denktash constantly assured them that Clerides 
understood and accepted this position. But now they were able to 
say to Denktash that the Archbishop had in effect imposed 
conditions by ruling out a particular solution, which was moreover 
the only sort of solution which they were likely to regard as 
acceptable. This made life very difficult for Denktash.806  
With this press conference and the strong reactions of the Turkish-Cypriot side, the 
second phase of the inter-communal talks ended. Unlike at the end of the first phase, 
this time there was general disillusionment over the future of the negotiations. 
 
The third phase: January 1969-September 1970 
In spite of the difficulties and the ’state of stagnation’ at the negotiating table, the 
local discussions had at least produced a peaceful atmosphere between the two 
communities. That ‘benign stalemate’, as the British characterized it, however, was a 
                                                          
804
 Phileleftheros, 31 December 1968 
805
 Costar to FCO, 31 December 1968: FCO 9/779, TNA 
806
 Costar to FCO, 3 January 1969: FCO 9/779, TNA 
270 
 
double-edged sword.807 The two communities were meanwhile evolving in separate 
directions and undermining any genuine wish or impulse to replace the existing 
stalemate with an authentically fresh start.  
Sir Norman Costar, before leaving Cyprus in April 1969, commented that the Cypriot 
people “are too narrowly concerned with their own political problem whose solution is 
not made easier by their love of bargaining for its own sake and their tendency to 
reach firmly held convictions on inadequate and unverified premises often emotional 
in genesis”.808 The third phase of the talks, had dragged on for a year and a half, 
under three different processes but none had borne any fruit, mainly due to what 
Costar explained as “inadequate and unverified premises” from both sides. President 
Makarios continued to operate under the premise that his side was best advised to 
wait for two reasons: there was no danger of a Turkish invasion, and the Turkish-
Cypriot economy was likely to implode.809 Nonetheless, the situation on the island 
was changing and one of the biggest challenges for the Cyprus Government was to 
realize the consequences of this transformation. Various political developments were 
soon to have an even more detrimental impact both on the pace and progress of the 
inter-communal negotiations. 
Progress of the negotiations 
The establishment of sub-committees, January-March 1969  
As soon as the new phase began, the two interlocutors exchanged proposals about 
the executive when it again became apparent that the gap on this issue was still 
wide. On the local administration issue there was yet to be found a suitable basis for 
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discussions and in order to avoid the deadlock, the two interlocutors decided to add 
a new procedure.  On 3 February 1969 they announced that sub-committees would 
be established examining technical issues on which there already existed some 
common ground.  
Reaching agreement, however, on the specific mandates of these sub-committees 
was more difficult than expected. It took almost a month to decide their portfolio and 
almost two months to initiate actual discussions. Eventually, it was agreed to 
establish two: one for the legislature dealing with the electoral system; and the other 
to examine Turkish-Cypriot reintegration in parastatal organizations.810 This 
development initially afforded some hope that the inter-communal talks were indeed 
making some progress. Soon disillusionment came. Mistrust and ulterior motives 
made it again impossible to produce any tangible progress before an over-all 
settlement of the Cyprus problem.   
Their initial point of contention concerned the sub-committees’ terms of reference. 
Denktash requested a sub-committee responsible for elements of the parastastal 
organizations that would have provided substantial benefits to Turkish-Cypriots, such 
as the gradual reintegration of the Turkish-Cypriots on the basis of 20% 
representation and the re-activation of normal services in the Turkish controlled 
areas.811 Nonetheless, the Cyprus Government rejected this proposal on the 
grounds that this was not a constitutional matter. It was a normalization measure that 
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could have been discussed under the existing Political Liaison Committee.812 For 
Makarios the Turkish-Cypriot motives were clear:  
Turkish policy was not at present aimed at achieving a 
constitutional settlement. The Turkish-Cypriots wanted to secure 
more measures of normalization, improving their economic and 
social lot at the expense of the Cyprus Government, without making 
any concessions which would materially affect the separateness of 
the Turkish-Cypriot community… [He] was very much in favour of 
normalization but concessions had to be made by both sides and 
he could not go on indefinitely agreeing to measures of 
normalization which benefit the Turkish-Cypriots only.813  
Nonetheless, the Greek-Cypriot tactic had another, deeper meaning. Although 
Makarios had adopted normalization measures that mainly concerned freedom of 
movement, he was reluctant to accept genuine normalization and reintegration of the 
Turkish-Cypriot factor in the state machinery. He still wanted time to force the 
Turkish-Cypriots to their knees whilst any real normalization would only serve to put 
off the implosion that he intended. Needless to say, the reluctance of the Turkish-
Cypriots to reciprocate with genuine normalization measures suited Makarios’ 
interests. That reality, however, could hardly be admitted outside a very narrow 
circle. 
In order to avoid another impasse, the two interlocutors agreed that at a first stage 
this sub-committee would examine only the possibility of the Turkish-Cypriot 
reintegration in the parastatal organizations whilst any agreement on the technical 
aspects would only be implemented given a wider constitutional settlement. 
Nonetheless, their very strict terms of reference made any substantial progress 
impossible. 
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New proposals for local administration, March 1969- August 1969 
While discussions on the sub-committees were still ongoing, outside the island there 
was an increasing concern about the lack of results so far. Pipinelis from Athens was 
trying through diplomatic channels and public speeches to urge the Cyprus 
Government to work for an over-all settlement before the Turkish elections of 
October 1969.814 Afraid about the possibility of an early deadlock in Cyprus, Britain 
and Greece along with the US and Canada decided to convince U Thant to exert 
pressure on the parties and request swift progress.815 After intense diplomatic 
activity throughout March in New York and Nicosia, it was finally decided that, in 
order to avoid prejudicing renewed substantial negotiations, the UN Secretary-
General would merely send a personal appeal to the Cypriot and Turkish 
Governments expressing concern.816 Interestingly, the Turkish Foreign Minister, 
Caglayiangil, criticized U Thant’s appeal, explaining that it was misdirected because 
Denktash was receiving instructions from the Turkish-Cypriot leadership and not 
from Ankara.817 Thus, this appeal had to be sent to Kuchuk instead.  
In March 1969, while seeking to produce fresh momentum to the local discussions, 
both Osorio-Tafall and the American Ambassador, Belcher, produced draft papers 
that gave informally to the parties with ideas on a compromise solution for the local 
administration. Although both set of proposals were similar, Osorio-Tafall’s ideas 
were closer to the Turkish-Cypriot requests because in general, they provided for a 
Turkish Minister of Interior responsible for the central local authorities.818 The US 
ideas, on the other hand, were more balanced, providing a Greek Minister of Interior 
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and a Turkish Deputy-Minister, each responsible for the respective Greek and 
Turkish central local authorities.819 Both suggestions, however, were rejected by the 
parties. 
Almost simultaneously and mainly due to Pipinelis, Makarios decided to instruct 
Clerides to prepare new proposals on local autonomy. These were slightly more 
flexible than those of 9 December and the Greek Foreign Minister seemed to be 
satisfied, explaining that he would do his best to convince his counterpart in Turkey 
to endorse them.820 Nevertheless, due to the previous hostile reaction of Turkey to 
the substance of the US proposals – which were definitely more flexible - Clerides 
expressed his concern to Pipinelis that presenting them now was most likely 
premature.821 The latter, however, explained that after the four-month hiatus, the 
Greek-Cypriot side should now take the lead and get things moving again. This 
would provide an important tactical advantage, for if the inter-communal talks ended 
in deadlock, as was generally feared, the burden of the failure would fall on the 
Turkish-Cypriot side.822 Hence this element was of the utmost importance to 
Pipinelis.  
According to the new Greek-Cypriot proposals, presented on 24 April, local 
government was still formulated based on administrative rather than political 
criteria.823 Each village remained the basic unit and the first tier of local government. 
Nevertheless, it was now accepted that in the second tier there would be a grouping 
of villages, not based on racial criteria as the Turkish-Cypriots suggested, but rather 
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on the principle of geographical proximity, embracing a similarity of administrative, 
economic and social problems. Finally, the Districts would constitute the third tier 
while all three levels would be supervised by the State through a District 
Commissioner.824 When informing Denktash about these new proposals, Clerides 
asserted: 
I don’t wish to mislead you and, therefore, I want to emphasize that 
as far as the proposed structure is concerned, this is the last step 
which the Government is willing to take. Of course, the question of 
the functions and the delineation of the areas is a matter on which 
some flexibility may be shown.825 
Indeed, when the new proposals were submitted, Pipinelis explained to Caglayiangil 
that it was an achievement for the Greeks to convince Makarios to make such 
concessions and that if the Turkish-Cypriot side failed to respond, there would be no 
further chances to convince Makarios to make any more concessions.826 Not only 
were the revised proposals rejected by the Turkish-Cypriot leadership,827 but they 
once again led to a new debate over the immediate break-off of the talks.828 
Although the Turkish Government agreed that the proposals were unacceptable, it 
urged the Turkish-Cypriots to advance counter-proposals in order to prevent 
deadlock.829  
Denktash had firstly to defuse aroused public opinion and the extremists within the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership before making counter-proposals.830 He also admitted 
that some members of the ‘TCPA’ were infiltrating the press with unhelpful 
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comments and statements, thus complicating his task. For that reason, Denktash 
firstly decided that henceforth only he would claim authority to make public 
statements on the negotiations’ progress. Meanwhile, he believed that the best 
procedure for the moment was merely to seek further clarifications from Clerides. 
The new counter-proposals were eventually presented a few months later, on 11 
August. 
The new Turkish-Cypriot counter-offer repeated its previous views over the structure, 
functions and state supervision of local governance.831 Clerides admitted that there 
was one positive element within Denktash’s response: his proposals, for the first 
time, talked of a ‘gradualist approach’ to the Cyprus problem. Denktash explained 
that the Turkish-Cypriots wanted iron-clad guarantees regarding the new settlement 
because they feared absorption by the Greek majority. However, he added that if a 
solution was agreed upon and implemented, after some years fair play and justice 
would be restored, dispelling the fears and suspicion of both communities.832 When 
such a point was reached, all contentions could be resolved once and for all. 
According to Clerides, this suggested that in some distant future the Greek-Cypriots 
would get the type of state they wanted.833 He recognized, however, that such a 
scenario, was not yet available because,  
Makarios would never again sign a constitutional document which 
looked as though it gave the Turkish-Cypriots such a privileged 
position that the unitary nature of the state was endangered. The 
Archbishop was concerned with the opinions of ordinary Greek-
Cypriots, and particularly with the opinions of a vociferous minority 
of them, who did not appreciate arguments about ‘evolutionary 
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growth’. And the Archbishop took formal documents literally: he 
saw things as the text described them and a text based on anything 
like Denktash’s proposals would not look good [to him].834  
After this set of proposals the inter-communal talks were again at a standstill. 
Clerides and Denktash decided to resume their confidential discussions on a 
personal basis only.835 But the danger of the discussions running completely into the 
sand was now real. For that reason, the Greek-Cypriot interlocutor decided on 1 
September to officially restate his side’s proposals on local-government, in order to 
produce clear-cut proof that the Greek-Cypriot side had indeed been aiming for a 
compromise.836 When Denktash received this letter, he realized that it was a 
“grandstand play” directed to public opinion and he feared that this might mean that 
the two negotiators were “reaching the end of the line”.837  
Seeking a fresh approach 
By October 1969, the two interlocutors came to the conclusion that they had 
exhausted every margin for discussion regarding local administration and that there 
was no more room for concessions. The talks remained at a standstill for two 
months. Notably, Clerides and Denktash had already managed to agree on the 
functions of the local authorities whilst the remaining stumbling blocks were the local 
administration’s structure and the degree of the state control.838 In truth, after the one 
small step ahead made by the Greek-Cypriot proposals of 24 April, the ball was now 
in the Turkish-Cypriot court. Meanwhile, both Pipinelis and the re-elected 
Government of Demirel were urging the parties to continue the inter-communal 
dialogue and try to avoid deadlock at all costs.  
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Osorio-Tafall in September unofficially intervened and suggested a new approach, 
discussing all other elements except local government.839 Moreover, he proposed 
that elements of an administrative and economic nature should now be discussed in 
order to practically enhance inter-communal cooperation. Although the chances of 
this approach succeeding were limited, it was the only viable alternative. Pipinelis 
also suggested to the Cyprus Government that it ought to use its economic muscle 
to foster inter-communal cooperation in the administrative and economic sectors in 
order to produce a practical incentive for the Turkish-Cypriots.840 Even though the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership had been extremely cautious, opening up the ‘tap’ of the 
Cyprus Government’s money or technical help to the enclaves would have gradually 
brought the Turkish-Cypriots closer to the idea of a quick settlement. There were 
already encouraging signs, coming especially from the agricultural and private 
sectors where inter-communal cooperation since 1968 had been enhanced, that a 
coordinated Government policy targeting normalization in economic and 
administrative sectors could have indeed proved fruitful.841 Nonetheless, this tactic 
would have meant further normalization and this still had little appeal to most Greek-
Cypriot leaders and especially to Makarios. Moreover, for Turkish-Cypriots it would 
have meant a practical delay of their plans for separate economic development. As 
expected, neither community took genuine measures towards that end.  
After a two-month break, the two negotiators met again on 1 December 1969. 
Denktash proposed that the issue of local administration should be set aside, as 
Osorio-Tafall suggested and try instead to work on two parallel exercises, the re-
examination of: a) all constitutional issues, except local government, on the 
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assumption that an agreement could not be reached on the latter; and b) all 
constitutional elements on the presumption that the 1960 system of local government 
would be maintained - that is, at a village level - with the difference that the local 
councils would be elected and not appointed by the Interior Minister.842  
While both negotiators started to work on this fresh idea, they were soon forced to 
abandon it. Denktash came under strong criticism from the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership for making an unacceptable concession by accepting this procedure, 
whilst Ankara was concerned about the marginalization of the local government 
question. When he was notified of Denktash’s internal difficulties and the implications 
that these might cause for the discussions, Makarios instructed Clerides to inform 
Denktash that the first exercise – to discuss all issues except local government – 
was unacceptable because the Turkish-Cypriots would try to wring several 
concessions from the Greek-Cypriots and then renew their unacceptable local 
government demands. Conversely, the only acceptable basis for Makarios was for 
local government to remain on the 1959-60 basis, provided that all the concessions 
made by Denktash on the other constitutional issues were still valid.843 This was 
naturally rejected by the Turkish-Cypriot side. In order to avoid the new deadlock, the 
two interlocutors tried to work again for a compromise on the judiciary, believing still 
that it was the only element that was easier to accommodate.844 If they could reach 
an agreement on this, they could finally present some concrete results to the public 
opinion, thus giving another kiss of life to the faltering negotiations. 
                                                          
842
 Ramsbotham to FCO, 28 January 1970: FCO 9/1147, TNA 
843
 Clerides, Vol.II, op. cit., p.347  
844
 Ramsbotham to FCO, 20 February 1970: FCO 9/1147, TNA 
280 
 
Throughout March 1970 there were serious developments within the Greek-Cypriot 
community which inevitably led to the slower pace of the inter-communal talks. The 
growth of the extreme nationalist movement and its underground activities led to the 
assassination attempt against Makarios and a week later to the assassination of 
Yorkadjis. This thesis will not analyse the events that led to these two developments, 
since these are studied elsewhere.845 Nevertheless, what is illustrated in our study is 
that the internal developments created a new challenge for the two sides regarding 
the inter-communal talks: the Turkish-Cypriot side was going to increase its public 
demands for further guarantees on security aspects while the Greek-Cypriots were 
not in a position to appear weak by making concessions.  
After the assassination attempt, Makarios announced that parliamentary elections 
would take place in July 1970. This was bound to hamper the negotiators from 
having any substantial exchanges and thus Clerides and Denktash decided instead 
to focus on a stock-taking exercise. In May 1970 they agreed to draft a joint paper 
presenting their points of agreement and disagreement hitherto on all constitutional 
aspects. This was necessary for two reasons: firstly, to summarize what had been 
achieved so far; and secondly, to provide the basis for a subsequent package deal. 
According to Clerides the two sides “would have looked into the five items in the joint 
document as a whole, to see whether concessions on one could be balanced by 
gains on another.”846 This long joint paper, ready by mid-August 1970, covered the 
five main topics, of the judiciary, police, legislature, executive and local government. 
The different approach and philosophies on all aspects were evident throughout, but 
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local government was clearly the most complex. 847 The two sides did not even agree 
on the title of this section. With the presentation of this paper the third phase of the 
local talks dragged to an end.  
Preparing for the next phase 
Before the official closing of the longest phase of the negotiations there was an 
unfortunate development. The architect of the moderate policy of Greece towards 
Cyprus and the one who had established a very friendly and constructive 
cooperation with his counter-part in Ankara, Panayiotis Pipinelis, died in July 1970. 
The British Ambassador in Athens ominously commented in 1968: “I am quite 
confident that as long as Papadopoulos and Pipinellis are in control of Greek 
domestic foreign policy, the question of enosis can be considered dead”.848 That was 
indeed a very important reality both for the initiation and the development of the 
talks. Since his appointment in November 1967 until his death, Pipinelis believed in a 
pragmatic approach towards the Cyprus problem and tried to convince the Greek 
and Greek-Cypriot leadership about its necessity.  
By August 1970, Makarios decided to follow one of the suggestions that Pipinelis 
made long before he died. The latter suggested that the Greek-Cypriot side should 
prepare a ‘concessions paper’ in which it would clearly state the maximum number of 
concessions it could offer in various negotiating contingencies.849 In that way 
Clerides would have clear instructions on what he could offer in a possible package 
deal, and so quicken the pace of the talks.  
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Makarios, therefore, prepared this document, which covered all constitutional 
aspects except local government. This was to be completed by Clerides.850 
Surprisingly, however, Makarios drafted this memorandum in a notably moderate 
fashion. Nonetheless, the guidelines he gave to Clerides about the local government 
still had traces of intransigence. The main Turkish-Cypriot demand for a central local 
authority organ was flatly rejected. Clerides explained that Makarios would have 
never accepted the latter point while he also knew that equally the Turkish-Cypriots 
would have never waived from this. For tactical reasons, he was willing, therefore, to 
appear flexible on all other issues, “since he was pretty sure that he would never be 
called upon to honour the bargain”.851  
Unlike Makarios, Denktash was not willing to make any concessions at the opening 
of the next phase.852 According to the Cyprus Government’s intelligence, the 
Turkish-Cypriots decided to take a hard line because of the internal turmoil within the 
Greek-Cypriot community. They over-estimated the Archbishop’s insecurity due to 
the growing split within the Greek-Cypriot community, the gradual regrouping of pro-
enosis forces and the erroneous belief that Athens was now considering displacing 
Makarios.853 However, Caglayiangil had again warned Denktash to keep the 
negotiations alive at all costs. The Greco-Turkish understanding was that as long as 
there was no other alternative, negotiations should not break down no matter the 
difficulties.  
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Internal developments  
The third phase of the inter-communal talks coincided with one of the most eventful 
periods of the Cyprus problem: the birth of four new political parties along with the 
emergence of several extremist organizations, the first democratic parliamentary 
elections for ten years and the gradual consolidation of the ‘TCPA’ along with the 
primacy of Denktash within his community. In dealing with this period it will be 
important to connect developments at the negotiating table with those on the ground.  
Formation of Greek-Cypriot political parties  
In February 1969 the political scenery of Cyprus changed overnight with the more or 
less simultaneous creation of four new political parties. Although there were from 
time to time efforts to create political parties, for nine years AKEL had remained the 
only coherent political party. Despite its electoral strength, however, it had always 
operated in Makarios’ shadow. Most importantly, this was due to the ‘stifling’ effect of 
Makarios’ and the Church’s role on the island. Makarios’ political predominance 
along with his posture that he was above politics essentially undermined the 
orthodox cultivation of the political consciousness within his constituency.854 By 
1969, however, things had changed. As will be explained below, this modest 
politicization was to a degree instigated by Makarios himself in order to avoid losing 
total control over the island’s politics.  
Firstly, on 5 February Glafkos Clerides along with Policarpos Yorkadjis announced 
their intention to establish the Unified Party, a centre-right wing party which belonged 
in the pro-Government camp and favoured an independent unitary state and 
supported the inter-communal talks. On the same day, Vassos Lyssarides 
announced the formation of his own socialist party, EDEK, again a supporter of 
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Makarios’ policies. Two days later, Nicos Sampson announced the creation of the 
Progressive Party, which held a pro-enosis line but simultaneously supported the 
continuation of the current constitutional talks.855 Meanwhile, Andreas Azinas, the 
leader of PEK, the Farmer’s Union, and the governor of the co-operative movement, 
with Makarios’ encouragement, worked on the sidelines to establish the fourth party, 
the Progressive Front. The official leader of the party was the mayor of Nicosia, 
Odysseas Ioannides. Similar in aims to Sampson’s party, the Progressive Front was 
nonetheless under Makarios’ total control. There were several ideological and 
political differences between all these parties but they all supported Makarios’ 
Government, since this was a prerequisite for popular support.856 Indicative was the 
fact that during the elections of 1970 each party competed to prove itself the most 
devoted supporter of Makarios.857 
The main questions deriving from the formation of these political parties concerned 
their timing, Makarios’ reaction and their effect on inter-communal talks. Also 
relevant here are the repercussions of Yorkadjis’ resignation from his post as 
Minister of Interior in November 1968 due to his alleged involvement in the 
assassination attempt of Colonel George Papadopoulos in Greece. After the turmoil 
following this event, Belcher accurately remarked that “the net result of the Yorkadjis 
affair in the domestic political arena will probably be to make political life much more 
‘political’”.858 Although Yorkadjis was disappointed that Makarios had sacrificed him 
then, it was nonetheless reported that there had been an understanding between 
them, with Makarios declaring Parliamentary elections after which Yorkadjis would 
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return to Greek-Cypriot politics. Belcher believed that Yorkadjis would grasp the 
opportunity to form an anti-Communist party, as he had long since intended to do.859  
Clerides admitted that he also favoured a counter-weight of AKEL and a consequent 
reduction of the church’s involvement in politics. Moreover, it was no secret that he 
was discouraged about the progress of the inter-communal talks and disillusioned by 
the short-sighted strategy of President Makarios. He, therefore, decided that a right-
wing party with wide popular support would be the only way to increase his own 
standing among the Greek-Cypriots and his influence on Makarios.860 It was already 
apparent that the various forces formed in Parliament since Independence, and now 
seemingly unified under the Patriotic Front, were actually in disarray. Their common 
denominator, Makarios, who had brought them together in 1959, was no longer able 
to keep them under the same roof. Therefore, the Clerides-Yorkadjis collaboration, 
although peculiar due to their very different political personalities, was ‘a marriage of 
convenience’.861 Yorkadjis had influence throughout the island, while his “rural 
organization of village groups was strong enough to provide a skeletal electoral 
machine, something which Clerides completely lacked”.862 Despite Turkish-Cypriot 
concerns over Yorkadjis’ past military record on the national issue, Clerides had 
assured Denktash that Yorkadjis was fully supportive of Clerides’ views and aims.863  
The announcement of the Clerides-Yorkadjis’ initiative was arguably crucial in 
sparking the formation of all the other parties. There was little doubt that Makarios 
was opposed to this development. He reluctantly accepted the Clerides-Yorkadjis 
                                                          
859
 Ibid. 
860
 Costar to FCO, 14 February 1969: FCO 9/785, TNA 
861
 Interview with Lellos Demetriades, Nicosia 27 May 2014 
862
 Loizos, op. cit.,p.237 
863
 Costar to FCO, 22 November 1968: FCO 9/778, TNA 
286 
 
decision but worked discreetly in order to prevent them from gaining enough political 
power that could have circumscribed his, hitherto unchallenged political authority. 
This most likely, was among the reasons that Makarios encouraged Azinas to work 
for the creation of another right-wing party.864 Several diplomatic circles also 
reported that Clerides had tried unsuccessfully to convince Azinas to join forces with 
him.865  
Makarios, at least publicly, welcomed these developments within his community. 
Nonetheless, he instructed his Ministers not to participate in any party as such. The 
Greek Government and Pipinelis were likewise concerned. They believed that such 
formations would hinder Makarios’ position in his community, reduce Clerides’ 
standing as Greek-Cypriot negotiator and divide the Greek-Cypriot community. All of 
these could have undermined progress of the talks. This fear, however, did not come 
to fruition. In spite of this feverish political activity in February 1969, the basic political 
stasis remained until the end of 1969, when it was finally decided that elections 
would take place sometime in 1970. 
The National Front and the Government’s stance 
Although the creation of the parties was a move towards the modernization and 
potential democratization of the Greek-Cypriot politics, a major setback to that goal, 
detrimentally impacting the peace-making process, occurred almost simultaneously. 
Makarios’ declaration of support for a ‘feasible policy’ of independence in January 
1968, the initiation of inter-communal negotiations on that basis, the forthcoming 
parliamentary elections and the formation of political parties could only mean that an 
independence mentality was being further consolidated within the Greek-Cypriot 
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community. By the same token, it appeared that the goal of enosis was being 
shelved for good. Yet, various segments of the Greek-Cypriot population failed to 
grasp the futility of the enosis aim and decided to force the Government to restore 
this national goal through extremist organizations.866 In March 1969 these 
underground formations made their first appearance. Their aims were mainly to 
terrorize, punish and politically eliminate those who were not working towards enosis 
and who sought to cultivate a ‘Cypriot consciousness’.867 Throughout spring and 
summer 1969 they distributed pamphlets and instigated physical attacks against 
various high-profile members of the Government, whilst bombs were left outside 
government buildings. There were several small terrorist groups behind those 
actions but the most important of them all was the so-called National Front.868  
By the summer of 1969, the inter-communal negotiations ground to a halt and a 
renewal of violence in the name of enosis had been initiated among the Greek-
Cypriot community. The Guardian particularly commented that “the long lull in 
progress towards a Cyprus settlement is producing the Greek-Cypriot factionalism 
that the moderate politicians feared. Underground groups, recapturing the heady 
days of their struggle against Britain, are proliferating and turning to violence”.869 The 
Cyprus Government, however, under-estimated this threat and the negative 
implications of terrorist actions on the negotiations. Likewise, President Makarios 
over-estimated his ability to convince the extremists to dissolve through mere 
exhortation and the use of his own personal prestige as the ethnarch of the Greeks 
of Cyprus. “The more his secular legitimacy was questioned, the more he relied on 
                                                          
866
 Markides, The Rise and Fall,  op. cit., p.77  
867
 Ramsbotham to FCO, 22 August 1968:  FCO 9/785, TNA 
868
 Cyprus Mail, 23 May 1969  
869
 The Guardian, 13 May 1969 
288 
 
his religious role as representative of all Greek-Cypriots”, Sant Cassia explains.870 
Both Denktash and several foreign representatives in Cyprus were constantly 
expressing to the Greek-Cypriot leaders their intense concern and warned them 
about the negative repercussions of this situation. Although on 28 August the 
National Front was declared illegal and in December certain actions were taken to 
confront this threat, these were ineffective. By January 1970 the British High 
Commissioner, Peter Ramsbotham, commented: 
It is clear that the National Front is not the fragmented collection of 
thugs, on whom the Cyprus Government were liable to crack down 
at any moment, which the Archbishop tried to lead me to suppose 
[was the case] during various conversations last year. The 
implications for the Cyprus internal situation, and more widely the 
Cyprus problem, are disturbing.871 
The National Front was dissolved after an armed raid on the Police Headquarters in 
Limassol in May 1970 and the ensuing trial of several of its members. It was a fact 
however, that although short-lived, the National Front actions had a further impact. 
By mid-1970 it had disrupted internal security, opened the door for Grivas’ return to 
the island’s politics and spread the seeds for the formation of EOKA B a year later. 
The troubles created among the majority community on the island inevitably led a 
few years later to a decline in inter-communal relations which rudely shattered the 
peaceful efforts for settlement.  
The Turkish-Cypriots did not lose time, attempting to capitalize on this unstable 
situation within the Greek-Cypriot community by holding that their demands for 
increased local autonomy within their own areas with a separate police force were 
entirely justified. They claimed that the Greek-Cypriot authorities had failed to 
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maintain law and order within their own areas and thus would also be unable to exert 
effective control on the Turkish-Cypriot areas in the event of any settlement. As time 
was passing and the situation among the Greek-Cypriot community was 
deteriorating, the Turkish-Cypriot stance was becoming more and more inflexible, 
whilst the Cyprus Government’s ability to make any concessions was undermined by 
its own internal problems.  
Additionally, the Government’s indecisiveness concerning these extremist 
movements proved to be a significant mistake with one severe long-term side-effect. 
The enosis drum was beating again within the Greek-Cypriot community and seeds 
of division were spreading. Various segments of the Greek-Cypriot community, 
especially the unsophisticated villagers, appeared to be sympathetic, if not to the 
actions of the National Front, then to its aims and goals. Ramsbotham observed that 
“no-one ever appears to witness who distributes National Front leaflets in the villages 
although everyone has copies, very much what happened over EOKA leaflets during 
the Emergency”.872 The assassination attempt against Makarios on 8 March 1970 
and the assassination of Yorkadjis ten days later, attended by rumours of the 
involvement of several Greek army officers, confirmed that the situation was getting 
out of hand.  
The rise of nationalistic feeling, still controllable at the moment, constrained 
Makarios’ room for manoeuvre, making him even keener to avoid accusations from 
the extreme right. As Clerides was later to emphasize repeatedly, Makarios was not 
willing to move in any direction unless he was sure of public support.873 Makarios’ 
tendency to avoid swimming against the current led him to give speeches to arouse 
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nationalistic sentiments within his community. In several of his speeches he still 
highlighted the undying national goal of enosis whilst helping to inflame Greek-
Cypriot public opinion by making references to what he depicted as devious Turkish-
Cypriot plans to divide the island. Above all, he consistently referred to the bleak 
prospects of the inter-communal talks due to Turkey’s inflexible position, re-assuring 
his audience that he would not make any more concessions since these would entail 
national dangers for Greek-Cypriots.874 Both the Turkish and Greek Governments, 
therefore, pressed Makarios to tone down his own rhetoric.875 Meanwhile, similar 
provocative statements were also made by the Cabinet’s hawks, such as the new 
Minister of Interior, Epaminondas Komodromos and the Minister of Education, 
Constantinos Spyridakis. Clerides told the British High Commissioner that although 
he intended to protest about these statements to the Ministerial Council, Makarios 
more likely was not going to support him since the latter preferred to allow his 
Ministers to say whatever they wanted in order to test out public reactions.876 The 
rekindling of the enosis rhetoric inevitably sabotaged Clerides’ constant efforts to 
dispel Turkish-Cypriot doubts about the good intentions of his side and the prospect 
that a unitary settlement could indeed guarantee their rights without being at the 
mercy of Greek-Cypriots. 
Nationalistic sentiment was further aroused by a series of press reports throughout 
the summer of 1969 concerning increased military preparations within the Turkish-
Cypriot sector. It was indeed true that a crisis sparked in Turkey in late May 1969 
had encouraged Turkish-Cypriot hawks of taking a more aggressive posture within 
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the ‘TCPA’.877 Information about partition plans had been transmitted from the 
Intelligence Service of Cyprus to the Presidential Palace. This intelligence, based on 
a “reliable Turkish-Cypriot source”, asserted that the Turkish-Cypriots were preparing 
the ground for military partition.878 Irrespective of whether those reports were indeed 
reliable or not (and they probably were not) it seemed that Makarios was convinced 
of their validity and this inevitably affected his decision-making. 
In closing this section, we may reflect on Denktash’s outburst to the British High 
Commissioner about Makarios’ speech on 24 August 1969, which brought Denktash, 
as he stated, into a very difficult situation. As the High Commissioner reported, 
Denktash was particularly furious because: 
Makarios accused the Turkish-Cypriot leaders … of pursuing 
‘federation and partition plans’. Denktash said that the Archbishop’s 
statements and the most recent one in particular had exposed him 
to considerable pressure from the hard-liners on his own side. 
Already this week he had received nine delegations which had 
come to congratulate him on his reconversion to the idea of 
partition and to seek his approval for their plans for increasing the 
separation of the Turkish community from the Greek-Cypriots in the 
particular fields in which they operated. … [Makarios’] statements 
continuously undermined the basis [of the talks] on which Denktash 
conducted them and gave encouragement to extremists of both 
sides. It was essential that the Archbishop should at least in public, 
accept the official statements of the Turkish Government policy and 
the views of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership at their face value.879  
Interestingly, during this period both Ankara and the Turkish-Cypriot leaders were 
praised by the British for their moderate and “statesmanlike reaction” on all the 
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provocations issuing from the Greek-Cypriot leaders and press.880 If there was 
indeed a blame-game in motion, the Turkish-Cypriot side had scored once again.  
Elections 1970 
Against this background, both Makarios and the Greek Government accepted that 
parliamentary elections should no longer be postponed; thus, they were scheduled 
for 5 July 1970. Extremely worried, however, that an electoral campaign would 
increase tension among his community, Makarios tried to sound out whether he 
could convince all parties that supported him to enter a pact over seats, similar to the 
1960 understanding with AKEL and the Patriotic Front. Although he acknowledged 
that it was undemocratic, Makarios believed that under the current circumstances, 
such a pre-arrangement would prevent any further division among his community. 
Especially after the assassination attempt against his life, Makarios was at pains to 
convince Clerides above all, to accept a number of seats that would give his party a 
narrow majority in Parliament.881 It was evident that Makarios wanted to achieve a 
distribution of seats that would enable him to retain his complete control. AKEL 
initially accepted Makarios’ offer of five seats; this did not represent its public 
support, but was in line with the party’s desire at the moment to avoid responsibility. 
Makarios also retained close contacts with Ioannides’ Progressive Front, the only 
serious rival of Clerides’ Unified Party in the forthcoming elections.  
Although Yorkadjis’ death in March 1970 and the scandal over his involvement in the 
assassination attempt on Makarios had affected the electoral strength of the Unified 
Party, Clerides rejected Makarios’ offer. His aim since 1968 had been to rival 
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Makarios’ absolute control within Parliament.882 Therefore, Clerides insisted on 
rejecting any pact if that did not give a clear majority to one party.883 Therefore, 
Makarios’ attempts to secure a wide pre-electoral agreement failed. It should be 
noted, however, that almost on the eve of the elections, Sampson’s apparently weak 
party merged with Ioannides’ Progressive Front. It is noteworthy that Clerides 
revealed to the British High Commissioner that although he had tried before the 
elections to form between his party and the Progressive Front “a solid bulwark 
against the communists”, it was Makarios that undermined his efforts. Clerides 
explained: 
He had recently access to the minutes of the post-mortem meeting 
of the Progressive Front from which it was clear that the Archbishop 
had not really encouraged their close cooperation with Clerides’ 
party against both the communists and the extreme right-wing 
forces. On the contrary, the Archbishop had made certain half 
promises which had not been fulfilled and which were now causing 
much resentment in the Progressive Front. Some of Clerides’ own 
UP followers were also feeling bitterness against the Archbishop.884 
Despite Makarios’ concerns and Grivas’ messages from Athens to the Greek-
Cypriots to boycott them, on 5 July 1970 elections did take place uneventfully. 
Clerides’ UP gained fifteen of thirty-five seats, the Progressive Front seven, EDEK 
two, AKEL nine and two independent candidates were also elected. The most 
significant part of these elections, however, was firstly that AKEL had won the 
majority of the votes and managed to elect all of its nine candidates, and secondly 
that EDEK’s candidates benefited by the way that AKEL was represented in these 
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elections.885 Although Clerides’ party won the majority of the Parliaments seats, he 
still failed to establish UP as an effective political counter-balance to Makarios’ 
dominance.   
Just a week before the elections, Makarios decided on a major ministerial reshuffle. 
He retained only the Foreign Minister, Kyprianou, Interior Minister Komodromos, and 
the Finance Minister, Andreas Patsalides. It was reported that Makarios initially 
intended to appoint another Minister of Interior since Komodromos had already 
caused several problems for the Government with his public speeches, but the Abbot 
of Kykko Monastery, who exerted significant influence on Makarios, urged the 
President to retain Komodromos.886 The balance between the hawks and the doves 
in the Cabinet remained the same, while Makarios decided to appoint Dr. Ihsan Ali 
as his personal advisor. This infuriated the Turkish-Cypriots and gave further 
credence to their demand for separate electoral rolls for the parliamentary elections.  
Turkish-Cypriot internal development  
The most important characteristic of this period for the Turkish-Cypriot side was a 
gradual diminution of the previous urgency for a settlement. The ‘TCPA’ had focused 
on the strengthening of its administrative structures, trying to find ways to finance its 
needs. By 1970 it managed to extend its control over the 12-13% of the island in 
which the Turkish-Cypriot community, according to Denktash, had “independent 
administration, security forces, courts, taxation system and everything else”.887 In 
spite of this structural development, the Turkish-Cypriots still had enormous 
economic and social problems and were inevitably dependent on Ankara. 
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Throughout 1968-1969, dissatisfaction steadily increased among the Turkish-Cypriot 
community regarding the continuation of economic hardships and unemployment. 
The Turkish-Cypriot student movement and the graduates returning from Ankara, 
along with the strikes of the school teachers, were only some of the problems of the 
‘TCPA’. The press reports and public debates about economic and political scandals 
within the ‘TPCA’ also inflamed public debate concerning the ineffectiveness of the 
old Turkish-Cypriot leadership.888 In their effort to tackle these problems, the ‘TCPA’ 
along with Ankara tried to promote the economic development of the enclaves by 
increased financial support from Turkey and the establishment of various new 
economic and administrative structures.889 As already seen in May 1968, the ‘TCPA’ 
decided to establish a Committee for economic development, later constituted as an 
Economic Planning Bureau. This was designed to produce a plan for industrial 
development and improvements in the agricultural sector. Moreover, a five-year 
development plan for the period 1969-74 was drafted along with a separate ‘TCPA’ 
development budget of £500.000 per annum.890 There were also reports that the 
‘TCPA’ approached several countries and organizations in order to gain technical 
and economic support for its development plan. Meanwhile, it intended to issue its 
own bonds that would have been mainly available to wealthy Turkish-Cypriots 
abroad, as another measure to cover its financial needs.891 Turkey also instructed 
that there should be reductions in military expenditure with the savings directed to 
                                                          
888
 Patrick, Political geography, op. cit., p.162;                                                                          
Rasmbotham, Dispatch, Turkish-Cypriot students, 10 April 1970: FCO 9/1172, TNA                                                                                                                                                                  
See press reports in FA2/109 and FA2/309, Cyprus State Archive 
889
 Halkin Sesi, 15 April 1970 
890
 Ramsbotham, Dispatch “Turkish-Cypriot Economic Development”,  10 September 1969:  FCO 
9/803, TNA  
891
Cyprus Intelligence Service to Secretary-General, Ministry of Interior, 21 October 1969:  Glafkos 
Clerides Archive 
296 
 
other sectors of the administration.892 It is also noteworthy that the size of the 
Executive Council of the ‘TCPA’ was reduced from nine to eight members to reduce 
its administrative cost.893  
Ramsbotham’s report on the economic planning of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership 
explained that the Turkish-Cypriot leaders had to realize that only economic 
reintegration could have saved them from permanently being second-class citizens 
in Cyprus.894  Unfortunately, however, “there have been disturbing signs that what 
the leadership desire is not economic parity for their community but economic 
separateness for its own sake”.895 Such an impulse became clearer by the end of 
1969 and into 1970, when a discussion took place between the two negotiators 
regarding the increase of inter-communal cooperation in economic and 
administrative sectors of the island. Although the Greek-Cypriot side was not willing 
to make any generous proposals, the Turkish-Cypriot leaders were now also 
reluctant to take any radical action that would mean freezing their own economic and 
development plans. Their official justification was that the proposals or efforts made 
by the Greek-Cypriot side to increase the economic inter-communal cooperation 
were aiming at absorbing them into the majority.896  
Preserving their separateness for security reasons, therefore, was an intensifying 
theme of the public speeches of Turkish-Cypriot leaders. When UNFICYP officials 
and Osorio-Tafall himself tried to convince the Turkish-Cypriots to allow some 
freedom of movement in their areas, they stubbornly refused to do so on such 
                                                          
892
 Clerides to Komodromos, 12 December 1969:  Glafkos Clerides Archive 
893
 Special News Bulletin, 21 July 1970: FA2/109, Cyprus State Archive 
894
 Ramsbotham, Dispatch “Turkish-Cypriot Economic Development”,  10 September 1969: FCO 
9/803, TNA 
895
 Ibid. 
896
 Memo on Inter-communal Talks, December 1969: FCO 9/783, TNA 
297 
 
grounds. By the end of 1969, Osorio-Tafall, greatly discouraged by the situation, 
started to question whether the presence of UNFICYP on the island was doing more 
harm than good. As he pessimistically noted to the American, Canadian and British 
diplomats, he had serious doubts about the real Turkish motives in Cyprus 
explaining: 
He had made his contribution to the extraction of various 
concessions from the Greek-Cypriot side. The lot of the Turkish-
Cypriots had been improved and, incidentally, their military situation 
had benefited. But the Turks had given nothing in return and had 
not even bothered to answer UNFICYP’s recent proposals in the 
field of military deconfrontation. Things had got to the stage where 
it could be argued that his activities favoured the Turkish side.897 
Their only concession came in August 1969 when the Turkish-Cypriots offered 
Greek-Cypriots, for tactical reasons, limited use of the Kyrenia-Nicosia road that they 
controlled.  
In July 1970, simultaneous elections took place within the de facto Turkish-Cypriot 
sector for the 15 seats in the Parliament and the 15 seats in the Communal 
Chamber. Like Makarios, Ankara wanted a pre-electoral pact in order to prevent the 
emergence of any political rivals to Denktash. For this reason, it prohibited the 
formation of political parties under the pretext of maintaining the unity of the 
community. Ahmet Berberoglu in particular, tried twice before the elections to 
establish his own opposition left-wing Republican Turkish Party and at both times 
Ankara stopped him.898 Although not re-elected, he was able to formally establish 
this party after the elections. Denktash was the key figure of the electoral campaign 
and all candidates had to sign up under his electoral manifesto: the National Solidary 
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Programme.899 All these candidates formed a loose political grouping, like the 1960 
Patriotic Front, designated the National Formation. This Formation’s manifesto was 
wide enough to be accepted by the majority of the Turkish-Cypriot community, 
except for some extreme voices. Naturally, the main key in his programme was the 
importance of their economic development, while it also highlighted the need for a 
solution that would permanently close the door to enosis.900 
As expected, Denktash managed to gain an overwhelming majority, making him from 
this point on the unchallenged leader within his community. Nonetheless, due to the 
way the inter-communal talks had evolved and the revival of the enosis campaign 
among the Greek-Cypriots, Denktash was not about to express any signs of 
moderation thereafter. Indeed, a high-ranking Turkish diplomat who visited Cyprus in 
June 1970 reported that “he had found the Turkish-Cypriots much less impatient [for 
settlement] than in the past”.901  
 
The fourth phase: September 1970-September 1971 
 
The fourth phase of talks will open on 21 September. The omens for 
success are not good. A hesitant Greek Government, a weak Turkish 
Government, an embattled Turkish-Cypriot community and an obstinate 
and ingenious Archbishop, are not the right ingredients for settlement. 
Even so, the next round will have more substance than seemed possible a 
few months ago, and the deliberations in and between Athens and Ankara 
may give them some added impetus. It is at least encouraging that 
‘package deal’ is now becoming part of the accepted vocabulary”.902  
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With these words, Peter Ramsbotham set the background of the last phase of this 
first round of talks, which was to end unsuccessfully a year later. The pace of the 
talks was now further reduced; the two interlocutors decided to have their meetings 
once a fortnight. The discussions on the constitutional elements were also reduced, 
as Denktash tried to focus on other elements such as the resettlement of the 
displaced Turkish-Cypriots and civil servants’ compensation. One of the most 
important characteristics of this phase was the intensification of unhelpful public 
statements from both sides. The terms of enosis and ‘functional federal 
administrative system’ were now on Denktash’s agenda. Turkey’s domestic 
problems led to a tougher posture of the Turkish-Cypriot side in general, while 
Makarios had to focus on two internal fronts: worsening Athens-Nicosia relations and 
the internal division of his community.  
Progress of the negotiations 
Package deal 
The new formula that would be used by the Greek-Cypriot was the so-called 
package solution. A few days before the re-activation of the negotiations, Makarios 
visited Athens and both Governments seemingly agreed on their next steps and the 
concessions they would make in order to avoid the early break-off of the talks. They 
agreed, among other considerations, to the retaining of the Vice-President’s office 
without veto powers, and to an examination of: a) the grouping of villages on ethnic 
criteria; b) which of the functions proposed by the Turkish-Cypriots for the central 
local government authority were not in conflict with the concept of the unitary state; 
and c) whether the Turkish communal chamber could be used as a coordinating 
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body.903 Nonetheless, Clerides stated that when Makarios returned to Cyprus, 
members of his Cabinet and his entourage disagreed with the Athens-Nicosia 
understanding, especially on the latter three points.904 
Although this disagreement caused delay, Clerides prepared this package deal on 
the basis of this Athens-Nicosia understanding and handed it over to Denktash on 30 
November 1970. From this new set of proposals, the Greek-Cypriot side for the first 
time conceded to three points about which it had hitherto been intransigent; the 
retention of the Vice-Presidency; separate electoral rolls; and the grouping of villages 
based on communal criteria. All these concessions hinged on certain concessions by 
the Turkish-Cypriot side. This, however, constituted a genuine effort on the part of 
the Greek-Cypriot negotiator to produce a promising basis for further negotiations.905 
Paradoxically, this was the only set of proposals that the Greek-Cypriot side had 
‘protected’ from the press, while the Government officially had insisted that it was not 
intending to make any new proposals anytime soon.906 These proposals represented 
the Greek-Cypriot negotiator’s most constructive effort to place the talks on the right 
track; perhaps by avoiding any early leakage Clerides aimed to avoid any public 
statements or unnecessary debates that would have destroyed this advantage. It 
was not until 17 January 1971 that Clerides admitted publicly that his side tabled 
proposals but without giving any details.907 According to Clerides’ explanation to 
Ramsbotham, he had not yet received permission from Makarios to submit these 
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proposals. Nevertheless, he believed that Denktash seemed in a position to respond 
positively, and he thus decided to “chance his arm”.908  
Two weeks later Denktash offered his personal thoughts on Clerides’ proposals. The 
former acknowledged that his community’s demand for a central authority organ 
would have never been accepted by the Greek-Cypriot side. However, a 
compromise reflecting two politically equal communities in Cyprus was needed and 
the new settlement must clearly illustrate this partnership status.909 To this end, 
Denktash made two suggestions following however, the same intransigent path. 
These were naturally rejected by the Greek-Cypriot side.910 Nevertheless, the most 
important element to be highlighted in his response was his remark that “the aim of 
his side was to achieve a functional federal administrative system, since 
geographical federation does not seem possible”.911 For the first time, Denktash was 
openly manipulating the term of the ‘unitary’ state, used during the previous three 
rounds of the talks, in order to justify his side’s now open demand for a functional 
federation. 
Denktash, however, confirmed that he would discuss with the rest of the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership and Ankara in order to formulate a comprehensive response to 
the 30th November proposals. Notwithstanding that, before leaving Ankara he 
explained that he had held meetings with various sections of his community in order 
to “elicit some indication of a wish for settlement … and it was only the hawkish 
elements who had spoken up”.912 The usefulness of the continuation of this dialogue 
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again became a matter for debate among the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. It was also 
apparent that the serious internal problems of the Demirel Government had started 
to affect negatively Turkey’s public perception of the inter-communal negotiations. 
The official response of the Turkish-Cypriot side, presented on 27 April 1971, was 
inevitably shaped within this context. These proposals will be discussed in the 
following section.  
The rehabilitation of the displaced Turkish-Cypriots 
From January until April 1971 there were no important discussions on constitutional 
elements. The Turkish-Cypriot side was deliberately delaying its response to the 
Greek-Cypriot proposals. Clerides acknowledged that although talks should 
continue, unless there was a Turkish-Cypriot response to the latest constitutional 
proposals, “topics for discussion were running out”.913 Although several 
normalization and practical issues were still pending, Clerides believed that if the 
balance of the talks was shifted onto them, then it would seem as if the talks were a 
high level liaison committee between two separate communities for solving practical 
problems.914 But for the moment the focus remained on displaced persons.  
Since the end of the second phase of the talks in 1968, Denktash had proposed the 
discussion of a scheme that would allow the return of Turkish-Cypriots to their 
villages. Although there were not any substantial negotiations, Denktash brought this 
matter up throughout 1969-1970. The Cyprus Government initially appeared 
receptive and agreed to undertake responsibility for the reconstruction of destroyed 
houses and despite the return of some families to their homes there was still not a 
coordinated policy to deal decisively with this issue. Clerides explains in his memoirs 
                                                          
913
 Ramsbotham to FCO, 26 February 1971:  FCO 9/1353, TNA 
914
 Rambsotham to FCO, 3 March 1971:  FCO 9/1353, TNA 
303 
 
that “Makarios accepted the views of the hawks that such a development was 
premature, and that it would ease the economic problem the Turkish-Cypriots were 
facing”.915 It was indeed true that if almost 20,000 displaced Turkish-Cypriots 
returned to their abandoned houses, and to their previous jobs, and begin again to 
contribute to the economy, the ‘TCPA’ would have been relieved of the huge 
financial burden of subsidies for ‘refugees’. Likewise, the benefits of this to the 
Turkish-Cypriot economy and sectors would have been evident.  
Makarios constantly reiterated the purely practical reason for delay on this issue. 
Ramsbotham recollected from his discussion with Makarios that the latter explained: 
The Government’s policy was genuinely in favour of progress in this 
matter. But they suffered from the incompetence of their own 
agents. There were endless formalities to be gone through and 
there was a chronic shortage of skilled labour in the building trade. 
There was also the question of priorities: he [Makarios] had 
guaranteed to the inhabitants of two Greek-Cypriot villages badly 
damaged in the 1968/9 floods that their villages would be restored 
before winter; despite this direction nothing had so far been done; if 
he now gave priority to Turkish villages, he would lay himself open 
to severe criticism by his own community.916  
For the Greek-Cypriot side the displaced persons’ rehabilitation was a very delicate 
issue. It had to find a suitable way to achieve the return of as many displaced 
Turkish-Cypriot as possible under Government control but in the meantime not give 
the possibility to the Turkish-Cypriots to build up their own numbers and thus 
potentially challenge the status quo in the areas controlled by the Government. That 
meant that it was willing to allow only the return of those who lived in villages where 
the Turkish-Cypriots constituted a minority. For their part, the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership was not prepared to allow displaced Turkish-Cypriots to accept 
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rehabilitation in villages where they would be once more integrated into a Greek 
majority. In this way the freeze on any genuine resettlement policy only became 
more pronounced.917 
The delay of the Cyprus Government to propose a concrete plan for the mass return 
of the ‘refugees’ was usually exploited for propaganda reasons by the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership. Finally, on 25 February 1971, Clerides presented a two-phased 
plan for their gradual return, firstly in areas that were not marked as sensitive and of 
strategic importance and then to the rest of the island.918 That plan, however, set 
several unacceptable conditions for Denktash, and it was not fully accepted. Once 
again on this very critical element, the talks ended in deadlock. 
Heading for a deadlock  
Since the submission of the 30 November proposals renewed debates among the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership considered whether the inter-communal talks should 
indeed be continued. Nonetheless, Makarios’ speech on 14 March 1971 in Yallousa 
was the straw that broke the camel’s back. In a very intense and emotional speech 
Makarios spoke extempore:  
Cyprus is a Greek island. It was Greek from the dawn of history and 
it shall remain Greek forever. We have taken it over as a wholly 
Greek island and we shall preserve it as an undivided Greek island 
until we hand it over to mother Greece.919  
The Greek Government tried diplomatically to play down this incident and to 
convince Ankara that it should not be given wider significance.920 Nevertheless, this 
speech coincided with the military coup and the fall of Demirel’s Government in 
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Ankara. The new Government, therefore, inevitably adopted a tougher line on the 
Cyprus issue. The Turkish-Cypriot reaction was strong. The press and the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership exploited this development in order to justify their insistence for a 
federal solution and for the imperative need of preserving partnership status in any 
new settlement. Suggestively, within the main propagandist publications issued by 
the Turkish-Cypriot authorities, this particular speech was usually highlighted as 
revealing of the ‘true’ intentions of the Greek-Cypriot side.921  
Denktash explained that although, personally, he did not believe that such rhetoric 
was of any significance since it was so endemic on both sides, this particular 
outburst “reinforced Turkish-Cypriot belief that the Greek-Cypriots were aiming at 
unification and independence simply as a prelude to enosis”.922 Against this 
background, Denktash along with Ankara prepared and tabled the long-awaited 
Turkish-Cypriot response on 27 April in a toughly worded letter. On matters of 
substance there was not any real advance of the Turkish-Cypriot position and 
nothing that could give a real momentum to the foundering process of the inter-
communal negotiations. Alarmed by the enosis statements, however, Denktash 
requested from Clerides a statement clarifying that the current discussions still aimed 
at a constitutional settlement on the basis of Independence and that the international 
status of the Republic would later be agreed upon by all the interested parties.923 It 
should be stated that before the submission of the new counter-proposals, Clerides 
was informed by various diplomatic sources that the Turkish-Cypriot decision as to 
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whether or not to continue the current negotiations would hinge on Makarios’ 
reaction to the impending communication.924 
Notwithstanding the above, the reply of the Greek-Cypriot side on 26 June did not 
satisfy the Turkish-Cypriot demands. According to the instructions he received from 
Makarios and despite the urge of the Greek Government to make substantial 
concessions in order to avoid the break-off of the talks, Clerides made concessions 
on elements of reduced importance merely to keep the talks going but without any 
substantial progress. According to the High Commissioner:  
This letter was an ingenious document, well drafted for 
presentational purposes, particularly at the UN … If published, it 
could be used as evidence that the Greek and Turkish 
Governments would be unreasonable if they tried to impose a 
solution on the pretext that the Cyprus Government were being 
very stubborn. Nevertheless, the letter rejected both the Turkish-
Cypriot and Greek proposals for local government …. It was as 
much a snub to Athens, as to Ankara and the Turkish-Cypriots.925  
As will later be explained, the background to this particular answer was the one that 
led to a crucial crisis between Nicosia and Athens.  
By the end of June it was clear that the talks were heading towards deadlock and 
both parties wanted to avoid the blame by a “sterile point-scoring exchange”.926 
Another set of letters was exchanged throughout August, especially focused on the 
issue of local government. The last letter was transmitted by Denktash to Clerides on 
20 September and marked the end of the fourth phase of the inter-communal 
negotiations. 
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Internal developments  
While on the inter-communal front ‘a negative stability’ was gradually 
consolidated,927 the same did not occur in the internal politics of the two communities 
and in their relations with their respective motherlands. Makarios was trying to re-
establish both his authority and the unity among his community, while Denktash was 
constantly strengthening his side’s position in negotiations with de facto realities. All 
these developments led the two parties to an unconstructive ‘double soliloquy’. Both 
parties were exchanging letters just for the sake of discussion, eventually leading to 
the termination of the first round of talks in September 1971. 
Makarios’ desperate need for unity and further consolidation of the ‘TCPA’ 
Throughout 1969-1970, Makarios came to realize that the rise of the enosis 
movement was gradually undermining his popularity. For that reason, after the 
Parliamentary elections, the arrest of certain members of the National Front and the 
standstill in negotiations, Makarios had the time to focus on his own internal 
problems and try to find a way to settle them. Moreover, after the heated exchanges 
between Pipinelis and Makarios in the spring of 1970, the meeting of Makarios and 
Papadopoulos in Athens on September 1970 seemed to have managed to put 
Nicosia-Athens relations back on track. According to the Cypriot Ambassador in 
Greece, the two leaders came to a complete agreement over the next steps in the 
talks, adding that “he had never during his ten years in Athens known such a good 
general understanding between them as now”.928 
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One of Makarios’ first goals in order to regain popularity was to find a way to 
reconcile with the extreme-right wing and bring the centre-right wing under his own 
complete control. The latter was helped by the fact that Clerides had no intention 
himself of playing an independent hand in the centre henceforth.929 Conversely, any 
rapprochement with the extreme right was difficult but still crucial for securing the 
internal unity within his community. His first move, despite public assurances to the 
contrary, was to release on parole the 31 members of the National Front a month 
after their conviction.930 The President was afraid that keeping the convicts in prison 
any longer would give the National Front a chance to retaliate against the 
Government. If this happened a permanent schism might open up within the Greek-
Cypriot community. Nevertheless, several voices within the Government argued that 
this was a mistake which in the long-term might disappoint other sections of the 
population. For example Clerides believed that this move risked making the extreme-
right respectable again and might negatively influence the morale of the police or the 
civil servants who still remained loyal to the Government.931 Furthermore, this could 
have been a useful tool for exploitation in Turkish-Cypriot hands when arguing for 
stronger security guarantees. It should be stressed that after the release, the 
National Front did abstain from the use of violence and was transformed into a 
political pressure group under the guidance of the nationalist Bishop of Kitium.932 
Additionally, on 27 January Makarios decided for the first time to invite 78 political 
figures, old and new Ministers and members of Parliament, along with political 
leaders from all parties, to discuss the national issue. Makarios wanted first and 
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foremost to clear up the rumours that he was working for a solution in a way that 
might fatally compromise the future of Greek-Cypriots as a community. Secondly, he 
had in mind that in case of a settlement, certain concessions would have to be 
made. To avoid a serious confrontation when this moment came, he decided to 
repeat a tactic from the past. As was the case in February 1959 when he invited all 
the main political forces to Lancaster House in London, it was now equally vital “to 
involve all shades of political opinion with his own position”.933 Several reports 
indicated that this meeting was a success. Although the extreme-right voices that 
attended wanted to press the President to take a more nationalistic approach, 
eventually, by emphasising the need for internal solidarity, Makarios “had imposed, 
[at least temporarily], on the Greek-Cypriot political leaders the onus of moderating 
their more extreme factionalism and uniting in support of his policy”.934 
Although the nationalist camp did not abandon the enosis goal and the danger of 
further violent incidents was not fully averted, by March 1971 it seemed that 
Makarios had managed to establish a precarious calm on his own side. Moreover, 
the constitutional proposals tabled on 30 November 1970 placed the Greek-Cypriots 
in an advantageous positions vis-à-vis the Turkish side. Nevertheless, Makarios on 
14 March made a serious tactical mistake. His feverish reference to enosis in his 
speech in Yallousa was exploited by Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot side to justify 
two important developments. Firstly, this speech afforded a further excuse to the 
new coalition Government of Nihat Erim to take a more rigid line on the Cyprus 
issue.935 Stronger guarantees would be needed against enosis, and the beginning 
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was made with Denktash’s 27 April proposals when asking Clerides to confirm the 
direction of the talks. A few months later, however, the Turkish side demanded a 
clear-cut statement against enosis. On 9 August Denktash stated: 
The question of guarantees never came up in our talks because 
that was a matter for later consideration …. Now, why did it come 
up all of a sudden? It came up because of certain statements by 
Archbishop Makarios to the effect that he will never sign any 
agreement which bars the way to enosis. This immediately made 
this issue a fundamental one for us.936 
Secondly, a few days after this speech, Denktash issued a communiqué which he 
signed as the ‘Vice-President of the Executive Council of the Turkish-Cypriot 
Administration’, dropping the word ‘Provisional’ from the ‘TCPA’.937 The Secretary-
General of the Turkish Foreign Ministry argued that although this move changed 
nothing, Makarios was responsible for this development. He warned that: 
If he [Makarios] persisted as he had done for the past two and a 
half years in frustrating every advance in the inter-communal talks, 
he would himself bring about the situation which he claimed most to 
fear and crystallise the two communities into a de facto partition.938 
This move was the culmination of actions over the preceding two years by the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership which aimed at forcing their de facto realities onto the 
negotiating table. The Turkish-Cypriots were now focused on increasing rapidly their 
economic and administrative separatism as a fait accompli. Part of that plan was 
probably the reason for the four month delay in drafting a reply to the first flexible 
proposals of the Greek-Cypriot side. Meanwhile, the public statements of several 
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Greek-Cypriot leaders about enosis, although directed at unifying the Greek-Cypriot 
front, only served to assist Turkish-Cypriot goals. 
Throughout 1971 the so-called ‘Turkish-Cypriot Administration’ adopted new 
measures which went further than merely providing the essential services for a 
deprived community, as it initially argued.939 It was reported that the most striking 
change in the outward appearance of the Turkish-Cypriot sectors was “the 
transformation of the fighters from ragged, poorly-armed irregulars of 1963 to the 
trained and efficient units”, as they sought to establish their control of Turkish-Cypriot 
areas outside the enclaves.940 
Moreover, Turkish-Cypriot political leaders no longer pretended that they were 
operating in accordance with the 1960 Constitution. Kuchuk and his entourage did 
not hesitate to openly call their ‘Administration’ a ‘Government’, whilst the ‘Members’ 
of the ‘Executive Council’ operated as fully-fledged Ministers with organized and 
structured development plans for each portfolio.941 The community which since 1960 
argued in favour of the full implementation of the Constitution until there was a new 
settlement was now openly disregarding it. It is also noteworthy that at the beginning 
of the local talks, the Turkish-Cypriot side believed that its economic problems could 
substantially be solved only after a settlement. Four years later they believed that 
they should organize and consolidate the economic structures of their side and only 
then reach a solution according to the new realities. In negotiations they no longer 
used the term ‘unitary state’ with the same meaning as in 1968. Denktash explained 
that “when we say unitary state we mean one single state …. A federal system, a 
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cantonal administration which the Greek-Cypriot regarded as unacceptable, does not 
alter the concept of a unitary state”.942 The British High Commissioner stressed that 
“they [Turkish-Cypriots] are now denying that they ever accepted the concept of a 
unitary state. Denktash’s agility has produced the concept of functional federalism 
and back-dated it to the 1960 Agreements, which he claims enshrined this idea”. 943 
All of these led to an important boost to the morale both of the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership and fighters. They still continued to resist the freedom of movement of the 
Greek-Cypriots throughout the enclaves, while their provocative attitude and 
obstructiveness in their relations with UNFICYP was placing the latter in a 
predicament. Certain UNFICYP officials admitted: 
This [normalization] was not too difficult when the Turkish-Cypriots 
were on the defensive and had to be protected from the Greek-
Cypriots; but now that both communities are asserting themselves, 
UNFICYP are finding that they are being ground between two 
millstones.944  
By means of this stance, therefore, the Turkish-Cypriot fighters steadily extended 
their de facto control of their enclaves, and UNFICYP was unable to prevent them. 
The Athens-Nicosia crisis 
Pipinelis, for his part, had repeatedly tried to convince the Cyprus Government to 
recognize the necessity of a quick settlement without specifying actual concessions. 
After his death, that changed. By 1971, the danger of the collapse of the talks was 
evident and this risked severely affecting Greco-Turkish relations as well. Both the 
new coalition government of Nihat Erim and the Greek Government wished to avert 
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these scenarios. Erim had admitted that the Cyprus problem was insignificant 
compared with the importance of Turco-Greco relations.945 Therefore, the two 
governments decided to hold an informal parallel dialogue while stressing, however, 
that it would be no substitute for inter-communal talks and hoping that some general 
agreement on Cyprus could be reached between them first.946 Meanwhile, when 
Denktash’s letter of 27 April 1971 was handed over to Clerides, Athens decided to 
formulate specific suggestions for the Cyprus Government.947 This Greek-Cypriot 
response would probably have been critical to the whole future of the inter-
communal negotiations and thus the Greek Government decided to intervene. 
Nonetheless, the submission of these Greek proposals on 11 June 1971 sparked a 
serious crisis between the two Governments.    
The Greek suggestions had attempted to accommodate several Turkish-Cypriot 
demands on local government in a way perceived by Makarios as damaging for the 
Greek-Cypriot cause.948 Specifically, responding to the Turkish-Cypriot demand for 
the consolidation of the local government functions within the new constitution, 
Athens proposed that these provisions of the settlement be incorporated in a 
streamlined law liable to amendment with the same strict procedures as the 
Constitution itself. Additionally, regarding the concept of the two separate central 
organs for local government, it was suggested: a) to accept either a Turkish-Cypriot 
Minister or Deputy Minister responsible for the local government; or b) to establish a 
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Ministry of Local Government with a Greek-Cypriot Minister and a Turkish-Cypriot 
Deputy Minister.949 
According to Clerides, the rejection of these Greek suggestions was one of the 
gravest Greek-Cypriot mistakes because they would not have hindered the unitary 
type of state that their side wanted to secure.950 Although Osorio-Tafall also tried to 
exert some moderate influence on Makarios for a genuine form of local government 
to the Turkish-Cypriots the Cyprus President cut no ice.951 Clerides was notified by 
several diplomatic sources that if Cyprus had adopted Greece’s proposals, the 
Turkish side would have accepted them.952  
Several people of Makarios’ entourage henceforth openly accused Greece of 
colluding with the Turkish Government in the previous NATO meeting in Lisbon in 
early June to impose a partitionist solution in Cyprus. Although this is a theory given 
credibility in several studies, there is little evidence of it from British archives.953 The 
most important point of the Lisbon meeting agreement between the Greek and the 
Turkish Foreign Ministers was that “there would be a final effort by both 
Governments to secure an agreement in the inter-communal talks”. The parties 
rather vaguely agreed – without specifying any particular solution - that a further 
meeting would be held in September to review the situation and “if there is still no 
headway perhaps consider other ways of achieving a settlement”.954 Claude Nicolet 
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is probably correct in asserting that the later repetition of conspiracy theories 
surrounding the Lisbon meeting was mainly useful for “propaganda and justification 
purposes”.955 
Constantinos Panayiotacos, the Greek Ambassador in Cyprus, explained that the 
leaks of the Greek letter to the Greek-Cypriot press and the accusations against the 
sinister plans of Athens infuriated Colonel Papadopoulos in Greece.956 The Greek 
dictator, therefore, decided to grasp the nettle and wrote a fierce letter to Makarios in 
which he explained once again the Greek proposals, whilst adding an indirect threat 
if the latter against did not comply. This was the straw that broke the camel’s back 
between the two Governments.957 Relations between the two capitals were further 
strained after August 1971 when it was reported that General Grivas left Athens, 
where he had been since December 1967, and returned to Cyprus. Although the 
Greek Government reported that it was unaware of Grivas’ plans, several Junta 
officials were certainly behind it.958 From that point onwards, the relations between 
the two capitals progressively deteriorated. Grivas’ presence in Cyprus undermined 
Makarios’ authority while the former secretly started to build an anti-Makarios 
underground organization dedicated to sabotaging the ‘feasible solution’ and to 
leading the island back to the enosis track.959 The consequences of these 
developments were to prove fatal. 
It was not until mid-1972 that the relations between the two Governments tentatively 
returned to fruitful cooperation. Nevertheless, the June 1971 crisis and the inherent 
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mistrust of Nicosia over Athens’ intentions was the main factor behind Cyprus’ 
reluctance to accept U Thant’s later proposal to save the process of the inter-
communal talks, as we shall now see. 
UN involvement and a new process implemented: September-
December 1971 
 
The only variable that could have saved the inter-communal talks after September 
1971 was an outside intervention and injection of fresh ideas. In early autumn, 
Kyprianou travelled to New York with several proposals. He sought the reactions 
mainly of countries of the western bloc regarding the direct involvement of the UN 
Secretary-General with his good offices as well as a parallel discussion in New York 
with the three Governments on the international aspects of the Cyprus problem.960 
Simultaneously, Makarios in Nicosia was testing the waters in regard to a new 
process of a seven-power enlargement of talks, with members of the Security 
Council.961 The latter proposition, however, was rejected by the West since it would 
have enabled the Soviet Union’s active involvement in the Cyprus problem. 
A fresh idea with some potential came in late September from Greece and was 
adopted, with certain modifications, by the UN Secretary-General. In particular, U 
Thant on 18 October proposed the broadening of the inter-communal talks, with the 
participation of his Special Representative Osorio-Tafall and two constitutional 
experts, a Greek and a Turk, having a purely advisory role. Initially both Ankara and 
Nicosia had strong reservations about this new process. The Turkish Government 
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was uncomfortable with the idea of a UN appointed member participating in the local 
talks. This would have led to an increased UN role in the process, which Ankara had 
traditionally tried to prevent.  
Conversely, the main reason for Nicosia’s reserved position was the proposal for 
participation of the constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey. On account of the 
previous Athens-Nicosia crisis, Makarios wanted to prevent Athens’ active 
involvement in the negotiations. He was convinced that a Greco-Turkish presence 
would assist the implementation of the unacceptable Greek suggestions of 11 
June.962 Kyprianou explained that Nicosia did not want ‘expert’ advice since the 
Cyprus problem was essentially political.963 He was also convinced that the new UN 
proposal for the enlarged talks was ‘cooked up’ in a NATO meeting between Greece 
and Turkey and that Turkey’s reluctance to accept it was not genuine.964  
Several reports claim that while Kyprianou was in New York and until he finally 
accepted U Thant’s proposal, he had caused resentment in several diplomatic circles 
due to his strong accusations that plans were being drafted behind his Government’s 
back.965 The Cyprus Foreign Minister had openly accused his Greek counterpart in 
the hallways of the UN building, while Osorio-Tafall alleged that Kyprianou’s 
behavior in New York was “that of an unbalanced man”.966 It was believed among 
foreign diplomats that Makarios’ reluctance to accept U Thant’s proposal was mainly 
due to Kyprianou’s strong position and his erroneous assessments that U Thant 
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would eventually either drop his proposal or at least modify it to something more 
favourable for them.967  
After the increased diplomatic activity both by UN officials and other foreign 
diplomats, two months later, on 13 December, U Thant’s proposal was accepted in 
principle by Nicosia. Ankara however, still had certain reservations, and a UN 
emissary had been sent to convince the Turkish Government to unconditionally 
accept the new formula.968 The danger of a complete collapse of the inter-communal 
talks was averted by February 1972 but there were still several pending procedural 
issues to be settled before their re-activation. The differences between Nicosia and 
Ankara over the exact terms of reference of the three extra participants and the 
scope of the negotiations had firstly to be ironed out.  
By summer 1972 all differences were settled; thus the new phase of the enlarged 
inter-communal talks began on 8 June in Nicosia with the presence of the new UN 
Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim, the Greek constitutional expert, Michael Dekleris, 
the Turkish expert Orhan Adikacti and the two negotiators, Glafkos Clerides and 
Rauf Denktash. As will be seen in the next chapter, the aftermath of the previous 
crisis between the Greek and the Cyprus Government formed the main underlying 
obstacle to the quick resumption of the new round of inter-communal talks. Despite 
the fact that this new UN formula proved to be effective indeed, the problems at the 
outset of the talks suggested that it was perhaps already too late for a viable 
settlement by June 1972. This will be more clearly indicated in the final chapter of 
the thesis. 
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Conclusion 
The Cyprus problem could be solved by an act of statesmanship rather 
than by violence or time; but statesmanship still looks the least likely 
way of solving it, even though the conditions in Greece and Turkey 
may never have been so favourable.969 
That was the ominous conclusion of a British diplomat in 1972 for the Cyprus 
problem. He was surely right. The first round of the inter-communal talks that we 
have so closely explored had proved one more lost opportunity for Cyprus’ future.  
When Polyviou in 1980 identified the reasons that the inter-communal talks failed, 
(taking into account their whole duration from 1968-1974), he distinguished three 
factors: a) reluctance and insufficient motivation of the parties; b) the policies of 
Greece and Turkey, which were inimical to a speedy agreement; and c) insufficient 
international support, particularly fromthe Western powers and the UN.970 Although 
after 1972 these three reasons were valid to some extent, the first prolonged round 
of the talks indicates something rather different.  
It is probably true that the Western powers during 1968-1971 did not actively 
interfere with the Cyprus problem and decided to take an ostensibly neutral line 
between the two sides. They were constantly trying through diplomatic channels to 
influence the parties towards moderation, while avoiding direct involvement. Both for 
the US and Britain, a peaceful and lasting solution on whatever the parties together 
might agree upon was regarded as the best possible scenario for their own security 
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Until this permanent settlement was 
achieved, however, the situation in Cyprus was characterized as a “benign 
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stalemate” which served their interests well enough.971 The only danger was the 
transformation of the benign to a malignant stalemate if the situation on the ground 
deteriorated. However, until the latter prospect occurred and forced them to 
recalculate, it was perceived that “this is a moment in the history of the Cyprus 
dispute when we should stand apart from it”.972 Presumably London and Washington 
not only recognized that the gap was still wide, but were not prepared to risk their 
relations with the various parties by pressing them in any direction.973 The two 
negotiators also admitted in private that they did not favour any outside interference 
yet.974 Besides, the US had already tried unsuccessfully in March 1969 to assist the 
parties by presenting some unofficial ideas that had immediately been rejected. 
Although Britain and US were reluctant to attempt to convince either of the parties of 
the need for particular concessions, we may remark that by the end of 1968, the 
Americans were indeed thinking about various ways that they might cajole Makarios 
to show some flexibility. It was widely believed that the key to a settlement was 
Makarios himself, since at that point he was the only one who could afford to appear 
flexible. According to the US State Department, although making direct suggestions 
was not an option, perhaps “playing upon his vanity” might work.975 In particular, the 
Americans suggested that “we should point out to him that the world recognized the 
peculiar importance of the personal role which he could play”.976 This possibility, 
however, was abandoned because the British believed it might prove counter-
productive and be condemned as an effort to interfere in Cypriot politics.977 It was 
                                                          
971
 Ramsbotham to FCO, 23 May 1969: FCO 9/781, TNA 
972
 FCO to Washington, 6 January 1969:  FCO 9/779, TNA 
973
 Costar to FCO, 17 October 1968: FCO 9/778, TNA 
974
 Call of Bendall by Denktash,  2 November 1970: FCO 9/1150, TNA 
975
 Washington to FCO, 30 December 1968: FCO 9/779, TNA 
976
 Ibid. 
977
 FCO to Washington, 6 January 1969: FCO 9/779, TNA 
321 
 
only at the outset of the talks that the Commonwealth Secretary, George Thomson, 
intimated to Kyprianou that more concessions were primarily expected by the Greek-
Cypriot side. “In dealing with their internal problems the Cyprus Government might 
remember it was always easier in such situations for the majority to take risks… 
Kyprianou said that this might be true of an internal situation … but within the whole 
area affected by this conflict, the Greek-Cypriots were a minority”.978 The British in 
general were wary of trying to suggest to Makarios anything more than the above 
perception. Costar had commented in 1968 that “anyone who tried to mediate or to 
be impartial with the Cyprus Government was seen as being opposed to it.”979 This is 
probably one of the most important considerations of British foreign policy towards 
Cyprus during this period. Therefore, the neutral posture of London and Washington 
was primarily intended to serve their interests and avoid being drawn into the details 
of the inter-communal talks, endangering their relations with the three players in the 
Cyprus problem; Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. 
The second dimension for our purposes, and the one identified by Polyviou, refers to 
the position of the two motherlands. Certainly throughout this period, the argument 
that they were inimical to a speedy agreement is problematic. As already seen, both 
Governments wanted genuinely and urgently to settle the problem on the basis of 
independence. In all their meetings with the communities’ representatives their main 
advice was always to continue negotiating, even if there was nothing substantial to 
discuss. Otherwise, the danger of deadlock without any other visible alternative 
would endanger the peace on the island.  
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During this period, the bilateral, but unofficial, Greco-Turkish meetings over the 
Cyprus problem continued and the only thing that they always agreed on was the 
need to exert moderate influence upon the parties in order to make concessions. 
Notwithstanding that, there was one main difference between the two Governments. 
Athens tried repeatedly to put pressure on Makarios for more concessions and this 
eventually led to a serious rift between the two. Conversely, Turkey was by no 
means keeping its own part of the bargain, making little effort to convince the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership for concessions either on constitutional or normalization 
issues. Initially Demirel had instructed Denktash that although he supported his 
efforts, it was up to the latter to convince the rest of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership of 
the specifics of the negotiations. After 1969 it seemed that the Turkish Government 
was not in a mood to actively urge the Turkish-Cypriots towards moderation. This, 
according to the British, was for two main reasons. Firstly, both before and after the 
elections, the Demirel Government was in a very difficult position internally. Even 
though it had won the October 1969 elections, it still had serious domestic problems 
and pressure towards the Turkish-Cypriots for concessions could have sparked 
further criticism from the political opposition and the military. Especially by the end of 
1970 the situation inside Turkey was deteriorating and by March 1971 Demirel’s 
Government fell. In order to avoid similar criticism as its predecessor, the new 
Government was not in a position to be constructive over Cyprus. Secondly, it was 
reported that Ankara remained erroneously convinced that it could sit back and do 
nothing because Athens would in any case be driven to force Makarios to  make 
concessions, even if this involved the use of extreme measures against him.980 
Ankara’s reluctance to urge the Turkish-Cypriots towards flexibility, at least on 
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freedom of movement, was definitely an unhelpful factor for the development of the 
talks and it gave Makarios an excuse for not actively pursuing measures that could 
have enhanced inter-communal cooperation. 
Lastly and most importantly, a factor that definitely influenced the lack of any positive 
development of the talks was the attitude of the two communities in Cyprus. Both 
communities’ leaders were reluctant to upset the status quo without first securing 
significant gains for their community. Certainly, the gains that each community 
sought were incompatible with each other’s: a Greek-led state and a minority status 
for the Turkish-Cypriots versus strong local autonomy with limited state supervision 
which would guarantee their partnership status. As already stated, the problem was 
always inherently political rather than legal. Thus, the compromise would not arise 
through constitutional negotiations but through the realities taking shape on the 
ground.  
Above all, there were two determining aspects of the problem: constitutional 
divergences and normalization/freedom of movement throughout the enclaves. Both 
leaderships adopted the same negotiating tactic in relation to these topics; they 
chose to appear flexible on the matters least existential to their own perceived 
interests and wholly unconstructive on the others. The Greek-Cypriots made certain 
concessions on normalization by removing the embargo policy, which in any case 
proved ineffective, but were totally inflexible on constitutional aspects. Likewise, the 
Turkish-Cypriots made certain concessions on the constitutional aspects, which did 
not compromise their aim for local autonomy, but were totally rigid on normalization 
and on freedom of movement.  
324 
 
Makarios believed that initially taking this rigid line on the constitutional problem and 
letting Denktash lay his own negotiating cards on the table openly was the best 
strategy. The former acknowledged that the key to the settlement was the bad 
economic situation of the Turkish-Cypriots. This undoubtedly had some validity. 
However, his passive policy of waiting for the latter to surrender was ineffective. 
Since 1968 the de facto separation of the Turkish-Cypriots was strengthening and 
these new realities were used as a bargaining chip by the other side. The Cyprus 
Government was aware of that danger since Denktash, Turkish diplomats and 
Pipinelis had many times warned the Greek-Cypriot politicians about the risky policy 
of ‘wait and see’.  
Denktash on the other hand, during the initial stages of the talks held the most 
moderate posture perhaps of his whole political career. The economic development 
of his community was one of the top priorities for him. Firstly, he believed that this 
might have been possible through a quick settlement of the Cyprus problem. That 
however, changed by the third phase of the talks. Public statements after 1970 of the 
Turkish-Cypriot leadership were highlighting the need to preserve their separateness 
until a settlement was reached. That, was a consequence of the realities developed 
within the ‘TCPA’.  
Vested interests have grown up which cannot be ignored. There is, 
for example the personal position not only of politicians but of civil 
servants who depend on the Administration. It is hard to imagine 
many Turkish-Cypriot institutions being abandoned once they have 
been set up with so much difficulty …. In short if the inter-
communal talks succeed, the practical problem of reintegration will 
still remain.981  
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Those according to the British High Commissioner, Robert Edmonds were the harsh 
realities prevailing by 1972. 
However, the Turkish-Cypriot reintegration in the state apparatus and the economic 
life of the island, along with the mass return of displaced persons in the Government-
controlled areas were perhaps the elements over which progress might have been 
achieved during the first two years of the talks. It should be noted that applying the 
‘return to homes’ policy is perhaps the most important element for restoring normalcy 
in cases like Cyprus, where breakdowns had triggered physical movement. Had both 
sides realized the importance of that element and had they chosen to grasp this 
nettle, much goodwill might been gained all round. 
Except from settling the displaced persons problem, the Turkish-Cypriot President of 
the Cyprus Development Corporation, Kemal Rustem, explained that any ‘carrot’ 
given by the Cyprus Government to the Turkish-Cypriots for improving their 
economic situation would have positively affected Turkish-Cypriot public opinion.982 
Nevertheless, Makarios and other hawkish members of his Cabinet believed that if 
such a policy was pursued it would have eased the economic problems of the 
Turkish-Cypriots, negatively affecting their willingness for settlement. The truth, 
however, was that in 1968 it was the Greek-Cypriot side which was in the position to 
make substantial proposals, to appear more generous or to try to re-enforce  
Turkish-Cypriot integration in order to promote trust and stop the further 
consolidation of the de facto realities that would have purportedly justified a federal 
solution. 
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By early 1970 the situation within the Greek-Cypriot community was deteriorating 
and this crucially reduced Makarios’ possibility of taking a constructive approach on 
the Cyprus problem. The mishandling of the National Front affair and the growing 
reflorescence of the enosis sentiment were factors that hindered any chance of 
progress on the inter-communal front. Doubts over the ulterior motives of the two 
communities were, therefore, gradually increasing. 
In 1968, there was definitely important momentum with at least some hope of a real 
settlement. Later developments, however disillusioned everybody. The 30 November 
1970 Greek-Cypriot proposals seemed to be a beacon of hope but they came too 
late. If they had been presented sooner, things might have been different. The truth 
was that by 1971 the chances of a settlement were running thin mainly due to the 
internal developments within each community. The British High Commissioner in 
August 1971 concluded: 
Had President Makarios been a statesman, rather than a highly 
skilful politician, he might have seized the opportunity which then [in 
1968] presented itself to negotiate a constitutional settlement on 
which it might have been possible to build a peaceful Cyprus. He 
missed it, deliberately, because he is convinced that time is on his 
side and because, for him the lesson of 1967 was not that war in 
the Eastern Mediterranean had only just been averted, but that his 
personal brinkmanship had paid off once again.983  
Makarios, as he himself admitted, had always used brinkmanship believing that he 
knew how far to take it.984 If this approach had succeeded in the past, at this juncture 
it failed precisely because it under-estimated the capabilities of his ‘opponent’. 
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Although the new negotiating procedure after 1972 initially seemed capable of 
breaking this vicious circle, by the end of 1972 the developments on the ground had 
transformed the inter-communal talks into  little more than a safety-valve which had 
to be maintained in order to forestall for as long as possible some kind of 
denouncement feared by everybody. Our final chapter will explore – in relation to the 
now staggering phenomenon of inter-communal dialogue - how this eventually 
happened.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Final Attempt: Narrowing the Constitutional Gap - 
Deterioration of the Political Realities 
By 1972, all previous efforts to find a settlement to the post-1960 Cyprus problem 
had run into the sand. Neither Plaza in 1964-1965, nor Greece and Turkey in 1965-
1967, nor finally the two communities themselves in 1968-1971, had been able to 
find acceptable common ground. It was clearly time to try a new ‘recipe’: bring all the 
parties collectively around the same negotiating table, including representatives of 
the two communities, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General and 
constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey. Although this new formula came as a 
‘kiss of life’ to the foundering process of inter-communal negotiations, it was 
generally believed that on matters of substance little could be achieved. The prior 
four-year experience inevitably had produced polarization and public commitments 
from which it was difficult to escape. Nevertheless, on 8 June 1972 under the aegis 
of the new UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, the new round of the expanded 
inter-communal talks commenced.   
Surprisingly, this new recipe proved to be the most effective of all. For the first time 
in ten years, in July 1974, there existed a comprehensive formula for the revision of 
the 1960 constitution that could have accommodated the concerns and interests of 
both communities. However, the crucial moment for the implementation of a 
compromise solution on the basis of an independent, unitary state, with adequate 
local government for the Turkish-Cypriots, had slipped away since the end of 1972. 
At that critical point, all parties were distracted by their own severe and intensifying 
internal problems, which made the need for meaningful progress through inter-
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communal talks less important. The internal problems that eventually led to the 15 
July 1974 coup d’état and the Turkish invasion five days later are beyond the scope 
of this study. However, before closing this thesis it is essential to highlight in brief 
how the internal developments and the political problems within each party 
condemned this new effort to futility. Particular focus will be given to three important 
junctures of the new round of the expanded negotiations: February 1972, January 
1973 and April 1974. In each of these three junctures, talks were interrupted but 
when resumed, the deterioration of the prevailing context made the prospects for a 
viable settlement progressively more bleak. By exploring the successive junctures, it 
will become clear that in any rounded and admittedly retrospective analysis, the real 
‘lost opportunity’ had been in the inter-communal nexus in 1968-1969.  
February 1972: An internal crisis prevents the quick resumption of 
the negotiations 
The first important hiatus in the fresh process came in February 1972, almost 
simultaneously with Ankara’s unconditional acceptance of the initiation of the inter-
communal talks, on the lines expressed in U Thant’s formula of 18 October 1971. As 
already noted, Greece had immediately gone along with U Thant’s proposal. 
Additionally, by December 1971, Nicosia conceded the participation of the Greek 
and Turkish constitutional experts in the inter-communal dialogue, provided that 
these would have a purely advisory role. Conversely, Turkey was wholly negative, 
due to its desire to avoid a more active UN involvement in negotiations. The Turkish 
Government wanted to minimize the UN role at the outset, but simultaneously to 
upgrade the role of the two constitutional experts.985 Meanwhile, it sought to ensure 
that the new initiative would constitute a fresh approach for a settlement, and not just 
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the continuation of the previous discussions.986 This was also favoured by Nicosia, 
since it believed that it could have injected the Treaty of Alliance question into this 
new phase.987 It was not until 5 February that the new UN Secretary-General 
managed to convince Ankara to withdraw its reservations by offering a formula 
securing that the new round of talks would not compromise the positions and 
principles of the parties.988 With Turkey’s final concurrence, the chances of Nicosia 
blocking the initiative was much reduced.989 In February 1972, therefore, almost 
three months after U Thant’s proposal for the expanded talks, everything seemed 
ready for their activation. Developments within the Greek-Cypriot community, 
however, altered the calculations involved. 
Early in February, the discovery by Grivas’ supporters that Makarios had secretly 
imported a large quantity of Czech arms, to be distributed to his loyal followers, led 
to a new crisis and to a serious diplomatic clash between Nicosia and Athens.990 The 
resumption of inter-communal talks had to be put in cold storage. Although the 
details need not concern us here, it is important to state why Makarios decided to 
make such a move and to identify its immediate consequences.  
Since June 1971 there had been increased rumours that Greece and Turkey were 
planning to impose a settlement on Cyprus over Makarios’ head. In September 1971, 
Makarios visited Athens, where he was warned that if the situation in Cyprus 
deteriorated to such an extent that could lead to a Greco-Turkish confrontation, 
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Athens would actively collude with Ankara in order to settle the Cyprus problem.991 
The situation was further complicated by the clandestine return of Grivas on the 
island on 31 August. Grivas’ aim was to organize a new enosis movement against 
Makarios’ ‘feasible’ policy. This movement, EOKA B, would be under his own 
leadership, while it would also be supported and funded by various groups within the 
shadowy penumbra of the military junta in Athens. These developments had caused 
great concern to Makarios, whose dependence on his loyal left-wing groups, 
especially that of Vassos Lyssarides, steadily grew as a consequence.992  
On 11 February, the Greek Government gave an ultimatum to Makarios, asking 
firstly that the arms be placed under UNFICYP’s custody and secondly, for a 
government of ‘national unity’, but without the Communist elements.993 Meanwhile, it 
was privately suggested that Makarios and Grivas should both withdraw from the 
island’s politics. It was evident that Athens was seeking ways to get rid of Makarios; 
thus by 14 February it became known that the Greek Government was preparing a 
coup d’état in order to force Makarios’ replacement. This dangerous action was 
prevented through American pressure on Athens.994 Amidst this storm, another crisis 
developed. In order to increase pressure against Makarios, in a meeting of the Holy 
Synod three enotist Bishops, with Athens’ support, called on Makarios to resign from 
the Presidency, on the grounds that his political office was incompatible with his 
archiepiscopal position.995   
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It took almost three months for the most serious – up to that point - Athens-Nicosia 
crisis to temporarily damp down and to by-pass the arms issue. Eventually, Athens 
dropped its insistence upon Makarios’ resignation and distanced itself from the 
enotist Bishops.996 However, the damaging effect of this crisis on the inter-communal 
talks was evident; it stalled the resumption of talks for almost three months and 
placed them in a still more combustible context.  
With the fatal timing of this importation of arms, Makarios exposed his authority to 
criticism from three different directions: Athens, the Bishops and Grivas. The centre-
right wing tried to keep a moderate stance throughout, while Makarios’ dependence 
on the left-wing groups was more evident than ever.997 Although the external threat 
against Makarios rallied Greek-Cypriot public opinion in his favour, the British High 
Commissioner explained that the Greek-Cypriots remained sharply divided: 
The fact has not been lost on the Greek-Cypriot community that it 
was the Archbishop who got himself into this mess in the first place 
by ordering the arms. While most Greek-Cypriots care little about 
the continuance of the inter-communal dispute, and (incredible 
though it may seem) rarely give a thought to the potential threat 
from Turkey … they have been rattled by the crisis with Greece. 
Some members of the business community are already murmuring, 
somewhat helplessly, that if the crisis can be alleviated by the 
Archbishop’s resignation, then he should go.998  
Meanwhile, after the unsuccessful initiative of Makarios to meet with Grivas on 26 
March 1972, and convince him of the dangers of enosis, it became certain that 
Grivas would not be easily side-lined. Ankara predictably exploited this crisis for its 
own interests by solidifying its demands for further security guarantees.999 As soon 
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as the arms issue was completely settled, the Turkish Government decided to set six 
new preconditions for the initiation of enlarged talks, arguing that the suggested 
Makarios-Grivas meeting had increased their suspicions over the real motives of the 
Greek-Cypriot community.1000  
After the UN’s involvement, on 18 May 1972, Kurt Waldheim made a new written 
request for the quick resumption of talks by using wording that satisfied all parties. 
Thus, on 8 June 1972, in Ledra Palace under the aegis of Waldheim, Clerides along 
with Denktash, the two constitutional experts, Michael Dekleris and Orhan Aldikacti, 
alongside Osorio-Tafall, re-activated the inter-communal negotiations. Nevertheless, 
this ceremonial meeting was “something of a cliff-hanger” because of the parties’ 
disagreement up to the last moment over their opening statements.1001 Having this 
background in mind, it was evident that the inter-communal talks had the odds 
stacked against them from the outset.  
February 1973: Presidential elections 
Although the chances for a quick solution were perceived as slim, by December 
1972 there was, nevertheless, a crucial breakthrough on the negotiating table. The 
facilitative role of Osorio-Tafall, along with the fruitful cooperation of Dekleris and 
Aldikacti, proved to be extremely helpful both towards bridging their differences on 
very important constitutional questions and avoiding counter-productive debates over 
the origins of the Cyprus problem and the guarantees’ question. 
In July 1972, as soon as the briefing stage of the talks began, Clerides decided to 
make a very important acknowledgement in order to dispel Turkish-Cypriot doubts 
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concerning the allegedly sinister Greek-Cypriot motives. He explicitly stated for the 
first time ever that his side considered the Zurich-London Agreements valid and 
made making particular reference to the Article 185 of the constitution, which 
excluded both enosis and partition.1002 Although this temporarily satisfied the 
Turkish-Cypriots, the upsurge of the pro-enosis campaign within the Greek-Cypriot 
community, along with the revelation of Grivas’ surreptitious importation of arms in 
October 1972, made Clerides’ previous acknowledgment ineffective. Therefore, by 
October the Turkish side had demanded an agreement in advance between Turkey 
and Greece for the renunciation of enosis.1003 After many attempts, the Greek 
Government and Clerides convinced their counterparts that if there was an open 
renunciation of enosis before having a complete constitutional settlement, Grivas’ 
supporters would definitely react violently and destroy any chance for progress.1004 
For this reason, Turkey agreed to temporarily stop calling for some broad statement 
of its long-term goals.  
After this set-back, all parties agreed that a new procedure should be employed to 
give emphasis to the legal, rather than political, nature of the problem.1005 More 
specifically, the inter-communal talks were about to be reconfigured in two ways: the 
five-party meetings and the bilateral meetings of the two constitutional experts. After 
the two negotiators set their basic political lines for each of the five constitutional 
issues, the two advisors would privately produce compromise legal formulas and 
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then present them to the other three parties for discussion and validation.1006 This 
procedure proved to be very useful. Although the prevailing tension within the Greek-
Cypriot community occasionally affected Ankara’s and Turkish-Cypriot’s demands, 
by the end of 1972 Dekleris and Aldikacti made significant progress on legislative, 
executive and judicial matters.1007 It was even asserted that by mid-1973 it would 
have been possible to reach an over-all agreement.1008  
At this critical stage, the second and most severe halt in the negotiating process took 
place. The talks were interrupted because of the February 1973 Presidential 
elections. Dekleris characterizes the end of 1972 as the golden missed opportunity 
for a settlement.1009 If elections were deferred, as had already happened in the 
period 1965-1967, momentum would not have been lost and settlement would have 
been in reach by 1973.  
Both Clerides and Dekleris, along with Aldikacti, tried to warn that this was not the 
right time for elections, mainly for two reasons.1010 First and foremost, it was going to 
interrupt the impetus achieved after October’s set-back. Secondly, a pre-electoral 
campaign within the already sharply divided Greek-Cypriot community, where pro-
Grivas and pro-Makarios factions were at loggerheads, further soured the fragile 
atmosphere. It should be stressed that it was already known that Grivas’ supporters 
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had penetrated the whole state apparatus, while only a third of the police remained 
loyal to Makarios.1011 In November 1972, Patroklos Stavrou, the President’s Under-
Secretary, reported that hardly a week passed without reports of plots against 
Makarios.1012 There was still, however, a third important reason for eschewing 
elections at that time. It was certain that Denktash would have been the absolute 
winner of the elections held within the enclaves. He would have definitely been 
elected as the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus and henceforth, he would 
not only be the Turkish-Cypriot negotiator but also the political leader of his 
community and a genuine rival to Makarios. Moreover, in this new capacity, 
Denktash’s posture in negotiations was going to be susceptible to his own opposition 
and, finally, as the Vice-President would have worked to secure as many privileges 
as possible in the new constitutional settlement.1013  
The final decision to hold or postpone the Presidential Elections depended on the 
Cyprus Government. The Turkish-Cypriots stated that if Greek-Cypriots decided to 
postpone elections, they would concur.1014 On 29 December 1972, however, 
Makarios announced that elections would be conducted on 18 February 1973. Had 
elections taken place, Makarios believed that he would have won the overwhelming 
majority of the Greek-Cypriot votes, as in 1968, and subsequently, would have 
strengthened his hand against all of his opponents inside and outside of the 
island.1015 Nevertheless, Makarios’ and his entourage’s assessment of the outcome 
of the elections was erroneous. His re-election was certain indeed and, in order to 
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avoid an open humiliation that would have further delegitimized their plans, Grivas 
and EOKA B decided to abstain. Makarios was, therefore, re-elected unopposed 
after an intense campaign that saw constant attacks and bombings against the state 
authority by Grivas’ faction. Consequently, Makarios failed to prove his pre-
dominance over the enosis front through an electoral battle, whilst the pre-elections 
period afforded Grivas a live opportunity for fomenting violent opposition against 
Makarios.1016 
Nonetheless, the damage was now severe; the Greek-Cypriot community was 
further divided, making the re-activation of inter-communal talks impossible before 
May 1973. Simultaneously, the Turkish-Cypriot negotiator’s position had been 
upgraded to that of the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. The latter element 
was profoundly reflected in the subsequent proposals of Denktash in the inter-
communal discussions. He was constantly increasing his demands both on the 
executive and local government issues.1017 
April 1974: Ankara’s provocative statements 
The chaos created before and after the elections eliminated the chances for a 
successful implementation of any later constitutional settlement, and brought the 
violent showdown closer. The Greek-Cypriot split and violence were getting worse. 
Indicative was the fact that in March 1973 an ecclesiastical coup took place by the 
enotist Bishops of the Holy Synod against Makarios. Moreover, by the summer of 
1973 the underground struggle between Grivas and pro-Makarios factions was 
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reaching its peak.1018 Inevitably, all these further inflamed the unstable atmosphere 
in Cyprus. Makarios was now completely distracted by these problems, giving no 
attention to what was happening on the negotiating table.1019 Denktash again took a 
tougher line, causing constant set-backs, while the Turkish diplomats more 
frequently than ever argued about the necessity of a federation.1020 Due to the 
strengthening of enosis militancy in Greek-Cypriot ranks, Ankara was also preparing 
militarily to invade the island, should circumstances make this essential.1021 Being 
totally pre-occupied with their own internal problems, the Greek-Cypriots wholly 
missed the threats surrounding them. By early 1974, Stephen Olver, the new British 
High Commissioner in Nicosia, characteristically reported:  
Behind a superficially business-as-usual atmosphere, both the 
Greek and Turkish sides have …. lost interest in the talks. These 
are still regarded as a useful safety-valve, and I am sure neither 
side will readily accept the odium of causing them to collapse. But 
there is no longer… much real belief on either side - or for that 
matter on Osorio-Tafall’s part either- that they can provide any real 
solution to the Cyprus problem.1022 
In spite of these realities, both Aldikacti and Dekleris continued their private meetings 
and produced compromise arrangements, especially on the most complex issue, that 
of local government. This had been the focus of their work since May 1973 and 
ironically, by the end of February 1974 they made significant progress.1023  
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Nonetheless, the autumn of 1973 marked a politically unstable era not only for 
Cyprus, Greece and Turkey but also for the region as a whole. The severe Arab-
Israeli crisis of October 1973, known as the Yom Kippur War, had almost led to a 
US-Soviet confrontation. On the other hand, the changes of the Greek and Turkish 
leaderships, produced a new more poisonous dynamic to the Cyprus problem.1024 
More specifically, Papadopoulos’ regime in Greece was overthrown by Brigadier 
Demetrios Ioannides, on 25 November 1973. The new regime consisted of 
“inexperienced and largely unsophisticated men with some xenophobic 
tendencies”.1025 Although the official line of the new leadership was the continuation 
of the inter-communal dialogue, through several other channels, the Greek regime 
set in motion a  dangerous policy that culminated in the 15 July coup d’état, while 
overthrew Makarios, and opened the way to the Turkish invasion five days later. It 
should also be stressed that Grivas died in January 1974 and the leadership of 
EOKA B had passed to the new Athenian regime. Grivas’ death, therefore, facilitated 
the implementation of Ioannides’ partitionist plans for Cyprus. 
Circumstances, however, had changed in Ankara as well. In January 1974, the new 
coalition government of Bulent Ecevit was formed. When in February Ecevit 
promulgated his government’s political programme, he underscored that federation 
was the most appropriate type of settlement in Cyprus. This is when the third 
interruption of the inter-communal talks occurred. As expected, this statement 
infuriated the Greek-Cypriot side. During the negotiators’ meeting on 2 April, Clerides 
explained that both the negotiators and the experts would suspend their meetings 
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unless there was an explicit retraction of Ankara’s statement.1026 Denktash publicly 
accused the Greek-Cypriot side of deliberately stalling the talks, while attempting to 
water down Ecevit's statement by stating vaguely that there was no change in his 
side’s aims.1027 It was not until 14 June, that all the parties agreed to an acceptable 
wording of a statement that would have enabled the continuation of the talks.1028  
Although Dekleris believes that this suspension was also fatal,1029 this third hiatus 
did not change anything practically. After the resumption of talks in 14 June, 
Makarios and the Cyprus Government were absorbed in concern for the worsening 
of the Athens-Nicosia relations and were unable to deal with the inter-communal 
dialogue.1030 Therefore, the talks indeed served as a mere safety-valve, because 
neither party was willing to take responsibility for their failure. When Olver reported in 
February 1974 on this reality, he also ominously predicted the inevitable eventual 
confrontation.1031 This is what in fact occurred on 15 July, when the inter-communal 
negotiations were forcibly terminated by developments on the ground.  
Conclusion 
We have already underlined the irony that despite the grave deterioration of the 
situation on the island by 1974, the two constitutional experts had found a 
comprehensive compromise that had seemed impossible during the previous 
Clerides-Denktash talks. Arguably, this came about because the experts focused 
completely on the legal nature of the problem, expressing both professionalism and 
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moderation in doing so. While they followed the political guidelines and instructions 
of the two communities, they were still determined to find even sui generis legal 
formulas to settle all pending and unresolved issues. It was the case, therefore, that 
a settlement was indeed reached on paper on the eve of the tragic events of the 
summer of 1974. However, a real political settlement was not near, although this is 
often held to have been so in later Cypriot accounts. The compromise agreement 
that Aldikacti and Dekleris so skilfully prepared was essentially meaningless without 
authentic political endorsement by both the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot leaderships. 
Compromise on the negotiating table seemed much easier than actually saying it out 
loud, especially in the context that developed from 1972 until 1974. Despite the fact 
that there was a theoretical settlement which in principle accommodated the needs 
of the two communities, all too suggestive of the difficulties was the renewal of the 
‘statement-battle’ for the semantics of this outcome in 1974. Was the solution that 
was being negotiated providing for a federal or a unitary state? Olver gave his own 
explanation by remarking:  
The original vague skeleton - an improved version of the 1960 
Constitution, removing some of the obvious friction points 
(Makarios’ ‘thirteen points’) and at the same time providing better 
safeguards for the Turks - looked attractive; but as more and more 
flesh was put on the bones by the two constitutional experts, it 
began to look more and more awkward by both sides. The closer 
they got – and over most issues, including local autonomy but not 
internal security, they are now very close - the more sharply 
focussed became the remaining sticking points. An act of faith 
could have jumped the gap - but neither side is in the mood for 
that.1032 
The train of a final settlement, which some people at least were ready to embark 
upon in 1972, had , at last left the station and made a good deal of progress on its 
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journey, but it was not clear that it still carried any real passengers on board. The 
Greek constitutional advisor, Michael Dekleris, believes that if the second 
interruption had been prevented, it would have been possible to reach a settlement 
by early 1973, and this would have subsequently been guaranteed in a five-party 
conference among the three guarantors and the two communities.1033 If that had 
been possible, Dekleris estimates that Grivas would have been neutralized and a 
solution successfully implemented on the island. Nevertheless, this is probably rather 
too optimistic. Grivas and the enosis front, both in Cyprus and in Greece, seemed 
determined to disrupt any solution that would have excluded enosis. Therefore, it is 
ambivalent whether the extreme factions of the junta military regime in Athens, which 
eventually violently took the lead in Greece after November 1973, or Grivas’ 
supporters on the island, would have allowed the new constitutional settlement to 
work. Since 1971, the political environment on the island was becoming more and 
more envenomed. The conditions in Cyprus would not easily have allowed an easy 
transition from the fragile status quo to a new state of affairs which would have 
definitively shelved enosis and granted a large degree of autonomy to the Turkish-
Cypriots.  
After six years and with an almost complete settlement drafted, the focus of the two 
communities’ leaderships had shifted elsewhere. Simultaneously with the advisers 
discussions, Denktash’s concern was diverted to his own internal opposition 
problems and the constant upgrade of the ‘TCPA’ to a fully-fledged autonomous 
state.1034 Meanwhile, Makarios, greatly pre-occupied by his own violent opposition, 
declared that there would be “neither partnerships, nor cantons, nor regional self-
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government, nor federation”.1035 The only factor that kept the negotiations alive was 
the reluctance of both parties to openly admit and accept blame for the failure and 
termination of the inter-communal talks. On the morning of 15 July 1974, the coup 
instigated by the military regime in Athens and executed by members of the National 
Guard against Makarios brought to an end the first prolonged and essentially 
deadlocked phase of Cyprus’ post-independence history after 1960. Its effects were 
to usher in a new post Turkish invasion phase, with its de facto partition which is 
tragically still with us forty years later.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
In a study conducted in 1979 on the dynamics of the Cyprus problem and the 
underlying reasons that led to the 1974 crisis, Paschalis Kitromilides arrived at the 
following conclusion: 
Foreign strategic interests dictated by the Cold War and power 
politics in the Middle East have been decisive factors in the 
development of ethnic conflict within Cyprus. In the context of all 
this, domestic conflict and the failures of local political leadership 
only facilitated the promotion of foreign interests at the expense of 
internal peace.1036  
Although the cultivation of mistrust and ethnic rivalry in Cyprus, especially in the 
1950s, was indeed manipulated by external factors, and the Zurich-London 
Agreements had indeed brought to life an inherently divisive bi-communal state, the 
scope of this thesis illustrated how domestic policies and internal factors from 1964 
until 1974 determined to a large extent – rather than merely ‘facilitated’ – the 
sequence of events that led up to 1974 crisis. The studies that usually give 
prominence to the great influence of the external factors into the evolution of the 
Cyprus problem tend to argue that the partition plans and actions of all interested 
parties, including the US, Turkey and Greece, that were particularly evident during 
the December 1963-August 1964 crises, had been eventually brought to fruition in 
July 1974.1037 Nonetheless, what is generally downplayed in the literature of the 
Cyprus problem is the fact that the situation on the island from 1964 until 1974 had 
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not been static. Likewise, the foreign policies of Greece and Turkey as well as of the 
US and Britain vis-à-vis the Cyprus problem had passed through several stages and 
variations. Therefore, the aim of this study was to throw into sharp relief the fact that 
the internal dimension and the de facto divergent development of the two 
communities after 1963-4, which was mainly domestically driven, had been decisive 
factors for the tragic ending of an important chapter in Cyprus history.  
Since the signing of the Zurich-London Agreements in 1959, both communities firmly 
believed that Independence was merely an interim path towards their long-term, but 
contradictory aims. Firstly, the Greek-Cypriots felt confident that the recognition of 
unfettered independence and the implementation of the right of self-determination 
would eventually convince the international community that enosis with Motherland 
Greece was inevitable. Conversely, the Turkish-Cypriots, even though they had 
already gained significant political privileges, had evolved a further long-term goal of 
their own: a federation in Cyprus that would ultimately produce partition. The crisis in 
1963-4 was believed to be the first step towards the fulfilment of all these 
contradictory goals. Yet although a good deal of the reality forged in 1963-4 was to 
remain in place, many of the variables surrounding the political conflict by no means 
remained static over the following decade. A good deal of this thesis has been 
concerned to show what those incremental changes were.  
The most significant ‘gain’  –  if we are to characterized it as such – for the Turkish-
Cypriot leadership from the crisis commencing in December 1963 was that events 
had fortuitously given them an opportunity to seize several strategic parts of the 
islands, make them into enclaves, encourage and even discipline parts of the 
minority population to move into these areas. Through these measures the Turkish-
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Cypriot leaders gradually forged a separate administrative structure of their own. 
This was the first step for generating the necessary preconditions for a federation in 
Cyprus. Despite their enormous financial difficulties, these separate structures, with 
Ankara’s assistance and without any substantial peace-making effort during the first 
years of the separation that could have seriously undermined the leadership’s plans, 
had been consolidated, strengthened as well as expanded their reach to those 
Turkish-Cypriots who had remained outside the enclaves. 
Although the Turkish-Cypriot long-term plans had indeed been ominous, their main 
pre-condition until 1967 for the initiation of a substantial dialogue between the two 
communities, that is the full return to the 1960 Constitution, had some traces of 
legality. In 1968, however, they realized that the new realities up to that point were 
indeed pressing for substantial amendments to the Constitution. The de facto 
separation had made them realize that accepting the majority of Makarios’ previous 
‘Thirteen Points’ was a small price to pay for securing the genuine local autonomy 
that they now favoured. This proved to be a unique window of opportunity through 
which both communities’ goals could have been effectively bridged. Nonetheless, 
there was one critical factor that the Greek-Cypriots failed to grasp. Although the 
three-year separation between 1964 and 1967, and especially Makarios’ policies 
towards the Turkish-Cypriots, had indeed made the Turkish-Cypriots realize the 
benefit of accepting the ‘Thirteen Points’, the latter were still adamant on one 
essential consideration: the preservation of the bi-communal nature of the state and 
the rejection of the downgrading of their political status gained in 1960. 
On the other hand, it is generally acknowledged that the most important victory of the 
Greek-Cypriot community came in March 1964, when UN Security Council 
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Resolution 186 confirmed the legitimacy of the Cyprus Government even without the 
participation of the Turkish-Cypriots. In this way, the Greek-Cypriots gained full 
control of the Republic of Cyprus leading towards the creation of an economically 
and socially stable country. The Doctrine of Necessity proved to be the most vital 
tool in the Government’s hands in order to reverse the political injustices produced 
by the Constitution and set the foundations for the unitary state under the majority’s 
rule.  By the same token, the Cyprus Government was confident that through the UN 
mechanisms and resolutions, either of the General Assembly or of the Security 
Council, it was possible to offset the remaining limitations set by the Treaties of 
Guarantee and Alliance. “The Cyprus Government had schooled its public to expect 
important advantages from the deliberations of the Plenary Assembly of UN”.1038 
Thus, the Greek-Cypriot leaders aligned their foreign policy towards securing what 
they saw as important and essential diplomatic victories within the UN. Finally, 
another important aspect of the Cyprus Government’s policy was the embargo policy 
towards the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves. Makarios believed that this strategy would 
eventually make the Turkish-Cypriots realize that the best interests of their 
community lay in returning to an economically thriving Republic of Cyprus, even if 
this meant doing so on terms determined by the stronger side. 
Moreover, regarding the enosis question, new realities had also emerged. Although 
enosis was constantly repeated in public rhetoric, it was no longer feasible, or even 
desirable, for the majority of the Greek-Cypriots. This fact even came to be 
acknowledged by President Makarios, even though it clashed with so much that he 
had sought to stand for in his own political and indeed ecclesiastical career. As 
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Attalides suggests, however, the enosis slogan had been manipulated by a 
dangerous minority within the Greek-Cypriot community in a way that in the end 
“reduced politics to chaos”.1039 Attalides also explains that the Greek-Cypriot leaders 
decided to tackle this great challenge “not by denouncing enosis as an ultimate aim, 
but rather by arguing that in the long run they were in favour of pure enosis (between 
1963 and 1968), or that enosis was the desirable aim, but it was impracticable (after 
1968)”.1040 
All the above Greek-Cypriot policies, however, carried costs: they further alienated 
the Turkish-Cypriot community, giving them in that way more excuses for 
consolidating their new de facto realities. These realities placed the Cyprus problem 
onto a more complicated basis. Despite their advantages for the Greek-Cypriot 
cause, all three policies of the Cyprus Government – the application of the Doctrine 
of Necessity, the internationalization and the importance given to the UN Resolutions 
along with the embargo policy towards the enclaves – had equally severe side-
effects for the Cyprus problem. Firstly, all the changes made under the Doctrine of 
Necessity had fatally neglected the most fundamental aspect of the 1960 
Constitution: the bi-communalism which was clearly evident throughout the whole  of 
the rigid, detailed and complex Constitution. Secondly, the UN resolutions provided 
merely moral support to the Greek-Cypriot cause and  limited practical benefits. On 
the contrary, it could be argued that the diplomatic victories within the UN enhanced 
the Cyprus Government’s intransigence over accepting nothing less than a unitary 
state under Greek-Cypriot control and minority rights for Turkish-Cypriots. That, as 
has already been seen, had led to an almost three-year stalemate in the UN peace-
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making efforts on the island. Likewise, after the initiation of the inter-communal talks 
in 1968, the Greek-Cypriot negotiating tactics were still reflecting the same 
intransigence, leading to detrimental delays in the negotiating process. Finally, the 
embargo policy towards the enclaves had exacerbated the economic discrepancies 
between the two communities. In 1969, the British High Commissioner, Peter 
Ramsbotham commented that 
What is required of the Cyprus Government is to see that it is not in 
their interest to allow the Turkish-Cypriots to fall irretrievably behind 
in the economic race and, consequently, not to insist on political 
concessions as a prerequisite for economic assistance. Turkish-
Cypriot economic serfdom could only serve to accentuate inter-
communal differences and perpetuate grievances with the 
consequent built-in risk of clashes after settlement.1041 
Bearing in mind all the above, the Greek-Cypriot aim to hold tight the reins of the 
Republic of Cyprus had to be sought pari passu with a substantial effort aiming at 
winning over the Turkish-Cypriot community, especially the part that continued to live 
outside the enclaves and the moderate leadership. That would have been an 
essential dynamic that could have produced a critical push towards inter-communal 
integration, thereby undermining the separatist plans of the Turkish-Cypriot 
leadership within the enclaves. This new internal dynamic was characterized by 
various diplomatic circles, especially after 1968, as a sine qua non for a settlement. 
Inter-communal integration therefore, along with substantial inter-communal 
negotiations, could have eventually led towards a lasting political settlement.  
In order to achieve integration however, what was needed was ‘a modus vivendi’ ; in 
other words normalization, enhancing inter-communal contacts and cooperation both 
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in the private as in public sector and rehabilitation of refugees. Although both 
communities’ leaders, and especially the Cyprus Government, accepted in theory the 
importance of normalization, modest efforts for inter-communal integration were 
promoted and this had been essentially driven from within the private sector, rather 
than by the Government’s policies themselves.1042 Arguably, in passing over the 
opportunities for integration, the Greek-Cypriots, who were traditionally regarded as 
more entrepreneurial and dynamically commercial, missed a trick. Certainly, they 
critically failed to realize the dangers in alienating the Turkish-Cypriots. In 1971, 
before leaving Cyprus, Ramsbotham ominously concluded: 
But if the Archbishop had handled the Turkish-Cypriots from the 
beginning with as much shrewdness as he has displayed in the 
United Nations, he might have been nearer to his objective of a 
Cyprus fully controlled by Greek-Cypriots. By his short-sighted 
policies towards the Turkish community he is, in effect, realizing his 
own worst fears – de facto partition of Cyprus.1043 
This critique touches on something quite basic in the political career of Makarios. 
Even back in the early 1950s he had set out to ‘internationalize’ the Cyprus question, 
and later as President he had sometimes skilfully presented himself as a leading 
figure of Non-Alignment. In other words, his acute sense of tactics and his taste for 
taking risks often led to apparent diplomatic successes. But the same sure touch 
seemed to desert him when it came to internal politics, and above all anything that 
concerned other communities than his own. 
In this thesis we have tried to shed some light on certain elements that until today 
have been considered taboo in Cyprus society: to admit that the impact of the 
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domestic policies of the two communities, especially from mid-1964 until 1971, had a 
decisive effect on how the Cyprus problem evolved and derailed, leading to the July 
1974 tragedy. The ways that the two communities separately developed on the 
island, coupled with the way that the UN peace-making efforts produced limited 
results during this critical decade, were primarily the aftermath of internal policies 
and choices rather than the exclusive outcome of external manipulations, even 
though outside diplomacy clearly had a part to play.   
However, a historical analysis of any past event is like watching a film you have seen 
before. When you already know the finale, by re-watching the movie you have a 
clearer perception of the context, the mistakes or the right decisions of the 
protagonists as well as the information and evidence that they ‘failed’ to grasp when 
it was absolutely necessary. Nonetheless, as the protagonists of a movie, the 
decision-makers in politics do not always take decisions based on purely cynical and 
rational criteria. Political considerations, internal rivalries, psychological barriers, firm 
beliefs and personality traits inevitably have a critical effect on the decision-making 
or the political planning processes. This is absolutely evident in the peculiar case of 
Cyprus’ politics.  
It is impossible at this stage not to see the recent history we have been discussing 
without resonances of where we are today, with all the inevitable differences this will 
raise. It has become common among some academics, and perhaps still more 
generally younger people, to see partition as an inevitable (and often by implication 
acceptable) destiny for the island.1044 Only time can tell. In some ways, ‘formalising’ 
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partition – which was brought about by the Turkish invasion of 1974 – would bring 
about a ‘solution’ not involving the wrench of painful compromises, and which would 
give limited benefits to each community. However, in protracted problems in plural 
societies, of which Cyprus is certainly one, the most broadly based and sustainable 
solutions do need compromises that are less than optimal for various parties. ‘Win-
win’ outcomes for the society as a whole in the long-term, can only be brought about 
by ‘lose-lose’ compromises along the way. If this remains the nub of things, it was 
undoubtedly the case in the decade we have examined in this thesis. Because it was 
the Greek-Cypriots who then dominated the foreground of political and administrative 
life in the island, this logic is one that applied most aptly to them. This thesis has, 
therefore, sought principally to highlight the driving forces of Greek-Cypriot political 
culture, since in the 1960s, as today, they are among the keys – though not of 
course the only ones – to regain a united island. 
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APPENDIX I 
BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS1045 
 
1. The State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential regime, the President 
being Greek and the Vice-President Turkish elected by universal suffrage by the 
Greek and Turkish communities of the Island respectively. 
2. The official languages of the Republic of Cyprus shall be Greek and Turkish. 
Legislative and administrative instruments and documents shall be drawn up and 
promulgated in the two official languages. 
3. The Republic of Cyprus shall have its own flag of neutral design and colour, 
chosen jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic. Authorities 
and communities shall have the right to fly the Greek and Turkish flags on holidays 
at the same time as the flag of Cyprus. The Greek and Turkish communities shall 
have the right to celebrate Greek and Turkish national holidays. 
4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected for a period of five years. In 
the event of absence, impediment or vacancy of their posts, the President and the 
Vice-President shall be replaced by the President and the Vice-President of the 
House of Representatives respectively. In the event of a vacancy in either post, the 
election of new incumbents shall take place within a period of not more than 45 days. 
The President and the Vice-President shall be invested by the House of 
Representatives, before which they shall take an oath of loyalty and respect for the 
Constitution. For this purpose, the House of Representatives shall meet within 24 
hours after its constitution. 
5. Executive authority shall be vested in the President and the Vice-President. For 
this purpose they shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek 
Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. The Ministers shall be designated respectively 
by the President and the Vice-President who shall appoint them by an instrument 
signed by them both. The Ministers may be chosen from outside the House of 
Representatives. Decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by an absolute 
majority. Decisions so taken shall be promulgated immediately by the President and 
the Vice-President by publication in the official gazette. However, the President and 
the Vice-President shall have the right of final veto and the right to return the 
decisions of the Council of Ministers under the same conditions as those laid down 
for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives. 
6. Legislative authority shall be vested in a House of Representatives elected for a 
period of five years by universal suffrage of each community separately in the 
                                                          
1045
 Glafkos Clerides, My Deposition Vol.I, (Nicosia: Alitheia, 1988), Annex B pp.416-422 
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proportion of 70 per cent for the Greek community and 30 per cent for the Turkish 
community, this proportion being fixed independently of statistical data. (NB-- The 
number of Representatives shall be fixed by mutual agreement between the 
communities). The House of Representatives shall exercise authority in all matters 
other than those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers. In the event of a 
conflict of authority, such conflict shall be decided by the Supreme Constitutional 
Court which shall be composed of one Greek, one Turk and one neutral, appointed 
jointly by the President and the Vice-President. The neutral judge shall be president 
of the Court. 
7. Laws and decisions of the House of Representatives shall be adopted by a simple 
majority of the members present. They shall be promulgated within 15 days if neither 
the President nor the Vice-President returns them for reconsideration as provided in 
Point 9 below. The constitutional Law, with the exception of its basic articles, may be 
modified by a majority comprising two-thirds of the Greek members and two-thirds of 
the Turkish members of the House of Representatives. Any modification of the 
electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities and of any law 
imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the Greek and Turkish 
members of the House of Representatives taking part in the vote and considered 
separately. On the adoption of the budget, the President and the Vice-President may 
exercise their right to return it to the House of Representatives, if in their judgment 
any question of discrimination arises. If the House maintains its decisions, the 
President and the Vice-President shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme 
Constitutional Court. 
8. The President and the Vice-President, separately and conjointly, shall have the 
right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs except the 
participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organisations and pacts of 
alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate, or concerning defence and 
security as defined in Annex 1. 
9. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall have, separately and 
conjointly, the right to return all laws and decisions, which may be returned to the 
House of Representatives within a period of not more than 15 days for 
reconsideration. The House of Representatives shall pronounce within 15 days on 
any matter so returned. If the House of Representatives maintains its decisions the 
President and the Vice-President shall promulgate the law or decision in question 
within the time-limits fixed for the promulgation of laws and decisions. Laws and 
decisions, which are considered by the President or the Vice- President to 
discriminate against either of the two communities, shall be submitted to the 
Supreme Constitutional Court which may annul or confirm the law or decision, or 
return it to the House of Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in part. The 
law or decision shall not become effective until the Supreme Constitutional Court or, 
where it has been returned, the House of Representatives has taken a decision on it. 
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10. Each community shall have its Communal Chamber composed of a number of 
representatives which it shall itself determine. The Communal Chambers shall have 
the right to impose taxes and levies on members of their community to provide for 
their needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervision. The 
Communal Chambers shall exercise authority in all religious, educational, cultural 
and teaching questions and questions of personal status. They shall exercise 
authority in questions where the interests and institutions are of a purely communal 
nature, such as sporting and charitable foundations, bodies and associations, 
producers' and consumers' co- operatives and credit establishments, created for the 
purpose of promoting the welfare of one of the communities. (N.B.-- It is understood 
that the provisions of the present paragraph cannot be interpreted in such a way as 
to prevent the creation of mixed and communal institutions where the in- habitants 
desire them.) These producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit 
establishments, which shall be administered under the laws of the Republic, shall be 
subject to the supervision of the Communal Chambers. The Communal Chambers 
shall also exercise authority in matters initiated by municipalities which are 
composed of one community only. These municipalities, to which the laws of the 
Republic shall apply, shall be supervised in their functions by the Communal 
Chambers. Where the central administration is obliged to take over the supervision 
of the institutions, establishments, or municipalities mentioned in the two preceding 
paragraphs by virtue of legislation in force, this supervision shall be exercised by 
officials belonging to the same community as the institution, establishment or 
municipality in question. 
11. The Civil Service shall be composed as to 70 per cent of Greeks and as to 30 
per cent of Turks. It is understood that this quantitative division will be applied as far 
as practicable in all grades of the Civil Service. In regions or localities where one of 
the two communities is in a majority approaching 100 per cent the organs of the local 
administration responsible to the central administration shall be composed solely of 
officials belonging to that community. 
12. The deputies of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the Inspector- General, the 
Treasurer and the Governor of the Issuing Bank may not belong to the same 
community as their principals. The holders of these posts shall be appointed by the 
President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement. 
13. The heads and deputy heads of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie and the 
Police shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic 
acting in agreement. One of these heads shall be Turkish and where the head 
belongs to one of the communities, the deputy head shall belong to the other. 
14. Compulsory military service may only be instituted with the agreement of the 
President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus shall have an 
army of 2,000 men, of whom 60 per cent shall be Greek and 40 per cent Turkish. 
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The security forces (gendarmerie and police) shall have a complement of 2,000 men, 
which may be reduced or increased with the agreement of both the President and 
the Vice-President. The security forces shall be composed as to 70 per cent of 
Greeks and as to 30 per cent of Turks. However, for an initial period this percentage 
may be raised to a maximum of 40 per cent of Turks (and consequently reduced to 
60 per cent. of Greeks) in order not to discharge those Turks now serving in the 
police, apart from the auxiliary police. 
15. Forces, which are stationed in parts of the territory of the Republic in- habited, in 
a proportion approaching 100 per cent by members of a single community, shall 
belong to that community. 
16. A High Court of Justice shall be established, which shall consist of two Greeks, 
one Turk and one neutral, nominated jointly by the President and the Vice-President 
of the Republic. The President of the Court shall be the neutral judge, who shall have 
two votes. This Court shall constitute the highest organ of the judicature 
(appointments, promotions of judges, &c.). 
17. Civil disputes, where the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the same 
community, shall be tried by a tribunal composed of judges belonging to that 
community. If the plaintiff and defendant belong to different communities, the 
composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court 
of Justice. Tribunals dealing with civil disputes relating to questions of personal 
status and to religious matters, which are reserved to the competence of the 
Communal Chambers under Point 10, shall be composed solely of judges belonging 
to the community concerned. The composition and status of these tribunals shall be 
determined according to the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber and they shall 
apply the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber. In criminal cases, the tribunal 
shall consist of judges belonging to the same community as the accused. If the 
injured party belongs to another community, the composition of the tribunal shall be 
mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice. 
18. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall each hi the right to 
exercise the prerogative of mercy to persons from their respective communities who 
are condemned to death. In cases where the plaint and the convicted persons are 
members of different communities prerogative of mercy shall be exercised by 
agreement between the President and the Vice-President. In the event of 
disagreement the vote for clemency shall prevail. When mercy is accorded the death 
penalty shall be commuted to life imprisonment. 
19. In the event of agricultural reform, lands shall be redistributed only persons who 
are members of the same community as the expropriated owners. Expropriations by 
the State or the Municipalities shall only be carried out on payment of a just and 
equitable indemnity fixed, in disputed cases, by the tribunals. An appeal to the 
tribunals shall have the effect of suspending action. Expropriated property shall only 
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be used for the purpose for which the expropriation was made. Otherwise the 
property shall be restored to the owners. 
20. Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by 
the Turkish inhabitants of these towns. However: (a) In each of the towns a co-
ordinating body shall be set up which shall supervise work which needs to be carried 
out jointly and shall concern itself with matters which require a degree of co-
operation. These bodies shall each be composed of two members chosen by the 
Greek municipalities, two members chosen by the Turkish municipalities and a 
President chosen by agreement between the two municipalities. (b) The President 
and the Vice-President shall examine within four years the question whether or not 
this separation of municipalities in the five largest towns shall continue. With regard 
to other localities, special arrangements shall be made for the constitution of 
municipal bodies, following, as far as possible, the rule of proportional representation 
for the two communities. 
21. A Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and constitution of 
the new State of Cyprus shall be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, 
Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey. A Treaty of military alliance shall also be 
concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. These two 
instruments shall have constitutional force. (This last paragraph shall be inserted in 
the Constitution as a basic article). 
22. It shall be recognised that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other 
State, or a separatist independence for Cyprus (i.e. the partition of Cyprus into two 
independent States), shall be excluded. 
23. The Republic of Cyprus shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment to Great 
Britain, Greece and Turkey for all agreements whatever their nature. This provision 
shall not apply to the Treaties between the Republic of Cyprus and the United 
Kingdom concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to the United 
Kingdom. 
24. The Greek and Turkish Governments shall have the right to subsidise institutions 
for education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to their respective 
communities. Equally, where either community considers that it has not the 
necessary number of schoolmasters, professors or priests for the working of its 
institutions, the Greek and Turkish Governments may provide them to the extent 
strictly necessary to meet their needs. 
25. One of the following Ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Defence or the Ministry of Finance, shall be entrusted to a Turk. If the President and 
the Vice-President agree they may replace this system by a system of rotation. 
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26. The new State which is to come into being with the signature of the Treaties shall 
be established as quickly as possible and within a period of not more than three 
months from the signature of the Treaties. 
27. All the above Points shall be considered to be basic articles of the Constitution of 
Cyprus. 
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APPENDIX II 
THIRTEEN POINTS OF MAKARIOS 1963 
 
1) The right of veto of the President and Vice-President of the republic to be 
abolished. 
2) The Vice-President of the republic to deputise for or replace the President of 
the republic in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his 
duties. In consequence therefore all the constitutional provisions in respect of 
joint action by the President and Vice President of the republic to be modified 
accordingly. 
3) The Greek President of the HoR and its Turkish Vice-President to be elected 
by the House as a whole and not as at present the President by the Greek 
Members of the House and the Vice-President by the Turkish Members of the 
House. 
4) The Vice-President of the HoR to deputise for or replace the President of the 
House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform his duties. 
5) The constitutional provisions regarding a separate majority for enactment of 
laws by the HoR to be abolished. 
6) The separate municipalities in the five main towns to be abolished. Provisions 
should be made so that: 
a) The municipal council of each of the aforesaid five towns shall consist of 
Greek and Turkish councillors in proportion to the number of the Greek 
and Turkish inhabitants of such town by whom they shall be elected 
respectively. 
b) In the budget of each of such aforesaid towns, after deducting any 
expenditure required for common services, a percentage of the balance 
proportionate to the number of the Turkish inhabitants of such town shall 
be earmarked and disposed of in accordance with the wishes of the 
Turkish councillors. 
7) The constitutional provision regarding courts consisting of Greek judges to try 
Greeks and of Turkish judges to try Turks and of mixed courts consisting of 
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Greek and Turkish judges to try cases where the litigants are Greeks and 
Turks to be abolished. 
8) The division of the security forces into police and gendarmerie to be abolished 
(provision to be made in case the head of the police is a Greek the deputy 
head to be a Turks and vice versa). 
9) The numerical strength of the security forces and of the army to be 
determined by law and not by agreement between the President and Vice-
President of the republic. 
10) The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the 
composition of the public service and of the forces of the Republic, i.e the 
police and the army to be modified in proportion to the ration of the population 
of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
11) The number of the members of the Public Service Commission to be reduced 
from then to either five or seven. 
12) All the decisions of the Public Service Commission to be taken by simple 
majority. If there is allegation of discrimination on the unanimous request 
either of the Greek or of the Turkish members of the Commission, its 
Chairman to be bound to refer the matter to the Supreme Constitutional Court. 
13) The Greek communal chamber to be abolished. 
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APPENDIX III 
VARIOUS PROPOSALS DURING THE FIRST ROUND OF INTER-
COMMUNAL TALKS 1968-1971 
 
 
1) Proposals by Mr. Clerides to Mr. Denktash on structure of Local Authorities 9 
December 1968: in Glafkos Clerides Archive 
 
2) Reports and comments regarding Toby Belcher’s (USA) and Bibiano Osorio-
Tafall’s (UN) suggestions on Local Government of March 1969: in FCO 9/780 
and FCO 9/781, TNA  
 
3) Explanatory letter and proposals by Mr. Clerides to Mr. Denktash on Local 
Administration, 24 April 1969: in Glafkos Clerides Archive 
 
4) Explanatory letter from Mr. Denktash to Mr. Clerides, 24 June 1969 and 
Counter-Proposals on Autonomous Local Government Authorities by Mr. Rauf 
Denktash, 11 August 1969:  in Glafkos Clerides Archive 
 
5) Summary of the Main Differences according to the Joint Document of August 
1970 (Office of Public Information to Director-General of Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Nicosia, 17 October 1970: FA2/91, Cyprus State Archive) 
 
6) Explanatory letter by Mr. Clerides to Mr. Denktash regarding proposals of 30 
November 1970,  9 April 1971: in FCO 9/1353, TNA 
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Proposals by Mr. Clerides to Mr. Denktash on structure of Local Authorities 9 
December 1968
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Reports and comments on Toby Belcher (USA) and Bibiano Osorio-Tafall (UN) 
suggestions on Local Government in March 1969 
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Explanatory letter and Proposals by Mr. Clerides to Mr. Denktash 
on Local Administration, 24 April 1969 
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Explanatory letter from Mr. Denktash to Mr. Clerides, 24 June 1969 
and Counter-Proposals on Autonomous Local Government 
Authorities by Mr. Rauf Denktash, 11 August 1969
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Summary of the Main Differences according to the Joint Document 
of August 1970 
 
a) Local government: Both communities agree on the fact that each village 
would constitute the first tier of local government. They disagree however, on 
the structure of the local government from the second tier and above. The 
Turkish-Cypriots insisted that as a second tier there would be grouping of 
villages based on racial criteria with two separate, central local authorities to 
supervise the areas of local government, and only tenuous links with the 
central government (coordinated by a Board consisting of the Under-
Secretaries of the President and Vice-President together with the Under-
Secretaries of certain Ministries). Additionally, these central local authority 
organs would have the right to administer themselves without reference to the 
central authorities. Furthermore, the Turkish-Cypriots demanded that their 
legislative powers would be entrenched in the Constitution. This structure for 
them was the only one that would guarantee their safety and prevent their 
domination in a Greek-controlled state. Conversely, the Greek-Cypriots 
maintained that the structure proposed by the Turkish-Cypriots essentially 
means a disguised federation that at any moment would lead towards partition 
of the island. For that reason they proposed that there would be grouping of 
villages not on racial but primarily geographical, economical and 
administrative criteria. The Parliament would be responsible for legislating on 
matters for local government although the local authorities would have the 
right to issue regulations.  
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b) Police: The Turkish-Cypriots were essentially proposing for three police 
forces: a Greek, a Turkish and a central. The local police forces would 
maintain general control of their area unfettered by the central government. 
The Greek-Cypriots did not agree. Conversely they proposed for one unified 
police with proportional representation of the two communities. 
c) Judiciary: Disagreement over the number of the judges of the Supreme Court 
and on the Turkish-Cypriot insistence that the litigants must have the right to 
be tried by a judge of their own community.  
d) Executive: The Vice-President’s post, according to the Greek-Cypriot had to 
be abolished, while the Turkish-Cypriot insisted it should be maintained. 
However, the latter agreed to the abolition of the veto powers and one of the 
three ministerial portfolios. 
e) Legislature: Disagreement over a mutually acceptable formula for common 
electoral rolls.  Over the composition of the House or Representatives, the 
Turkish-Cypriots asked for 75 Members: 60 Greek-Cypriots and 15 Turkish-
Cypriots. Conversely, the Greek-Cypriots insisted on 60 Members of which 48 
Greek-Cypriots and 12 Turkish-Cypriots. 
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Explanatory letter by Mr. Clerides to Mr. Denktash regarding 
proposals of 30 November 1970, 9 April 1971 
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